Punishment is a central component of humans’ psychological repertoire: the desire to punish emerges early in life and persists across cultures and development (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002; Hamlin et al., 2011; Henrich et al., 2010; Smith & Warneken, 2016). Although punishment is so central to the human experience, scholars across disciplines have conceptualized punishment in different ways. For instance, some scholars have conceptualized punishment as a type of behavior directed toward those who cause harm or violate social norms (e.g., Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Deutchman et al., 2021) and have worked toward elucidating punishment’s instrumental value (e.g., Alschuler, 2003; Delton & Krasnow, 2017; Nagin, 1998, Zimring & Hawkins, 1995). However, other scholars have conceptualized punishment as more than just a behavior: these scholars have argued that punishment is both a behavior and a mechanism for social communication. These scholars often describe this idea as the “expressive theory of punishment” (Feinberg, 1965; Hampton, 1992; Kahan, 1996). Though past work has argued that punishment is communicative, few programs of research have empirically tested how laypeople interpret punishment’s messages. The paucity of research examining people’s understanding of punishment’s messages is not a miniscule omission. Scholars writing on theories of punishment often postulate, at least implicitly, that laypeople will understand punishment in a way that is consistent with normative theory (e.g., Bregant et al., 2020; Darley & Pittman, 2003). If this postulation is misguided, it could undermine the extent to which people view punishment policy as legitimate (e.g., Nadler, 2004; Tyler, 2006). My dissertation addresses this topic by investigating children’s and adults’ inferences about what punishment signals about punished individuals’ identities. When thinking about identity, people often reason about the current self in tandem with past and future selves (e.g., Peetz & Wilson, 2008). By extension, people may interpret punishment’s messages as communicating distinct information about different selves. I examine this possibility by investigating the inferences laypeople make about people's past, present, and future identities on the basis of punishment. Below, I describe the chapters in my dissertation, each of which consists of one manuscript within my larger program of research. Chapter 1 (Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2021-a), a theory paper, provides a conceptual foundation for the empirical portions of the dissertation. Namely, this chapter introduces the idea that certain forms of legal punishment (incarceration) are especially well-suited to communicate morally relevant information, paying special attention to the idea that such punishment communicates negative moral information about punished individuals. Chapter 2 (Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2020) builds on Chapter 1 by leveraging experimental methods to understand how laypeople understand punishment’s signals. Specifically, Chapter 2 examines children’s and adults’ inferences about what punishment signals about who a punished individual was in the past. Chapter 3 (Dunlea & Heiphetz, in press) extends the results of Chapter 2 by documenting the downstream social consequences of how people understand punishment’s past-oriented messages. Specifically, Chapter 3 examines how different messages about a punished individual’s past shape people’s attitudes toward such individuals in the present. Chapter 4 (Dunlea & Heiphetz, 2021-b) builds on Chapters 2 and 3 by investigating laypeople’s inferences about punishment’s future-oriented messages, specifically probing people’s views about what punishment might signal about who a punished individual might become. Finally, Chapter 5 (Dunlea et al., under revised review) addresses laypeople’s inferences about punishment’s future-oriented messages in a complementary way—by examining the extent to which people understand punishment as communicating messages about intergenerational immorality. That is, Chapter 5 asks whether people understand punishment as conveying morally relevant information about future generations of individuals related to punished individuals (i.e., children of incarcerated parents). Together, these chapters shed light on the origins and development of people’s reasoning about punishment’s messages. In doing so, this dissertation integrates sub-areas of psychology (social cognition, development, moral psychology) and connects psychology with related fields (e.g., philosophy, law) to answer questions central to jurisprudential inquiry.

Thesis advisor: David M. Rasmussen / This dissertation defines and defends the concept of ‘criminal oppression.’ Criminal oppression occurs when people are excluded from full participation in important social and political institutions because they are perceived to have violated certain community norms. Oppression is primarily a structural phenomenon, in which practices of formal and informal institutions unjustly harm people based on group membership. In structural oppression, there is rarely an individual who can be said to be responsible for the oppression, but I argue that at times, individuals may also be agents of oppression when they create, perpetuate, or exacerbate structural oppression. Applying this theory of oppression, the criminal justice system in the United States is an oppressive structure that unjustly harms those considered to be ‘criminals’ through a variety of practices. There are three categories of unjust practices: policing, adjudication and punishment, and collateral effects of arrest and conviction. These three categories of practices create the social group ‘criminals’ by subjecting certain people to these kinds of treatments. I use the word ‘criminal’ to describe those who are treated as criminals by police, the courts, and even private individuals like employers. To be a ‘criminal,’ it is not necessary that one has committed a crime or been convicted of a crime. Racial and criminal oppression deeply related historically and conceptually. Nevertheless, they are distinct kinds of oppression. In the United States, those who are not racially oppressed but are ‘criminals’ face many of the same unjust obstacles as those who are racially oppressed in addition to being ‘criminals.’ Some may argue that ‘criminals’ duly convicted of crimes deserve to be socially and politically excluded. But, I argue that the criminal justice system is not properly conceived of as an apolitical institution that can assess moral blameworthiness. Nor should it be able to offer punishments that amount to social and political exclusion. Instead, the criminal justice system is one political institution amongst many, and it ought to be governed by the same principles of liberty and equality that govern other political institutions. Criminal law’s proper function is to facilitate government as a system social cooperation. Therefore, it ought to respond to criminal acts with actions designed to promote inclusion rather than exclusion. Moreover, even if someone has committed a crime, that does not mean that they ought to be subject to violence or permanent second-class status. Finally, I address specific, feminism-driven arguments for using the criminal justice system to fight violence against women. Some feminists argue that the expressivist function of punishment—the ability of punishment to express disapproval and disavowal—makes it a perfect tool for fighting the normalization of violence against women. The problem, they contend, is that this violence is under-punished in the United States, and the solution to ending violence against women is to increase prosecutions and advocate for harsher punishments because punishment will change the social norms and make violence against women rarer. To this, I argue that those who create laws or mete out punishments do not have control over the social meaning of punishment with precision. The historical and present-day oppressive features of criminal law and punishment interfere with the ability of prosecution and punishment to condemn certain types of acts without also condemning people. Thus, feminists who try to use the criminal justice system to fight gender-based violence will find it to be ineffective and potentially harmful to the already oppressed group of ‘criminals.” Chapter 1argues that ‘criminals’ are oppressed using a structural model of oppression that focuses on how collections of institutional policies and practices can create and maintain unjust power relations between groups of people. I will also use an externalist theory of group identity to argue that being arrested or convicted of a crime is not necessary or sufficient for membership in the social group ‘criminal.’ Chapter 2 explains the relationship between racial oppression and the oppression of ‘criminals,’ noting the historical development of the modern prison system. Chapter 3 argues that the proper role of criminal law is to support systems of social cooperation, not to punish pre-political wrongs. I will suggest that criminal law is in essence part of the social contract, not a separate sphere of justice to which distinctive, retributive principles apply. Instead, the criminal law cannot determine moral blameworthiness and is only justified in sanctioning rule violations for the sake of supporting social cooperation in a society whose institutions are worth supporting. In Chapter 4, I propose a feminist, expressivist defense of the use of prosecution and harsh punishment as a response to rape and domestic violence that takes the structural nature of violence against women into account. Chapter 5, however, demonstrates why even this theory cannot justify incarceration in the non-ideal sphere because of the oppressive history and practice of the American criminal justice system. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The thesis is a comparative study of two campaigns waged against capital punishment. Specifically, it is an examination of the public arguments and legislative action which transpired in Oregon and Great Britain when their respective legislatures considered and then approved laws to abolish the penalty of death for the crime of murder -- Oregon in 1963 and Britain in 1965.

Imposing punishments on adults Abstract This thesis deals with the imposition of punishments on adult offenders. The introductory chapters are devoted first to the definition of the concept of punishment and its position in relation to protections measures, and then to the system of punishment, within which the different types of punishment and their classification according to various criteria are discussed. A substantial part of the work is devoted to the interpretation of the issue of the purpose of punishment, which is the starting point for the imposition of punishment. The purpose of punishment is described using the three main theories of punishment, namely retributive, utilitarian and mixed theories. These theories, their approach to the purpose of punishment and their historical development are discussed in more detail, including their various modifications. This chapter also deals with the purpose of punishment in the Czech legal system and, in connection, with the question of the primary and secondary purpose of punishment. This chapter also includes a separate discussion of the issue of general and individual prevention, which is important in terms of distinguishing the different approaches to the purpose of punishment according to the above-mentioned theories of punishment. Closely related to...

Punishment of disqualification and its control Abstract The topic of this diploma thesis is the punishment of the disqualification and its control. The main goal of this work is to analyze the regulation of the disqualification of activity in the Czech legal system, to describe the control of its execution and especially the pitfalls associated with control and, last but not least, to propose changes in legislation. The text of the thesis is divided into nine chapters, some of which contain subchapters. In conclusion, I summarize and assess the results of the work set out in its introduction. The first chapter discusses the theoretical nature of punishment and its purpose in general and then specifically the punishment of disqualification itself. The second chapter traces the historical development of the punishment of disqualification. The third chapter is divided into three subchapters. The first of them represents the system of punishments in the Czech legal system, the other specifically focuses on alternative punishments and the last is focused only on the punishment of disqualification. The fourth chapter, divided into four subchapters, is devoted to the imposition of the punishment of disqualification and its imposition. This part of the work outlining the practice of the courts is based mainly on...

Capital punishment is a forceful moral issue that is frequently overlooked. This is possibly due to the reverence many have toward the rule of law or a passive acceptance of the status quo. In this thesis I will begin with a discussion of context to the topic of the death penalty in order to address potential biases. Then I examine not only the ethical merit of the death penalty but the foundational justifications for a system of criminal justice to show that the special relationship between the state and its citizens does not lend itself to or allow for the instantiation of the death penalty. I look first to several theories of punishment selecting the most viable theory in order to make the most plausible case in favor of the death penalty. From there I establish that there is some intuitive merit to the notion that the vicious deserve unhappiness and see how far that intuition might extend. In this section I examine the merits and demerits of Kantian retributivism in order to address the many intricate ethical and political issues involved in the death penalty debate. I’ve chosen the Kantian ethical framework because of the nuance with which many of the problems of retribution are solved. Kant insets the enlightenment principles into his moral framework and provides reasoned explanations for there insistence, as such his work provides a background from which I will work through details and resolve contradictions. I will then make an argument for the moral personhood of the state and sketch the special relationship it has to its citizens. Finally I will offer a system that incorporates the ideas developed in the previous sections and gives a practical answer to the death penalty debate. It is my ultimate argument that there is no absolute ban on the death penalty, possibly even some intuitive merit to the scheme, but ultimately many moral limitations on its implementation.

No / Recent research by Andrew Reynolds has interrogated the archaeological record for evidence of Anglo-Saxon execution cemeteries (Reynolds 2009). This paper will discuss how osteological evidence can aid our interpretation of Anglo-Saxon capital punishment and give insight into the type of evidence that might aid in the identification of corporal punishment from skeletal populations. The importance of correctly interpreting skeletal trauma is essential, but this can be supported by scrutinising the palaeodemographic profile of execution populations, burial position, an understanding the decomposition process and the significance of post-depositional disturbance of burials. It will lay down a framework for the successful identification of corporal and capital p unishments, with reference to Anglo-Saxon documentary sources. / Full text of the author's final draft is unavailable due to copyright restrictions.

The corporal punishment of children is being widely challenged today. Christians have traditionally followed the "spare the rod and spoil the child" approach and must respond to the new situation. Corporal punishment is part of the wider disciplinary process. It can lead to corporal abuse, but this is not a reason per se to reject it. Parents have a right to discipline their children, including the use of reasonable corporal punishment. Teachers can also use corporal punishment to enforce discipline, although its use will soon be banned in all South African schools, following world trends. Corporal punishment in the home and at school satisfies the criteria of both the deontological and teleogical approach to theological ethics. It should be retained as part of a multi-faceted approach to discipline. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / M.Th. (Theological Ethics)

The corporal punishment of children is being widely challenged today. Christians have traditionally followed the "spare the rod and spoil the child" approach and must respond to the new situation. Corporal punishment is part of the wider disciplinary process. It can lead to corporal abuse, but this is not a reason per se to reject it. Parents have a right to discipline their children, including the use of reasonable corporal punishment. Teachers can also use corporal punishment to enforce discipline, although its use will soon be banned in all South African schools, following world trends. Corporal punishment in the home and at school satisfies the criteria of both the deontological and teleogical approach to theological ethics. It should be retained as part of a multi-faceted approach to discipline. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / M.Th. (Theological Ethics)

This thesis provides an ethical analysis of imprisonment as a mode of punishment. Consisting in an introduction and four papers the thesis addresses several important questions concerning imprisonment from a number of different perspectives and theoretical starting points. One overall conclusion of this thesis is that imprisonment, as a mode of punishment, deserves more attention from moral and legal philosophers. It is also concluded that a more complete ethical assessment of prison conditions and prison management requires a broader focus. It must include an explicit discussion of both how imprisonment directly affects prison inmates and its negative side-effects on third parties. Another conclusion is that ethical discussions on prison conditions should not be too easily reduced to a question about how harsh or lenient is should be. Paper 1 argues that prisoners have a right to privacy. It is argued that respect for inmates’ privacy is related to respect for them as moral agents. Consequently, respect for inmates’ privacy is called for by different established philosophical theories about the justification of legal punishment. Practical implications of this argument are discussed and it is argued that invasion of privacy should be minimized to the greatest extent possible, without compromising other important values or the rights to safety and security. It is also proposed that respect for privacy should be part of the objective of creating and upholding a secure environment. Paper 2 discusses whether the collateral harm of imprisonment to the children and other close family members of prison inmates may give rise to special moral obligations towards them. Several collateral harms, including decreased psychological wellbeing, financial costs, loss of economic opportunities, and intrusion and control over their private lives, are identified. Two perspectives in moral philosophy, consequentialism and deontology, are then applied in order to assess whether these harms are permissible. It is argued that from either perspective it is hard to defend the claim that allowing for these harms are morally permissible. Consequently, imprisonment should be used only as a last resort. Where it is deemed necessary, it gives rise to special moral obligations. Using the notion of residual obligation, these obligations are then categorized and clarified.                 Paper 3 focuses on an argument that has figured in the philosophical debate on felon disenfranchisement. This argument states that as a matter of democratic self-determination, a legitimate democratic collective has the collective right to decide whether to disenfranchise felons as a way of defining their political identity. Yet, such a collective’s right to self-determination is limited, since the choice to disenfranchise anyone must be connected to normative considerations of political significance. This paper defends this argument against three charges that has been raised to it. In doing so it also explores under what circumstances felon disenfranchisement can be permissible. Paper 4 explores the question of whether prison inmates suffering from ADHD should be administered psychopharmacological intervention (methylphenidate) for their condition. The theoretical starting point for the discussion is the communicative theory of punishment, which understands criminal punishment   as a form of secular penance. Viewed through the lens of the communicative theory it is argued that the provision of pharmacological treatment to offenders with ADHD need not necessarily be conceived of as an alternative to punishment, but as an aid to achieving the penological ends of secular penance. Thus, in this view offenders diagnosed with ADHD should have the option to undergo pharmacological treatment. / <p>QC 20170110</p>