Thesis (B.Phil.)--University of Oxford, 2009. / Supervisor: Professor C.C.W. Taylor. Bibliography: leaves 86-90.

Inaug.-diss.--Munich. / Lebenslauf. "Anmerkungen" (bibliography): p. [58]-82.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Alexander P.D. Mourelatos. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 152-160).

This thesis paper attempts to gain perspectives on three different philosophers by focusing on the fundamental concepts of their philosophical positions. The section on Plato examines the concept of dialectic as it appears in the Republic by distinguishing it from the concept of the hypothetical method, and by understanding these two concepts by means of the equally important concepts of noêsis (intellection) and dianoia (scientific and critical thought). The section on Aristotle focuses on the main concepts of Books I-II of the Nicomachean Ethics, which are happiness, energeia (being-at-work), virtue, and the mean. The section on Marx focuses on the concepts by means of which Marx framed his conception of history.

No description available.

acase@tulane.edu / The Western philosophical tradition arguably begins as a dispute over the status of poetry. In the Republic Socrates characterizes the relationship between poetry and philosophy as an “ancient quarrel,” and yet this characterization is challenged as much by Plato’s use of the dialogic form as by the frequency of his reflections on Greek poetry. Why write poetically and so often about poetry if it’s the antithesis of philosophy? This thesis, “The Idiot Soul of Wit: On the Genius of Hamlet and Ion,” examines the relation between philosophy and poetry through interpreting Plato’s Ion and Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Not only can these works be understood to share a similar generic form—Plato’s dialogues are closer to dramatic poetry than a scientific treatise—but they are both concerned with the significance of form in particular. This shows up in a twofold way. First, both have a reflexive plot that mirrors the psychology of the titular character, which plays out as a reciprocity between action and speech, since for each speech is the principle action. Second, they employ a similar frame: Hamlet turns on revenge and soliloquy, Ion yokes together war and poetry. Thus structurally both aim to synthesize action and reflection, but frame their divergence in the starkest terms: violence requires no words; poetry requires no deeds. The same duality is exhibited by their respective lead characters, who play the double role of actor and spectator: Ion is asked to reflect upon his skill in performance; Hamlet attempts to commit the self-aware act. Ultimately both fail, yet failure illuminates the core proposition of each work: if we cannot know ourselves, we may yet grasp what allows us to pose the self as a question. Through examining these texts, this study confronts the radical privacy of the self that necessitates poetic language, and the dialectic by virtue of which self-knowledge is possible to the extent that it is—which, given the centrality of self-knowledge to Socratic philosophy, indicates why Plato can neither win nor forfeit the contest with poetry. / 1 / Charlie Gustafson-Barrett

Since Forms and particulars are separate, Plato is left with the task of describing the way in which they are related. One possible way of construing this relation is to suppose that particulars resemble Forms. Socrates proposes this and is refuted by Parmenides in the so-called Likeness Regress (Parmenzdes 132c12-133a7). This work comprises both an exposition and an analysis of the Likeness Regress. In the exposition, I work out the argument-form of the Likeness Regress in second-order logic (and later, show that first-order logic is sufficient). This symbolisation provides a baseline for the balance of the exposition, which has two focuses: first, I define what it means for particulars to resemble Forms, with the help of D. M. Armstrong's account of resemblance in A Theory of Unwersals; second, I demonstrate that the infinite regress argument of the Likeness Regress is indeed vicious, with the help of T. Roy's theory of regress arguments. In the analysis, I proceed with the premiss that an asymmetrical account of the resemblance relation would allow Socrates to escape Parmenides' refutation. I examine various accounts of asymmetrical resemblance (including those accounts put forward by R. E. Allen, P. T. Geach and G. Vlastos), but reject these in favour of my own account. My account of asymmetrical resemblance is based on understanding the resemblance relation as a function that is not self-inverse. Finally, I argue that the Likeness Regress need not be considered definitive, since we find in the ontology of the Timaeus a conception of resemblance that fits my account of asymmetrical resemblance. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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My examination of Plato’s valuation of eros in the Symposium and Phaedrus dialogues in its manifold elements in general has resulted in a more concrete definition of eros as a relational entity. The transition of an initially natural cosmic force in archaic times into a more valid ethical quality so as to encourage betterment in human relations is evident in Plato’s philosophy. The terms ‘Platonic love’ and ‘eros’ are misinterpreted and my thesis purports to prove that Plato’s eros is a spiritual quest for beauty (kalos), truth (alethes) and the good (agathos). Modern scholastic commentaries were referred to and proved helpful in assessing the differences in ancient and current ethical schools of thought. The argument purports that Platonic eros is not a static condition of soul but a continuous movement/progress towards the highest spiritual love. / Ancient Languages and Cultures / M.A. (Ancient Languages and Cultures)