The thesis is based on a multi disciplinary study involving both particulars regarding military history and certain psychological theories. In order to be able to discuss the psychological experiences of Boers during the guerrilla phase of the Anglo-Boer War, the first chapters of the thesis strive to provide the required background. Firstly an overview of the initial conventional phase of the war is furnished, followed by a discussion of certain psychological issues relevant to stress and methods of coping with stress. Subsequently, guerrilla warfare as a global concern is examined. A number of important events during the transitional stage, in other words, the period between conventional warfare and total guerrilla warfare, are considered followed by the regional details concerning the Boers’ plans for guerrilla warfare. These details include the ecological features, the socio-economic issues of that time and military information about the regions illustrating the dissimilarity and variety involved. In the chapters that follow the focus is concentrated on the psychological impact of the guerrilla war on the Boers. The wide range of stressors (factors inducing stress) are arranged according to certain topics: stress caused by military situations; stress caused by the loss of infrastructure in the republics; stress caused by environmental factors; stress arising from daily hardships; stress caused by anguish and finally stressors prompted by an individuals disposition. Then the psychological theories regarding an individual’s resistance resources (or general resistance resources ─ GRRs) and the means of using these resources to cope with stress are applied to the actual circumstances that the Boers were faced with. This discourse is arranged according to material resources, motivational issues and intrapersonal resources. Subsequently the complete guerrilla warfare phase is considered, the accent being placed on the psychological effect that the Boers’ strategies, as well as the British counter strategies, had on the republican forces. The phase is subdivided into four stages according to the course of the war, while still furnishing an overall account of the guerrilla phase ─ ranging from the initial successes on Boer side, the gradual decline in Boer initiatives to the final months, when the few successful encounters that the Boers launched, came too late to change matters. In the final chapter the impact of the guerrilla warfare on a selected group of Boers is examined in the form of case studies. The group includes President M.T. Steyn, whose health failed him in the end and Generals C.R. de Wet and J.C. Smuts, where their positive conduct is considered from a psychological perspective. The result of the continuous pressure on the young Commandant G.J. Scheepers is examined and the stress related experiences of Chief Field Cornet H.S. van der Walt, Burghers P.J. du Toit and R.W. Schikkerling are analysed. / Thesis (DPhil(History))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Jurisprudence / unrestricted

This thesis is a study of the nature of guerilla activity, guerilla tactics in the lower North, guerillas on the middle southern border (Kentucky and Tennessee), guerilla war in Kansas and Missouri, and the guerilla in the Southwest.

Hezbollahs success during the second Lebanon war in 2006 caused a great stirr through the field of military theorists and analysts. The organization was by most numericals clearly out-gunned and out-numbered compared to the combat-experienced Israel defense forces. The Lebanese forces however managed to not only stifle the Israeli offensive actions but held their ground through the 34 days long war resulting in a stalemate and a United Nations resolution. Theories have evolved from or in ways of explaining this puzzling case. Dual approaches have been identified as some theorize that hybrid warfare is a completely new phenomenon where others state it’s a flavor of the month expression for the same old tactics seen many times before. This study seeks to further explore the complex nature of irregular conflicts and find whether a new theory of hybrid warfare ’Unrestricted warfare’ or a senior compendium’On guerrilla warfare’ best can explain this.The findings of this study concludes that neither theory can be out-ruled and opens for further research within the the second Lebanon war as well as on the theories ’On guerrilla warfare’ and ’Unrestricted warfare’.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Submitted by admin tede (tede@pucgoias.edu.br) on 2017-03-30T18:47:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 RICARDO PEREZ PEREZ.pdf: 927867 bytes, checksum: 62378977001364fbf71dd1b1d1d76954 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-30T18:47:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RICARDO PEREZ PEREZ.pdf: 927867 bytes, checksum: 62378977001364fbf71dd1b1d1d76954 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-01 / The present study is based on an analysis of the intellectual trajectory of Carlos Marighella. Consequently, the construction and ideological line adopted by the ALN, one of the most important guerrilla organizations formed in Brazil after the 1964 civilmilitary coup. Therefore, the established sieve essentially included the writings of Carlos Marighella, founder and leader of the aforementioned revolutionary organization. The incendiary combined the dynamism of practical revolutionary with an intense literary production. Marighella's writings merge with the nature of the leftist guerrilla organization - the ALN - in which the whole ideological and doctrinal structure is initiated, including "organizational principles," "tactical principles," and "strategic principles." Then, it is possible to highlight, in the process of maturity of its texts, the theoretical, ideological and practical construction proposed by Marighella for the ALN that will converge in the action as guiding principle of the organization, bringing to the surface the sui generis contribution of its ideas to the Revolutionary left. The period comprised by the research began in 1948 when party teaching debates initiated due illegality that the Brazilian Communist Party had initiated and ended in 1969 with the assassination of Carlos Marighella for military repression. / O presente trabalho debruça-se numa análise sobre a trajetória intelectual de Carlos Marighella. Ilumina-se, consequentemente, a construção e linha ideológica adotada pela ALN, uma das mais importantes organizações guerrilheiras formadas no Brasil após o golpe civil-militar de 1964. Para tanto, o crivo estabelecido, essencialmente, abarcou os escritos de Carlos Marighella, fundador e líder da organização revolucionária citada. O guerrilheiro conjugou o dinamismo de revolucionário prático a uma produção literária intensa. Os escritos de Marighella fundem-se à natureza da organização guerrilheira de esquerda – a ALN –, neles, toda a estrutura ideológica e doutrinária é lançada, incluindo os ―princípios organizativos‖, os ―princípios táticos‖ e os ―princípios estratégicos‖. Com isso, é possível evidenciar, no processo de maturidade de seus textos, a construção teórica, ideológica e prática proposta por Marighella para a ALN que convergirá na ação como princípio norteador da organização, trazendo à superfície a contribuição sui generis de suas ideias para a esquerda revolucionária brasileira. O período abrangido pela pesquisa inicia-se em 1948 quando dos debates de direcionamento partidário inaugurados devido à ilegalidade que o Partido Comunista Brasileiro fora lançado e finaliza-se em 1969 com o assassinato de Carlos Marighella pela repressão militar.

Problem Investigated. This dissertation is a study of the political effects of low-intensity warfare in Indonesia since 1945. In particular, it examines the interaction between general principles and contextual variables in guerrilla conflict, to determine whether such conflict causes the diffusion of political power. Analysis of insurgent movements indicates that power structures within a guerrilla group tend to be regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority. Conversely, studies of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques indicate that successful COIN depends on effective political control over the local population. This tends to be exercised by regional or local military commanders rather than by central authority. Based on this, the author???s initial analysis indicated that one should expect to see a diffusion of political authority from central leaders (whether civilian or military) to regional military leaders, when a society is engaged in the conduct of either COIN or guerrilla warfare. The problem investigated in this dissertation can therefore be stated thus: To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect? Procedures Followed. The procedure followed was a diachronic, qualitative, fieldwork-based analysis of two principle case studies: the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-1962 and the campaign in East Timor 1974-1999. Principle research tools were: ??? Semi-structured, formal, informal and group interviews. ??? Analysis of official and private archives in Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK. ??? Participant observation using anthropological fieldwork techniques. ??? Geographical analysis using transects, basemapping and overhead imagery. ??? Demographic analysis using historical data, cartographic records and surveys. Research was conducted in Australia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bandung), the Netherlands (The Hague and Amsterdam) and the United Kingdom (London, Winchester, Salisbury and Warminster). Fieldwork was conducted over three periods in West Java (1994, 1995 and 1996) and one period in East Timor (1999-2000). General Results Obtained. The two principal case studies were the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-62 and the campaign in East Timor since 1974. The fieldwork data showed that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate the political power-diffusion effect posited by the author. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events at the systemic and regional levels of analysis ??? the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and increasing economic and media globalisation. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels. This process, then, represented a power diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means ??? most often military or insurgent leaders. Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables at different levels of analysis. Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis ??? particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation ??? tend to slow such diffusion. Moreover, while power may be diffusing at one level of analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at local level). Analysis of the Malayan Emergency indicates that, in a comparable non-Indonesian historical example, the same general tendency to political power diffusion was evident and that the same broad contextual variables mediated it. However, it would be premature to conclude that the process observed in Indonesia is generally applicable. The nature and relative importance of contextual factors is likely to vary between examples and hence additional research on non-Indonesian examples would be necessary before such a conclusion could be drawn. Further research on a current instance of guerrilla operations in Indonesia is also essential before the broader contemporary applicability of these findings can be reliably demonstrated. Major Conclusions Reached. Based on the above, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus: The command and control (C2) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders. If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military???s, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has interests largely identical to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant. The process of power diffusion can thus be summarised as follows: A crisis driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of violence, one facet of which may include guerrilla operations. If guerrilla operations do occur, the C2 structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders. The same (or a contemporaneous) crisis produces a breakdown of formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures. The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events. Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the trigger for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then determined by contextual variables.

Problem Investigated. This dissertation is a study of the political effects of low-intensity warfare in Indonesia since 1945. In particular, it examines the interaction between general principles and contextual variables in guerrilla conflict, to determine whether such conflict causes the diffusion of political power. Analysis of insurgent movements indicates that power structures within a guerrilla group tend to be regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority. Conversely, studies of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques indicate that successful COIN depends on effective political control over the local population. This tends to be exercised by regional or local military commanders rather than by central authority. Based on this, the author???s initial analysis indicated that one should expect to see a diffusion of political authority from central leaders (whether civilian or military) to regional military leaders, when a society is engaged in the conduct of either COIN or guerrilla warfare. The problem investigated in this dissertation can therefore be stated thus: To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect? Procedures Followed. The procedure followed was a diachronic, qualitative, fieldwork-based analysis of two principle case studies: the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-1962 and the campaign in East Timor 1974-1999. Principle research tools were: ??? Semi-structured, formal, informal and group interviews. ??? Analysis of official and private archives in Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK. ??? Participant observation using anthropological fieldwork techniques. ??? Geographical analysis using transects, basemapping and overhead imagery. ??? Demographic analysis using historical data, cartographic records and surveys. Research was conducted in Australia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bandung), the Netherlands (The Hague and Amsterdam) and the United Kingdom (London, Winchester, Salisbury and Warminster). Fieldwork was conducted over three periods in West Java (1994, 1995 and 1996) and one period in East Timor (1999-2000). General Results Obtained. The two principal case studies were the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-62 and the campaign in East Timor since 1974. The fieldwork data showed that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate the political power-diffusion effect posited by the author. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events at the systemic and regional levels of analysis ??? the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and increasing economic and media globalisation. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels. This process, then, represented a power diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means ??? most often military or insurgent leaders. Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables at different levels of analysis. Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis ??? particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation ??? tend to slow such diffusion. Moreover, while power may be diffusing at one level of analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at local level). Analysis of the Malayan Emergency indicates that, in a comparable non-Indonesian historical example, the same general tendency to political power diffusion was evident and that the same broad contextual variables mediated it. However, it would be premature to conclude that the process observed in Indonesia is generally applicable. The nature and relative importance of contextual factors is likely to vary between examples and hence additional research on non-Indonesian examples would be necessary before such a conclusion could be drawn. Further research on a current instance of guerrilla operations in Indonesia is also essential before the broader contemporary applicability of these findings can be reliably demonstrated. Major Conclusions Reached. Based on the above, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus: The command and control (C2) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders. If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military???s, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has interests largely identical to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant. The process of power diffusion can thus be summarised as follows: A crisis driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of violence, one facet of which may include guerrilla operations. If guerrilla operations do occur, the C2 structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders. The same (or a contemporaneous) crisis produces a breakdown of formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures. The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events. Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the trigger for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then determined by contextual variables.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 8, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Kalev I. Sepp. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-96). Also available online.