This study examines the relationship between popular support for the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which is an ethnic insurgent and terrorist organization mainly operating in Turkey, and its terrorist activities during the pre-and post-election periods in Turkey . Popular support has been measured through popular votes for the political party affiliated with the PKK in 1999 general, 2004 local and 2007 general elections. Two leading theories of social movements, Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) and Relative Deprivation Theory (RD), were used as theoretical approach. The study uses secondary data and constructs a longitudinal design. An advanced statistical analysis technique, a generalized hierarchical linear model: time nested within subjects (or GHLM repeated measures) was employed in this study. Findings indicate that popular support is positively related to terrorist attacks of the PKK in Turkey. More popular support for the insurgent leads to more terrorist attacks. Furthermore, terrorist attacks gradually increased over the pre-election period of general elections. However, terrorist attacks abruptly increased upon the election but then subsequent terrorist attacks decline over the post-election periods.

This study is a historical analysis of Turkish-Iraqi relations from the Gulf War of 1990 up to the Iraqi elections of 2005 and the end of Transitional Administration Law (TAL) and prior to the permanent constitution. This study attempted to explain how Turkish-Iraqi relations entered into a new phase with the Gulf War of 1990. In this year, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Following this invasion, Iraq was attacked by coalition forces and at the end of this war, Iraq was nearly divided when a safe haven was created for the Kurds in northern Iraq. In this regard, this thesis paid attention to three factors that had significant impact on the foreign policy of Turkey towards Iraq: a de facto Kurdish state in northern part of this country and apprehension about the possibility of an independent Kurdish state, the existance of PKK in northern Iraq as a result of a power vacuum there and concerns about the future fate of Turkomans in Iraq and attempts to protect their rights. This study has demonstrated how Kurdish question has influenced Turkey&rsquo / s policy towards Iraq and restricted its options.

This thesis investigates depictions in the Kurdish media (Rudaw and Firat News Agency (ANF)) of mass violence perpetrated against Kurdish civilians in northern and northeastern Syria – an area known to Kurds as Rojava – in recent years. Articles from two media organizations were subject to mixed-method text analysis (quantitative and qualitative) to uncover how mass violence was portrayed. The theory of framing in the media is used to show how violence is committed and what role ideology plays in this process. It is subsequently used in order to uncover commonly used frames for the roles played by various actors involved in mass violence. Hence, a comparison is made between the contents of the two media institutions. The results primarily relate to the role of ideology in the coverage of mass violence by the selected Kurdish media outlets, which are affiliated with two major Kurdish political parties, one left-leaning and one right-leaning. Findings revealed different aspects of mass violence, governed principally by nationalist and partisan orientations. Nationalist agendas played a significant role in Rudaw’s content and a smaller one in ANF’s. Partisan agendas had roughly the same magnitude in both, and the two outlets clashed politically but met nationalistically in many areas. The research questions were addressed through a content analysis of tens of stories disseminated by both Kurdish media organizations during the same time-space.

How states narrate the world, their own policies and convey their story of events to a growing extent conditions the responses of others and the trajectory of political discussions. While storytelling is increasingly prevalent as a way of exerting influence in the political spheres of today, wider understanding of its practical manifestations is limited to a handful of actors. By applying the theory of strategic narratives to an actor such as Türkiye, this study aims at expanding this knowledge. Examining communication from senior Turkish politicians, a narrative analysis is conducted to closely examine the case of the Turkish narrative portrayal of Sweden within the context of its NATO accession process. This study seeks to explore the strategic and intentional nature of these narrative constructions. Based on the analysis, the conclusion is drawn that Türkiye continuously and persistently utilizes various aspects and elements that are to be understood as of a strategic nature when narrating Sweden in relation to the political affair. In essence, these findings deepen our understanding of strategic communication and storytelling by broadening the spectrum of actors behind them.

This research critically challenges the conventional understanding of terrorism, which is influenced by the views of states that label certain non-state actors as terrorists and their action as terrorism. The research demonstrates that there is a need to critically study the characteristics of every armed conflict constructed as terrorism. This is the case of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, which is constructed in the Turkish official discourse as a phenomenon of terrorism perpetrated by the PKK. In addition, the Turkish narrative of terrorism is not limited to the PKK, but it transcends to the Syrian Kurdish PYD and YPG, and other Kurdish movements and individuals. The findings of this research reveal that the Turkish official narrative of terrorism functions to achieve two main goals. The first goal is to delegitimize the PKK and the other Kurdish movements. The second goal is to legitimize the repressive policies of the Turkish authorities regarding these movements in particular and the Kurds in general. This is interconnected with the denial of the existence of the Kurdish question and framing it in the context of the narrative of terrorism. The research also reveals that the language and policy of peace and war could change according to the interests of states’ elites. This is the case of the approach of the Turkish authorities regarding the Kurdish question, which changed under the influence of the elections and voting agendas of Erdogan and AKP. The research found that during the peace process and before the June 2015 elections, the approach of Turkish authorities was pro-peace negotiations and non-military action. However, as the AKP was not able to secure the majority that it sought in the June elections, the AKP authorities abandoned the peace process and adopted a military campaign and repressive policies. The latter matched the appeal of the AKP leadership to the votes of nationalist Turks in the November 2015 elections and the April 2017 referendum. / The full text was made available after embargo; 28th August 2020

Pourquoi les négociations de paix échouent-elles? Pour répondre à cette question, ce mémoire synthétise la littérature sur les théories de la négociation et l’intervention de tierces parties dans les conflits intra-étatiques. À l’aide de la méthode de l’étude de cas, j’applique ce cadre théorique au troisième cycle de négociations de paix entre la Turquie et le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan, qui s’est tenu de la fin décembre 2012 à Juillet 2015. Le modèle de négociation de guerre met l’accent sur les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible qui mènent à l’échec de négociations. Les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible sont habituellement plus aigus dans les conflits intra-étatiques. Car il est plus difficile d’obtenir les informations sur les capacités militaires des groupes armés non-étatiques (GANE) et il y a généralement de grandes asymétries de pouvoir entre les États et les GANE. Cette étude de cas apporte ainsi quatre contributions à la compréhension du sujet. Premièrement, lors d’un processus de paix, les deux parties impliquées peuvent consciemment faire des choix qui ne leur permettront pas d’atteindre leurs objectifs. Deuxièmement, ces choix résultent des mesures mal-conçues dans les pratiques de négociation et/ou l’absence de tierce partie qui rétablirait l’équilibre relatif de pouvoir et qui le maintiendrait pendant les négociations de paix. En fin de compte, cela accentue les problèmes d’engagement crédible. Troisièmement, les changements exogènes perturbateurs en matière des capacités relatives, en particulier en faveur des GANE, peuvent produire les problèmes d’information asymétrique. Quatrièmement, certains conflits ne se prêtent pas à l’intervention de tierce partie. Il peut être très difficile ou lourd de conséquence pour les tierces parties de rétablir l’équilibre relatif des pouvoirs. / Why do peace negotiations fail? Answering this question, this dissertation synthesizes the literature on bargaining theory and third party involvement in intrastate conflicts. Using qualitative case study methods, I employ this theoretical framework to the third round of the peace talks between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which was held between December 2012 and July 2015. Bargaining model of war highlights the problems of information asymmetries and credible commitment that lead to bargaining failures. Information asymmetries and commitment problems are usually more severe in intrastate conflicts because it tends to be more difficult to obtain information about the military capabilities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and there tends to be larger power asymmetries between states and NSAGs. The case highlights four sets of implications. First, both sides in a peace process can willingly make choices that fail to achieve the ends to which they aspired. Second, these choices result from ill-designed measures in bargaining practices and/or the lack of a third party that would redress the relative balance of power and maintain it during the peace talks. This ultimately intensifies the problems of credible commitment. Third, disruptive exogenous shifts in relative capabilities, especially in favor of the NSAG, may produce asymmetric information problems. Fourth, some conflicts do not lend themselves to third-party involvement, as it may be too difficult or costly for third parties to redress the relative balance of power.

This thesis examines how the ‘terrorist’ label affects those that are labelled by this designation, particularly with reference on a subsequent choice to use violence in the context of an ethno-nationalist conflict. Drawing on the PKK as a case study, the study asks: what effect did the labelling of the PKK as a ‘terrorist organisation’ by the Turkish government have on the use of violence by Kurds in the Turkish-Kurdish ethno-nationalist conflict? The invocation of the label terrorist in any conflict often means both the labeller and the labelled are predisposed to use violence. This study argues that this process of labelling leads the labeller and the labelled to frame one another as an existential threat. To date, the effects of using the label ‘terrorist’ in an ethno-nationalist conflict context remain relatively understudied in both social and political sciences. The period under analysis extends from 1992 to 2015, corresponding to the period during which the Turkish government continuously designated the PKK as ‘terrorist’. In conflict discourse, belligerents use demeaning labels against each other to gather support, legitimacy or simply to increase combatants’ morale. The study argues that the label terrorist is a constituent element of the conflict. The Turkish government uses the label terrorist as a tool to securitise the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-nationalist conflict. The Turkish government’s labelling of the PKK as ‘terrorist’ places the Kurdish issue in the broader framework of securitisation, a theory in International Relations. While securitising the Kurdish issue has bestowed more powers to the Turkish government to combat violence described as ‘terrorist’, the resolution of the ethno-nationalist conflict became increasingly more complex leading to protracted waves of violence. Analysing data collected through semi-structured qualitative interviews with Kurds from Turkey, the study reveals that the impact of the label terrorist is far more complex than previously assumed in the existing academic literature. The specific effects of the label terrorist on any given conflict, however, are the subject of an empirical question to be settled through rigorous research. Drawing on the Labelling Theory of Deviance fathered by Howard S. Becker and complemented by discourse analysis, this study finds that the application of the label terrorist against the PKK increases the perception of victimization among its wider Kurdish community. Secondly, the research demonstrates that the invocation of the label terrorist against the PKK places the group’s actors and sympathizers in a situation that makes it harder for them to engage in peaceful means of resolving the conflict. The interplay between these two consequential effects of victimisation and political exclusion leads to the conclusion that there is an indirect relationship between designating an ethno-nationalist armed group ‘terrorist’ and the choice to use violence.

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