Thèse--Paris, 1964. / Without thesis statement. Bibliography: p. [667]-745.

No description available.

En 1971, le Parti socialiste est refondé. L'objectif est alors de conquérir le pouvoir. En 2007, le PS perd des élections présidentielles devenues son objectif « naturel » : il est aujourd'hui un parti de gouvernement et dispose d'une implantation électorale sans précédent. Cette réussite électorale n'a pas été sans générer de profondes mutations du parti. Celui-ci a été structuré sur le modèle du parti de masse et ses membres le pensent intrinsèquement comme un parti de militants. Mais, tiraillés entre ce qu'est effectivement le PS et ce qu'il devrait être, ses dirigeants ont dû adapter l'organisation socialiste à son statut. Cette adaptation est étroitement liée aux rapports qu'entretiennent désormais les socialistes à l'Etat : il a fallu intégrer les contraintes du pouvoir et surtout ajuster le parti à la professionnalisation croissante de ses élites. Or, si la croissance du financement public dans son budget, la recomposition de son organisation centrale, ou bien encore le poids des élus sur le parti semblent corroborer cette idée, l'imbrication croissante du PS dans l'Etat, sa cartellisation donc, ne saurait s'effectuer mécaniquement. L'organisation du PS est avant tout l'objectivation de la configuration partisane socialiste, c'est-àdire le produit des interdépendances qui lient l'ensemble des membres du parti entre eux. L'accession au pouvoir et la réussite électorale ont profondément bouleversé cette configuration, heurtant ainsi directement la forme et les représentations de l'organisation socialiste. La cartellisation de l'organisation constitue donc la traduction contrariée et toujours inachevée dans sa forme des transformations qui affectent la configuration partisane socialiste. Autrement dit, s'il est dorénavant « normal » que le Parti socialiste prétende au pouvoir, cette évidence n'a été rendue possible qu'au prix de la cartellisation de son organisation, condition nécessaire au bon fonctionnement d'une configuration partisane lentement – et parfois douloureusement – adaptée aux exigences que le statut du parti requiert. Aussi, au terme de cette évolution, même si les représentations du PS comme « parti de militants » perdurent encore, celui-ci est désormais bel et bien, et avant tout, une véritable entreprise partisane.

Th.--Tunis, 1989. / Bibliogr. p. 267-275. Index.

Diss.--Universität Hamburg. / Bibliogr. p. 701-796. Index.

Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Histoire--Montpellier 3, 2002. / Bibliogr. p. 437-473. Index.

Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Histoire--Aix-Marseille 1, 2002. / Notes bibliogr. Index.

Texte remanié de: Mémoire de maîtrise--Histoire--Paris 1. / Notice réd. d'après la couv. Bibliogr. p. 257-264. Index.

Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Histoire--Paris 8, 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 337-343. Index.

This dissertation examined the lives and motives of militants in the Parti Quebecois in 1987 and 1988, at the end of a phase of demobilization for this organization in the Quebec independence movement. / This study found that most PQ militants were francophone males under 40 years of age, with college degrees. They worked at jobs which would make them part of the intelligentsia, and along with some students, worked in francophone contexts. They often came from political homes, especially "nationalist" ones, and some militants felt hostility towards "les anglais". Most were actively involved in previous voluntary associations, especially activist organizations. They were recruited young and had prior attitudinal affinity. Most were self-recruited, while the others were recruited through family and friend networks. Their principal motive for joining was a set of ideological beliefs about Quebec independence, and they experienced no pressure to become a member. Most future militants, began by giving some casual labour to the PQ and then were invited to participate in more responsible positions. While a few militants stayed as "casual labour", the rest became "cadre" who worked part-time benevolently or "careerists" who received full-time jobs and salaries. The casual labour and cadre militants worked irregular hours, and had distinct preferences for and against certain types of political tasks. Most militants joined to further Quebec independence but intraparty conflict pitted youthful Johnsonists against older orthodox militants in 1987 and 1988. Among those militants who quit, most led busy, well-adjusted lives after the PQ, which were directed towards personal goals such as jobs or further education. / The data pointed out that the PQ militants were motivated to join by grievances such as the minorization of French-Canadians within Canada, fears about the French language and culture in Quebec, discontent with federalism, and to a lesser extent, status inequality and economic domination by anglophones. These grievances and aspirations for greater political autonomy for Quebec were the principal internal motives. The collective incentive of independence and the supporting beliefs that it would bring political autonomy, international prestige and cultural protection were the most important determinants of whether or not a militant would join the PQ. Many militants spoke of the selective incentives gained through militancy, especially the social, educational and political benefits. Altruism existed in small doses, but by-and-large, people volunteered their time to the PQ because it benefitted them. Finally, expectancy of success was a necessary factor for militant motivations. The 1980 referendum defeat appeared to be the cause of the factionalism which dominated the phase of demobilization in the Parti Quebecois from 1980 to the Fall of 1988. / The motives for staying or leaving after years of commitment were similar to and different from the motives for joining. The most important factor affecting a militant's decision to leave was the collective incentive. If the party's overall goal changed, many militants quit. Some militants of the losing faction stayed attached to the party due to social ties, paid positions, and the lack of viable alternative parties. Those militants who had some weaker ethnic group grievances, who believed less in the benefits of independence for Quebec, who enjoyed less certain organizational incentives, and were more pessimistic about the chances of success for their political party and social movement were more likely to be demobilized. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)