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#The feminization of poverty' : education - the inequality of access and opportunityMullan, Deirdre January 1994 (has links)
No description available.
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POWER DEVIATION ANALYSIS OF THE ROCKNEBY WIND FARMRIVERO CÁMARA, FRANCISCO JOSÉ January 2015 (has links)
Nowadays the globalization and the economy expansion of the emerging countries demand anincreasing amount of energy. Therefore, energy production as well as the efficiency of energyusage, is essential for future developments of societies. Renewable energies appear as a turnkeysolution that could support the growing demands, and at the same time not being harmful to theenvironment [1]. Within the types of renewable energies, wind energy could be considered asone with large potential.In this paper I present the study of a Swedish wind farm placed in Rockneby.Once the wind turbines were installed and working correctly, a discrepancy between the realenergy obtained and the theoretical energy indicated by the manufacturer was detected. Thestored data in the SCADA system were compared with the values provided by the manufacturerand several analyses were performed. Initially an anomaly in the power residual deviation wasdetected. It was showing an unusual behaviour at high wind speeds. The variation of the airdensity in the wind farm at hub height was considered as a possible reason of the disagreementobserved in the power parameters since the reference density used by the manufacturer was aconstant value calculated in laboratory environment. However, this idea was rejected becausethe power generated in both conditions is similar. The pitch angle was analysed after detectinga significant variations in wind speed measurements made by the anemometer in the turbinenumber three. As a result, it was found a pitch variation in the turbine which seems due to afailure in the anemometer. As a final result, the turbulences were analysed giving as aconclusion that the turbulence intensity were situated around 20%. Therefore, I mainly suggestas a possible explanation of this fact the influence of the turbulence accompanied of a badcalibration or failure in the anemometers.
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Power Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard : Attacks and Countermeasures for 8-bit MicrocontrollersFransson, Mattias January 2015 (has links)
The Advanced Encryption Standard is one of the most common encryption algorithms. It is highly resistant to mathematical and statistical attacks, however, this security is based on the assumption that an adversary cannot access the algorithm’s internal state during encryption or decryption. Power analysis is a type of side-channel analysis that exploit information leakage through the power consumption of physical realisations of cryptographic systems. Power analysis attacks capture intermediate results during AES execution, which combined with knowledge of the plaintext or the ciphertext can reveal key material. This thesis studies and compares simple power analysis, differential power analysis and template attacks using a cheap consumer oscilloscope against AES-128 implemented on an 8-bit microcontroller. Additionally, the shuffling and masking countermeasures are evaluated in terms of security and performance. The thesis also presents a practical approach to template building and device characterisation. The results show that attacking a naive implementation with differential power analysis requires little effort, both in preparation and computation time. Template attacks require the least amount of measurements but requires significant preparation. Simple power analysis by itself cannot break the key but proves helpful in simplifying the other attacks. It is found that shuffling significantly increases the number of traces required to break the key while masking forces the attacker to use higher-order techniques.
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FEASIBILITY STUDIES FOR SMALL HYDROPOWER PROJECTS (HYDROELECTRIC, PLANNING, RECONNAISSANCE, WATER RESOURCES)King, Robert Donald, 1954- January 1986 (has links)
No description available.
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Power analysis side channel attacks: the processor design-level contextAmbrose, Jude Angelo, Computer Science & Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, UNSW January 2009 (has links)
The rapid increase in the use of embedded systems for performing secure transactions, has proportionally increased the security threats which are faced by such devices. Side channel attack, a sophisticated security threat to embedded devices like smartcards, mobile phones and PDAs, exploits the external manifestations like processing time, power consumption and electromagnetic emission to identify the internal computations. Power analysis attack, introduced by Kocher in 1998, is used by adversaries to eavesdrop on confidential data while the device is executing a secure transaction. The adversary observes the power trace dissipated/consumed by the chip during the encryption/decryption of the AES cryptographic program and predicts the secret key used for encryption by extracting necessary information from the power trace. Countermeasures proposed to overcome power analysis are data masking, table masking, current flattening, circuitry level solutions, dummy instruction insertions, balancing bit-flips, etc. All these techniques are either susceptible to multi-order side channel attacks, not sufficiently generic to cover all encryption algorithms, or burden the system with high area cost, run-time or energy consumption. The initial solution presented in this thesis is a HW/SW based randomised instruction injection technique, which infuses random instructions at random places during the execution of an application. Such randomisation obfuscates the secure information from the power profile, not allowing the adversary to extract the critical power segments for analysis. Further, the author devised a systematic method to measure the security level of a power sequence and used it to measure the number of random instructions needed, to suitably confuse the adversary. The proposed processor model costs 1.9% in additional area for a simplescalar processor, and costs on average 29.8% in runtime and 27.1% in additional energy consumption for six industry standard cryptographic algorithms. This design is extended to a processor architecture which automatically detects the execution of the most common encryption algorithms, starts to scramble the power waveform by adding randomly placed instructions with random register accesses, and stops injecting instructions when it is safe to do so. This approach has less overheads compared to previous solutions and avoids software instrumentation, allowing programmers with no special knowledge to use the system. The extended processor model costs an additional area of 1.2%, and an average of 25% in runtime and 28.5% in energy overheads for industry standard cryptographic algorithms. Due to the possibility of removing random injections using large number of samples (due to the random nature, a large number of samples will eliminate noise), the author proposes a multiprocessor 'algorithmic' balancing technique. This technique uses a dual processor architecture where two processors execute the same program in parallel, but with complementary intermediate data, thus balancing the bitflips. The second processor works in conjunction with the first processor for balancing only when encryption is performed, and both processors carry out independent tasks when no encryption is being performed. Both DES and AES cryptographic programs are investigated for balancing and the author shows that this technique is economical, while completely preventing power analysis attacks. The signature detection unit to capture encryption is also utilised, which is used in the instruction injection approach. This multiprocessor balancing approach reduces performance by 0.42% and 0.94% for AES and DES respectively. The hardware increase is 2X only when balancing is performed. Further, several future extensions for the balancing approach are proposed, by introducing random swapping of encryption iterations between cores. FPGA implementations of these processor designs are briefly described at the end of this thesis.
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Gate-level Leakage Assessment and MitigationKathuria, Tarun 22 July 2019 (has links)
Side-channel leakage, caused by imperfect implementation of cryptographic algorithms in hardware, has become a serious security threat for connected devices that generate and process sensitive data. This side-channel leakage can divulge secret information in the form of power consumption or electromagnetic emissions. The side-channel leakage of a crytographic device is commonly assessed after tape-out on a physical prototype.
This thesis presents a methodology called Gate-level Leakage Assessment (GLA), which evaluates the power-based side-channel leakage of an integrated circuit at design time. By combining side-channel leakage assessment with power simulations on the gate-level netlist, GLA is able to pinpoint the leakiest cells in the netlist in addition to assessing the overall side-channel vulnerability to side-channel leakage. As the power traces obtained from power simulations are noiseless, GLA is able to precisely locate the sources of side-channel leakage with fewer measurements than on a physical prototype. The thesis applies the methodology on the design of a encryption co-processor to analyze sources of side-channel leakage.
Once the gate-level leakage sources are identified, this thesis presents a logic level replacement strategy for the leakage sources that can thwart side-channel leakage. The countermeasures presented selectively replaces gate-level cells with a secure logic style effectively removing the side-channel leakage with minimal impact in area. The assessment methodology along with the countermeasures demonstrated is a turnkey solution for IP module designers and is also applicable to larger system level designs. / Master of Science / Consider how a lie detector machine works. It looks for subtle changes in a person’s pulse to tell if the person is telling the truth. This unintentional divulgence of secret information is called a side-channel leakage.
Integrated circuits reveal secret information in a similar way through their power consumption. This is caused by the transistors, used to build these integrated circuits, switching in concert with the secret data being processed by the integrated circuit. Typically, integrated circuits are evaluated for side-channel leakage only after they have been manufactured into a physical prototype. If the integrated circuit is found vulnerable it is too expensive to manufacture the prototype again with an updated design.
This thesis presents a methodology, Gate-level Leakage Assessment (GLA) to evaluate integrated circuits for side-channel leakage during their design process even before they are manufactured. This methodology uses simulations to identify the specific transistors in the design that cause side-channel leakage. Moreover, this thesis presents a technique to selectively replace these problematic transistors in the design with an implementation that thwarts side channel leakage.
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An Investigation of Differential Power Analysis Attacks on FPGA-based Encryption SystemsMcDaniel, Larry T. III 22 July 2003 (has links)
Hardware devices implementing cryptographic algorithms are finding their way into many applications. As this happens, the ability to keep the data being processed or stored on the device secure grows more important. Power analysis attacks involve cryptographic hardware leaking information during encryption because power consumption is correlated to the key used for encryption. Power analysis attacks have proven successful against public and private key cryptosystems in a variety of form factors. The majority of the countermeasures that have been proposed for this attack are intended for software implementations on a microcontroller. This project focuses on the development of a VHDL tool for investigating power analysis attacks on FPGAs and exploring countermeasures that might be used.
The tool developed here counted the transitions of CLB output signals to estimate power and was used to explore the impact of possible gate-level countermeasures to differential power analysis. Using this tool, it was found that only a few nodes in the circuit have a high correlation to bits of the key. This means that modifying only a small portion of the circuit could dramatically increase the difficulty of mounting a differential power analysis attack on the hardware. Further investigation of the correlation between CLB outputs and the key showed that a tradeoff exists between the amount of space required for decorrelation versus the amount of decorrelation that is desired, allowing a designer to determine the amount of correlation that can be removed for available space. Filtering of glitches on CLB output signals slightly reduced the amount of correlation each CLB had. Finally, a decorrelation circuit was proposed and shown capable of decorrelating flip-flop outputs of a CLB, which account for less than 10% of the CLB outputs signals. / Master of Science
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JMASM Algorithms and Code: A Flexible Method for Conducting Power Analysis for Two-and Three-Level Hierarchical Linear Models in RPan, Yi, McBee, Matthew T. 01 January 2014 (has links)
A general approach for conducting power analysis in two-and three-level hierarchical linear models (HLMs) is described. The method can be used to perform power analysis to detect fixed effects at any level of a HLM with dichotomous or continuous covariates. It can easily be extended to perform power analysis for functions of parameters. Important steps in the derivation of this approach are illustrated and numerical examples are provided. Sample code implementing this approach is provided using the free program R.
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Techniques of Side Channel CryptanalysisMuir, James January 2001 (has links)
The traditional model of cryptography examines the security of cryptographic primitives as mathematical functions. This approach does not account for the physical side effects of using these primitives in the real world. A more realistic model employs the concept of a <I>side channel</I>. A side channel is a source of information that is inherent to a physical implementation of a primitive. Research done in the last half of the 1990s has shown that the information transmitted by side channels, such as execution time, computational faults and power consumption, can be detrimental to the security of ciphers like DES and RSA. This thesis surveys the techniques of side channel cryptanalysis presented in [Kocher1996], [Boneh1997], and [Kocher1998] and shows how side channel information can be used to break implementations of DES and RSA. Some specific techniques covered include the timing attack, differential fault analysis, simple power analysis and differential power analysis. Possible defenses against each of these side channel attacks are also discussed.
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Techniques of Side Channel CryptanalysisMuir, James January 2001 (has links)
The traditional model of cryptography examines the security of cryptographic primitives as mathematical functions. This approach does not account for the physical side effects of using these primitives in the real world. A more realistic model employs the concept of a <I>side channel</I>. A side channel is a source of information that is inherent to a physical implementation of a primitive. Research done in the last half of the 1990s has shown that the information transmitted by side channels, such as execution time, computational faults and power consumption, can be detrimental to the security of ciphers like DES and RSA. This thesis surveys the techniques of side channel cryptanalysis presented in [Kocher1996], [Boneh1997], and [Kocher1998] and shows how side channel information can be used to break implementations of DES and RSA. Some specific techniques covered include the timing attack, differential fault analysis, simple power analysis and differential power analysis. Possible defenses against each of these side channel attacks are also discussed.
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