Thesis (PhD--Geography)--University of Auckland, 2009. / " A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 420-439).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1997. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 196-204).

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 24, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 264-269).

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Over the last decade, the demand for a unifying and foundational theoryof mathematics has become more critical. This is referred to as ”thefoundational crisis in Mathematics”. In this paper I will present a newposition in the philosophy of mathematics called Pluralism. Pluralismquestions the demand for a foundational theory that can encompass all ofmathematics, and consider the possibility of having opposing mathematicaltheories that are all veracious. I will argue for Pluralism being themost advantageous theory in the philosophy of mathematics in responseto the foundational crisis of mathematics. I will argue for this by discussingthe three major themes in philosophy of mathematics: Realism,Anti-realism, and Nihilism, and show that none of them are suitable asa foundational theory. I will further argue that Pluralism gives us thebest account of mathematics as it is practiced and gives the best possibleoutset for future mathematical research and creativity.

This thesis examines the ineliminable status of pluralism in contemporary sciences, especially in biology. Pluralism in science is endorsed to avoid loss of knowledge, unproductive debates and explanatory inflexibility while the plurality indicates the disunited nature of knowledge in some areas. The pluralist stance approach, as an epistemological stance, argues that it is possible to reduce modest forms of pluralism to sophisticated forms of monism. However, the pluralist stance is vulnerable to the monist challenge that today&rsquo / s science is incomplete and brings a sort of epistemological disorder to scientific territory. This thesis tries to answer the following question: is it more beneficial if a modest form of pluralism is adopted for a better scientific practice? Integrative pluralism as a type of modest pluralism can be as pragmatic as the pluralist stance, without seeking theoretical unification but advocating explanatory resolution for a better scientific conduct.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed Sept. 22, 2008). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 477-517).

One cannot begin to understand the nature of Hul’qmi’num legal tradition without first acknowledging and understanding the relationship between culture and law. The Coast Salish people have a vibrant culture, influenced heavily by the nature of their relationships with their ancestors, their kin and their lands. These relationships permeate their legal tradition. Influencing not only regulatory aspects of law, but also dispute resolution processes. Trying to understand and appreciate this tradition outside of this worldview would be detrimental to the tradition itself, as I believe it would result in a transformation of the laws and practices. In thinking about the relationship between law and culture, this research has identified two fundamental categories of law within the Hul’qumi’num legal tradition: 1) snuw’uyulh and 2) family laws. Snuw’uyulh refers to a condition generated by the application of seven teachings: 1) Sts’lhnuts’amat (“Kinship/Family”); 2) Si’emstuhw (“Respect”); 3) Nu stl’I ch (“Love”); 4) Hw’uywulh (“Sharing/Support”); 5) Sh-tiiwun (“Responsibility”); 6) Thu’it (“Trust”); and 7) Mel’qt (“Forgiveness”). Accordingly, universal teachings seek to foster harmony, peacefulness, solidarity and kinship between all living beings and nature in the world. In a sense, snuw’uyulh is a state or condition and Hul’qumi’num legal tradition encompasses all the animating norms, customs and traditions that produce or maintain that state. As a result, Hul’qumi’num law functions as the device that produces or maintains the state of snuw’uyulh. There is another fundamental category of law present within the Hul’qumi’num world – family laws. Family laws encompass the norms, customs and traditions, or customary laws, which produce or maintain the state of snuw’uyulh. Law is a practice – an activity. Arguably, much of the practice of law takes places in the form of regulation and conflict and dispute resolution. Similar to how law cannot be separate from its surrounding culture, nor can the processes developed to resolve conflicts in the law. Since time immemorial the Hul’qumi’num Mustimuhw have utilized processes and practices to resolve conflicts and disputes both within their communities and with other communities in the Coast Salish world. Although the processes and practices have varied over time, it is possible to identify several inherent standards of conflict resolution which the Hul’qumi’num people continue to utilize in resolving their disputes. / Graduate / Sarah.Morales@uottawa.ca

The theory of constitutional pluralism suggests that interacting legal orders that are (or claim to be) constitutional in nature need not—and should not—necessarily be regarded as being hierarchically arranged, with one ‘on top of’ the others. Rather, the relationships between the orders can be conceived of heterarchically. However, there is an assumption in much of the literature that the ‘interface norms’ that regulate the relationships within such a heterarchy are universal by nature, capable of undifferentiated application across differing constitutional orders. This thesis examines whether interface norms are in fact universal by nature, or whether they are relationship- and context-dependent, taking as its field of study three interacting legal orders—those of Ireland, the European Union, and the European Convention on Human Rights. It uses an established model of constitutional pluralism based on ‘coordinate constitutionalism’ to test the assumption of universality across three constitutional frames: the ‘vertical’ relationship between Ireland and the European orders, the ‘horizontal’ relationship between the European orders, and the ‘triangular’ panoply of state, Union and Convention. Having analysed the interface norms at work in these relationships, both in isolation and in the round, the thesis concludes that these norms are not in fact universal, and that different conceptions of constitutional pluralism need to pay much greater attention to the specific nature of any given constitutional order and its relationship with other orders in the constitutional heterarchy.