The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of "civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different onedimensional theories of punishment are dealt with (retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and restitutionalism}, indicating that each fulfils some of the criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the onedimensional theories fulfils all the necessary conditions, however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach, incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime, thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence providing a morally defensible account of punishment. Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the various approaches examined. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of "civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different onedimensional theories of punishment are dealt with (retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and restitutionalism}, indicating that each fulfils some of the criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the onedimensional theories fulfils all the necessary conditions, however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach, incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime, thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence providing a morally defensible account of punishment. Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the various approaches examined. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)