Too often the acknowledgment that race is a social construction ignores exactly how this construction occurs. By illuminating the way in which the category of blackness and black individuals are made, we can better see how race matters in America. Antidiscrimination policy, social science research, and the state's support of its citizens can all be improved by an accurate and concrete definition of blackness. Making Blackness, Making Policy argues that blackness and black people are literally made rather than discovered. The social construction of blackness involves the naming of individuals as black, and the subsequent interaction between this naming and racial projects. The process of naming involves an intersubjective dialogue in which racial self-identification and ascription by others lead to a consensus on an individual's race. These third parties include an individual's community, the media, and, crucially, the state. Following Ian Hacking, this process is most properly termed the dynamic nominalism of blackness. My dissertation uses analytic philosophy, qualitative and quantitative research, and historical analysis to defend this conception. The dynamic nominalist process is illustrated through the media's contribution to the making of Barack Obama's blackness, and the state's creation and maintenance of racial categories through law, policy, and enumeration. I then argue that the state's dominant role in creating blackness, and the vital role that a black identity plays in millions' sense of self, requires the United States Government to support a politics of recognition. The state's antidiscrimination efforts would also improve through the adoption of a dynamic nominalism of blackness. Replacing the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission's inconsistent and contradictory definitions of race with the dynamic nominalism of blackness would clarify when and how racial discrimination occurs. / African and African American Studies

Oppression makes certain social identities morally significant. I argue in my dissertation that this relevance manifests in disparate ways and that we should develop a theory about three ontologically distinct aspects of a social identity in order to explain these differences. The way institutions define people in terms of race, gender, or religion matters because that classification plays a role in how individuals can or cannot participate in society. But oppression is not only a series of structural barriers: it also fosters demeaning stereotypes that distort the way we self-identify or how we form beliefs about others. Oppression can warp interpersonal relationships as well because it enables others to impose an oppressive social identity on to us. This interpersonal aspect of oppression depends on specific interactions because we can present distinct “public identities” across different social circles: someone can come out as LGBT at home, but not at work; to friends, but not family. I use each of these aspects of a social identity to illuminate cases where oppression creates similar experiences of subordination among group members that non-members do not experience. These shared experiences can constitute a special, if undesirable, relationship among the oppressed that generates a special obligation for the oppressed to resist their own oppression. / 2023-02-28

In this dissertation I criticize and reconfigure the ontological framework within which discussions of the organization, ontogeny, and evolution of organic form have often been conducted. Explanations of organismal form are frequently given in terms of a force or essence that exists prior to the organism’s life in the world. Traits of organisms are products of the selective environment and the unbroken linear inheritance of genetically coded developmental programs. Homological traits share unbroken vertical inheritance from a single common ancestor. Species are the product of exclusive gene flow between conspecifics and vertical genetic inheritance. And likewise, race is ascribed on the basis of pre-existing essential features. In place of this underlying preformationism which locates the source of form either in the informational program of inherited genes or within a selecting environment, I suggest form is the product of an organism’s self-construction using diverse resources. This can be understood as a modification of Kant’s view of organisms as self-organizing, set out in his Critique of Judgment (1790). Recast from this perspective the meaning and reference of “trait,” “homology,” “species,” and “race” change. Firstly, a trait may be the product of the organism’s self-construction utilizing multiple ancestral resources. Given this, homologous traits may correspond in some but not all of their features or may share some but not all of their ancestral sources. Homology may be partial. Species may acquire epigenetic, cellular, behavioural, and ecological resources both vertically and horizontally. As such, they are best conceived of as recurrent successions of self-constructed and reconstructed life cycles of organisms sharing similar resources, a similar habitus, similar capacities for sustaining themselves, and repeated generative processes. Lastly, race identity is not preformed but within the control of human organisms as agents who self-construct, interpret, and ascribe their own race identities utilizing diverse sets of dynamic relationships, lived experiences, and histories.

Thesis advisor: David M. Rasmussen / This dissertation defines and defends the concept of ‘criminal oppression.’ Criminal oppression occurs when people are excluded from full participation in important social and political institutions because they are perceived to have violated certain community norms. Oppression is primarily a structural phenomenon, in which practices of formal and informal institutions unjustly harm people based on group membership. In structural oppression, there is rarely an individual who can be said to be responsible for the oppression, but I argue that at times, individuals may also be agents of oppression when they create, perpetuate, or exacerbate structural oppression. Applying this theory of oppression, the criminal justice system in the United States is an oppressive structure that unjustly harms those considered to be ‘criminals’ through a variety of practices. There are three categories of unjust practices: policing, adjudication and punishment, and collateral effects of arrest and conviction. These three categories of practices create the social group ‘criminals’ by subjecting certain people to these kinds of treatments. I use the word ‘criminal’ to describe those who are treated as criminals by police, the courts, and even private individuals like employers. To be a ‘criminal,’ it is not necessary that one has committed a crime or been convicted of a crime. Racial and criminal oppression deeply related historically and conceptually. Nevertheless, they are distinct kinds of oppression. In the United States, those who are not racially oppressed but are ‘criminals’ face many of the same unjust obstacles as those who are racially oppressed in addition to being ‘criminals.’ Some may argue that ‘criminals’ duly convicted of crimes deserve to be socially and politically excluded. But, I argue that the criminal justice system is not properly conceived of as an apolitical institution that can assess moral blameworthiness. Nor should it be able to offer punishments that amount to social and political exclusion. Instead, the criminal justice system is one political institution amongst many, and it ought to be governed by the same principles of liberty and equality that govern other political institutions. Criminal law’s proper function is to facilitate government as a system social cooperation. Therefore, it ought to respond to criminal acts with actions designed to promote inclusion rather than exclusion. Moreover, even if someone has committed a crime, that does not mean that they ought to be subject to violence or permanent second-class status. Finally, I address specific, feminism-driven arguments for using the criminal justice system to fight violence against women. Some feminists argue that the expressivist function of punishment—the ability of punishment to express disapproval and disavowal—makes it a perfect tool for fighting the normalization of violence against women. The problem, they contend, is that this violence is under-punished in the United States, and the solution to ending violence against women is to increase prosecutions and advocate for harsher punishments because punishment will change the social norms and make violence against women rarer. To this, I argue that those who create laws or mete out punishments do not have control over the social meaning of punishment with precision. The historical and present-day oppressive features of criminal law and punishment interfere with the ability of prosecution and punishment to condemn certain types of acts without also condemning people. Thus, feminists who try to use the criminal justice system to fight gender-based violence will find it to be ineffective and potentially harmful to the already oppressed group of ‘criminals.” Chapter 1argues that ‘criminals’ are oppressed using a structural model of oppression that focuses on how collections of institutional policies and practices can create and maintain unjust power relations between groups of people. I will also use an externalist theory of group identity to argue that being arrested or convicted of a crime is not necessary or sufficient for membership in the social group ‘criminal.’ Chapter 2 explains the relationship between racial oppression and the oppression of ‘criminals,’ noting the historical development of the modern prison system. Chapter 3 argues that the proper role of criminal law is to support systems of social cooperation, not to punish pre-political wrongs. I will suggest that criminal law is in essence part of the social contract, not a separate sphere of justice to which distinctive, retributive principles apply. Instead, the criminal law cannot determine moral blameworthiness and is only justified in sanctioning rule violations for the sake of supporting social cooperation in a society whose institutions are worth supporting. In Chapter 4, I propose a feminist, expressivist defense of the use of prosecution and harsh punishment as a response to rape and domestic violence that takes the structural nature of violence against women into account. Chapter 5, however, demonstrates why even this theory cannot justify incarceration in the non-ideal sphere because of the oppressive history and practice of the American criminal justice system. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

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This thesis began (in thought) as a response to the killing of Trayvon Martin in 2012 and that of Mike Brown not too long after, and the many victims who succumbed to some form of racial profiling of another before these deaths, in-between, and after. Desmond Cole wrote an article in 2015 that further precipitated the thought into action and the desire to address racial profiling in writing form. In the thesis I take a philosophical approach to racial profiling, and although in the first two chapters I address the ordinary discussions surrounding racial profiling, in the latter two I tackle the problem of moral responsibility which I take to be central. In the first part of the thesis I defend the policy in the case of illegal weapons possession based on Henry Shue’s principle of basic rights, but in the latter part I question this assertion. Even if blacks were shown to commit more of certain crimes or even violent crimes, that does not address the fact that crime arises out of context and in the case of “black crime” out of a racialized context. In the latter part of the thesis I work through the problem of collective and personal moral responsibility, eventually maintaining that not only is reparations just, but for racial profiling to be justified investment must be made into racialized communities with high rates of poverty. This is because collective responsibility must be taken for the societal oppression and discrimination that has partly resulted in high rates of racialized crime. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

The present dissertation is a case study in applied phenomenology, specifically the postcolonial phenomenology of racism theorized by Lewis Gordon and applied to scholarly studies conducted on African American Jews and their kinfolk. My thesis is the following: Presumptively ontological human natures cannot function axiomatically for humanistic research on African American Jews. A humanistic science of Africana Jews must foreground the lived social worlds that permit such Jews to appear as ordinary expressions of humanity. The basic premise here is that subaltern (or denied) humanity exists in a neocolonial social world by virtue of an ordinariness that supervenes on humanity. For example, the more historians consider Africana Jews as ordinary, the more Africana Jews' humanity will appear. And the more human Africana Jews appear, the more inhuman their extraordinary appearance appears. This symbiosis constitutes a basic existential condition. When research on Africana Jews ignores this condition, it succumbs to ontological Jewishnness and other concepts rooted in what postcolonial theorist Frantz Fanon calls the "colonial natural attitude. / Religion

There is a tendency in education theory to place the focus on the consequences of racial hegemony (racism, Eurocentric education, low performance by racial minorities) and ignore that race is antecedent to these consequences. This dissertation explores the treatment of race within critical theory in education. I conduct a metaphysical analysis to examine the race concept as it emerges from the works of various critical theorists in education. This examination shows how some scholars affirm the scientifically discredited race concept by offering racial essentialist approaches for emancipatory education. I argue that one of consequences of these approaches is the further tightening of racial constraints on the student’s personal autonomy. This mandates that critical theorists gain a deeper understanding of race as a problem, conceptually, epistemically, ideologically, and existentially. I argue that critical theorists of education draw from work conducted in the philosophy of race by theorists such as K. Anthony Appiah, Jorge Gracia, Charles Mills, and Naomi Zack to gain insights on the metaphysics of race to better inform theory and praxis. I further recommend the creation of a critical philosophy of race in education to address and combat race as a problem and its consequences. I contend that the groundwork for philosophy of race in education must entail strategies that encourage and assist theorists and teachers to move toward the elimination of the race in society, while utilizing race only as heuristic tool to address its consequences. Additionally, I argue that a philosophy of race in education must advocate for an education for autonomy as a means to racial liberation for students.

Racial Contract fait partie de ces livres pionniers qui ont permis aux théories critiques de la race de faire leur entrée en philosophie politique. Dans cette analyse libérale des inégalités raciales, Charles W. Mills propose de prendre la suprématie blanche comme outil conceptuel pour décrire et expliquer les problèmes liés à la race aux États-Unis. Le potentiel émancipatoire de cette approche subversive chez les personnes racisées noires n’a pas été étudié. Dans ce mémoire, après avoir comparé diverses conceptions de la notion de « race », nous examinons la façon dont Mills articule les concepts de « suprématie blanche » et d’« épistémologie de l’ignorance » afin d’expliquer les injustices raciales. Finalement, nous explorons la théorie de la résistance de Shannon Sullivan afin d’évaluer sa compatibilité avec la théorie descriptive de Mills. En fin d’analyse, nous estimons qu’une philosophie de la résistance aurait avantage à se tourner vers des théories critiques de la race autres que celle de Mills, telles que celle de W.E.B. Du Bois afin d’avoir un concept de l’individu racisé noir qui rend compte de son agentivité et donc de sa capacité à résister. Nous soutenons aussi que le concept de « suprématie blanche », tel que développé par Mills, est un outil théorique cohérent, valide et potentiellement utile à l’élaboration d’une philosophie de la résistance noire. Enfin, même si sa portée est plutôt restreinte, nous considérons que l’apport des « traîtres de la race » tel que Shannon Sullivan dans une philosophie de la résistance peut potentiellement être positif. / Racial Contract is one of the pioneering books that brought critical race theories into political philosophy. In this liberal analysis of racial inequalities, Charles W. Mills proposes to use white supremacy as a conceptual tool to describe and explain race-related problems in the United States. However, the emancipatory potential of this subversive approach among "black" people has not been studied. In this master thesis, after comparing various conceptions of "race", we examine how Mills articulates the concepts of "white supremacy" and "epistemology of ignorance" to explain racial injustices. Finally, we explore Shannon Sullivan's theory of resistance to assess its compatibility with Mills' descriptive theory. In the end, we believe that a philosophy of resistance would benefit from turning to critical theories of race other than that of Mills, such as W.E.B. Du Bois, in order to have a concept of the "black" individual that accounts for his or her agentivity and thus his or her capacity to resist. We also argue that the concept of "white supremacy", as developed by Mills, is a coherent, valid and potentially useful theoretical tool for the development of a philosophy of black resistance. Finally, even if its scope is rather limited, we consider that the contribution of "race traitors" such as Shannon Sullivan to a philosophy of resistance can potentially be positive.