Denna uppsats är huvudsakligen en diskussion av Augustinus försök att förena tesen att människan har en fri vilja med sin predestinationslära. Enligt de definitioner av ”determinism” och ”fri vilja” som föreslås i uppsatsen, utesluter predestinationens förhandenvarande möjligheten för människan att ha en fri vilja. Augustinus utgångspunkt i tron och hans antaganden om Guds och människans egenskaper, gör det omöjligt för honom att acceptera en sådan slutsats. Det samtidiga föreliggandet av predestinationen och den fria viljan utgör en betydelsefull komponent i hans syn på människans relation till Gud. Uppsatsen undersöker hur Augustinus resonemang i De Libero Arbitrio (Om den Fria Viljan) står sig mot en nutida kritik, för att i förlängningen söka påvisa varför hans antagande att människan har fri vilja inte är förenligt med hans samtidiga antagande att Gud har predestinerat alla händelser i världen. / This paper is mainly a discussion of Augustine’s combination of the idea that human beings have a free will with his doctrine of predestination. According to the definitions of “determinism” and “free will” suggested in this paper, the actuality of predestination excludes the possibility of human free will. Since Augustine takes starting-point in his belief in God and his assumptions about the attributes of God and human beings, such a conclusion is impossible for him. The actuality of both predestination and human free will is an important feature of his view of the relationship between human beings and God. This paper investigates how Augustine’s line of argument in De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will) manages to hold against a modern criticism. The primary aim is to show why Augustine’s assumption that human beings have free will is inconsistent with his assumption that God has predestined all events of the world.

<p>Denna uppsats är huvudsakligen en diskussion av Augustinus försök att förena tesen att människan har en fri vilja med sin predestinationslära. Enligt de definitioner av ”determinism” och ”fri vilja” som föreslås i uppsatsen, utesluter predestinationens förhandenvarande möjligheten för människan att ha en fri vilja. Augustinus utgångspunkt i tron och hans antaganden om Guds och människans egenskaper, gör det omöjligt för honom att acceptera en sådan slutsats. Det samtidiga föreliggandet av predestinationen och den fria viljan utgör en betydelsefull komponent i hans syn på människans relation till Gud. Uppsatsen undersöker hur Augustinus resonemang i De Libero Arbitrio (Om den Fria Viljan) står sig mot en nutida kritik, för att i förlängningen söka påvisa varför hans antagande att människan har fri vilja inte är förenligt med hans samtidiga antagande att Gud har predestinerat alla händelser i världen.</p> / <p>This paper is mainly a discussion of Augustine’s combination of the idea that human beings have a free will with his doctrine of predestination. According to the definitions of “determinism” and “free will” suggested in this paper, the actuality of predestination excludes the possibility of human free will. Since Augustine takes starting-point in his belief in God and his assumptions about the attributes of God and human beings, such a conclusion is impossible for him. The actuality of both predestination and human free will is an important feature of his view of the relationship between human beings and God. This paper investigates how Augustine’s line of argument in De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will) manages to hold against a modern criticism. The primary aim is to show why Augustine’s assumption that human beings have free will is inconsistent with his assumption that God has predestined all events of the world.</p>

This work freely follows the bachelor thesis Social predeterminations for studying in France. The content studies evolution of french educational system and experts opinions on problematics of equal chances in acces to the education. Pierre Bourdieu and Raymond Boudon reflect in their theories changes in society after 1968, student protests and crisis of universities, and ask how to solve them. Interviews with University of Avignon's students and teachers and questionnaire research brought many important ideas which helped to explore the difference of entering to two academic insitutions: university and grand école. KEY WORDS: education, predetermination, social status, french educational system, school reformes

La théorie statistique univariée des valeurs extrêmes se généralise au cas multivarié mais l'absence d'un cadre paramétrique naturel complique l'inférence de la loi jointe des extrêmes. Les marges d'erreur associée aux estimateurs non paramétriques de la structure de dépendance sont difficilement accessibles à partir de la dimension trois. Cependant, quantifier l'incertitude est d'autant plus important pour les applications que le problème de la rareté des données extrêmes est récurrent, en particulier en hydrologie. L'objet de cette thèse est de développer des modèles de dépendance entre extrêmes, dans un cadre bayésien permettant de représenter l'incertitude. Le chapitre 2 explore les propriétés des modèles obtenus en combinant des modèles paramétriques existants, par mélange bayésien (Bayesian Model Averaging BMA). Un modèle semi-paramétrique de mélange de Dirichlet est étudié au chapitre suivant : une nouvelle paramétrisation est introduite afin de s'affranchir d'une contrainte de moments caractéristique de la structure de dépendance et de faciliter l'échantillonnage de la loi à posteriori. Le chapitre 4 est motivé par une application hydrologique : il s'agit d'estimer la structure de dépendance spatiale des crues extrêmes dans la région cévenole des Gardons en utilisant des données historiques enregistrées en quatre points. Les données anciennes augmentent la taille de l'échantillon mais beaucoup de ces données sont censurées. Une méthode d'augmentation de données est introduite, dans le cadre du mélange de Dirichlet, palliant l'absence d'expression explicite de la vraisemblance censurée. Les conclusions et perspectives sont discutées au chapitre 5 / Uni-variate extreme value theory extends to the multivariate case but the absence of a natural parametric framework for the joint distribution of extremes complexifies inferential matters. Available non parametric estimators of the dependence structure do not come with tractable uncertainty intervals for problems of dimension greater than three. However, uncertainty estimation is all the more important for applied purposes that data scarcity is a recurrent issue, particularly in the field of hydrology. The purpose of this thesis is to develop modeling tools for the dependence structure between extremes, in a Bayesian framework that allows uncertainty assessment. Chapter 2 explores the properties of the model obtained by combining existing ones, in a Bayesian Model Averaging framework. A semi-parametric Dirichlet mixture model is studied next : a new parametrization is introduced, in order to relax a moments constraint which characterizes the dependence structure. The re-parametrization significantly improves convergence and mixing properties of the reversible-jump algorithm used to sample the posterior. The last chapter is motivated by an hydrological application, which consists in estimating the dependence structure of floods recorded at four neighboring stations, in the ‘Gardons’ region, southern France, using historical data. The latter increase the sample size but most of them are censored. The lack of explicit expression for the likelihood in the Dirichlet mixture model is handled by using a data augmentation framework