This thesis, bearing the name "The crime of drunkenness according to § 360 of Act No. 40/2009Coll., Criminal Code" aims to analyse and understand deeper the crime of drunkenness in all its aspects. Initially, it deals with the historical kontext of this crime and the development of its conception through history to this day. The thesis also describes terms of diminished sanity and insanity as well as other terms related to the crime including the institute actio libera in causa in both of its forms. This crime is indeed an atypical one, whilst being one of the methods of dealing with illegal deeds committed by inflicted insanity. Such crime lies in the fact that the offender of an act otherwise criminal (one lacking an important sign of a crime) had, prior to such act, induced himself to a state of insanity by culpable consuming or applicating an addictive substance. Insanity as itself exclude criminal culpability of the offender, however not in cases hen offender self-inducing it by consuming or applicating an addictive substance, which makes the crime of drunkenness unique. No less interesting is that, in a way, the crime of drunkenness overcomes the principle nullum crimen sine culpa, or no crime without culpability, since it is composed of two separate actions, while culpability revers only to...

現行有關逃漏稅研究的國內外文獻，無論在理論推導或實證分析上，多集 中於非法的租稅逃漏（tax evasion）上，而忽略了另一種合法的減少稅 負的方法：租稅規避（tax avoidance）。本文乃將 Falkinger & Walther (1991) 獎懲並行的制度與傳統的租稅逃避（tax aversion）理 論相結合，而以較嚴謹的方式分析聯合的個人租稅逃漏與租稅規避的選擇 行為，即所謂的租稅逃避行為。本文共分為四章十節，略述如下：第一章 為緒論，分為三節，分別說明研究動機與目的、研究範圍與方法及章節安 排。第二章為文獻回顧，分為三節，以國、內外文獻為探討單元，分別依 時間順序及研究範圍與方法，針對租稅逃漏、租稅規避與租稅逃避聯合決 策行為等三個領域的文獻作假設分析與結論整理，最後則做一小結。第三 章為獎懲並行的租稅逃避理論（ A Mixed Penalty- Reward Tax Aversion Theory ），分為三節，第一節介紹獎懲並行的租稅逃避理論， 主要分成基本假設、模型設立、比較靜態分析和加入獎勵因素後的影響四 部份來討論。第二節乃以獎懲並行的租稅逃避模型與前章中所述較具代表 性的逃、避稅理論模型加以比較。最後則作一小結。第四章為結論，僅一 節。由於另一租稅減少途徑──租稅規避──的存在改變了許多僅討論租 稅逃漏文獻的結論。本文主要的結論是，除了查獲率和邊際懲罰率的變動 對申報所得和避稅所得佔總逃避所得的份額有明確的正向影響外，其他相 關變數如總所得、邊際稅率和邊際避稅成本的變動所造成的影響均不明確 ；而邊際獎勵率的變動對申報所得的影響亦無法確定，然其對避稅所得佔 總逃避稅所得的份額卻造成（反直觀的）負面的效果。此外，提高獎勵率 是否提高或降低其他變數變動的效果，其答案亦無法肯定。這些發現表 示 Falkinger & Walther (1991) 對於採用獎勵制度的優點似乎有誇大之 嫌。