This thesis is a case study about Corporate Social Responsibility in Chinese media industry. The implementation of CSR in state-owned media companies and private media companies are different. The role that the government play in Chinese media companies implementing CSR were barely studied before. Since this thesis is a case study, two media companies were chosen for this study. One is CCTV, a state-owned media company, another is Tencent, a private media company. Document analysis was chosen as the main method for the analysis. Stakeholder theory, corporate political connection, and meta-governance are the main theories used in this study. In this thesis, the analysis of implementing CSR is divided into two dimensions, internally and externally implementing CSR. The internal dimension is further analyzed in three aspects, employees and health at work, shareholders, and public welfare and charitable activities. The external dimension is further analyzed in four aspects, customers, business partners, local community, and government. The role of the government in companies implementing CSR is subsequently analyzed. The results show that in implementing CSR, state-owned media companies significantly different from private companies. State-owned media companies follow more on government’s guidance, private media companies have more freedom but they still need to build a good relationship with the government. The role of the government in both companies is different. The role of the government in state-owned media companies is like a leader, and in private media companies is like an important stakeholder.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2017-08-31T13:48:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1659534 bytes, checksum: 1b2924b9fd8a32a8b34b8c78d7f46089 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Viviane Lima da Cunha (viviane@biblioteca.ufpb.br) on 2017-08-31T15:55:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1659534 bytes, checksum: 1b2924b9fd8a32a8b34b8c78d7f46089 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Viviane Lima da Cunha (viviane@biblioteca.ufpb.br) on 2017-08-31T15:59:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1659534 bytes, checksum: 1b2924b9fd8a32a8b34b8c78d7f46089 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-31T15:59:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1659534 bytes, checksum: 1b2924b9fd8a32a8b34b8c78d7f46089 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This study sought to analyze the effect of the political connections on the cost and the corporate debt gain, assuming the importance of the benefits tied to the government's political interference in the firms. Based on the model proposed by Bliss and Gull (2012), the political connections were measured in a way adapted to the Brazilian context, following three means in which the government uses to maintain links with the organizations, they are: the connection by property structure , By board of directors and by donations or financing to the electoral campaigns. The sample consisted of 233 companies that had their cost and their debt gain quantified, verified the possible relations with the political connections and some financial characteristics, through regressions by the Weighted Least Squares Method (MQP), a methodology that seeks to assign a lower Weight to the observations that have greater variance of the error. In the results it was possible to observe, from the descriptive analyzes, a median of the debt cost per year of 16.72. It can also be observed that the effective gain of the debt, from the reduction of its cost, is not enjoyed by all the companies in the sample. Based on the regression analysis, it can be observed that the companies that hold the government ownership, with the direct shareholding in their shareholding structure, have a reduced debt cost in relation to the other companies in the sample. In addition, the evidence indicates that companies that have members of their Boards of Directors with political backgrounds earn higher debt gains. Thus, it is possible to emphasize that the main contributions of this study refer to the evidence that the political connections of companies in Brazil are directly related to the reduction of the cost of corporate debt, which is also confirmed by the study of their positive relations With the debt gain, since it is possible to notice that politically connected companies have a greater reduction of their cost of debt than their cost of equity. This suggests that such firms may be having greater access to the reduced interest rates of public banks. / Este estudo buscou analisar qual é o efeito das conexões políticas sobre o custo e o ganho da dívida das empresas, pressupondo a importância dos benefícios atrelados à interferência política do governo nas firmas. Com base no modelo proposto por Bliss e Gull (2012), as conexões políticas foram mensuradas de modo adaptado ao contexto brasileiro, seguindo três meios em que o governo se utiliza para manter elos com as organizações, são eles: a conexão por estrutura de propriedade, por conselho de administração e por doações ou financiamentos às campanhas eleitorais. A amostra contou com 233 empresas que tiveram seu custo e seu ganho da dívida quantificado, verificadas as possíveis relações com as conexões políticas e algumas características financeiras, por meio de regressões pelo Método dos Mínimos Quadrados Ponderados (MQP), metodologia que busca atribuir um menor peso às observações que possuem maior variância do erro. Nos resultados foi possível notar, a partir das análises descritivas, uma mediana do custo da dívida ao ano de 16,72. Também pode ser observado que o ganho efetivo da dívida, proveniente da redução de seu custo, não é desfrutado por todas as empresas da amostra. Com base nas análises de regressão, pode-se observar que as empresas que mantêm em sua estrutura acionária a propriedade do governo, com a participação acionária de forma direta, apresentam um custo da dívida reduzido em relação às demais empresas da amostra. Adicionalmente, as evidências indicam que empresas que possuem membros de seus Conselhos de Administração com antecedentes políticos auferem maiores ganhos da dívida. Dessa forma, é possível destacar que as principais contribuições deste estudo se referem às evidências de que as conexões políticas das empresas no Brasil estão diretamente ligadas à redução do custo da dívida das empresas, o que é ratificado pelo estudo, também, de suas relações positivas com o ganho da dívida, uma vez que é possível notar que empresas conectadas politicamente possuem maior redução de seu custo da dívida do que do seu custo de capital próprio. Isto sugere que tais empresas podem estar tendo maior acesso às taxas de juros reduzidas dos bancos públicos.

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Corporate political connections have been shown to induce preferential treatment towards connected firms. This thesis evaluates whether the effect of connections is reflected in the composition of public procurement suppliers in Czechia, using municipal procurement awarded between 2006 and 2020. In particular, we hypothesise that changes in municipal mayors affected the rate of new procurement suppliers following the elections in 2014 and 2018. The findings show that the rate of new suppliers increased significantly in municipalities that elected a new mayor in the 2014 elections; however, the effects appeared to be negative in 2018. We further hypothesise that these results can be driven by the major success of new political parties in 2014, with a large share of new politicians being elected to office. We specifically examine the case of ANO, the political movement that dominated both elections. We do not find robust evidence of a surge in new suppliers in municipalities where ANO was notably successful, suggesting that the effect was not driven only by this party and pointing to alternative explanations.

[pt] Nesse artigo, eu estudo a relação de alocação de crédito e contribuições de camapanhas políticas. Para atingir tal objetivo, eu uso dados de emprestimo das opereções indiretas do banco nacional de desenvolvimento economômico e social (BNDES) no nível da firma entre 2003 e 2014. Explorando variação da mesma empresa contribuindo e não contribuindo para campanhas políticas e de tipos de bancos, eu testo se firmas que contribuíram para campanhas políticas no nível federal têm acesso preferencial a credito por meio de efeito fixo de firma-banco, firma-tempo e de banco-tempo. Eu encontro que empresas conectadas politicamente vêem sua probabilidade de receber um empréstimo de bancos federais aumentar. Por outro lado, elas têm uma probabilidade menor de receber de bancos privados. Resultados na margem intensiva indicam que empresas conectadas com políticos no nível federal recebem, em média, contratos de crédito maiores de bancos federais. Além disso, essas empresas tomam emprestado valores menores de bancos privados. Esse efeito é concentrado na linha de crédito usada para financiar máquinas e equipamentos. Efeitos heterogêneos de conexões com candidatos ganhadores e perdedores variam de acordo com o modelo econométrico. / [en] In this paper, I study the relationship between allocation of credit and political campaign contribution. In order to achieve this goal, I use loan data on indirect operations from Brazilian development bank (BNDES) at the firm level between 2003 and 2014. Exploring variation for the same firm contributing and not contributing to political campaign and for type of bank, I test if firms that contribute to political campaign at the federal level have preferential access to credit through firm-bank, firm-time and bank-time fixed effect. I find that politically connected firms increase their likelihood of receiving a loan from state-owned banks. On the other hand, they have a lower probability of receiving a loan from private banks. Results for intensive margin show that companies connected with politicians at the federal level receive, on average, greater credit from federal banks. In addition, these companies borrow lower amounts from private banks. This effect is concentrated on the credit line used to fund machine and equipment. Heterogeneous effects of connections with winning and losing candidates vary according to the econometric model I use.

Yes / While previous research has emphasized the role of stakeholder pressures, firm‐specific factors, as well as CEO characteristics as important drivers of corporate social responsibility (CSR) implementation, our understanding of how political connections impact small and medium‐sized enterprises' (SMEs') CSR implementation expenditure is quite limited. In this study, we contribute to filling this gap by investigating the effects of political connections and CSR expenditure and explain the conditions that impact this relationship. Using data from 473 SMEs in Ghana, we find that political connections negatively influence CSR implementation expenditure. However, the negative effect is weakened when a firms' reputation and competitive CSR implementation pressures are high. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. / University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

Cette thèse est composée de trois chapitres distincts qui visent à analyser empiriquement la prise de décisions des entreprises et/ou des dirigeants dans le champ de la comptabilité financière. Le premier chapitre, co-écrit avec Francois Brochet et Sven Michael Spira, analyse comment le risque d’action collective sur les marchés financiers pour des raisons liées à des investissement discipline le comportement des dirigeants et réduit les coûts d’agence. Le deuxième chapitre étudie comment des changements de règlementation sur le marché du travail crée des incitations pour les dirigeants à manipuler leurs comptes autrement, ce qui est néfaste pour l’entreprise. Le troisième chapitre, co-écrit avec Renaud Coulomb et Marc Sangnier, étudie comment les connections politiques conduisent les dirigeants des entreprises à commettre des délits d’initiés présumés. / This dissertation is composed of three distinct chapters that empirically investigate various forms of decision-making by firms and/or managers in the field of empirical financial accounting. The first chapter presents a work joint with Francois Brochet and Sven Michael Spira, analyzing how the risk of securities lawsuit for investment-related reasons disciplines managers and reduce agency concerns with respect to investment. The second chapter examines how changes in labor regulation affect managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings using other tools that are ultimately detrimental to firms. The third chapter, joint with Renaud Coulomb and Marc Sangnier, explores how political connections lead directors to engage in plausibly fraudulent insider trading in financial markets.

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The Value of Political Connections: Evidence from the Czech Republic Miroslav Palanský Abstract This thesis estimates the value of political connections in the Czech Republic and it is divided into two parts. The first one explores the recently extended, most advanced publicly available data set on political party financing in the Czech Republic, covering the time period 1995-2015. We analyze basic patterns in party funding and their development over time. We focus primarily on private funding from both legal and natural persons. The data show that there exists substantial heterogeneity in the volume of private funding across parties and over time, but contributions from the government budget remain the most important source of income for all larger parties. We analyze the available data on donations and discuss several issues regarding the notion that donors may view contributions as investment, yielding possible profits in the future. In the second part, we use the data set of corporate donations to construct a proxy variable for political connections and to estimate the effect of being connected to a political party on the financial performance of such firms. We find that the connected firms perform significantly better than the non- connected ones in the years following the establishment of the...

Politically connected firms may extract rent which significantly improves their financial performance, but with social costs to others in form of market distortions. The thesis presents the first empirical analysis of personal political connections to government ministers in the Czech Republic. We estimated value of political connections and inspected subsidies and public procurements allocation as channels of rent extraction on firm-level data set of 1993-2015 period. For both approaches, cross-section regressions and dynamic matching on covariates and propensity score, we found that connected firms significantly underperform their similar rivals, but slightly improve their performance over the time of connection to minister in office. Connected firms gain significantly more subsidies which confirms subsidy allocation as a channel of rent extraction. We interpret our results that firms may seek political connections as the last option how to improve their bad financial results and remain on the market. Biased subsidy allocation to connected firms in sectors where firms are dependent on subsidies like agriculture creates market distortions and could lead to significant consumer harm.