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<p>This thesis advances a number of claims, some conceptual, some empirical, some normative. The conceptual claims are concentrated in chapters 1 and 2, where a general account of the notion of a source of law is provided. Roughly, sources of law are documents or practices (e.g. statutes, judicial decisions, official customs) from which norms can be derived that function as sources of content-independent reasons for judges to decide legal cases one way or another. The remainder of the thesis is dedicated to discussing whether legal scholarship – or, more precisely, a particular type of legal scholarship that can be described as standard or doctrinal – is used as a source of law (as the concept is defined in chapters 1 and 2) in modern municipal legal systems. The conclusion that legal scholarship is used as a source of law (and thus as a source of content-independent reasons for action) may come as a surprise to those who associate recourse to legal scholarship by judges with judicial activism. It will be argued, however, that legal scholarship can plausibly be used to mitigate discretion. Indeed, it is precisely because it can be used in this way that judges sometimes refer to scholarship deceptively and suggest that it limits discretion in situations in which it in fact does not.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>In this thesis I deal with the issue of relativism that threatens Toulmin’s field- dependency thesis (i.e. the claim that the standards of argument appraisal depend on the argument field in which the argument occurs). After offering partial interpretation of the concept of “argument fields” and elucidating the concept of field-dependence, I argue that Toulmin’s field-dependency thesis does result in an unacceptably strong relativism.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Karl Rahner, responding to the problems raised by Kant's critical philosophy, sought to present a Thomistic metaphysics of realism in a modern thought-form through a reduction of the interrogative thrust of the intellect to its possibility conditions, and so, like Marechal before him, attain an absolute affirmation of Being. Rahner's transcendental system, however, would seem to have been overtaken by a more existential stress in phenomenological thinking. Emmanuel Levinas, with his thought of the Other and his attempt at an excendence from Being, would seem at first glance to sit uncomfortably alongside Rahner's system, yet, a closer reading of both unearths a remarkable convergence in their thinking. The deeper phenomenological reduction which Levinas undertakes to reveal the inter-subjective context of consciousness helps to humanise Rahner's approach. This thesis attempts a fruitful confrontation of both thinkers by, firstly, indicating the tension between Rahner's own philosophical propaedeutic and his theological writings, particularly on grace, mystery and the love of God and neighbour, where he affirms that human existence is ultimately reductio in mysterium and that human fulfilment is to be found in a personal relationship with a human Other. A second purpose is to show how these same theological themes can be developed from within Levinas' own thought, and how his own philosophy can provide a worthwhile context for Christian theology. The thesis unfolds by considering the various methods - metaphysical, transcendental and phenomenological - which surround both thinkers (Chapter 1) and then proceeds to outline their various philosophical influences (Chapter 2). Since the notion of Being as self-presence is fundamental in Rahner, and since Levinas refuses a philosophy of presence, Chapter 3 questions the privilege of presence. This will lead, in its turn, to a rethinking of the notion of subjectivity: the subject is not to be consider as presence-to-self but as a relationship with the Other (Chapter 4). This relationship is experienced in Desire (Chapter 5) and in the responsibility experienced before the face of the Other (Chapter 6). The relation between ethics (the good) and Being is pursued in chapter 7. Finally, the notion of mystery is indicated as the theme which inspires the work of both Rahner and Levinas (Chapter 8). Rahner's unmastered mystery will become Levinas' incomprehensible infinity in the presence of which the subject is called to response and responsibility.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this study it is asked why we do not consider ourselves guiltier and more responsible with regard to the thousands of people who, through no fault of their own, die daily from preventable, poverty-related causes. Such neglect of the global poor is not surprising from certain perspectives. However, when the matter is approached from the perspective of Emmanuel Levinas's ethical philosophy, one is faced with the paradox that Levinas claims we are infinitely and inescapable responsible for the other, while the preventable dying of thousands of poor people indicates that we do not behave as though we are infinitely responsible for the other. It would seem as though Levinas is crudely mistaken. However, Levinas distinguishes between an interpersonal ethical relation and an impersonal political relation with the other. The former is a relation of asymmetrical and infinite responsibility to which we are summoned by the uniqueness of the other's 'face.' The latter is a relation in which the 'third' is present, therefore requiring that the self limit his responsibility to a specific other and disperse it amongst numerous others. The presence of the third indicates the beginning of impersonal justice, institutions, politics, knowledge, as well as equality and reciprocity between the self and the other. However, every person that I encounter is a general other with whom I stand in a political relation, while at the same time, also a specific other who commands my infinite responsibility. With every other, I am simultaneously in a symmetrical political relation and an asymmetrical ethical relation. This is the ambiguity of political society: do I relate to the other politically or ethically? Both options enjoy legitimacy; however, from a Levinasian perspective, the choice to politically respond to the other less so. To understand our indifference to the global poor, this study analyses the principal debate about transnational responsibility, the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate, from a Levinasian perspective. Three ways in which the ethical relation with the extremely poor global other have been suppressed, thereby contributing to our ethical indifference to him, are identified. First, writers in the cosmopolitan-communitarian debate seek to preserve the subject in the greatest autonomy and freedom possible and thereby 'legitimise' a political response to the other. Second, when approaching the issue of global justice, cosmopolitan and communitarian theorists suppress the otherness of the other, which is what reminds us of our infinite responsibility for the other and the fact that justice is always incomplete. Third, insofar cosmopolitans prioritise and advocate a greater concern for the global poor, the strategy they favour (they emphasize human equality) is counterproductive for it overlooks and suppresses the uniqueness of both the subject and the other in the interpersonal ethical relation. The criticism of these three aspects of the cosmopolitancommunitarian debate is then extended into claims that a more ethical relating to the globally poor than is presently the case is possible. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie vra waarom ons onsself nie skuldiger en meer verantwoordelik beskou teenoor die duisende mense wat elke dag, sonder enige toedoen van hul eie, as gevolg van voorkombare, armoed-verwante oorsake, sterf nie. Vanuit sekere perspektiewe is sulke nalatigheid te wagte. Wanneer ons egter die kwessie vanuit die perspektief van Emmanuel Levinas se etiese filosofie benader, kom ons voor 'n teenstrydigheid te staan, aangesien Levinas aandring dat ons oneindiglik en onvermydelik verantwoordelik is vir die ander, terwyl die daaglikse voorkombare sterftes van duisende arm mense aandui dat ons nie optree asof ons onsself as oneindiglik verantwoordelik teenoor die ander beskou nie. Dit wil voorkom asof Levinas eenvoudig verkeerd is. Levinas tref egter 'n onderskeid tussen 'n interpersoonlike etiese verhouding en 'n onpersoonlike politiese verhouding met die ander. Eersgenoemde is 'n verhouding van asimmetriese en oneindige verantwoordelikheid waartoe ons beveel word deur die uniekheid van die ander se 'gesig.' Laasgenoemde is 'n verhouding waarby ook 'n 'derde' betrokke is, en daarom moet die self sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor die spesifieke ander beperk om so ook sy verantwoordelikheid teenoor 'n veelheid van andere na te kom. Die teenwoordigheid van die derde dui die beginpunt van onpersoonlike geregtigheid, institusies, politiek, kennis, asook gelykheid en wederkerigheid tussen die self en die ander, aan. Elke person wat ek teëkom is 'n algemene ander met wie ek in 'n politiese verhouding staan, asook, tegelykertyd, 'n spesifieke ander teenoor wie ek oneindiglik verantwoordelik is. Teenoor elke ander staan ek terselfdetyd in 'n simmetriese politiese verhouding en 'n asimmetriese etiese verhouding. Die dubbelsinnigheid van die samelewing lê daarin dat ek moet besluit of ek polities of eties teenoor die ander gaan optree. Beide opsies geniet 'n mate van legitimiteit, alhoewel, 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander minder legitiem is vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse oogpunt. In 'n poging om ons apatie teenoor die wêreld se armes te verstaan, word die sentrale debat rondom die kwessie van transnasionale verantwoordelikheid, die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre debat, vanuit 'n Levinasiaanse perspektief geanaliseer. Drie wyses waarop die etiese verhouding met die ander onderdruk word, en sodoende bydra tot ons etiese apatie teenoor die ander, word geïdentifiseer. Eerstens poog skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse kommunitêre debat om die subjek so 'n groot mate van outonomie en vryheid as moontlik te handhaaf en te bewaar, en 'legitimiseer' in die proses 'n politiese respons teenoor die ander. Tweedens, wanneer die kwessie van globale geregtigheid deur skrywers in die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat aangeraak word, word die andersheid van die ander, wat ons aan ons etiese verantwoordelikheid teenoor die ander, asook aan die onvoltooide aard van geregtigheid, herinner, onderdruk. Derdens, in soverre kosmopolitaanse skrywers hulself beywer om 'n groter mate van besorgdheid teenoor arm persone regoor die wêreld te ontlok, blyk die strategie wat deur hulle gevolg word (hulle beklemtoon menslike gelykheid) teenproduktief te wees, aangesien hierdie strategie die uniekheid van die subjek en die ander in die etiese verhouding misken en onderdruk. Die kritiek teenoor hierdie drie aspekte van die kosmopolitiaanse-kommunitêre debat word dan uitgebrei na aansprake dat 'n meer etiese houding teenoor die wêreld se armes moontlik is.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, June, 2007. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

Through evaluating Hilary Bok’s argument from her essay Freedom and Practical Reason, I hope to shed light on the overall question of whether we can have free will if determinism is true. In the first two chapters I will fully explain and break down Bok’s argument for genuine epistemic alternatives. In chapter three I will evaluate the success of Bok’s arguments. Specifically, I will offer a variety of intuitive examples to show that epistemic unpredictability is not enough to make our alternatives genuine. I will then use more examples to consider the relative importance of unpredictability and endorsement to free will.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 173-180). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

In Soigne ta chute, a novel by Neo-Quebecer writer Flora Balzano, immigration stereotypes are challenged by the irony of the narrator. The critique section of this thesis describes how the irony of a marginalised character can yield an identity statement. This essay studies how Quebec realities are echoed in an ironic manner by the narrator, illustrating her cultural identity within Quebec society yet all the while affirming her complex subjectivity. The observation of the ironic mechanisms will allow for a better understanding of the exploited strategies depicted in the creative writing section of this thesis, the novel Y'a pus d'eau dans piscine . The character portrayed in this novella is unsatisfied with traditional identity categories and makes use of irony and digression to create new identity configurations. Those strategies then allow this character to gain perspective on the consequences of her gender hybridization.