Yes / The aim of the study is to investigate two relatively underexplored factors, namely, the R&D (research and development) capabilities of target firms and the strength of intellectual property (IP) institutions in target economies, that influences the choice of equity ownership in cross border acquisitions (CBAs) undertaken by multinational enterprises (MNEs) from BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies. We develop our key hypothesis on foreign market entry through CBAs by incorporating insights from transaction costs economics, the resource-based view and institutional theory to investigate the determinants of full versus partial equity ownership. Using logistic regression estimation methods to a sample of 111 CBA deals of BRICS MNEs in 22 European countries, we find that BRICS MNEs are likely to pursue full rather than partial acquisition mode when target firms have high R&D capabilities. However, the greater the degree of strength of IP institutions in target economies and higher the target firms’ R&D capabilities, the more likely it is for BRICS MNEs to undertake partial, rather than, full acquisition mode. We provide interesting theoretical insights and managerial implications that might underlie some of the key findings on CBAs by emerging market MNEs.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln über mikroökonomische Themen. Die ersten beiden Kapitel befassen sich mit Themen der Industriökonomie und Wettbewerbstheorie, wohingegen das dritte Kapitel Fragestellungen von Cheap Talk Spielen untersucht. Kapitel 1 untersucht die Folgen, die sich aus einer partiellen Akquisition zwischen Wettbewerbern ergeben. Kapitel 2 analysiert die Auswirkungen einer Forschungs-und Entwicklungs (FuE)- Kooperation auf die Investitionsanreize in einem Markt, in dem eine Mehrproduktunternehmer mit einem Einzelproduktuntfirma konkurriert. Kapitel 3 untersucht die Funktion der Mediation zur Erleichterung der Kommunikation mit privaten Informationen. / This dissertation consists of three independent chapters in the field of microeconomics. The first two chapters are concerned with topics of industrial organization and competition policy, whereas the third chapter addresses some problems in cheap talk games. Chapter 1 studies anti-competitive issues that arise from partial acquisition between competitors. Chapter 2 analyzes the effects of cooperation on R&D investment incentives in a market where a multi-product firm competes with a single-product firm. The third chapter examines the role of mediation in facilitating communication with private information.