The purpose of the essay has been to analyze if the Swedish Army ground forces, can be looked upon as a learning organization as the doctrines declare. This in the perspective that a working, collective Lessons Learned-process does not exist in the Swedish Army with the possible long term effects of diminishing its war-fighting capabilities. The method is a qualitative text analysis of the recently published report from the Swedish Army Land Warfare Center. The report focuses on tactical experiences from the Swedish ground forces perspective through the years 2009-2012, in the over a decade long Afghanistan-operation. The result indicates that the specified organization, the Army and its ground forces, can be seen as a learning organization but with great flaws. The flaws can be seen in all chosen theoretical disciplines, but are the most palpable in the most important one - the system thinking - which is essential for long term learning. But the analysis also gives some good news. The discipline that embraces the most indications of learning is the personal mastery. The inner strength, will and skill sets of the personnel are striking. The analysis points out that a deep learning exists, specifically on individual and lower levels, but is hindered by the system. Hence, the organization is filled with tacit knowledge. The conclusion is that the war-fighting capabilities might actually have been strengthened, but mainly on individual and low level but not as the organization should have. It lacks a working system for it.

Svensk militär verksamhet organiseras och leds i ett normalläge, för att snabbt kunna möta och hantera en hastigt uppkommen påfrestning. På motsvarande sätt finns annan verksamhet i samhället som verkar under liknande förutsättningar. Vad kännetecknar en militär organisation som skall hantera påfrestningar med hög operativ effekt, och vad utmärker metoden för att leda verksamheten vid påfrestning? Vilka utmaningar och lösningar kan identifieras? I syfte att vidga perspektiven gjordes en jämförelse i kontrasterande syfte mellan ett militärt förband och ett akutsjukhus. Genom en induktivt driven ansats och kvalitativ metod, genomfördes sju semistrukturerade djupintervjuer vid Luftstridsskolan i Uppsala och Lokal katastrofledning vid Gävle sjukhus. Likheterna mellan de undersökta enheterna avseende organisation och ledningsmetod samt utmaningar och lösningar kopplade till detta var stor. Med utgångspunkt i begreppen High Reliability Organizations och Ambidextrous Organizations diskuteras resultaten, som ger förutsättningar att utveckla organisation och ledningsmetod främst vid författarnas förband Luftstridsskolan. För att nå detta är författarnas konkreta rekommendationer, med stöd i empiri och litteratur, bl.a. att i högre utsträckning nyttja tvärfunktionellt sammansatta ledningsgrupper för att hantera påfrestningar eller komplexa planeringsuppgifter och därigenom minska stuprörstänkande, att sträva mot förbättrad gemensam lägesbild vid flottiljstab och att avkräva lojalitet mot beslutad organisation och ledningsmetod. Detta bedöms leda till ökad operativ effekt vid förbandet. / Swedish armed forces are normally organized for education and training on a daily basis, for the purpose of rapidly being able to deal with sudden events or strains. What signifies a military organization and command dealing with these kinds of strains whilst maintaining a high level of operational effect? What challenges do they face and what kinds of solutions are available? In order to expand the perspective a comparison was made with a military unit and an emergency hospital. This study was carried out withan inductive and qualitative method, and seven semi-structured interviews were conducted. By the perspectives of High Reliability Organizations and Ambidextrous Organizations, the results are discussed. The resemblances between the two researched units are surprisingly striking in the investigated areas of interest. In order to improve organization and command at the researched military unit, the authors recommend the following actions: the use of joint functions command groups to a greater extent in order to enhance the ability to handle strains and sudden events, to strive for a greater level of situational awareness on all levels in the organization and the demand for loyalty to organization and structure of management decided by the commander. These actions are deemed to increase the level of operational effect at the unit.