Boston University. University Professors Program Senior theses.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / Thesis advisor: Nasser Behnegar / This dissertation presents the different accounts of the origin of law in Plato’s Laws and I seek to show how the question of the law’s origin relates to Plato’s political philosophy as a whole. For the early modern political philosophers, the concept of a pre-political “state of nature” plays a central role in their attempt to describe the sources and limits of legitimate political authority. The question of the origin and development of the city is given much less emphasis by the ancient philosophers and it is not clear how their opinions about this question relate to their understanding of politics. In Plato’s Laws, however, the question of whether law has a divine, natural, or conventional origin is at the center of the Athenian Stranger’s inquiry. I begin by arguing that the conventionalist view of law, religion, and morality as it is presented in Book X depends on a materialist natural science that the Athenian knows to be deficient. At the same time, the Athenian also knows that he does not possess demonstrative knowledge of the existence of providential gods. Because of his knowledge of his ignorance about these matters, he is compelled to consider the claim that certain laws have a divine origin. In order to evaluate these claims he turns the conversation toward the question of the purpose of law and shows that a divine law must be understood to perfect human beings by making them virtuous. I argue that the core of the Athenian’s confrontation with the claim that law has a divine origin is a dialectical inquiry into virtue and happiness. Although the Athenian does not carry out this inquiry in the conversation in the Laws itself, I argue that the results of such an inquiry are shown by his new beginning in Book III, which begins with the question of the origin of the regime. In Book III he breaks with the traditional claims about law’s divine origin and he offers his own account of the human origin of the city and its laws. Although the Athenian’s account is in some respects similar to that of the conventionalists, I argue that he departs from them in important respects due to his deeper understanding of the roots of our ignorance about the human good. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

acase@tulane.edu / 1 / Derek Duplessie

My dissertation is an interpretation of Plato’s Hippias Major, in which Socrates investigates τό καλόν (usually translated as “the beautiful” or “the noble”). My reading of the Hippias Major focuses on the importance of appearing beautiful, to others and thereby to oneself, and reveals the way in which the impulse to appear beautiful is connected to the desire for the immortal preservation of oneself and one’s own. The impulse to appear beautiful is essential to political life, insofar as the pleasure of praise effects a kind of harmony between the private good and the common. This impulse, however, is also a fundamental impediment to Socratic philosophy, as it prevents the critical examination of oneself and one’s opinions, while hindering a truly erotic experience of the beautiful. In examining these issues, my dissertation seeks to establish the Hippias Major’s connection to and consonance with other more popular Platonic dialogues, such as the Republic, Symposium, and Phaedo. / Travis John Mulroy

With the advent of traditions based on revealed law, political philosophy was forced to reorient its approach to the topic of law. Yet it remains in question whether the classical tradition’s medieval inheritors ever broke entirely with their pagan forebears. As a contribution to that debate, this dissertation compares the discussions of law found in Plato’s Statesman and Laws with the parallel accounts found in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed and in the Book of Roots written by the late-medieval Maimonidean Joseph Albo. The benefit of a comparative approach is that through these authors’ convergences and differences we may see problems that are inherent in law as such and those that may be related to divine law in particular. Plato subjected divine law to his critique of law as such: unlike prudence, law cannot address what is rare or novel because its commands are necessarily generalizations. Law so understood is a necessary evil that, at best, could merely imitate the wise ruler. At the same time, in its appeal to ancestral authority, law seeks to suppress the philosopher’s radical questioning. In a community based on revealed religion, the problems of law are intensified, especially the tension between law and philosophy. Therefore, the most urgent task for Maimonides and his followers was the clarification of the moral, psychological, and theological conditions of the very idea of divine law. Only then could they examine whether their own divine law mysteriously transcends the limits of law as such. / 1 / Seth Appelbaum

This thesis considers how Martin Heidegger treats “wonder” (thaumazein) in Plato and Aristotle versus how it appears to be treated by them. The introduction outlines how the problem of wonder arises when Heidegger mentions particular instances from Plato’s Theaetetus and Aristotle’s Metaphysics as the basis for his claim that philosophy originates in wonder. In chapter one, I analyze each of the twenty-four occurrences of wonder in Plato’s Theaetetus, beginning with a preliminary discussion of Heidegger’s delimitation of wonder from the wondrous. In chapter two, I examine the relation between philosophy and wonder in chapters one and two of Book Alpha of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In chapter three, I begin by considering Heidegger’s later lecture, What is that—Philosophy?, before turning to his earlier writing, The Need and Necessity of the First Beginning and the Need and Necessity of an Other Way to Question and to Begin. I end by reflecting on Heidegger’s account of pre-Socratic versus Socratic philosophy in these writings and consider how Leo Strauss seems to provide an alternative to Heidegger’s analysis. Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the relation between wonder and Eros in Plato and Aristotle. / 1 / Ryan Patrick Crowley

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2007. / Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Despite the evident importance of beauty (τὸ καλόν) in Plato, the precise relation between beauty and goodness (τὸ ἀγαθόν) has yet to be specified. Part of the reason for this seems to be the belief that καλός should not be translated ‘beautiful,’ because it has a broader sense and application than our word ‘beautiful.’ A better translation, on this view, would be something like ‘fine.’ But it is difficult to see the difference between fineness and goodness, and it is perhaps for this reason that determining the relation between the two has not been felt an urgent task. In the first chapter we shall investigate the use of the Greek word καλός in some of the major authors prior to and contemporary with Plato in order to determine the strength of the evidence for translations of καλός other than ‘beautiful.’ It will be argued that the evidence for translations of καλός other than ‘beautiful’ is weak, and thus that the word should generally be translated ‘beautiful.’ When we turn to Plato’s understanding of τὸ καλόν, we find that he often seems to associate the concept closely with goodness, and yet there are also passages which suggest a difference between the two. Thus the first question to ask is whether beauty and goodness are at least coextensive for Plato? In the second chapter it will be argued that despite some apparent evidence to the contrary, he does seem to think they are coextensive. In the third chapter we argue that Plato identifies goodness and unity, and that the coextension of goodness and beauty is explained on the model of the necessary connection between certain forms, or immanent characters, in the Phaedo. But it does not follow from this that goodness and beauty are identical. In the fourth chapter we will argue that, though beauty and goodness are connected in concrete particulars, qua forms they are distinct, i.e., there are two separate forms, the form of the good (which is identical to the one) and the form of beauty. Finally, a theme which runs more or less throughout this work is that, contrary to what one might expect, Plato seems to discover what is good by asking what is beautiful. This may seem counterintuitive, because there are passages, like Republic 452d-e and 509b, where it seems that goodness determines or in a way causes beauty, but it seems that when trying to discover what is truly good, Plato always settles on what is beautiful. It may be agreed, even by those who disagree about what goodness is, that things like justice and courage are beautiful, and it is these that Plato always thinks constitute the human good.

Despite the evident importance of beauty (τὸ καλόν) in Plato, the precise relation between beauty and goodness (τὸ ἀγαθόν) has yet to be specified. Part of the reason for this seems to be the belief that καλός should not be translated ‘beautiful,’ because it has a broader sense and application than our word ‘beautiful.’ A better translation, on this view, would be something like ‘fine.’ But it is difficult to see the difference between fineness and goodness, and it is perhaps for this reason that determining the relation between the two has not been felt an urgent task. In the first chapter we shall investigate the use of the Greek word καλός in some of the major authors prior to and contemporary with Plato in order to determine the strength of the evidence for translations of καλός other than ‘beautiful.’ It will be argued that the evidence for translations of καλός other than ‘beautiful’ is weak, and thus that the word should generally be translated ‘beautiful.’ When we turn to Plato’s understanding of τὸ καλόν, we find that he often seems to associate the concept closely with goodness, and yet there are also passages which suggest a difference between the two. Thus the first question to ask is whether beauty and goodness are at least coextensive for Plato? In the second chapter it will be argued that despite some apparent evidence to the contrary, he does seem to think they are coextensive. In the third chapter we argue that Plato identifies goodness and unity, and that the coextension of goodness and beauty is explained on the model of the necessary connection between certain forms, or immanent characters, in the Phaedo. But it does not follow from this that goodness and beauty are identical. In the fourth chapter we will argue that, though beauty and goodness are connected in concrete particulars, qua forms they are distinct, i.e., there are two separate forms, the form of the good (which is identical to the one) and the form of beauty. Finally, a theme which runs more or less throughout this work is that, contrary to what one might expect, Plato seems to discover what is good by asking what is beautiful. This may seem counterintuitive, because there are passages, like Republic 452d-e and 509b, where it seems that goodness determines or in a way causes beauty, but it seems that when trying to discover what is truly good, Plato always settles on what is beautiful. It may be agreed, even by those who disagree about what goodness is, that things like justice and courage are beautiful, and it is these that Plato always thinks constitute the human good.

Thesis--Bonn. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 183-188).