The <u>first essay</u> [“Twin Deficits and Free Lunches: Macroeconomic Outcomes In Anticipation of Foreign Aid”] concerns itself with situations in which private agents anticipate a future windfall (free lunch) that will help service the debt resulting from a present fiscal expansion (implemented via a temporary tax cut). Such expectations of a windfall can arise in the context of natural resource discoveries or, more interestingly, due to perceptions by agents in “too important to fail” countries that will be bailed out through higher foreign aid or debt relief. We employ an overlapping generations model featuring credit constraints to study the real effects of such free lunch expectations in a small open economy, drawing contrasts with the standard tax and money finance closure rules. The model is solved analytically and shows that anticipated aid is equivalent to current aid when agents have perfect foresight, so that a temporary tax cut is seen as permanent. Accordingly, agents raise their consumption and indebtedness (at the expense of future generations) by an amount that is an increasing function of their “impatience” (subjective rates of time preference plus probability of death). A worsening of the current account obtains (twin deficits) across a range of plausible closure rules, including those featuring money finance. The introduction of credit constrained households (we study the variant where myopic agents spend their current disposable incomes) does not alter the basic result in the case of full aid finance, but does matter for mixed tax-aid regimes, in more complex settings where agent expectations and donor promises on aid diverge, and when governments face borrowing constraints so that the timing of aid delivery matters. The <u>second essay</u> [“The Role of Domestic Debt in Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation For Developing Economies”] focuses on the remaining source of government financing, i.e. domestic debt, and the role it can play in mobilizing private savings, facilitating credit intermediation in higher risk settings (i.e. serving a “collateral” function on bank balance sheets), developing financial markets and supporting economic growth in general. To investigate this question empirically, we set up a new domestic debt database covering about 100 developing economies, going back three decades to 1975; explore Granger causality links between domestic debt and key macroeconomic and institutional variables; and estimate the growth impact of domestic debt using panel regressions, allowing for non-linear effects. Domestic debt, as a share of GDP is found to exert a significant positive impact on economic growth, with potential channels including domestic savings mobilization, provision of risk-insurance on banks’ balance sheets; and greater institutional accountability of the state to its citizens. Although this result countervails more established arguments against domestic debt (i.e. that it leads to crowding out and banks to become lazy), there is some evidence that above a ratio of 35 percent of bank deposits, domestic debt does begin to undermine economic growth. The growth payoff also depends on debt quality, with higher payoffs observed for positive interest-rate bearing marketable debt issued to nonbank sectors. The <u>third and final essay</u> [“Why Do Banks in Developing Economies Hold Domestic Government Securities?”] explores demand-side determinants of domestic debt, by focusing on commercial bank holdings of government paper, discriminating carefully between voluntary factors (such as mean-variance portfolio optimization) and statutory ones (cash reserve and capital adequacy requirements). The analysis is made possible by the construction of a dataset on government and private returns (real and nominal) for almost 600 banks from 70 emerging and low-income economies, spanning the (pre-Basel II) period 1995-2005. A battery of structural cross-section regressions indicates that banks’ portfolio decisions are at least as significantly influenced by mean-variance considerations as regulatory factors: the actual portfolio share of government securities (λ) responds intuitively, and sizably, to variations in the moments of the distributions for government and private returns as well as in the minimum-variance portfolio share (λ*). Higher cash reserve requirements tilt portfolios away from government securities toward riskier private lending, while higher capital adequacy requirements work the other way. The association between actual portfolios and the identified determinants is noticeably weaker at lower ends of the λ distribution, suggesting the domination of non-CAPM factors in those contexts.

This thesis explores the impact of two behavioural finance concepts, social psychology and psychology, on household financial decisions. Under social psychology, I investigate whether the variety and intensity of social engagement enhances stock market participation. With regard to psychology, I examine two behavioural biases. First, I investigate whether mental accounting influences portfolio choice in three asset classes and whether financial advice and housing tenure increase (decrease) the effects of mental accounts on portfolio choice. Second, I examine whether households’ self-reported housing wealth are anchored on published house price indices and whether anchoring bias is mediated by market information, mortgage refinancing decisions and social factors. The main contributions and findings in the three studies are as follows. First, although there is an elaborate body of research concerning the relationship between social engagement mechanisms and portfolio choice, most studies investigate specific mechanisms in isolation. Using three waves in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), I bring together five social engagement measures in one model and show that socially engaged individuals are more likely to participate in the stock market. Consistent with Granovetter’s (1973) theory of social networks I find that a weak tie (measured by social group involvement) has a positive effect on stock market participation whereas a strong tie (measured by talking to neighbours) has no effect. More trusting individuals are more likely to participate in the stock market, as are those who identify with a political party. In contrast, the degree to which religion is important appears to have little impact. These results are robust using different specifications. Overall, the results of this study demonstrate that the likelihood of stock market participation increases with the variety and intensity of social engagement. Second, despite the established theoretical underpinnings of mental accounting in behavioural portfolio theory (BPT) and recent extensions, not much is known about their implications in real life situations. I use a recent UK household survey, the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS), which has comprehensive information about financial assets to investigate whether there are differences in the ownership and portfolio share of three asset classes among individuals who exhibit no mental account, a single mental account and multiple mental accounts, and the conditional influences of financial advice, housing, cognitive ability, time preference and risk tolerance. Overall I find that mental accounting together with financial advice and housing tenure explain variations in both the probability of ownership and portfolio share in the three asset classes. Households that exhibit a single mental account have low share of investments in, and are less likely to own, a risky asset when compared to those that exhibit no mental account or exhibit multiple mental accounts. I also find that, when compared to having no mental account, exhibiting a single mental account or multiple mental accounts increases both the probability and investment share in a fairly safe asset but decreases portfolio share in safe assets. In addition, among those that exhibit a single mental or multiple mental accounts, financial advice decreases portfolio share in risky assets and fairly safe assets and increases portfolio share in safe assets. Housing tenure increases both the probability and portfolio share in risky assets, decreases portfolio share in fairly safe assets and increases portfolio share in safe assets. These results are consistent using multi-equation regressions, sub-samples, reparametrised variables and poisson regressions. Finally, as little is known about how households derive the self-reported house prices estimates that are commonly used to determine housing wealth, the third study examines whether households are anchored on published house price indices. The key conjecture is that, while assessing the values of their homes, homeowners place more weight on house price news at the expense of property characteristics and other market information. I find support for this hypothesis using sixteen waves of the BHPS, multiple methods, and both regional and national house price indices. I conclude that changes in self-reported housing wealth are anchored on changes in published house price indices. Specifically, ownership through a mortgage and greater financial expectations increase anchoring effects while mortgage refinancing decreases the effects. Moreover, use of money raised from refinancing for home investment, as opposed to other consumption purposes, has a positive association with change in self-reported house value and both uses reduce anchoring bias. In addition, I find that computer use increases anchoring bias and, among social engagement mechanisms, religiosity reduces anchoring while other measures have no effect. These results are robust to internal instrumental variables, national aggregate house prices, alternative indices and sub-samples.

本研究顯著地發展時間轉換Lévy過程在最適投資組合的運用性。在連續Lévy過程模型設定下，槓桿效果直接地產生跨期波動度不對稱避險需求，而波動度回饋效果則透過槓桿效果間接地發生影響。另外，關於無窮跳躍Lévy過程模型設定部分，槓桿效果仍扮演重要的影響角色，而波動度回饋效果僅在短期投資決策中發生作用。最後，在本研究所提出之一般化隨機波動度不對稱資產報酬動態模型下，得出在無窮跳躍的資產動態模型設定下，擴散項仍為重要的決定項。 / This study significantly extends the applicability of time-changed Lévy processes to the portfolio optimization. The leverage effect directly induces the intertemporal asymmetric volatility hedging demand, while the volatility feedback effect exerts a minor influence via the leverage effect under the pure-continuous time-changed Lévy process. Furthermore, the leverage effect still plays a major role while the volatility feedback effect just works over the short-term investment horizon under the infinite-jump Lévy process. Based on the proposed general stochastic asymmetric volatility asset return model, we conclude that the diffusion term is an essential determinant of financial modeling for index dynamics given infinite-activity jump structure.

Submitted by Paulo César Coimbra Lisbôa (pc.coimbra@gmail.com) on 2010-11-11T01:39:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 PhD_Thesis_Coimbra_v1.pdf: 516617 bytes, checksum: c44a6f3efb7c504da91a6f20e0a95b3f (MD5) / Rejected by Andrea Virginio Machado(andrea.machado@fgv.br), reason: Conforme conversamos, peço fazer a alteração para acesso livre. Andrea on 2010-11-11T14:03:11Z (GMT) / Submitted by Paulo César Coimbra Lisbôa (pc.coimbra@gmail.com) on 2010-11-11T14:17:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 PhD_Thesis_Coimbra_v1.pdf: 516617 bytes, checksum: c44a6f3efb7c504da91a6f20e0a95b3f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Virginio Machado(andrea.machado@fgv.br) on 2010-11-16T11:21:16Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 PhD_Thesis_Coimbra_v1.pdf: 516617 bytes, checksum: c44a6f3efb7c504da91a6f20e0a95b3f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-11-17T10:49:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PhD_Thesis_Coimbra_v1.pdf: 516617 bytes, checksum: c44a6f3efb7c504da91a6f20e0a95b3f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-11-30 / Contaminação da confiança é um caso especial de incerteza Knightiana ou ambiguidade na qual o tomador de decisões está diante de não apenas uma única distribuição de probabilidades, mas sim de um conjunto de distribuições de probabilidades. A primeira parte desta tese tem o propósito de fornecer uma caracterização da contaminação da confiança e então apresentar um conjunto de axiomas comportamentais simples sob os quais as preferências de um tomador de decisões é representada pela utilidade esperada de Choquet com contaminação da confiança. A segunda parte desta tese apresenta duas aplicações econômicas de contaminação da confiança: a primeira delas generaliza o teorema de existência de equilíbrio de Nash de Dow e Werlang (o que permite apresentar uma solução explícita para o paradoxo segundo o qual os jogadores de um jogo do dilema dos prisioneiros com um número infinito de repetições não agem de acordo com o esperado pelo procedimento da indução retroativa) e a outra estuda o impacto da contaminação da confiança na escolha de portfolio. / Contamination of confidence is a special case of Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity in which the decision maker faces not simple probability measure but a set of probability measures. The first part of this thesis has the purpose to provide a characterization of the contamination of confidence and then present a simple set of behavioral axioms under which the decision maker’s preference is represented by the Choquet expected utility with contamination of confidence. The second part of this thesis presents two economic applications of the contamination of confidence: the first of them generalizes Dow and Werlang’s existence Theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (which enables to present an explicit solution to the paradox on which players in a finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma breaks down backward induction) and the other studies the impact of the contamination of confidence in the portfolio choice.

Les gérants de portefeuille pour compte de tiers sont souvent jugés par leur performance relative à celle d'un portefeuille benchmark. A ce titre, ils sont amenés très fréquemment à utiliser des modèles internes de "risk management" pour contrôler le risque de sous-performer le benchmark. Par ailleurs, ils sont de plus en plus nombreux à adopter une politique de rémunération incitative, en percevant une commission de sur-performance par rapport au benchmark. En effet, cette composante variable de leur rémunération leur permet d'augmenter leur revenu en cas de sur-performance sans contrepartie en cas de sous-performance. Or de telles pratiques ont fait récemment l'objet de nombreuses polémiques : la période récente de crise financière mondiale a fait apparaître certaines carences de plusieurs acteurs financiers en terme de contrôle de risque ainsi que des niveaux de prise de risque et de rémunération jugés excessifs. Cependant, l'étude des implications de ces pratiques reste un thème encore relativement peu exploré dans le cadre de la théorie classique des choix dynamiques de portefeuille en temps continu. Cette thèse analyse, dans ce cadre théorique, les implications de ces pratiques de "benchmarking" sur le comportement d'investissement de l'asset manager. La première partie étudie les propriétés de la stratégie dynamique optimale pour l'asset manager concerné par l'écart entre la rentabilité de son portefeuille et celle d'un benchmark fixe ou stochastique (sur ou sous-performance). Nous considérons plusieurs types d'asset managers, caractérisés par différentes fonctions d'utilité et qui sont soumis à différentes contraintes de risque de sous-performance. Nous montrons en particulier quel est le lien entre les problèmes d'investissement avec prise en compte de l'aversion à la sous-performance et avec contrainte explicite de "risk management". Dans la seconde partie, on s'intéresse à l'asset manager bénéficiant d'une rémunération incitative (frais de gestion variables, bonus de sur-performance ou commission sur encours additionnelle). On étudie, selon la forme de ses incitations financières et son degré d'aversion à la sous-performance, comment sa stratégie d'investissement s'écarte de celle de l'investisseur (ou celle de l'asset manager sans rémunération incitative). Nous montrons que le changement de comportement de l'asset manager peut se traduire soit par une réduction du risque pris par rapport à la stratégie sans incitation financière soit au contraire par une augmentation de celui-ci. Finalement, nous montrons en quoi la présence de contraintes de risque de sous-performance, imposées au gérant ou traduisant son aversion à la sous-performance, peut être bénéfique à l'investisseur donnant mandat de gestion financière. / It is common practice to judge third-party asset managers by looking at their financial performance relative to a benchmark portfolio. For this reason, they often choose to rely on internal risk-management models to control the downside risk of their portfolio relative to the benchmark. Moreover, an increasing number are adopting an incentive-based scheme, by charging an over-performance commission relative to the benchmark. Indeed, including this variable component in their global remuneration allows them to increase their revenue in case of over-performance without any penalty in the event of underperforming the benchmark. However, such practices have recently been at the heart of several polemics: the recent global financial crisis has uncovered some shortcomings in terms of internal risk control as well as excessive risk-taking and compensation levels of several financial players. Nevertheless, it appears that analyzing the impact of these practices remains a relatively new issue in continuous time-dynamic asset allocation theory. This thesis analyses in this theoretical framework the implications of these "benchmarking" practices on the asset manager's investment behavior. The first part examines the properties of the optimal dynamic strategy for the asset manager who is concerned by the difference of return between their portfolio and a fix or stochastic benchmark (over- or under-performance). Several asset manager types are considered, defined by different utility functions and different downside-risk constraints. In particular, the link between investment problems with aversion to under-performance and risk management constraints is shown. In the second part, the case of the asset manager who benefits from an incentive compensation scheme (variable asset management fees, over-performance bonuses or additional commission on asset under management), is investigated. We study how, depending on the choice of financial inventive structure and loss aversion level, the asset manager's strategy differs from that of the investor (or the strategy of the asset manager receiving no incentive remuneration). This study shows that the change in investment behavior of the asset manager can lead to both a reduction in the risk taken relative to the strategy without financial incentives or conversely an increase thereof. Finally we show that the existence of downside risk constraints, imposed on the asset manager or corresponding to their aversion for under-performance, can be beneficial to the investor mandating financial management.