The public's demand for accountability will have a significant impact on research universities' revenue resources in the future. Driving the demand is a perceived lack of institutional productivity. Undergraduate students' graduation rates represent one product of public research universities. States have already latched onto these rates as a measure of institutional performance; and as a result, states have provided a basis for public research universities to use the relationship between dollars invested in the institution and undergraduate students' graduation rates to respond to accountability issues. Current research provides little insight into this relationship. Research in this study uses concepts from the higher education production function, the resource dependency theory, and the Principal-Agent Model to investigate undergraduate students' four-year and six-year graduation rates as an institutional product. The research provides a greater degree of transparency into the relationship between dollars invested in public research universities and undergraduate students' graduation rates than has previously been shown. As a result of this relationship analysis, the research enables the development of a model for predicting undergraduate student graduation rates relative to dollars invested in the institution from different sources.

Recently, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have adopted policies that engage the private sector in the implementation of their development mandates. Despite the implications of these changes, the subject is among the least conceptualized. By applying a theory-guided process-tracing (TGPT) methodology, this paper examines the process of change at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It advances a constructivist argument and evaluates whether this change could be viewed as a norm-driven change, where norms of corporate social responsibility (CSR), in the process of interaction and learning, have obtained an intersubjective quality and redefined the role of the private sector in the context of organization’s objectives. The paper evaluates this argument in light of the alternative assumptions of the principal-agent model, the bureaucratic culture literature, and rational choice institutionalism. It highlights the implications of this research in empirical, analytical, and theoretical terms for further studies and concludes that, without a due assessment of the intervening effect of norms on policies, the causal claims of other theories are seriously challenged.

Cette thèse porte sur les conséquences de l’aversion à l’ambiguïté dans des contextes dynamiques en économie. En particulier, elle s’intéresse aux conséquences de l’aversion à l’ambiguïté dans les décisions d’investissement irréversibles, ainsi que dans un problème d’aléa moral dynamique, modélisé en temps continu. Le premier chapitre propose une revue de la littérature traitant de l’aversion à l’ambiguïté en contexte dynamique. Nous y passons en revue les modèles existants ainsi que leurs applications en économie et en finance. Le second chapitre s’intéresse aux décisions d’investissement irréversible d’un monopole et de firmes en compétition parfaite, en présence d’ambiguïté à propos de la volatilité du processus stochastique gouvernant la demande. Cette notion particulière d’ambiguïté nécessite de mobiliser les outils récents de la théorie des espérances non linéaires. On y montre qu’en présence d’aversion à l’ambiguïté, la stratégie optimale d’un monopole implique d’investir plus rapidement que dans un marché en concurrence parfaite. Le troisième chapitre s’appuie sur les résultats du second chapitre pour traiter le cas d’une concurrence imparfaite entre deux firmes. Le quatrième chapitre traite d’un problème d’aléa moral dynamique en temps continu et on y introduit la notion plus classique d’ambiguïté à propos de la dérive du processus gouvernant l’incertitude. On y montre que sous certaines restrictions semblables au cas standard, le contrat optimal est linéaire par rapport à la production finale. Ce résultat nous permet ensuite de discuter l’effet de l’aversion à l’ambiguïté sur les incitations et l’utilisation de l’information. / This thesis focuses on the consequences of ambiguity aversion in dynamic contexts in economics. In particular, we focus on the consequences of ambiguity aversion in irreversible investment problems, and in dynamic moral hazard problems in continuous-time. The first chapter reviews the literature on ambiguity in dynamic contexts, and reviews existing models as well as their applications in economics and finance. The second chapter deals with irreversible investment in the monopoly case and under perfect competition, under ambiguous volatility. The notion of ambiguous volatility requires the use of recent tools in non linear expectation theory. We show that the optimal entry strategy of a monopoly under ambiguous volatility implies investing sooner than the perfectly competitive equilibrium under volatility ambiguity. The third chapter builds on the results of the second chapter and treats a special case of imperfect competition. The last chapter deals with a dynamic principal-agent problem under moral in continuous-time, in which agents perceive ambiguity about the drift of the relevant process. We show that under certain conditions, the optimal contract is linear in final output. We then use this result to discuss the effect of ambiguity aversion on the incentive power of the optimal contract and the informativeness principle.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第23671号 / 経博第654号 / 新制||経||300(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)准教授 菊谷 達弥, 教授 関口 格, 准教授 安達 貴教 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

<p>Principal agent theory is widely used to model supply chain relationship, in which a supplier is the agent and a manufacturer is the principal. Both the manufacturer and supplier can influence product quality and consequentially share costs of product failures. Rich theoretical results under the principal agent model framework have been accumulated in the last two decades, but empirical evidence on whether the Stackelberg’s leadership game truly imitates practical supply chain relationship remains unfound. We study the domestic automobile industry in the last decade and provides to our best knowledge the first empirical evidence to assess the validity and practicality of principal agent theory and draw the implications of principal agent theory on supply chain relationship costs. Our empirical results suggest that Japanese OEMs behave more like principal agent theory suggests than the US OEMs in general and thus gain significant benefits in terms of marginal effort costs in motivating suppliers’ quality improvement behaviors and reducing overall manufacturer’s quality costs. Specifically, Toyota behaves closest to the optimal solution in the principal agent theory and therefore has the lowest manufacturer effort costs in improving product quality and achieves the overall lowest manufacturer’s quality costs in supply chain. Honda and Nissan are ranked 2^nd and 3^rd in terms of principal agent behaviors, but their marginal quality improvement effort costs are 33% and 61% higher than Toyota, and their total manufacturer’s quality costs are both around 17% higher compared to industrial leader Toyota by our estimate. US OEMs GM, Ford and Chrysler are believed to behave inconsistent to principal agent theory suggest, and consequently suffer a much higher marginal effort cost in motivating supplier’s quality improvement than Toyota as well as the overall manufacturer’s quality costs. GM and Ford are estimated doubled marginal effort costs than Toyota, and Chrysler is even higher at 1.6 times. GM’s overall manufacturer’s quality cost is 24% higher than Toyota, Ford is around 31% higher and Chrysler is around 48% higher. Our analysis gives a new perspective from principal agent theory to explain why Japanese OEMs especially Toyota has a better supply chain quality costs than US OEMs as literature and consensus suggested. In addition, we contribute in literature by linking the principal agent theory with automotive industrial data and first ever empirically validate the legitimacy of principal agent theory in modeling manufacturer-supplier relationship and quantitatively derive practical conclusions on marginal effort costs and manufacturer’s total supply chain quality cost implications. To guarantee the robustness of the empirical results, various sensitivity analyses are conducted and our main conclusions remain unchanged. </p>

Many venture capitalists (VCs) use the “VC method” of valuation where they use judgment to estimate a probability of successful exit while determining the ownership share to demand in exchange for investing in a venture. However, prior models are not aligned with the “VC method” because they do not consider private information about entrepreneurial characteristics, the primary drivers of the above probability, and consequently do not model judgment. The three main chapters of this thesis—one theoretical, one simulation, and one empirical study—examine the venture capital deal process in sync with the “VC method.” Chapter 2 is theoretical and develops a principal-agent model of venture capital deal process incorporating double-sided moral hazard and one-sided private information. The VC is never fully informed about the entrepreneur’s disutility of effort in spite of due diligence checks, so takes on a belief about the latter’s performance in the funded venture to determine the offer. This study suggests that there exists a critical point in the VC’s belief—and correspondingly in the VC’s ownership share—that maximizes the total return to the two parties. It also uncovers optimal revision strategies for the VC to adopt if the offer is rejected where it is shown that the VC should develop a strong advisory capacity and minimize time constraints to facilitate investment. Chapter 3 simulates venture capital deals as per the theoretical model and confirms the existence of critical points in the VC’s belief and ownership share that maximize the returns to the two parties and their total return. Particularly, the VC’s return (in excess of his or her return from an alternate investment) peaks for a moderate ownership share for the VC. Since private information with the entrepreneur would preclude the VC from knowing these critical points a priori, the VC should demand a moderate ownership share to stay close to such a peak. Using data from simulations, we also generate predictions about the properties of the venture capital deal space—notably: (a) Teamwork is crucial to financing; and (b) If the VC is highly confident about the entrepreneur’s performance, it would work to the latter’s advantage. Chapter 4 reports the results from our survey of eight seasoned VCs affiliated with seven firms operating in Canada, USA, and UK, where our findings received a high degree of support.

Many venture capitalists (VCs) use the “VC method” of valuation where they use judgment to estimate a probability of successful exit while determining the ownership share to demand in exchange for investing in a venture. However, prior models are not aligned with the “VC method” because they do not consider private information about entrepreneurial characteristics, the primary drivers of the above probability, and consequently do not model judgment. The three main chapters of this thesis—one theoretical, one simulation, and one empirical study—examine the venture capital deal process in sync with the “VC method.” Chapter 2 is theoretical and develops a principal-agent model of venture capital deal process incorporating double-sided moral hazard and one-sided private information. The VC is never fully informed about the entrepreneur’s disutility of effort in spite of due diligence checks, so takes on a belief about the latter’s performance in the funded venture to determine the offer. This study suggests that there exists a critical point in the VC’s belief—and correspondingly in the VC’s ownership share—that maximizes the total return to the two parties. It also uncovers optimal revision strategies for the VC to adopt if the offer is rejected where it is shown that the VC should develop a strong advisory capacity and minimize time constraints to facilitate investment. Chapter 3 simulates venture capital deals as per the theoretical model and confirms the existence of critical points in the VC’s belief and ownership share that maximize the returns to the two parties and their total return. Particularly, the VC’s return (in excess of his or her return from an alternate investment) peaks for a moderate ownership share for the VC. Since private information with the entrepreneur would preclude the VC from knowing these critical points a priori, the VC should demand a moderate ownership share to stay close to such a peak. Using data from simulations, we also generate predictions about the properties of the venture capital deal space—notably: (a) Teamwork is crucial to financing; and (b) If the VC is highly confident about the entrepreneur’s performance, it would work to the latter’s advantage. Chapter 4 reports the results from our survey of eight seasoned VCs affiliated with seven firms operating in Canada, USA, and UK, where our findings received a high degree of support.

Multi-target incentive contracts are widely observed in practice to stimulate salesforce effort. However, little is known about their effectiveness and the issues involved in designing them. In this thesis, we investigate the incentive contracting problem between a manufacturer and an agent when the realized sales of a product are affected by both the agent's selling effort and the type of the agent. The agent's type is uncertain to the manufacturer, whereas the agent can observe the actual type when exerting her selling effort. Again, this is unobservable by the manufacturer. For contract design problem, we develop a principal-agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We examine the manufacturer's optimal contract parameter decisions employing a single multi-target contract for the agent who can be of different types. Because menu contracts are commonly studied in literature for the adverse selection problem, we also study a menu of single-target contracts; and examine the manufacturer's optimal contract parameter decisions. We then compare the performance between the two types of contract. We arrive at a number of managerial insights regarding the design and the performance of multi-target contract and menu contract.

Diese Arbeit enthält drei unabhängige Kapitel, jedes davon im Bereich der Dynamischen Vertragstheorie. Kapitel I zeigt, dass deterministische dynamische Prinzipal-Agenten-Verträge immer mindestens so ertragreich sind wie stochastische, falls die sogenannte Methode erster Ordnung des dynamischen Mechanismus-Designs erfüllt ist. Meine Ergebnisse legen dar, dass die in der Literatur übliche Einschränkung auf deterministische Verträge zulässig ist, so lange die Methode erster Ordnung gültig ist. Kapitel II basiert auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Ilia Krasikov und Rohit Lamba. Ein Großanbieter (Prinzipal) handelt mit einer kleinen Firma (Agent) einen wiederkehrenden Geschäftsvertrag aus, wobei sich der Agent als ungeduldiger erweist. Der optimale Vertrag wird durch zwei Schlüsseleigenschaften beschrieben: Neustart und Abbruch, die vielerlei Eigenschaften der angebotenen Verträge darlegen. Kapitel III basiert schließlich auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Rohit Lamba. Darin besitzt der Agent dynamische private Information, die einem Markovprozess folgt. Ein monopolistischer Prinzipal verkauft dem Agenten ein nicht-dauerhaftes Gut und er verpflichtet sich in jeder Periode an den ursprünglich ausgehandelten Vertrag. Die entstehenden Informationskosten verhindern erst-beste Verträge bei auftretender Persistenz im Typ des Agenten. Diese Arbeit stellt einen Weg bereit, wie man den optimalen deterministischen Vertrag in dynamischen Prinzipal-Agenten-Modellen erhält. Der gewöhnliche Weg mit lediglich lokal nach unten bindenden Anreizverträglichkeitsbedingungen misslingt bei hoher Persistenz der Typrealisierungen und bei stark differenzierender Diskontierung. Zudem zeigt die Arbeit wann mit Gewissheit stochastische Verträge ausgeschlossen werden können. / This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each in the field of dynamic contracting. Chapter I shows that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. My results demonstrate that the usual restriction in the literature to deterministic contracts is admissible, as long as the first-order approach is valid. Chapter II is based on joint work with Ilia Krasikov and Rohit Lamba. We consider a large supplier (principal) who contracts with a small firm (agent) to repeatedly provide working capital in return for payments. The agent is less patient than the principal. The optimal contract is characterized by two key properties: restart and shutdown, which capture various aspects of contracts offered in the marketplace. Finally, Chapter III is based on joint work with Rohit Lamba. We consider the problem of optimal contracting where the agent has dynamic private information, which follows a Markov process. In each period, a monopolistic principal sells a nondurable good to the agent and she commits to the contract she made in the initial period. The emerging information costs prevent first-best contracts whenever there is persistency in the agent’s type. This thesis provides a strategy on how to obtain the optimal deterministic contract in dynamic principal-agent models with Markovian type realizations. We see that the usual approach with only local downward binding incentive compatibility constraints does not work for highly persistent type realizations and for large differences in discounting. Furthermore, I show in which situations we with certainty can exclude stochastic contracts.

本文嘗試以訊息理論中的代理模型來探討台灣在今年(2005,民國94年)將承銷舊制改為新制，對國內初級市場以及當中參與者(包括初次上市公司、公司原大股東、投資人以及承銷商四者)的影響。 經過本文從模型建立、推導和結果之比較分析後發現，事實上，金管會所欲解決國內初級市場的許多不合理問題，最後可以歸納成為兩大問題：一、如何讓承銷商解決公司與投資人之間資訊不對稱的問題？該問題表現在承銷價被低估，或是公司欺騙投資人其真實獲利類型來取得額外之獲利上。二、如何讓公司可以在上市時，真正拿到所募集之資金並且做妥善運用？該問題表現在承銷價被高估，或是原大股東在公司上市時賣老股所能得到之獲利上。 透過本文模型證明，藉由觀察新舊制下承銷價、原大股東以及公司獲利來源的變化可知，新制實施的各種長短期措施，例如短期下強制公司必須以新股承銷(解決問題一)、要求承銷商運用專業審核監督公司的營運概況(解決問題二)，長期下則透過承銷商分級管理制度(解決問題二)等，只要金管會確實執行，的確能讓初級市場最主要的兩大問題得到解決，最終還可達到完全資訊狀態。 但是，本文觀察發現，上半年整個初級市場的概況只能以「冷清」兩字來形容，因此繼續從新制實施的短期角度來看，考慮初級市場四種參與者所增加的各項成本，包括發行成本、資訊揭露成本等，以及其在適應新制時所造成新的衝擊與影響，包括公司額外募得之資金運用不當、每股盈餘遭稀釋之衝擊等等之後，本文發現經過初級市場四種參與者的交互影響，則最壞情況為發生「短期獲利低類型公司被逐出初級市場」的現象，並導致初級市場失靈而失去其所能帶給公司作為籌資管道之功能，這便可解釋為何初級市場近來會有如此冷清的情況。 因此本文建議，未來新制應做適度修正，例如降低公司上市時的成本、提供更大的誘因讓承銷商願意承做上市案件，避免初級市場發生失靈的可能；最後若再加上金管會確實長期下來公平客觀的執行承銷商分級管理制度，解決承銷商過度競爭之情況、讓投資人有信心願意相信承銷商會替其解決資訊不對稱的問題，則新制對整個初級市場以及參與者而言，將可帶來正面的效果與助益。 事實上，本文在研究過程中發現，國內承銷制度變革多著重於增加消極外部監督力量，並強調解決投資人與公司之間資訊不對稱的問題；但是本文以為，未來承銷制度還可走向實施能夠創造積極且為內部自發性監督力量的措施，且亦應設法解決承銷商與投資人、承銷商與公司之間資訊不對稱的問題才是，因此本文提出：一、在讓承銷商恢復專業方面，除了先前所提減少消極外部監督力量之衝擊，應設法再擴大承銷商的獲利來源和增加其本身積極內部監督之力量，例如培養出特有的服務項目尋求專業化或是選擇提供多種服務達到範疇經濟效果，以及品牌建立等；二、在解決公司與投資人之間資訊不對稱的問題方面，除了透過承銷商，本文認為還可藉由公司本身品牌之建立創造出自我監督力量，以及讓國內投資人從以散戶為主體到組成團體，形成類似法人之概念創造另一個外部監督的力量。三、在讓公司可以真正拿到上市時所募集之資金並做妥善運用方面，除了新股發行，本文建議，公司在使用新制上市時應了解到不能再沿用舊制的思考模式，須事先規劃如何降低新制帶給公司的衝擊，至於上市後，尚須透過完善的公司治理制度，來健全整個公司資金運用情形，因此金管會在對承銷制度進行改革的同時，也應考慮是否亦須適時修改出更完善的公司治理制度，藉由同時對公司上市前後之行為做完善的規範，相信能讓承銷制度的改革達成更顯著的效果。 藉由以上三方面之建議，本文希望能夠更迅速有效的解決國內當前初級市場所存在的不合理問題，並讓其在未來朝著更健全的方向發展，進而使得國內整個資本市場達成質與量皆提升的目標。