Presentism is the view that necessarily, it is always the case that only present objects exist and time passes. Characterized as such, presentism faces three objections: the reference objection, the grounding objection, and the objection from the special theory of relativity. Presentists cannot offer an adequate response to the latter objection, and can only avoid succumbing to the first two objections by adopting a descriptive account of propositions and a new account of truth grounding. The main motivation for presentism – the argument from experience – also faces serious objections, and is ultimately refuted by another objection from the special theory of relativity. A new version of presentism, Barcan presentism, can be shown to offer a better response to the reference objection than classical presentism. Barcan presentism, however, should still be rejected based on the grounding objection and the objection from the special theory of relativity.

Presentism is the view that necessarily, it is always the case that only present objects exist and time passes. Characterized as such, presentism faces three objections: the reference objection, the grounding objection, and the objection from the special theory of relativity. Presentists cannot offer an adequate response to the latter objection, and can only avoid succumbing to the first two objections by adopting a descriptive account of propositions and a new account of truth grounding. The main motivation for presentism – the argument from experience – also faces serious objections, and is ultimately refuted by another objection from the special theory of relativity. A new version of presentism, Barcan presentism, can be shown to offer a better response to the reference objection than classical presentism. Barcan presentism, however, should still be rejected based on the grounding objection and the objection from the special theory of relativity.

In 1986, David Lewis offered what he thought would be the decisive objection against endurantism, showing it to be an implausible theory. The problem of temporary intrinsics stated that an object cannot have two complementary intrinsic properties while maintaining identity, as endurantists claim. Perdurantism, then, must be the more plausible theory, according to Lewis. The endurantists responded to this objection by formulating different versions of endurantism designed to avoid the problem. Subsequently, the endurantist tried to undermine the perdurantist position by arguing that a perduring object cannot undergo what is considered to be genuine change. As a result, endurantism is the more plausible theory. However, the perdurantist can show that endurantism seems to fail to provide an account of change as well. In what follows, I argue that the implicit ontological commitments of the endurantists and perdurantists have prevented the problem of temporary intrinsics and change from resolving the endurantist/perdurantist debate. I offer examples of plausible ontologies for the endurantist and perdurantist in order to emphasize this problem. I will argue that, in order to resolve the debate, one must ultimately examine the ontological accounts of each theory. / Master of Arts

In this paper I argue that the presentist cannot deal adequately with cross-temporal relations. I look at several attempts to solve the cross-temporal relations objection and find only one that might work. Still I argue that even it can't deal with cross-temporal spatial relations such as continuity. I defend Sider here against two plausible responses. The first is that instantaneous velocities can be employed on the presentist's behalf to get them out of trouble. I argue that this response won't work. The second is a response by Dean Zimmerman in which the presentist accepts that past space-time points exist at present. I argue that his response does indeed provide us with a solution but that the cost of that solution is far too high. / text

There is a debate in the philosophy of time over the status of non-present entities. Do these things exist, and if so, what sorts of things are they? Recently, the debate has split into two groups, presentists and eternalists. Presentists hold that no past or future things exist now. Socrates does not now exist, though he did in the past; my future daughter does not now exist, though she may in the future. Ontologically, the present is distinct, serving to demarcate all that currently has existence. As far as the eternalist is concerned, all entities - whether past, present, or future - are equally real. If it was, is, or will be, it can be found in the eternalist picture of time. As such, there is no distinct present at which some entities exist while others do not; rather, everything enjoys the same ontological status. I will be concerned to offer an assessment of the presentist view. Common objections against presentism will be examined, amplified, and answered where appropriate. I will not examine the arguments in favor of the presentist view. Rather, I wish to describe why it is that the eternalist feels compelled to deny presentism. Ultimately, my goal will be to show that although presentism survives some of the current objections raised against it, it does not survive them all. Presentism is an interesting, but ultimately unsatisfactory view. There is a modified form of presentism (call it presentism*) that can meet the objections raised against the original position, and after noting some of the objections raised against presentism, I will sketch the outlines of presentism* in some detail. I intend to show that presentism* is able to retain what is most valuable about presentism, while also withstanding certain objections that the latter view could not.

There is a debate in the philosophy of time over the status of non-present entities. Do these things exist, and if so, what sorts of things are they? Recently, the debate has split into two groups, presentists and eternalists. Presentists hold that no past or future things exist now. Socrates does not now exist, though he did in the past; my future daughter does not now exist, though she may in the future. Ontologically, the present is distinct, serving to demarcate all that currently has existence. As far as the eternalist is concerned, all entities - whether past, present, or future - are equally real. If it was, is, or will be, it can be found in the eternalist picture of time. As such, there is no distinct present at which some entities exist while others do not; rather, everything enjoys the same ontological status. I will be concerned to offer an assessment of the presentist view. Common objections against presentism will be examined, amplified, and answered where appropriate. I will not examine the arguments in favor of the presentist view. Rather, I wish to describe why it is that the eternalist feels compelled to deny presentism. Ultimately, my goal will be to show that although presentism survives some of the current objections raised against it, it does not survive them all. Presentism is an interesting, but ultimately unsatisfactory view. There is a modified form of presentism (call it presentism*) that can meet the objections raised against the original position, and after noting some of the objections raised against presentism, I will sketch the outlines of presentism* in some detail. I intend to show that presentism* is able to retain what is most valuable about presentism, while also withstanding certain objections that the latter view could not.

No description available.

Denna uppsats tar upp två filosofers argumentation kring konflikten mellan Presentism och denspeciella relativitetsteorin: D. H. Mellor och Theodore Sider. Utifrån detta ges ett försvar avPresentism i ljuset av speciella relativitetsteorin och Mellor´s och Sider´s argument. Försvaretgår ut på att visa att denna konflikt inte innebär inkompatibilitet. Möjligheten att försvaraPresentism genom att påpeka olika tolkningar av speciella relativitetsteorin som empirisktlikvärdiga ges.

This thesis describes and defends the moving spotlight theory, a metaphysical theory concerning the fundamental temporal structure of reality. The moving spotlight theory has two essential components: first, a thesis about presentness; and second, a thesis about the existence (in the most general sense) of things over time. The first thesis is that exactly one instant of time is absolutely, objectively, non-relatively present. This thesis is usually called the ‘A-theory of time’. (The opposing view, according to which no instant of time is absolutely, objectively, non-relatively present, is usually called the ‘B-theory of time’.) The second thesis is that things neither begin nor cease to exist over time; in other words, that it is always the case that everything exists forever. Following Williamson (2013), I call this thesis permanentism. Historically, the moving spotlight theory has been among the least popular plausible theories of time. However, that is because the view has been badly misconstrued. In this thesis I provide a careful description of the moving spotlight theory and show that moving spotlighters can easily respond to the main arguments that have been raised against their view. I also show that the moving spotlight theory, when correctly understood, is the very best theory of time. In particular, the moving spotlight theory inherits the simplicity, explanatory power, and scientific respectability of permanentism, while at the same time describing a world in which there is genuine time and change. In terms of structure, the thesis has two parts, each containing three chapters. In Chapter One, I introduce the A-theory and defend it against some common objections. In Chapter Two, I describe a version of the moving spotlight theory which I call ‘classic MST’, and argue that if the moving spotlight theory is true, classic MST is true. In Chapter Three, I argue against the traditional method of characterising theories of time, and develop a new method in its place. In Chapter Four, I argue that the A-theory is true. In Chapters Five and Six, I argue that we think and speak as if permanentism is true, so we should accept permanentism. I conclude that the moving spotlight theory, and therefore classic MST, is true.

My thesis is a development and defence of the "Williamsonian" view of time, a temporalmetaphysical theory based on Timothy Williamson’s (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002) views concerning modality. As far as I am aware, the theory has never been developed or defended in print. The Williamsonian view is a version of the "a-theory" of time based on acceptance of the thesis of eternal existence, according to which always, everything always exists (i.e. everything exists eternally). I defend the Williamsonian view by showing that every other plausible temporal-metaphysical theory is subject to serious objections that cannot be raised against the Williamsonian view. I conclude that the Williamsonian view is the only plausible theory of time.