Thesis (S.T.D.)--Catholic University of America, 1927. / Biographical. "Bibliography": p. xi-xiv.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The purpose of this study is to determine the perception of women revealed in the writing of Philo of Alexandria. Although Richard Baer approached the subject in Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female, no comprehensive examination has been made of the role Philo accorded women. I set Philo's writing on the subject of women within the context of two intellectual traditions, the Jewish and the Greek, in order to determine whether he accepts, rejects or alters inherited attitudes. I study it also in the context of the multifarious ways Philo uses "male" and "female" to express comparisons. There emerges a coherent pattern, which indicates that Philo's statements about women are not isolated from his overall understanding of the meaning of "female." After establishing these two larger contexts, I narrow the scope of the study, by demonstrating that Philo's perception of women cannot be determined from his statements about "man." I do this by studying the context in which he uses both Greek terms translated by the English term "man," anthropos and aner, as well as looking into the use of the two terms in the Septuagint and in some earlier Greek writing. In the body of the work I study Philo's material on Biblical women and contemporary women, subdividing the first group according to Philo's terms, "women" and "virgins." The conclusion of the work is that Philo intensifies the subordination of women which he draws from both traditions. He views woman as a danger to man unless she is under his strict control. Since his first concern is the survival of the community through the religious strength of its men, he believes that woman ought to play an auxiliary role, and to be prevented from any behaviour which would deter men from their religious quest. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The objective of this dissertation is to examine the conception of divine providence in the writings of Philo of Alexandria (ca. 25 BCE -50 CE). In order to achieve this aim, we shall follow the theocentric structure of Philo's thought as outlined in the important passage De Opificio Mundi 171-2. In this passage, Philo correlates the idea of providence with his concept of God and the theory of creation. In Chapter One, we shall first review the formal aspects of Philo's concept of God, in particular the idea of God's transcendence, and then correlate how Philo conceptualizes the idea of providence in light of these formal aspects. In particular, we shall explain how Philo can predicate that God is provident in nature, although, strictly speaking, it is Philo's view that God cannot be apprehended in his essence. In Chapter Two, we shall discuss how Philo explains the immanence of God in the cosmos in terms of the Logos and the divine powers, one of which he specifically characterizes as the providential power. In Chapter Three, we shall examine how the concept of God and the notion of providence are both critical for Philo's theory of creation. Philo conceives of the role of providence in cosmological matters as being responsible for the design, administration and continuous existence of the created universe. There are two more issues-raised in Philo's treatise De Providentia-which are critically important in order to gain a thorough understanding of Philo's conception of divine providence. These are the questions of astral fatalism and theodicy. In Chapter Four, we shall address why Philo rejects the assumptions implied in astral fatalismthe divinity of the stars, moral determinism-as irreconcilable with the conception of divine providence. He rejects the divinity of the stars because they cannot be transcendent as God and thus have causal influences over human lives. He rejects astral fatalism because it renders absurd the notion of moral responsibility. Finally, in Chapter Five, we shall correlate the question of theodicy with Philo' s conception of providence. Philo proceeds from the Platonic premise that God is not the cause for evil in any way, neither for physical evil nor for moral evil. Unlike the category of physical evil, which he explains in terms of Stoic arguments, the category of moral evil incriminates human beings directly. For Philo, the existence of moral evil exonerates God and his providence as the cause for evil and anchors the blame in the person. Moral evil originates when the rational part of the soul, the mind (which is inherently free and knows the difference between good and evil), cannot resist the assault by the senses and the passions. Philo thus places both the origin and the responsibility for moral evil on the shoulder of the human being. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Texte remanié de: Dissertation--Histoire--Potsdam--Universität Potsdam, 2000. Titre de soutenance : Abwehr von Antisemitismus und der Kampf um Selbstbehauptung. / Bibliogr. p. 275-292.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- McMaster University, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 243-259). Also available via World Wide Web.

Zugl.: Kopenhagen, Univ., Diss., 2007

Thesis (Th. M.)--Covenant Theological Seminary, St. Louis, MO, 1998. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-84).

Inaug.diss.--Leipzig. / Vita. "Principaux ouvrages": p. 2-3.

Thèse--Faculté de théologie protestante de l'Université de Genève.