Thesis (PhD--Geography)--University of Auckland, 2009. / " A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 420-439).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1997. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 196-204).

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 24, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 264-269).

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Over the last decade, the demand for a unifying and foundational theoryof mathematics has become more critical. This is referred to as ”thefoundational crisis in Mathematics”. In this paper I will present a newposition in the philosophy of mathematics called Pluralism. Pluralismquestions the demand for a foundational theory that can encompass all ofmathematics, and consider the possibility of having opposing mathematicaltheories that are all veracious. I will argue for Pluralism being themost advantageous theory in the philosophy of mathematics in responseto the foundational crisis of mathematics. I will argue for this by discussingthe three major themes in philosophy of mathematics: Realism,Anti-realism, and Nihilism, and show that none of them are suitable asa foundational theory. I will further argue that Pluralism gives us thebest account of mathematics as it is practiced and gives the best possibleoutset for future mathematical research and creativity.

Thesis advisor: Richard Atkins / Thesis advisor: Daniel McKaughan / Trust is vital for much of what we know and do. Yet, standard accounts of trust face a problem. Either they analyze trust in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions such that they face counterexamples, or they fail to explain trust’s role in social practices. To address this problem, I develop and defend a view that I call pragmatic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that trust comes in many forms. I show how pluralism can address counterexamples and preserve the insights of standard theories of trust. However, pluralism neglects to explain how the diverse interests of different parties coalesce in cooperative social practices. In turn, pragmatism provides an explanatory strategy for uniting various forms of trust according to their function. Specifically, I examine trust’s role in disposing parties to rely on each other to achieve their goals. This shared, dispositional function explains how various forms of trust can facilitate cooperative social practices. I argue that pragmatic pluralism is plausible given developments in empirical trust research. I then apply insights from pragmatic pluralism to disputes about values in science and trust in artificial intelligence. I contend that well-placed trust in each case requires a normative view about the appropriate conditions of trust. While pragmatic pluralism is a descriptive account of trust, I conclude that it provides resources for inquiring about the normatively appropriate conditions of trust—those conditions according to which a trustee is worthy of trust. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2024. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This thesis examines the ineliminable status of pluralism in contemporary sciences, especially in biology. Pluralism in science is endorsed to avoid loss of knowledge, unproductive debates and explanatory inflexibility while the plurality indicates the disunited nature of knowledge in some areas. The pluralist stance approach, as an epistemological stance, argues that it is possible to reduce modest forms of pluralism to sophisticated forms of monism. However, the pluralist stance is vulnerable to the monist challenge that today&rsquo / s science is incomplete and brings a sort of epistemological disorder to scientific territory. This thesis tries to answer the following question: is it more beneficial if a modest form of pluralism is adopted for a better scientific practice? Integrative pluralism as a type of modest pluralism can be as pragmatic as the pluralist stance, without seeking theoretical unification but advocating explanatory resolution for a better scientific conduct.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed Sept. 22, 2008). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 477-517).

One cannot begin to understand the nature of Hul’qmi’num legal tradition without first acknowledging and understanding the relationship between culture and law. The Coast Salish people have a vibrant culture, influenced heavily by the nature of their relationships with their ancestors, their kin and their lands. These relationships permeate their legal tradition. Influencing not only regulatory aspects of law, but also dispute resolution processes. Trying to understand and appreciate this tradition outside of this worldview would be detrimental to the tradition itself, as I believe it would result in a transformation of the laws and practices. In thinking about the relationship between law and culture, this research has identified two fundamental categories of law within the Hul’qumi’num legal tradition: 1) snuw’uyulh and 2) family laws. Snuw’uyulh refers to a condition generated by the application of seven teachings: 1) Sts’lhnuts’amat (“Kinship/Family”); 2) Si’emstuhw (“Respect”); 3) Nu stl’I ch (“Love”); 4) Hw’uywulh (“Sharing/Support”); 5) Sh-tiiwun (“Responsibility”); 6) Thu’it (“Trust”); and 7) Mel’qt (“Forgiveness”). Accordingly, universal teachings seek to foster harmony, peacefulness, solidarity and kinship between all living beings and nature in the world. In a sense, snuw’uyulh is a state or condition and Hul’qumi’num legal tradition encompasses all the animating norms, customs and traditions that produce or maintain that state. As a result, Hul’qumi’num law functions as the device that produces or maintains the state of snuw’uyulh. There is another fundamental category of law present within the Hul’qumi’num world – family laws. Family laws encompass the norms, customs and traditions, or customary laws, which produce or maintain the state of snuw’uyulh. Law is a practice – an activity. Arguably, much of the practice of law takes places in the form of regulation and conflict and dispute resolution. Similar to how law cannot be separate from its surrounding culture, nor can the processes developed to resolve conflicts in the law. Since time immemorial the Hul’qumi’num Mustimuhw have utilized processes and practices to resolve conflicts and disputes both within their communities and with other communities in the Coast Salish world. Although the processes and practices have varied over time, it is possible to identify several inherent standards of conflict resolution which the Hul’qumi’num people continue to utilize in resolving their disputes. / Graduate / Sarah.Morales@uottawa.ca