In response to the possibilities for selection created by reproductive technologies like IVF and Prenatal screening, Julian Savulescu has argued that parents have a moral obligation to employ selective technology in order to have the best child that they can possibly have. This idea, which Savulescu has called the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, appears reminiscent of historical eugenics. However, Savulescu has argued that this principle is not eugenic. In this paper I argue that there are good reasons to think that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence is eugenic. Specifically, I argue that this principle shares five common features with historical eugenics which justify the conclusion that it is eugenic. However, while I argue that this principle is eugenic, I argue that it is not morally problematic for that reason because the shared features of historical eugenics and the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, which justify the claim that the principle is eugenic, are not morally problematic. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-10-08 22:23:59.333

In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children and that such use should not be prohibited. In 'Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy', Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related children. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning, including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions, thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted. In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz's criticisms misconstrue my arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument from adoption.

Är det möjligt att välja rätt embryo vid In-vitro fertilisering (IVF)? I sådana fall, vad innebär det att något är det rätta embryot? I denna uppsats diskuteras IVF och de moraliska dilemman som kan uppstå vid val av embryo. Vid IVF är det möjligt att ställa en preimplantorisk genetisk diagnostik (PGD) vilken kan ge information om genetiska sjukdomar och andra anlag, såväl som kön och kromosomfel. Enligt Julian Savulescu, som förespråkar the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, är vi moraliskt skyldiga att välja ett friskt embryo, vilket också anses vara det rätta embryot. I kontrast till detta ställs Christine Overall som menar att Savulescus princip innebär problem för hur vi bör se på barnafödande. Jag diskuterar vidare hur vi utifrån ett socialt och ett samhällsperspektiv kan se det som moraliskt tveksamt att förbjuda att personer med vissa anlag föds, samt försöker visa på Savulescus ignorans för hur IVF fungerar och att detta bidrar till att hans argument fallerar.

When it comes to potential children, is to love them to leave them be (nonexistent)? I examine the possibility of virtuous reproduction, as well as some more basic theoretical issues surrounding the nature of moral goodness and obligation generally. Currently, there is a large body of literature in the field of reproductive ethics on questions of what considerations and practices ought to guide reproductive decision-making. The appropriate use of testing technologies to inform such decision-making, for instance, has been widely debated. Much smaller and less visible is the debate surrounding the prior question of whether reproduction itself is morally appropriate or desirable. I am particularly interested in how consequentialist strategies for including considerations of beneficence in reproductive decision-making have shaped moral approaches to reproduction. The principle of procreative beneficence (PPB), which mandates potential reproducers to select the best possible child, highlights the problematic nature of these strategies. The limited conceptual resources and problematic normative foundations of such strategies have stymied the development of a robust discussion on the ethics of reproduction itself. Other types of ethical approaches, loosely defined as deontological, offer superior accounts of what is at issue in reproduction, but also draw on some flawed background assumptions regarding, for instance, the nature of the moral agent and the scope of the moral sphere. The question of the morality of reproduction itself thus leads to an examination of far more basic issues in ethical theory: namely, the significance of meta-ethical commitments, and the desirability of a normative framework that offers a rich and agent-focused account of moral goodness and badness. I argue that a virtue-centred ethics, grounded in neo-Aristotelian naturalism, accomplishes just that. And it is well-equipped to provide a meaningful and helpful analysis of the morality of reproduction, both holistically, in terms of the potential virtuousness of reproduction generally, and in terms of how the virtues of courage and benevolence may be expressed in reproduction. I conclude that a virtue-centred assessment of reproduction offers a sound and practical form of evaluation and that a virtuous character may indeed be expressed through reproduction. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-17 10:44:50.827

Infertile and childless women think about, live with, and defend their status as mothers and as nonmothers, arguably more so than other women for whom motherhood comes about accidentally or relatively easily in accordance with a plan. Within this group of infertile and childless women are those who are otherwise socially marginalized by factors like class, race, age, marital status, and sexual identity. This dissertation asks about the ways in which marginalized infertile and childless women in America make sense of their situations given the climate of “stratified reproduction” in which the motherhood mandate excludes them or applies to them only obliquely. While other researchers focus on inequalities in access to treatment to explain why many marginalized women eschew medically assisted reproduction and adoption, I emphasize women’s resistance to these attempts at normalization. I take a critical, poststructural, feminist stance within a constructivist analytical framework to suggest that the medicalization, commodification, and bureaucratization of the most available alternative paths to motherhood create the role of the “infertile woman”—i.e., the white, middle class, heternormative, married, “desperate and damaged” cum savvy consumer. By contrast, the women who participated in this study are better described as the “ambivalent childless” (i.e., neither voluntary nor involuntary) and the “pragmatic infertile.” These women experience infertility and childlessness—two interrelated, potentially stigmatizing “roles”—in ways that belie this stereotype, reject the associated stigma in favor of an abiding, dynamic ambivalence, and re-assert themselves as fulfilled women in spite of their presumed deviance.

Despite its immense personal significance, procreation is an inherently other-regarding endeavor. By its very nature, the decision to procreate is the decision to bring into existence another morally considerable being, one who will be exposed to the full range of harms, benefits, and risks that accompany a typical human life, and one who cannot by its nature ever consent to being born. Moreover, when this decision is undertaken in a community of persons, it is also a decision to affect the lives of others in a host of profound (if often underappreciated) ways, from its effects on population size and environmental sustainability, to its consequences for a community's distribution of resources. In many cases, of course, these interests coincide: adults need children for their parenting projects, societies need citizens for the maintenance of their institutions, and children themselves are often happy to have been brought into existence. However, as a burgeoning literature is beginning to demonstrate, the various interests that are implicated by procreative decision-making can also come into conflict as well, and in ways that raise basic questions of justice. This thesis explores five of these questions, and in so doing, seeks to contribute to our understanding of the normative significance of procreation. Chapter One considers the relationship between procreation and child welfare, asking what role (if any) prospective children's interests play in limiting the scope of the right to procreate. Chapters Two and Three consider the relationship between procreation and parenthood, asking whether the act of creating a child generates special rights and/or obligations to parent that child. Chapter Four considers how the significant costs of procreation and parenting ought to be distributed through society, asking whether parents are responsible for paying the full cost of their childrearing projects, or whether childrearing costs should be shared in some way among parents and non-parents alike. Finally, Chapter Five considers our moral obligations to orphaned children, asking whether it is permissible to create new children in conditions where there are already existing children in need of parental care. While numerous positions are defended on each of these interrelated questions, one general conclusion runs through all of them: rather than being viewed as something that is immune from moral scrutiny, or as something that individuals have an unqualified right to do, procreation ought to be viewed as the site of potentially conflicting interests that must be carefully balanced against one another.

This thesis aims to interpret the elements of beauty and art in the marriages portrayed in Geoffrey Chaucer¡¦s Canterbury Tales by means of St. Thomas Aquinas¡¦s theory of beauty and that of art. St. Thomas asserts that beauty consists of three elements: proportion, clarity and integrity, and that art imitates and denotes production. I take beauty and art as the crucial concepts and use analogy as the inquiring tool to examine the imaginary domain between beauty and art as applied to marriage, meanwhile investigating the implied language of intercommunication between aesthetics and marriage. Marriage is taken as a representation of beauty; its different forms and contents portrayed in Chaucer¡¦s various tales will be analyzed so as to see to what extent they reflect and diverge from medieval aesthetic sensitivity and how aesthetic theory can be adopted to interpret medieval marriage. In Chapter One, the theory of ¡§proportion¡¨ is applied to the various forms of marriage depicted in the Tales to explore how the marriage of the nobility and that of the commoners will correspond to this element of beauty, as portrayed in ¡§The Clerk¡¦s Tale,¡¨ ¡§The Man of Law¡¦s Tale,¡¨ ¡§The Second Nun¡¦s Tale,¡¨ ¡§The Franklin¡¦s Tale,¡¨ ¡§The Merchant¡¦s Tale,¡¨ ¡§The Miller¡¦s Tale,¡¨ ¡§The Wife of Bath¡¦s Prologue¡¨ and her tale. Chapter Two examines the roles the variants of ¡§clarity,¡¨ that is, physical and spiritual beauty, play in marriage, and a debate on the coexistence and non-coexistence of physical and spiritual beauty of a wife among the pilgrim-tellers will be demonstrated. Furthermore, in Chapter Three I shall extend the medieval concept of art to that of the ¡§procreative art¡¨ in marriage, and explore the relationship between the procreative art and the ¡§integrity¡¨ of marriage in the aforementioned tales. The conclusion discusses Chaucer¡¦s positions on the aesthetics of marriage of the nobility and that of the commoners portrayed in the tales.

This thesis analyzes the beliefs of population theorist Julian L. Simon through the creation of a harm principle. It specifically analyzes his argument that we value our freedom to choose how many children we want above all other values in the context of overpopulation and environmental destruction. The developed harm principle is meant to give us a method to decide how to balance our personal freedom with our security-survival. I begin with an overview of Simon’s work, as well as an exposition of other prominent population theorists. I then propose a principle that is a utilitarian alternative to John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle. I apply the principle to the situation wherein overpopulation causes such great environmental damage that we must choose between upholding procreative rights and our continued survival. I conclude that in most cases we will accept limitations on our procreative freedom in order to maintain our planet and ensure our security-survival.