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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / The problem of this dissertation is to present a critical exposition of the place of reason in Paul Tillich's conception of God. A discussion of the definition of reason as well as the place of reason in man and in his knowledge of God is a prerequisite to the consideration of the central problem of the dissertation. Reason is defined in terms of its ontological and technical functions. Ontological reason is active in the awareness or intuition of God and the ideal norms of goodness, beauty and truth. Ontological reason functions to relate man to that which is ultimately real. Technical reason, on the other hand, functions to appropriate all knowledge, to organize all experience into a consistent unity. But it is the same reason which is active in each case. Man is a composite unity of form (reason) and vitality (power). In essence man is in unity with God, man's logos is united with God's logos. In his essential nature, then, man is united with God and there is no distinction between reason and revelation. But man is free as well as rational, and he exercises his freedom to act by acting partially against his logos. In so doing man comes into existence. Thus existential man is in partial separation from and partial union with God. In existence man's reason is "fallen," it does not perceive God with absolute clarity. But existential reason is not wholly depraved; it still has the capacity to apprehend the world meaningfully and to be aware of God. Indeed, reason is the common basis upon which communication between God and man is possible. Though reason cannot produce the experience of unity with God, reason performs the important functions of receiving, judging and appropriating revelation. [TRUNCATED]

The work of Nelson Goodman has significantly impacted the philosophical landscape of the latter half of the twentieth century. In this thesis I critically assess Goodman’s later metaphysics, particularly his ontological relativism and multiple worlds hypothesis. I argue that, while Goodman’s view is interesting and important to philosophic thought, it critically fails as a tenable metaphysical position. This failure is twofold: first, Goodman’s argument for ontological relativism rests on the representational fallacy and is therefore unsound; and second his position, when considered as a self-standing metaphysical doctrine, is incoherent. My conclusion is that Goodman must admit some mind-independent structure of reality, otherwise his view should be rejected. However, while I do not argue for any specific form of realism, once some mind-independent structure is admitted, a general realist position becomes preferable to Goodman’s anti-realist, relativist, and constructivist view. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-11 13:59:52.292

While much research has established that gender has undesirable effects, and some has even concluded that subjective and social life would be preferable without it, there has been limited extension of these claims to the corollary of exploring how it might be eradicated and what could replace it. This thesis considers if and how this could be done. It provides a practicable elaboration of an alternative way of being to that of sex/gender difference by developing theory that argues that the eradication of sexual difference is possible and desirable, and presenting various practices that demonstrate this. Drawing on gender theory and feminist science, the durability of gender is traced back to its anterior spectre of an assumed stable and immutable sex, and specifically compulsory sexual difference. Also, drawing on philosophy and empirical sociological studies, it argues that this is not ontologically tied to the nature of sexual difference, but to socially and intersubjectively constituted and enacted factors, and therefore that social life without sexual difference is an ontological possibility and other ways of being and relating are possible. The normative argument that the existence of sexual difference is undesirable is made by appealing to an ideal of “autonomy,” which sexual difference serves to limit. Simone de Beauvoir’s ethical philosophy is drawn on to develop an ontological ethics that posits freedom or autonomy as a collective situated “doing” which sexual difference limits by presenting oppositional antagonism as universal. A more preferable (and practically possible) situated way of “doing” that maximises “autonomy” would be that of reciprocity. In elaborating the principle of reciprocity as a replacement for sexual difference and considering its practicability, it is evaluated in terms of the normative precepts that the thesis takes off from in order to consider its robustness and to avoid accidentally replicating the restriction on, or “violence” towards autonomy that it is intended to replace. Potential antinomies in realising such an ethic, specifically in “impure” real-world contexts are considered. Also, specific features to ensure and maintain reciprocity are developed, by treating the “androgyny” that I argue is inherent to reciprocity as a transcendence, and not combination or collapse, of the oppositional nature of sexual difference. These constitute a specific way of relating to others that is both specific to them individually and also encompasses the universal ethic of reciprocity. In making this ethic practicable, the thesis considers some possible means or strategies through which a reciprocal (in the specific sense developed) ethic could be fostered so that subjects could understand themselves and others without presumptions of sexual difference. It offers some illustrations of ways of perceiving and treating the self and others (and learning how to do so) that are reciprocal, drawing on real-world queer, anarchist and pedagogical practices that are compatible with the ontological, normative and practical precepts of the ethic of reciprocity. It also considers what the consequences for the eradication of sexual difference might be for “sexuality” and desire. My distinctive contribution to knowledge lies in taking critical, deconstructive theoretical work around gender that is often construed as abstract and impracticable, and attempting to render it socially relevant and utilisable, without undermining its antiuniversalising impulses. I have done this by teasing out the practical implications of such theoretical insights and by drawing on non-traditional sources of ideas / theory. Knitting divergent theories together in an original way, I have contributed to making such theories useful for social change by crafting what I argue is a thorough workable re-constructive ethic that is compatible with the impulses of deconstruction.

It is widely agreed that ontological reduction is possible, that the ontology of one theory can be shown to be nothing over and above the ontology of a distinct theory. However, it is also widely agreed that one assesses a theory’s ontology by determining what it says there is. I show that there is a tension between these orthodox positions. To resolve this tension, I propose and defend the view that the ontological commitments of a statement are sensitive to the theory in which it is embedded. / text

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There is a large philosophical literature focused on what sorts of things can be said to exist. This field is called ontology. Ontological disputes have sometimes been accused of being merely verbal disputes: that they are concerned only with language and not with facts. Some think that if this accusation is correct, philosophers should give up doing ontology. However, whether the accusation is correct and whether it is so serious depends on what is meant by verbal dispute. Eli Hirsch in particular has argued that ontological disputes are merely verbal in one specific sense. In this paper, I first argue that his accusation fails to show that ontological disputes are not substantive. Even if we admit that ontological disputes are verbal in Hirsch's sense, they may still be substantive in a variety of other senses. Second, I argue that even though ontological disputes are substantive, the reason for this will not support stronger claims about the nature and role of ontological disputes. / Master of Arts

The concept of ontological security has grown extensively in the International Relationsliterature, owing to the new explanations it generates for states’ security- and identity-relatedbehavior. In the process, however, the concept has become sprawling, vague and incoherent,due to the multitude of different understandings of the concept. To improve the concept’sadequacy, counter the risk of conceptual stretching, and provide the foundation for a commonresearch agenda, this essay constructs a typology to divide and classify the ontological securityliterature in IR. The typology’s main contribution is the dimension of ontological insecuritymechanisms, understood as the different ways that the ontological security of an agent can bethreatened, and the different types of existential anxieties that follow. To test and illustrate thistypology, the essay conducts an empirical case study of Russia’s engagement in the conflict inSyria since 2015. The results strongly indicate the presence of all ontological insecuritymechanisms, thus clearly implying that Russian behavior in Syria is driven by ontologicalsecurity concerns. The findings also demonstrate the typology’s usefulness and fruitfulness inmore closely specifying the nature of the ontological insecurity in particular cases.

In the world of commercial computing, consumers are being inundated with baroque, bloated, and difficult-to-use computing applications, tools that use computational methods and technologies to perform tasks. Market forces demand that new versions of these applications implement more features, the user-accessible behaviors and services implemented by the application, than their predecessors or competitors. Ensuring that planned features required for market competitiveness enhance a computing application without these side effects first requires that we understand how these features contribute to the overall design and conceptual integrity of the application While conceptual integrity affects all aspect of the application, we are primarily interested in how an applications user-accessible features have been designed and implemented. To this end, we have developed a research framework, methodologies, and artifacts for measuring the conceptual integrity of a computing artifact from its theory of the world or its ontology. We use conceptual coherence, which we define as the degree to which an applications concepts are tightly related, as a first approximation for conceptual integrity. We claim the following: any computing application has a central or core set of concepts that are essential to that applications ontology and can be identified through analytical means; and concepts that are not essential to an applications ontology either exist to support core concepts or are peripheral to the ontology. Peripheral concepts reduce an applications conceptual coherence. We have developed the method of ontological excavation to identify the concepts in a computing application and model them as an ontology expressed as a semantic network. To identify core and peripheral concepts and to measure an ontologys conceptual coherence, we developed methodologies for ontological analysis. If usefulness depends on the conceptual integrity of an applications ontology such that it ensures high fitness to a problem domain, then we would expect that users solving problems in that domain will invoke the concepts integral to the solution more often than those concepts that do not. Thus, to validate our structural measures, we claim the following: the probable use of the application will invoke core concepts more frequently than peripheral concepts in the ontology.

Investiga se o neoconstitucionalismo, teoria jurídica advinda do constitucionalismo do pós segunda guerra, cujo marco filosófico é o pós positivismo, enquadra-se no conceito restrito de ideologia, desde a perspectiva de Karl Marx e Gyorgy Lukács. Para tanto, parte do entendimento da categoria ideologia sob um prisma ontológico, ou seja, a ideologia estará alicerçada na realidade material da sociedade, logo as inversões ideológicas, necessariamente corresponderão as inversões materiais da sociedade, como ocorre no capitalismo. Neste sentido, a pesquisa pretende primeiramente expor e analisar o conceito de ideologia trazido por Karl Marx e Gyorgy Lukács. Em um segundo momento, buscará a análise dos aspectos doutrinários referentes ao neoconstitucionalismo, desde o sentido de seu marco histórico e teórico, mas também ressaltando os paradigmas filosóficos e políticos. Finalmente, propõe-se a analisar o neoconstitucionalismo enquanto ideologia, desde a análise ontológica do direito. / Investigates if Neoconstitutionalism, the legal theory originated from Post Second World War Constitutionalism whose philosophical framework is the post positivism, falls within the restricted concept of ideology from the perspective of Karl Marx and Gyorgy Lukacs. The perspective of analysis parts from the understanding of ideology in an ontological perspective, therefore considering it as rooted in material reality of society, as consequence of what ideological inversions will be interpreted as necessarily corresponding to material inversions in society, in the way it occurs in capitalism. In this sense, the research aims first to expose and analyze the concept of ideology brought by Karl Marx and Gyorgy Lukacs. The second effort will be directed to the analysis of doctrinal aspects of Neoconstitutionalism mainly in its historical and theoretical framework, but also emphasizing its philosophical and political paradigms. Finally, the ontological critic of law will be employed to analyze Neoconstitutionalism as ideology.