The Tamil Tigers were one of the most organized, focused, and influential organizations in Asian politics during the last three decades. Throughout the existence of the organization, the goal of the LTTE was to establish a separate Tamil state – Tamil Eelam - comprising the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka where Tamil-speaking populations were dense. The Sri Lankan civil war, which ended in May of 2009, claimed tens of thousands of lives, displaced hundreds of thousands of residents, and impeded the economic well-being of Sri Lanka. This thesis employs the operational code analysis as a way to better understand the character, behaviour, and norms of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. An additional purpose of this thesis is to test the utility of this model in the case of a terrorist organization such as the LTTE. The Operational Code Analysis framework was premiered by Nathan Leites in his two-part study of the Bolshevik Party, and was subsequently revived and re-imagined by a number of academics. The iteration of the Operational Code framework used in this thesis is a qualitative analysis which is comprised of ten questions: five ‘philosophical’ and five ‘instrumental’. This examination reveals that while this model has much to offer in analyzing this terrorist organization, it is in some ways a flawed method of exposition. However, the model produces unexpected insights about the stated beliefs of the LTTE.

American foreign policy think tanks are an important part of the American foreign policy elite. By gathering data, publishing research, and reaching out to the public and government, think tanks help set the public debate agenda. The question I asked was whether these American foreign policy think tanks exhibited a shared worldview during the past three election cycles. I analyzed 7,000 documents (half a million verbs) published by the seven American foreign policy think tanks active in the three general elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012: the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Cato Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the RAND Corporation. To measure the collective and individual worldviews of these seven think tanks, I used the Profiler Plus software, which answered Alexander George’s operational code questions based on the transitive verbs for the Self and the Other. My research showed that the collectivity of the seven think tanks had three separate worlds of action with three different worldviews. It also showed that the worldview of the American collective Self was very stable across time. Another empirical finding was that from the perspective of the seven think tanks, the United States’ actions were the most similar to the actions of other great powers: Europe, China, and Russia. It was also shown that from the perspective of the seven think tanks, China was the most cooperative nation and Terrorists were the most conflictual actors in the world.

As presidential candidates rhetorically articulate their beliefs during presidential debates, they reveal a lot about their underlying ideological beliefs. These beliefs were examined through the lens of an established methodology called the Operational Code, which uses a program to decipher a candidate's beliefs through what they say in debate transcripts. In this study, the belief trends of the Operational Codes of all presidential candidates from 1976-2012 were examined through a rhetorical lens, and it was found that rhetoric was indeed the driving force for the apparent changes in Operational Code beliefs. These changes were examined on a greater level of detail through four case studies, which illustrated the changes in Operational Code beliefs and rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, the incumbent presidential candidates, the 2004 election, and lastly, with the independent presidential candidates.

abstract: Operational code analysis (OCA) is a common method of content analysis within the foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature used to determine the “operational code” of state leaders and, by extension, the foreign policy behaviors of their respective state. It has been tried and tested many times before, on many different world leaders from many different time periods, to predict what the foreign policy behavior of a state/organization might be based on the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of their leader about the political universe. This paper, however, questions if there might be types of politicians that OCA, conducted using the automated Verbs In Context System (VICS), has problems delivering accurate results for. More specifically, I have theoretical reasons for thinking that populist leaders, who engage in a populist style of communication, confound VICS’ analysis primarily because the simplistic speaking style of populists obscures an underlying context (and by extension meaning) to that leader’s words. Because the computer cannot understand this underlying context and takes the meaning of the words said at face value, it fails to code the speeches of populists accurately and thus makes inaccurate predictions about that leader’s foreign policy. To test this theory, I conduct the content analysis on speeches made by three individuals: Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, and Narendra Modi, before and after they became the executives of their respective countries, and compared them to a “norming “ group representing the average world leader. The results generally support my hypotheses but with a few caveats. For the cases of Trump and Johnson, VICS found them to be a lot more cooperative than what I would expect, but it was also able to track changes in their operational code - as they transition into the role of chief executive – in the expected direction. The opposite was the case for Modi’s operational code. All-in-all, I provide suggestive evidence that OCA using VICS has trouble providing valid results for populist leaders. / Dissertation/Thesis / Summary Statistics and Calculations of Indices / Masters Thesis Political Science 2020

This thesis creates a new variable for threat perception built upon psychological concepts and then applies this new variable to the question of why leaders use military force in certain situations. The concept of threat perception has a long history in the field in terms of its effect on leaders choosing to use military force. However, while the concept of threat perception is inherently psychological, previous proxies for the variable have included only situational factors, which is highly problematic. By utilizing the Operational Code, this study creates a new threat-perception variable based on cognitive constructs. Using a sample of US presidents, this new variable is tested in two different ways. The first examines three psychological characteristics (need for power, in-group bias, and distrust) from Leadership Trait Analysis that are thought to influence the level of threat perception in a leader. The second examines threat perception as an explanatory variable for the use of force alongside three other important control variables (economic violence, presidential popularity, and US power). The use of force variable is derived from Meernik's Use of Force dataset with each case in the dataset representing an opportunity to use force. The psychological data are derived from the verbal material of US presidents using at-a-distance methods found in the literature. OLS regression and probit are used to model the research questions. The project finds that levels of threat perception are indeed affected by a leader's level of distrust, in-group bias, and need for power. In addition, the new psychologically-derived threat-perception variable is a very good predictor of a president's use of force: presidents with higher levels of threat perception have a much higher probability of using force when the situation presents an opportunity.

The intention of this project is to examine whether or not; Anthony Charles Lynton "Tony" Blair, experienced any belief changes or learning, during the period he was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK), a period which lasted 10 years commencing 1997 until 2007. Our analysis will cover a timeline beginning from 1999 a point in time when the UK participated in NATO’s Operation Allied Force during the Kosovo War until 2006 when Britain took on the reins of the EU presidency for a six-month period. An exploration, of the beliefs behind a leader’s decision making logic, should always be considered a prudent undertaking especially when it comes to foreign policy studies. This is because, it is only through such activity scholars can comprehend the distinction between decisions and actions. Thus, understanding when and how; an individual leaders’ belief system changes, is of central importance in furthering our ability in explaining not only state behaviour, but, also the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’. The main purpose of an operational code analysis is to enable political scientists and policy makers alike, to deduce from a particular leader’s verbal content, what that actor's beliefs are and the premises they take in relation to their decision-making process. The first of our two part hypotheses seeks to determine whether Tony Blair exhibited changes in his beliefs at various stages of his premiership. These stages were signified by events which were also crucial in defining his political legacy. The events are divided into three categories, Post Kosovo – Pre Iraq, Pre 9/11 – Post 9/11 and Pre EU – Post EU. On completion of our VICS and SPSS analysis on Tony Blair’s operational code belief we discovered that there were no statistically significant changes in any of his operational indices. So, due to the lack of statistically significant changes in Blair’s Philosophical and Instrumental indices we could not classify the events selected for this analysis as having produced any influence on his belief system. Thus we rejected our null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.

Does the operational code of a state's leadership have an effect on its behavior during foreign policy crises? Specifically, do states with more conflictual operational codes opt for a more conflictual response to crises, or do systemic and structural variables intervene to limit their significance? While the study of individual level psychology in international relations has been gaining momentum, the causal links between beliefs and behavior have yet to be solidified. This study used ordered logistic regression across three models to determine the effect of the operational code on state crisis behavior while controlling for key domestic and crisis dimension variables. Predicted probabilities were also used to better demonstrate the variables' substantive effects. The 50 cases used in this research are drawn from the International Crisis Behavior Dataset composed by Brecher and Wilkenfeld, and they focus on the United States as the major crisis actor. Operational code data were derived from computer-based content analysis using the Verbs In Context System (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). The theoretical goal of this paper was to explain variance in state crisis behavior through variations in the operational codes of US Presidents. The results demonstrate that the operational codes of leaders do affect state crisis behavior. Specifically, the operational code indices P1 and I1 show that a leader with a more conflictual view of the nature of the political universe and a conflictual direction of strategy is more likely to employ escalatory crisis behavior.

This paper seeks to determine under what conditions a U.S. president can implement a grand strategy given the nature of domestic and international opportunities and constraints. It will examine three comparative case studies: Jimmy Carter, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, with the goal of determining what conditions are necessary at the individual, domestic, and systemic levels of analysis for grand strategy implementation. At the individual level, it will apply operational code analysis, as well as an examination of personal characteristics for each case study. At the domestic level, it will apply a five-prong test for examining factors that are key to grand strategy implementation: (1) unity of foreign policy team; (2) strength of presidency; (3) party alignment between Congress and the president; (4) public opinion; and (5) strength of domestic economy. At the systemic level, it will examine significant events faced by each president that tested whether his grand strategy could respond effectively to international imperatives. Ultimately, it will assess the success of each president's attempt at grand strategy implementation based on: (1) how closely U.S. policies aligned with his grand strategy; and (2) whether policies put in place that aligned with his grand strategy improved the global standing of the U.S. Through this analysis, it will assess the larger implications of having a grand strategy on U.S. foreign policy.

Les approches psychologiques connaissent un essor dans l’étude des relations internationales. Elles sont essentielles dans l’étude du processus cognitif des leaders, qui est central à la prise de décisions en politique étrangère. Notre recherche porte sur l’axe d’engagement choisi par les États-Unis envers les alliés, de l’unilatéralisme au multilatéralisme, dans l’adoption des politiques étrangères et s’il est déterminé par la vision du monde des présidents. Parmi les politiques étrangères américaines adoptées entre 2001 et 2013, nous retenons les plus significatives en termes de multilatéralisme, afin de construire la variable dépendante. Le cadre théorique utilisé, le code opérationnel, propose l’analyse du schéma cognitif de leaders à l’aide d’une étude de contenu de leurs écrits et de leurs discours. Cette théorie énonce que la vision du monde inhérente à un leader influence le comportement et les décisions du gouvernement dans les relations internationales. Cette étude examinera les discours relatifs à la politique étrangère américaine prononcés lors des mandats de George W. Bush et lors du premier mandat de Barack Obama en tentant de comparer empiriquement les résultats de leur code opérationnel à leur degré de multilatéralisme avéré dans leurs décisions. Nos résultats ne montrent pas de liens directs entre la vision du monde des présidents et l’axe d’engagement adopté en politique extérieure. Nous en concluons que la méthode d’analyse quantitative ne nous permet pas de déceler de changements concrets entre les mandats des présidents. Nous proposons alors d'autres explications concurrentes comme la théorie des élites ou l’ordre international libéral qui pourraient mieux répondre à notre problématique. / Cognitive theories are increasingly recognized in international relations studies. They are necessary in the study of a leader's cognitive process which is central to foreign policy decision-making. This study focuses on the axis of commitment the United States has adopted towards allies, from unilateralist to multilateralist, and analyzes if it is influenced by the president’s worldview. American foreign policies adopted between 2001-2013 are selected according to their relevance to multilateralism to construct the dependent variable. Our theoretical framework is the operational code, which allows an evaluation of the cognitive scheme according to public and private content discourse analysis. This theory suggests that the president’s worldview has an impact on government's behaviour and decisions making within international relations. This research is based on George W. Bush’s foreign policy speeches during his two mandates and on Barack Obama’s first mandate speeches, seeking to empirically compare their operational codes to the levels of multilateralism resulting from their decisions. Our findings cannot establish a direct link between the president's worldview and their position on the foreign policy commitment axis. We conclude that our quantitative analysis method is not adapted to illustrate a tangible change between the president's mandates. Therefore, we suggest alternative explanations such as the elite theory and the liberal international order which could better answer our research question.

Does a state leader's psychology influence lethality in civil wars? This thesis analyzes the aforementioned question during post-1945 civil wars. This particular subject, paying close attention to individual psychology at the state level, is gaining traction amongst scholars, though limited scholarly attention has addressed whether leader psychology is an indicator of conflict severity in terms of lethality. The psychology of the state leader in this thesis is assessed from leadership traits and operational code indices, specifically direction of strategy (I1) and interpretation of the nature of the political universe (P1). The data and cases used are pulled from datasets by Dr. James Fearon and the Correlates of War Project. The leaders' speech content is derived primarily from prepared material and analyzed using verbal content analysis via Profiler Plus. In measuring the effects of the predictors on my dependent variable, I chose the methodological approach of count data models, specifically, zero-truncated negative binomial regression. The results from the eight models I ran show that specific psychological traits, particularly a leader's I1 and P1 scores, level of distrust, and need for power, do play a significant role when determining the causes of civil war lethality.