This thesis examines the nature of the relationship between migrants’ ideology and the dominant political culture in their host country, exploring what happened to German liberal migrant politicians in 19th century Wisconsin and Queensland. It does this by using Louis Hartz’s fragment theory which he developed in The Liberal Tradition in America and The Founding of New Societies. Hartz argues that the crucial factor in the political development of the new settler new societies was the migration of a fragment of European society bound by a common Weltanschauung or world view. In the United States, Hartz identifies the relevant group as the Puritans who fled Britain in the 17th century, and whose Calvinism he links to Lockean liberalism. Hartz and his collaborator Richard Rosecrance, who wrote the Australian section of New Societies, argue Australia was shaped by the lower-middle and working-class migrant fragment, inspired by political reform movement in England, and who arrived in the first half of the 19th century armed with a utilitarian-radical ideology. With no strong opposition these fragments congeal without reference to Europe and stagnate into monolithic political cultures where all the disparate elements merge into a broad - although at times quarrelsome – national consensus. According to Hartz, this consensus is re-enforced by the individualist capitalism of The American Dream or the radical collectivism of The Australian Legend – which become the foundation of the two nations’ respective national character. Hartz acknowledges that the new migrant from Europe is a constant threat to this political-cultural status quo. However, he says by “consciously articulating the fragment ethic”, the new migrant is absorbed, keeping in check the ideological challenges inherent in migration. This thesis argues that, in the case of the German liberals, who left their homeland in the 1840s and 1850s, the process was more complex than the one Hartz describes. In Wisconsin, German liberalism was most aligned to Jeffersonian democracy and the Germans either rejected outright or never fully embraced other strands within the political consensus such as Puritan moralism, Jacksonian democracy and Hamiltonian federalism. In Queensland their German liberalism was most compatible with utilitarianism and the Germans rejected most elements of classical liberalism, the evangelical element within social liberalism and the working-class radicalism of the Labor Party. They accepted Jeffersonian democracy and utilitarianism in their respective new homes because they were closest to their core German liberal principles of secularism, the primacy of the rule of law, romanticism, opposition to the aristocracy, and an aversion to rampant capitalism. Most important, however, were their attitudes towards the Staat and Volk. The Staat was both as a potential enemy and also a vital ally in liberal reform and the Volk were seen as potential colleagues in a liberal state but also as a danger to stability. Over the course of their careers they ideologically realigned, leaving parties and factions whenever challenged and using their German liberal ideals as their political reference point.

This thesis examines the nature of the relationship between migrants’ ideology and the dominant political culture in their host country, exploring what happened to German liberal migrant politicians in 19th century Wisconsin and Queensland. It does this by using Louis Hartz’s fragment theory which he developed in The Liberal Tradition in America and The Founding of New Societies. Hartz argues that the crucial factor in the political development of the new settler new societies was the migration of a fragment of European society bound by a common Weltanschauung or world view. In the United States, Hartz identifies the relevant group as the Puritans who fled Britain in the 17th century, and whose Calvinism he links to Lockean liberalism. Hartz and his collaborator Richard Rosecrance, who wrote the Australian section of New Societies, argue Australia was shaped by the lower-middle and working-class migrant fragment, inspired by political reform movement in England, and who arrived in the first half of the 19th century armed with a utilitarian-radical ideology. With no strong opposition these fragments congeal without reference to Europe and stagnate into monolithic political cultures where all the disparate elements merge into a broad - although at times quarrelsome – national consensus. According to Hartz, this consensus is re-enforced by the individualist capitalism of The American Dream or the radical collectivism of The Australian Legend – which become the foundation of the two nations’ respective national character. Hartz acknowledges that the new migrant from Europe is a constant threat to this political-cultural status quo. However, he says by “consciously articulating the fragment ethic”, the new migrant is absorbed, keeping in check the ideological challenges inherent in migration. This thesis argues that, in the case of the German liberals, who left their homeland in the 1840s and 1850s, the process was more complex than the one Hartz describes. In Wisconsin, German liberalism was most aligned to Jeffersonian democracy and the Germans either rejected outright or never fully embraced other strands within the political consensus such as Puritan moralism, Jacksonian democracy and Hamiltonian federalism. In Queensland their German liberalism was most compatible with utilitarianism and the Germans rejected most elements of classical liberalism, the evangelical element within social liberalism and the working-class radicalism of the Labor Party. They accepted Jeffersonian democracy and utilitarianism in their respective new homes because they were closest to their core German liberal principles of secularism, the primacy of the rule of law, romanticism, opposition to the aristocracy, and an aversion to rampant capitalism. Most important, however, were their attitudes towards the Staat and Volk. The Staat was both as a potential enemy and also a vital ally in liberal reform and the Volk were seen as potential colleagues in a liberal state but also as a danger to stability. Over the course of their careers they ideologically realigned, leaving parties and factions whenever challenged and using their German liberal ideals as their political reference point.

Orientador: Leila Mezan Algranti / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-22T04:16:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Meirelles_JulianaGesuelli_D.pdf: 3797424 bytes, checksum: 1fbaa0a6e0395af649cfd590e5f16c0f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: Esta tese investiga os possíveis sentidos da política cultural durante a governança de D. João no mundo luso-brasileiro entre os anos de 1792-1821. O ponto de partida da pesquisa dá-se no início de sua Regência (1792) e encerra-se com seu retorno a Lisboa (1821). Sob as diretrizes do iluminismo luso-brasileiro, a investigação das especificidades da política cultural joanina recaiu sobre quatro locus de cultura de ampla interlocução social: a imprensa interatlântica, os Reais teatros, as Reais Academias Militares e as Reais Bibliotecas Públicas da Corte. Através de uma abordagem interatlântica, buscamos compreender as peculiaridades da administração joanina no universo da cultura em um período de grave crise política no Império Português / Abstract: This thesis investigates the cultural policy fostered by D. João's government in the Luso-Brazilian world during the years 1792-1891. The project has as its starting point the beginning of his reign (1792) and concludes with his return to Lisbon (1821). In the light of the Luso-Brazilian Enlightenment, the research has focused on 4 cultural locus of wide-ranging social reach: the inter-Atlantic press, the Royal theatres, the Royal military academies and the Court's Royal public libraries. Through an inter-Atlantic approach, the present study hopes to understand the intricacies of D. João's administration of the cultural sector in a period of deep political crisis in the Portuguese Empire / Doutorado / Politica, Memoria e Cidade / Doutora em História

Early modern Poland-Lithuania figured significantly in the political perceptions of Europeans in the long seventeenth century – not only due to its considerable size and enormous commercial and military resources, but also, and just as importantly, due to its exceptional religious and political situation. This interest in Poland-Lithuania was shared by many Britons. However, a detailed examination of how Britons perceived Poland-Lithuania at that time and how they treated Poland-Lithuania in their political debates has never been undertaken. This thesis utilises a wide range of the previously neglected source material and considers the patterns of transmission of information to determine Britons' awareness of Poland-Lithuania and their employment of the Polish-Lithuanian example in the British political discourse during the seventeenth century. It looks at a variety of geographical and historical information, English and Latin descriptions of Poland-Lithuania's physical topography and boundaries, and its ethnic and cultural make-up presented in histories, atlases and maps, to establish what, where and who Poland-Lithuania was for Britons. Poland-Lithuania's political framework, with its composite structure and unique relationship between the crown and nobility, elicited a spectrum of reactions, and so this thesis evaluates the role that both criticism and praise of Poland-Lithuania played in British constitutional debates. Consequently, the study argues that Britons' perceptions of Poland-Lithuania were characterised by great plasticity. It claims that Britons' impressions of the country were shaped by multiple – real or imagined - borders, whether cultural, economic or political, but also that Britons were affected by the exposure to a uniform, idealised historiography of this country. Crucially, the thesis asserts that references to Poland-Lithuania constituted an ingenious ideological and polemical device that was eagerly used throughout the period by Britons of diverse political sympathies. Moreover, through the examination of the kingdom's geopolitical role, particularly its fluctuating position as a “bulwark of Christendom”, side by side its engagement against Protestants, the thesis challenges the assumption that anti-Catholicism dominated seventeenth-century British perceptions of the world.

From the end of the 18th century, the view that youth had a political role to play spread among students in Europe. This view was directly opposed to the paternalistic authoritarian regimes governing the old universities like that at Uppsala, which had been organised as patriarchal corporations for some two hundred years. The thesis deals with the attempts of Uppsala students, despite their lack of formal power, to influence society and their own university. It focuses on the political culture manifested by the students, i.e., the forms that their political action took and the values that were involved. With a view to broadening the perception of student politics, the thesis examines student political action in relation to the prevailing distribution of power and the social settings within the university. The phenomenon of students participating in politics challanged the traditional patriarchal view of the social role appropriate for the young. Overt student politics were pursued principally from the base provided by the new student societies. The thesis includes a prosopographical study of the students involved in such societies. The overt opposition and organisational endeavours were, however, just the tip of the student political iceberg. Within the patriarchy, students were obliged to resort to covert politics, such as creating a commotion outside professors’ homes, failure to perform acts of courtesy and other anonymous or ambiguous actions. The mid 19th century saw a greater participation of students in open political interaction. At the same time, the need to comment and explain their political actions in the press inevitably deprived students of opportunities for surreptitious political action, and the phenomenon of covert student politics petered out. The conflict between the old university and the new student organisations was thus reflected in the relation between open and covert student politics, and shaped the development of these two spheres of activity.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Armed forces the world over have three primary functions — force development, force deployment and force employment. Defence policy plays a guiding role in all of these, but is especially important in establishing the rationale for the creation of those military capabilities that force development brings about. The end of the Cold War, which coincided with a new political dispensation in South Africa, also gave rise to a new security paradigm: a theory implying both a reduction in the utility of military force, and an adjustment in the use of military forces. This phenomenon changed the context within which states generate modern defence policy, but did not affect the causal relationship between policy publications and the outcomes of a military’s force development activities. Usually, a defence policy presupposes the development of armed forces that are effective and efficient at executing their mandate — a condition that is measurable in terms of the organisation’s levels integration, skill, quality and responsiveness. The thesis uses this concept, both as a point of departure and as a structural organising device, to describe the variance between defence policy and military capabilities. A general analysis of South Africa’s defence policy publications indicates that, indeed, the policymakers had thoroughly considered the armed forces’ effectiveness when they wrote the White Paper (1996) and the Defence Review (1998). By 2006, the South African Army has interpreted national defence policy and formulated a future strategy of its own, very much in alignment with the ‘modern system’ approach of the original policy publications. However, further analysis of the actual capabilities of the South African National Defence Force indicates a major variance between the relevant defence policy publications, the military’s force development outcomes, and the present demands of the South African security environment. There appears to be quite serious deficiencies in the attribute of integration, which arise primarily from political influences; furthermore, the military’s quality is under strain, mainly because of the defence force’s seeming inability to formulate a strategy that is not only acceptable, but also suitable and feasible. While the armed forces appear to be skilful enough to execute their present (peacetime) missions, success in the type of operations that policy demands is unlikely. In summary, the study suggests that the principal reason for the large variance between defence policy, military capabilities, and real operational demands stems from defence’s lack of responsiveness to its resource constraints and operational realities. The thesis therefore concludes that the defence force has been largely unsuccessful in complying with the demands of defence policy, irrespective of the fact that the policy by itself may be obsolete and/or inappropriate for the South African context; furthermore, that military effectiveness in meeting current operational demands is also doubtful. Finally, the defence force’s schizophrenic organisational culture may be the primary cause of it moving ever closer to reneging on its constitutional mandate. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Gewapende magte wêreldwyd het drie primêre funksies — magsontwikkeling, magsontplooiing en magsaanwending. Verdedigingsbeleid vervul ‘n rigtinggewende rol in al hierdie funksies, maar is veral belangrik om die skepping van die militêre vermoëns, wat deur magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite daargestel word, te regverdig. Gevolglik beoog hierdie tesis om die mate van ooreenkoms tussen die voorskrifte van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleid en die werklike militêre vermoëns van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag te beskryf, soos dit ontwikkel het tussen 2000 en 2011. Die einde van die Koue Oorlog (samelopend met die totstandkoming van ‘n nuwe bedeling in Suid-Afrika) het geboorte gegee aan nuwe denke betreffende veiligheid, wat ook ‘n afname in die nuttigheid van militêre mag en ‘n aanpassing in die aanwending van militêre magte tot gevolg gehad het. Hierdie verskynsel het die omgewing waarbinne moderne state verdedigingsbeleid ontwikkel verander, maar nie die kousale verband tussen beleidspublikasies en die uitkomste van ‘n weermag se magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite aangeraak nie. Gewoonlik veronderstel ‘n verdedigingsbeleid die ontwikkeling van gewapende magte wat doeltreffend en doelmatig is in die uitvoering van hul mandaat — ‘n toestand wat meetbaar is in terme van die organisasie se vlakke van integrasie, vaardigheid, kwaliteit, en hul vermoë om toepaslik op omgewigsinvloede te reageer. Die tesis gebruik hierdie konsep, beide as ‘n vertrekpunt en as ‘n strukturele ordeningsmeganisme, en om die verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid en militêre vermoëns te beskryf. ‘n Algemene ontleding van Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleidspublikasies toon dat, met die skryf van die Witskrif (1996) en Verdedigingsoorsig (1998), beleidmakers wel deeglike oorweging geskenk het aan die weermag se doeltreffenheid; so ook die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër, wat teen 2006 sy eie toekomsstrategie die lig laat sien het. Desnieteenstaande getuig verdere ontleding van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasional Weermag se werklike vermoëns van diepgaande verskille tussen verbandhoudende beleidspublikasies, die weermag se ontwikkelingsuitkomste, en die huidige eise van die Suid-Afrikaanse veiligheidsomgewing. Dit wil voorkom asof daar ernstige integrasie-leemtes is, komende hoofsaaklik vanuit die politieke omgewing; verder is die gewapende magte se kwaliteit onder druk, hoofsaaklik vanweë die weermag se onvermoë om ‘n strategie te formuleer wat gelyktydig aanvaarbaar, geskik en uitvoerbaar is. Die gewapende magte mag dalk vaardig genoeg wees om hul huidige (vredestydse) take te verrig, maar dit is te betwyfel of hulle suksesvol sal wees in die voer van die tipe operasies soos beleid voorgeskryf. Ter opsomming dui die studie aan dat die groot verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid, militêre vermoëns en werklike operasionel eise voor die deur van ‘n gebrek aan doelmatige aanpassing by hulpbrontekorte en operasionele werklikhede gelê kan word. Die tesis maak dus die gevolgtrekking dat die weermag grootliks onsuksesvol was om aan die vereistes van verdedigingsbeleid te voldoen, ongeag die feit dat verdedigingsbeleid op sigself verouderderd en/of ontoepaslik binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks mag wees; verder, dat militêre effektiwiteit ter voldoening aan huidige operasionele eise tans ook verdag is. Ten slotte is die weermag se tweeslagtige organisasiekultuur moontlik die belangrikste oorsaak van die neiging na die versaking van verdediging se grondwetlike mandaat.

In July, 2000, Mexico ended seven decades of single-party rule with the election of Vicente Fox as president, culminating its gran fiesta democrática of the 1990's. Less than a decade later, though, the party's over. Citizen disenchantment with politics is widespread: Mexicans profoundly distrust parties, politicians, and parliament. Mexico is hardly unique. Satisfaction with democracy is low, declining, or both in 72 new (or older, poor) democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. This dissertation analyzes the causes and consequences of the current Mexican malais--and of discontentment with democracy around the world. It addresses two groups of questions. First, what causes dissatisfaction with democracy? Does it attach to specific politicians or institutions, or to poor evaluations of government performance? Or does it bespeak a deeper frustration with democracy and its inability to meet citizens' expectation--particularly socioeconomic ones? Second, what does disillusionment bode for political participation? Do dissatisfied citizens quit voting? Do they become alienated or turn to confrontational participation? I argue that a main cause of political dissatisfaction is a citizen concept of democracy, "substantive" democracy, emphasizing economic improvement and social equity, combined with poor government performance in just those respects. This combination poses challenges for democracy in many countries, not just Mexico. Though citizens in apparently ineffective democracies are more disposed to entertain authoritarian alternative--which have already toppled some wavering democracies--most new democracies, including Mexico, have hung on. Widespread and deep dissatisfaction with democracy may jeopardize the survival of some new democracies, but the more immediate concern raised by dissatisfaction is its detrimental impact on political participation--and, ultimately, the quality of democracy. For citizens who conceive of democracy as an instrument of economic equality, their governments' failure to ameliorate poverty leads to disengagement from politics. These citizens vote and engage in institutional participation less often. Dissatisfaction also predisposes a small but significant minority of citizens to contentious political participation. Political dissatisfaction makes new democracies more likely to consolidate as what scholars have described as "semi-", "partial", or "illiberal" democracies. / text

In this thesis, a collective urban sector-consisting, in various different guises, of civic governments, urban merchants, and townspeople-is presented as a vital and distinctive component of later medieval English political society. The dynamics of this urban political sector are reconstructed through the use of a modified version of the 'urban systems' approach found in historical geography and economic history, positing that towns are defined by their evolving relationship with one another. Drawing from the municipal records of twenty-two towns, this thesis charts the composition of the later medieval English 'urban system' and the manner in which urban groups belonging to this 'system' participated in a broader national political sphere over four chronological periods-1413-35, 1435-50, 1450-61, and 1461-71. In 1413-35, the highly authoritative and institutionalised governments of Henry V and the child Henry VI fostered vertical relationships between the Crown and a variety of individual civic governments, leading both national and urban political actors to operate within a shared political culture, but not necessarily encouraging inter-urban political communication. This would change in the periods that followed, as the absence of strong royal authority after 1435 renewed the strength of lateral mercantile networks and facilitated the re-emergence of a semi-autonomous inter-urban political community, which saw little reason to participate in the civil wars of the early 1450s that now seemed divorced from its own interests. In the 1460s, however, the financially extractive policies of Edward IV once again gave civic governments and ordinary townspeople a greater stake in royal government, which was reflected in the high level of urban participation in the dynastic conflicts of 1469-71. The developments occurring in these four phases illustrate both the interdependence of urban and national politics in the later medieval period, and the mutability of their relationship with one another.

This dissertation discusses United Arab Emirates (UAE) state-society relations in historical perspective; analyses qualitatively the Emirati political culture; examines how the latter affects governmental policies in the UAE; and evaluates both qualitatively and quantitatively the political orientations and values of the Emirati educated youth. Through a discussion of existing theoretical and conceptual approaches, and the observation of the UAE case study, it argues that an important and overlooked dimension among students of state-society relations in authoritarian rentier states is citizens’ political culture, which should nonetheless be examined within a more integrative framework of analysis. Accordingly, this study employs a refined version of the holistic ‘state-in-society’ approach (Kamrava, 2008), in combination with rentier state theory (RST) and the political culture perspective (Almond & Verba, 1963), to qualitatively discuss the general Emirati political culture (agency/input), and assess how the latter affects governmental performance/policies (output); and to evaluate, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the political culture of the educated Emirati youth as the main potential supporters or opponents (agency/input) of the ruling elite. Adding to the debate around the continued significance and scope of RST, the dissertation concludes that the rentier nature of a state does not necessarily determine its people´s lack of interest in politics, but can actually empower them to challenge authoritarianism through political socialization. The historical approach to UAE political movements and discussion about contemporary political standpoints demonstrate that governmental policies (redistributive, co-optative, repressive, or reformist) are mainly driven by domestic pressure and run parallel to historical development of domestic political activism. Hence, rentierism by itself does is not sufficient to explain state-society relations in the Gulf region. Finally, the analysis and measurement of cognitive, affective and evaluative political orientations of Emirati UAEU students reflects that there is adherence to ‘post-materialistic’ and ‘self-expression’ values among important sectors of the Emirati educated youth, which are associated with the emergence of a participative political culture (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005): an ‘aspiring participant’ political culture.

The small island of St Barthélemy was a Swedish colony 1784–1878 and saw its greatest population growth and trade during the turn of the nineteenth century. This was because of Gustavia, the Swedish founded free port, which attracted mariners from the Caribbean, North America and Europe. Their goal was to become Swedish subjects, as Swedish neutrality provided a benefit during the various wars at this time between France, Great Britain and the United States. As these mariners changed their national allegiance from their country of origin to Sweden, questions about their political rights emerged. The makeup, as well as the role, of the local council became a contested issue between native and naturalized Swedes. This conflict, as well as many other local and global issues, was discussed in various mediums. I have examined petitions, the newspaper The Report of Saint Bartholomew and discussions within the council, to create an understanding of how political expression was formed by the population, as well as controlled by Swedish administrators. This analysis has been performed through an intersectional framework considering gender, race and ethnicity. My study shows that while most native and naturalized Swedes believed in input from the population, they had different perceptions of what the purpose of this input was. The Swedish administration saw the political participation of the naturalized population as purely advisory, without any obligation to perform its wishes, which the population resented and protested. Gender played a significant role in the formation of political expression, as masculinity was essential to the identity of white men and free men of colour as political subjects. Yet ethnicity, in terms of place of birth, had no significant impact among the free population’s political identity, although it did render them politically unreliable in the eye of native Swedish administration.