The United States has a long-standing history of appropriating Indigenous representations for the use of mascots in athletics. Despite protest by Indigenous groups against this practice, professional athletics teams continue to appropriate Indigenous representations as mascots. The National Congress of American Indians produced a public service announcement (PSA), Proud to Be (PTB), to elicit support from the general public for changing the name/mascot Redskins. The purpose of the proposed research is to experimentally examine the effects that PTB has on support among Non-Indigenous participants, as function of political alignment. We considered two competing outcomes: The Counterproductive Hypothesis predicts the more conservative participants are, the less supportive they will be of changing the Redskin name/mascot, especially after watching the PTB rather than two control PSAs (directed at ending the word retard or reducing texting and driving). We also expect that the more conservative participants are, the less supportive they will be of either “name change” campaign, especially the one that corresponds with the PSA they view. Alternately, The Effective Hypothesis predicts if the PSA induces empathy among viewers, it could elicit support independent of political perspective. That is, participants will be supportive of changing the Redskin name/mascot after watching PTB rather than either control PSA. This effect will occur through the effects of PTB on increased empathy (specific to the target group). Preliminary analyses provide support for the Effective Hypothesis: Regardless of political perspective, participants experienced increased empathy for Indigenous People after viewing PTB, which led to increased support for the message promoted by Proud to Be.

Thesis advisor: Michael D. Grubb / Thesis advisor: Julie Holland Mortimer / This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays that explore industrial organization of the advertising agency and airline markets, as well as the role of local political environment in identification of treatment effects in minimum wage studies. In the first chapter, “Competitor Avoidance and the Structure of the Advertising Agency Industry in the United States,” co-authored with Sylvia Hristakeva, we develop an applied theory model to show that the tendency of advertisers to avoid sharing their agencies with product-market competitors may have led to creation of a unique organizational structure in the advertising agency market, known as a holding company (HC). HCs control multiple agencies and coordinate their bidding choices when competing for new clients. Although many other professional service markets, such as markets for legal and accounting services, feature competitor avoidance, HCs are forbiddingly costly in these markets due to restrictions on outside ownership. Using a theoretical model, we show that HC structure helps agencies manage client conflicts by allowing them to choose an unconflicted agency to bid for a client. We collect a novel dataset on identities of bidding agencies and estimate that serving an advertiser's competitor reduces an agency's odds to compete for the advertiser by 91.6 percent. We predict that the market concentration would increase by 35 percent if competitor avoidance was not a factor in this market. We also predict that banning bid coordination within HCs would increase the average number of bidders in an account review from four to nine. Auction theory predicts that an increase in the number of bidders would create a downward pressure on the mark-ups charged by agencies, however some of this pressure may be counteracted by increased costs of winning a client due to entering multiple bids. In the second chapter, “’Use It or Lose It,’ or ‘Cheat and Keep?’ The Effects of Slot Restrictions on Airline Incentives,” co-authored with Ratib Ali, we investigate the impact of slot control on competition in the domestic airline market. The Federal Aviation Administration manages congestion in high-density airports by capping the number of flights permitted in any given hour and allocating the rights (or slots) to a take-off or landing among airlines. Airlines must use their slots at least 80% of the time to keep them for the next season. This rule creates a perverse incentive for airlines to hold on to underutilized slots by operating unprofitable flights instead of forfeiting these slots to a rival. Using exogenous removal of slot control at the Newark Airport in 2016, we investigate the lengths at which airlines go to meet the minimum requirements that let them keep the slots while violating what a neutral observer might call the “spirit” of the regulation. In the third chapter, “Political Trends in Minimum Wage Policy Evaluation Studies,” co-authored with Andrew Copland and Jean-François Gauthier, we explore the role of local political environment in identification of treatment effects in minimum wage studies. The effects of minimum wage on employment in low-wage sectors have long been debated in the literature. Some economists find small disemployment effects, whereas others argue that these effects are close to zero and statistically insignificant. The core of the debate lies in establishing adequate control groups for areas that experience minimum wage changes. At the same time, minimum wage changes are almost always a consequence of a political vote. Our paper adds to the debate surrounding control group identification by highlighting the importance of accounting for underlying political trends. Failure to do so may result in a violation of the standard “parallel trends” assumption maintained in most of the literature. We illustrate this possibility by re-estimating Dube et al. (2010) on a sample of politically aligned and unaligned counties and controlling for state expenditures that may be used to finance confounding policies. We document that the sample of never politically aligned county pairs produces a positive and significant estimate of elasticity of employment (0.245), suggesting that the restaurant industry labor market may be non-competitive. In contrast, when we restrict the Dube et al. (2010) sample to perfectly politically aligned counties, we obtain a marginally significant estimate of employment elasticity of -0.145. These two estimates explain the seminal result in Dube et al. (2010) that the elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage is zero. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Submitted by Guilherme Silveira Leite (guilherme.silveira.leite@gmail.com) on 2016-03-09T03:49:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Guilherme_Leite.pdf: 761355 bytes, checksum: 943adb2f7b300c89b8c6a6dd02dbd45d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2016-03-10T16:13:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Guilherme_Leite.pdf: 761355 bytes, checksum: 943adb2f7b300c89b8c6a6dd02dbd45d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-10T16:16:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Guilherme_Leite.pdf: 761355 bytes, checksum: 943adb2f7b300c89b8c6a6dd02dbd45d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-17 / The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of electoral variables, such as political alignment and election years, in the public federal banks behavior. Using banking and electoral data for Brazilian municipalities, panel regressions are made in order to identify the credit and loss provisions pattern in political aligned cities through the electoral cycle. By the tests we found no evidence of credit or loss provisions increase related to the electoral variables, results that do not support the political use of public banks hypothesis. / O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar se a atuação dos bancos públicos federais é impactada por variáveis eleitorais como o alinhamento político e períodos de eleição. Utilizando dados de crédito bancário e dados eleitorais dos municípios brasileiros, são feitas regressões em painel para identificar o comportamento do crédito e das provisões dos bancos públicos federais em cidades politicamente alinhadas ao governo federal ao longo do ciclo eleitoral. Pelos testes realizados, não encontramos evidências de aumento da concessão do crédito ou de aumento das provisões relacionadas às variáveis eleitorais, resultados que não corroboram a hipótese de uso político dos bancos públicos.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar se municípios que possuem algum tipo de alinhamento político com o executivo federal possuem maiores chances de receber empréstimos do Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), e se esses são de maiores valores financeiros no caso da existência de tal alinhamento. Foi utilizado um painel de dados com os municípios brasileiros entre os anos de 2003 e 2010. Em ambas as análises, foram utilizados os métodos de dados empilhados, dos efeitos fixos e dos efeitos aleatórios. Os resultados indicam que o alinhamento exerce pouca influência sobre os empréstimos do BNDES. / This paper aims to investigate whether municipalities with any type of political alignment with the Federal Executive are more likely to take out loans from BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social) and whether the amounts are larger in such cases. A data panel on Brazilian municipalities between 2003 and 2010 was used. In both analyses performed, we used the pooled, fixed effects, and random effects estimation models. The results show that the political alignment exerts little influence on loans from BNDES to Brazilian municipalities.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo investigar se municípios que possuem algum tipo de alinhamento político com o executivo federal possuem maiores chances de receber empréstimos do Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES), e se esses são de maiores valores financeiros no caso da existência de tal alinhamento. Foi utilizado um painel de dados com os municípios brasileiros entre os anos de 2003 e 2010. Em ambas as análises, foram utilizados os métodos de dados empilhados, dos efeitos fixos e dos efeitos aleatórios. Os resultados indicam que o alinhamento exerce pouca influência sobre os empréstimos do BNDES. / This paper aims to investigate whether municipalities with any type of political alignment with the Federal Executive are more likely to take out loans from BNDES (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social) and whether the amounts are larger in such cases. A data panel on Brazilian municipalities between 2003 and 2010 was used. In both analyses performed, we used the pooled, fixed effects, and random effects estimation models. The results show that the political alignment exerts little influence on loans from BNDES to Brazilian municipalities.

[pt] Esta tese é uma coleção de três ensaios empíricos em economia bancária no Brasil. O capítulo 1 mostra evidências que cidades governadas por prefeitos da base aliada do governo federal recebem mais crédito de bancos públicos federais. Utilizando uma base de dados longitudinal única que cruza informações de crédito em nível municipal com resultados eleitorais no período 1997-2008, eu exploro variações no alinhamento político de cada município ao longo do tempo para estimar seu impacto no montante de crédito. Como resultado, observo que os bancos públicos federais aumentam seus empréstimos em 10 por cento a mais em cidades alinhadas. Em resposta, os bancos privados restringem sua expansão de crédito nessas localidades, embora o efeito líquido seja de um aumento no crédito agregado para cidades alinhadas, deixando a questão de uma provável má alocação de capital entre cidades. Eu também utilizo outra base de dados de crédito única e ainda mais abrangente, disponível somente a partir de 2004, e emprego a metodologia de regressão com descontinuidade em disputas eleitorais apertadas para avaliar possíveis problemas de identificação. Em contraste com a literatura, eu observo que os resultados não são conduzidos por empréstimos direcionados, mas por operações de crédito livre. O capítulo 2 analisa firmas que contribuem para campanhas eleitorais de modo a testar a hipótese de favorecimento de crédito como retribuição a contribuição de campanha. Combinando dados de contribuição de campanha e informações de crédito ao nível da firma, eu exploro variações em uma mesma firma ao longo do tempo para testar se aquelas que contribuem para partidos da base aliada do governo federal recebem mais crédito de bancos públicos federais. Os resultados indicam que contribuintes de campanha de partidos da base aliada têm maior proporção de seu crédito oriundo de bancos públicos federais e tomam de uma maneira geral 20 por cento a mais de crédito que firmas que contribuem para outros partidos. No capítulo 3, eu aproveito da introdução de uma nova forma de seguro depósito voluntário, conhecido por DPGE (Depósito a Prazo com Garantias Especiais), para avaliar questões relevantes relativas a corrida bancária, liquidez de mercado (market liquidity) e liquidez na captação (funding liquidity). Primeiramente, documento uma corrida de depositantes a bancos pequenos e médios no Brasil após o agravamento da crise financeira global de 2008. A seguir, observo que esta corrida bancária foi impulsionada primordialmente por investidores institucionais. Em seguida, demonstro que, em resposta ao enfraquecimento da posição no seu passivo, os bancos reduziram seu ativo liquidando suas posições de crédito. Em quarto lugar, encontro evidências de que a introdução do DPGE ajudou a estabilizar as captações bancárias. Com este novo instrumento, os certificados de depósito (CD) passaram a ser segurados em até 20 milhões de reais, enquanto os demais eram segurados em até 60 mil reais. Por fim, demonstro que bancos com menor liquidez nos ativos foram aqueles que escolheram emitir DPGE, apesar de seu elevado custo (emissores devem pagar prêmio mensal de mais de seis vezes o valor cobrado em depósitos segurados convencionais). Portanto, restaurar a liquidez pelo lado do passivo (funding liquidity) foi mais importante a bancos mais afetados pela liquidez de mercado (market liquidity), ou seja, para aqueles com menos ativos líquidos. Uma investigação dos determinantes da emissão de DPGE mostra que: 1) bancos mais dependentes de cessão de carteira de crédito antes da crise estão mais propensos a emitir no novo esquema de depósito segurado; e 2) bancos com proporção mais elevada de crédito em relação ao ativo estão mais propensos a emitir sob o novo esquema, embora os resultados sejam menos precisos. Tais resultados são importantes por diversas razões. Primeiramente, estão entre os primeiros resultados empíricos a documentar a relação entre liquidez de mercado (ma / [en] This thesis is a collection of three empirical essays on banking using Brazilian data. Chapter 1 provides evidence that cities ruled by a mayor from the presidential coalition s party receive significantly more credit from public federally owned banks. Using a unique longitudinal database that matches branch-level credit information with election outcomes over the period 1997-2008, I explore the within-municipality variation in political alignment to estimate the impact of alignment on the amount of credit. I find that public federal banks increase their lending 10 per cent more in aligned cities. In response, private banks contract credit, but the net effect is an increase in aggregate credit to aligned cities, raising the issue of a misallocation of capital across cities. I also use another unique and more comprehensive credit database, available only since 2004, and apply a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to address possible identification concerns. In contrast with the received literature, I find that the results are not driven by earmarked lending, but by non-earmarked operations. Chapter 2 focuses the analysis on firms that donate to electoral campaigns in order to test for the hypothesis of favored lending as a reward mechanism for campaign giving. I combine data from firm level campaign contributions with credit information and explore within-firm variation in order to test whether donating to aligned parties results in a better access to credit from public federal banks. Results indicate that campaign contributors to aligned parties have a higher lending share from public federal banks and borrow 20 per cent more than firms that donate to nonaligned parties. In Chapter 3 I take advantage of the introduction of a voluntary deposit insurance program to address several important questions concerning bank runs, market liquidity and funding liquidity. I first document a depositors run on small and medium banks in Brazil after the worsening of the global financial crisis. Second, I find that the bank run was led mainly by institutional investors. Third, I show that, in response to the weakening position on the liability side, banks responded by liquidating their credit position on the asset side of the balance sheet. Fourth, I find evidence that the introduction of a new voluntary insurance instrument called DPGE (Time Deposits with Special Insurance) seemed to have helped stabilize banks positions. Under DPGE, Certificates of Deposit (CD) are insured up to 20 million reais, while standard non-DPGE other time deposits are secured up to 60 thousand reais. Fifth, I show that banks whose assets were more illiquid selected themselves into expensive DPGE (issuers have to pay monthly premium of more than six times the value charged on conventionally insured deposits). Thus, providing funding liquidity was more important for banks that were more affected by market liquidity (having less liquid assets). An investigation of the determinants of issuing DPGE shows that: 1) banks that relied more on credit assignments before the crisis are more likely to issue under the new insurance scheme; 2) banks with higher credit-to-assets ratios are also more likely to issue under the new scheme, although the results on credit-to-assets are a little less precise. These results are important for several reasons. First, they are the first empirical results to document the relationship between market and funding liquidity. In particular, self-selecting into DPGE allows us to see that banks with more illiquid assets need more funding liquidity in the midst of a crisis. Second, the fact of the voluntary nature of the program is interesting per se. By providing voluntary, albeit expensive, insurance, banks may self-select only when they have little option (because of asset-side market illiquidity). Although I do not perform a full welfare analysis, this suggests that mandatory insurance may be sub-optimal for two reasons. First, banks that do not need it may be paying excessive premiums. Second, mandatory insurance may