<p>A large part of modern Western philosophy defines selfhood as the self’s ability to master itself and psychological wellbeing as the actualization of self-integration. However, as this thesis argues, Kierkegaard’s understanding of longing for God challenges this understanding human identity, especially as it is articulated by Kant and the German Idealists. Through an examination of Kierkegaard’s <em>Concluding Unscientific Postscript</em> and his religious discourses, the thesis argues that Kierkegaard’s theology of longing both undermines the modern psychology understanding of autonomous selfhood and preserves a qualified understanding of autonomy. The thesis argues that Kierkegaard’s theology has much in common with Augustine’s understanding of longing in <em>The Confessions.</em> For Kierkegaard, the longing for God is not just a heteronomous desire for self-annihilation in God. The longing in question is relational and intellectual; it is a response to God’s illuminative self-revelation and self-communicative love. But as relational, the life lived in longing for God is not wholly autonomous either. In prayer the soul experiences its own neediness and imperfections as it begins to experience God’s perfection. Broadly conceived, the thesis explores Kierkegaard’s understanding of this <em>neither . . . nor . . . </em>, that is, his understanding of a religious life lived neither fully autonomously nor fully heteronomously. The thesis argues further that much contemporary scholarship cannot take Kierkegaard’s relational understanding of the God-relationship seriously and therefore misinterprets his understanding of human identity.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Few philosophers, today, are doing more than simple recognition of Levinass debt to phenomenology when a thorough explication of how phenomenological methodology impacts Levinass work is needed. This dissertation is the needed discussion of methodology that has been so absent in Levinas as well as in so many of his interpreters. The purpose, herein, is to synthesize Levinass work, explicating it in terms of transcendental methodology, the result of which reveals Levinass claims to be more defensible when understood in these terms than when the full rigor of this methodology is not properly grasped. First, to connect Levinas to transcendental phenomenology a correct perspective of the phenomenological tradition is needed. I argue that phenomenology is a methodology that discloses those horizons that condition experience such that appearance takes on meaning. I further argue that it is important to see this disclosure as something open-ended and ongoing rather than a method capable of fully revealing a final telos. Levinas fits into this methodology by providing the ethical as just such a horizonal condition, while his constant returning to this theme highlights the need to keep reworking the description of its meaningful impact on experience. Second, I defend Levinas from those who claim his work cannot be phenomenological, based on what they see as an implied Jewish tradition informing his description. I argue that what must be understood is that Levinass reference to God, Biblical stories, and Jewish wisdom impose an unsettling language that is introduced to replace traditional phenomenological language that does not always allow for the goals phenomenology sets for itself. This imposition does not use the Jewish tradition to make his argument but as a vocabulary far better at describing the ethical condition than what is commonly used in phenomenology. The final step of explication involves the actual application of the methodology, now understood aright, to Levinass claims about the other, the self, and the ethical. The result is that once we understand the ethical as the infinite originative horizon out of which the conscious ego emerges, later interpretations of Levinas will be able to successfully move beyond his work.

This thesis is first and foremost the result of my grappling with the works of Meister Eckhart. Accordingly, I intend to present here my reading of Eckhart's thought. This reading, my struggle to interpret the Meister, was, from the beginning, however, motivated by the aim to join a certain conversation. This conversation is what I have come to know as 'Christian philosophy'. I am new to the circles of those who admit to be participating in this scandalous project, yet already I have become quite aware of the controversy pervading this notion. It comes to the fore not only in the critical voices from the 'outside', questioning its meaning, relevance and legitimacy, but also in a lack of 'internal' consensus concerning its entailments. This is not necessarily a point of criticism on my part. In fact, I am much a proponent of conversations or projects that have an openness to them and lack clear cut deliminations. It does, however, make a brief apologia in preparation to this thesis necessary. I have no ambition whatsoever to state here what Christian philosophy is or should be. God forbid! I merely deem it important to place my project in context, and for that purpose I intend here to point out to the reader the direction I am facing. Thus, what needs to be clarified at the outset of my argument is that particular understanding of Christian philosophy this thesis intends to engage. The question here is, where and how to locate the conversation this thesis hopes to join. [from Prologue, p. 3]

The symbolic meal, known as the Eucharsit, Lord's Supper, Holy Communion, and many other names is of peculiar interest to the Christian church. This thesis presents the results of a psychological examination of the teachings of the church present both in creeds, statements, and by individual writers.

Despite the current emphasis on person centred, holistic care in health, the concept of spirituality has been discussed very little in the field of speech and language therapy (SLT). The nursing spirituality literature has proliferated in the last twenty years but, by contrast, very few SLT studies exist which mention the spiritual needs of patients with communication problems and how they express them. Individuals experiencing severe, life-changing events, such as a stroke, may need to engage with and discuss their spiritual needs, in order to make sense of what has happened to them. The aim of this study was to discover what it is like to express spiritual issues when one has an acquired communication impairment (aphasia). I also wanted to discover what it is like to be a healthcare professional working with people with communication impairment expressing their spirituality. I used a phenomenological approach in order to interview eight people with aphasia about their spirituality. Participants with aphasia used a variety of strategies to express these ideas, which included employing non-verbal communication techniques, such as gesture, writing key words, intonation and artefacts. I also interviewed five members of the multidisciplinary stroke team (MDT) about what it is like to work holistically with people with aphasia. Each interview resulted in a participant story. People with aphasia talked about religious themes, such as visions and prayer, but also non-religious life meaning-makers, such as gardening and art. MDT members discussed themes such as spirituality as part of their remit and giving the patient time to communicate. The stories were then explored through the interpretive lens of some concepts propounded by Merleau-Ponty (2002), namely ambiguity, lived body, language and thought, and wonder. Frank’s illness narratives (chaos, restitution and quest) were also considered in order to analyse the participants’ stroke journey in relation to expressing spirituality. People with aphasia can and do discuss their spiritual concerns, particularly when they are entering a quest phase of their illness narrative. They employ many non-verbal mosaics in order to convey spiritual issues, and are helped by the listener employing a phenomenological attitude of openness and attentiveness. Healthcare professionals expressed their willingness to listen to their patients’ spiritual stories, in the interests of holistic practice. Being able to express spiritual needs can enhance wellbeing, help foster therapeutic rapport, and enable people to engage more fully in the rehabilitation process.

The aim of this study was to uncover and illuminate aspects of spirituality, which may be present in the work of primary school teachers. Four themes emerged out the analysis and were coded using the methodology consistent with an Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). The themes were: ● Spirituality as an aspect of identity formation and understanding. ● Relationships as central to understanding and formation. ● Teaching and learning as a shared encounter through mentoring. ● Spirituality as a contextual resource. IPA was chosen as a methodology as it places the participant as central to and expert in their lived experience whilst acknowledging the ways in which the researcher impacts on the interpretative process. Drawing on phenomenology whilst adopting a systematic process of analysis, the material uncovered ways in which spirituality can be used a resource in the professional encounter. The implications for this study points towards a new definition of spirituality that encompasses ‘moments of profundity and connection with other that leads to change’. This is particularly important in relation to the teachers in this study and could be of value to others in the education profession. Seeing one’s spirituality as a source of wisdom and as a contextual resource has allowed the participants to make connections with their colleagues and pupils that draw heavily on their spirituality in order to make sense of and bring change to situations and relationships. These instances are profound in nature for each individual but has brought about change in the situation, relationship or way of teaching and relating to one’s environment. As such the definition of spirituality in this study both encompasses established understanding of what it means to be spiritual but places this in the educational environment and profession. It is hoped that the findings of this study lead to an awareness of the way in which one’s spirituality can be drawn upon as a positive agential resource will be acknowledged in teacher education programmes and school-based teaching.

Despite being a key notion in the examination of the process of human objectification, reification has not received sufficient attention in recent years, especially in the study of religion. Building on Axel Honneth’s analysis, I examine the concept of reification within a Sufi context, more precisely, within the esoteric paradigm of Ibn ‘Arabī’s oneness of being (waḥdat al-wujūd). I contend that the root of reification, not only lies in the forgetfulness of the origin of cognition in recognition, as Honneth argued, but also in the forgetfulness of the origin of recognition in pure consciousness, i.e. the oneness of being. I argue that since the problem of reification consists of the loss of the primacy of our non-discursive dimension over the discursive one, the solution must lie in the rectification of that order. This can only be brought about through mystical experience, in which a momentary suspension of thought occurs, and our identity as part and parcel of the continuum of consciousness is disclosed. Hence, I argue for the necessity of the preparation for mystical experience through ritual practice, as it moves us from discursive to non-discursive states of being. Through physical activity, our sense of embodiment is increased, shifting us from a ‘thinking’ to a ‘sensory’ mode, which paradoxically detaches us from our identification with the physical body. Using phenomenological methods and knowledge by presence theories, I examine Ibn ‘Arabī’s esoteric approach to the ritual practice of purification, prayer and fasting. I maintain that the essence of ritual is the disclosure of one’s ontological poverty, which within the paradigm of the oneness of being (waḥdat al-wujūd), must also amount to the phenomenal self-differentiation of the divine. Thus, I conclude that the root of the problem of reification essentially lies in accounts of selfhood.

This study is an ethnohistorical examination of Indian religious responses to contact with Euroamericans on the Columbia Plateau, from 1600 to 1850. Plateau natives understood their encounter with European civilization primarily as a momentous spiritual event, and sought new sources of spiritual power to cope with their rapidly changing world. White people seemed to the Indians to have an abundance of spirit power, and many native religious efforts were aimed at capturing some of this power for themselves. These efforts included the protohistoric Prophet Dance, the syncretic "Columbian Religion" of the fur trade era, and the initial enthusiastic response to the first Christian missionaries on the Plateau. Each of these attempts was marked by great enthusiasm at first, and each was abandoned with bitter disappointment as the material condition of the natives worsened. By 1850, most Indians had abandoned the idea that the spirit power of the white people could ever be accessed by themselves, and new religious impulses took the form of nativist movements which sought to purge the natives of white influences.;Because both Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries were active on the Plateau, I also compare the conversion efforts of the two faiths. to native eyes, the cultural flexibility, language skills, impressive ceremonies, and superior organizational structure of the Catholics compared favorably to the stem and incomprehensible doctrines of the Protestants. But in both cases most Indians accepted Christian doctrines only as a supplement, and not as a replacement of native beliefs. True converts proved rare before the reservation period.

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C. S. Lewis is very concerned about the naturalist assumptions which underlie much of modern knowledge. He attempts to show that the naturalist philosophy, when taken to its logical conclusion, undermines the validity of our reasoning processes and our moral judgments. He then attempts to offer an alternative philosophy which can serve as an adequate basis for our reasoning and ethics. Lewis sees three basic metaphysical possibilities: naturalism, dualism, and theism. Naturalism views the natural process as the ultimate reality. Everything that exists is either a part of or a product of this process. Dualism asserts that there are two equal, uncreated, independent, and self-existing entities. Theism regards God as the ultimate reality. He is the source of all things, including nature. We will discuss these three metaphysical theories in order, emphasizing their implications for epistemology and ethics. In the chapter on theism we will also present the concept of God which Lewis espouses, along with his reasons for doing so. We will then discuss Lewis's epistemology. We will examine first the theistic basis for it and then the relationship between reason and nature. Afterwards we will look at the reasoning process itself, considering the role of thinking, knowing, imagining, and language in that process. Finally, we will critique Lewis's epistemology from the perspective of a pragmatic epistemology. The choice of a pragmatic epistemology for this purpose is based on its widespread acceptance at the present time. This critique will point out some possible problems in both epistemologies and will suggest a possible resolution for them.