The central problem of the dissertation concerns the possibility of a distinction between truth-evaluable and non-truth-evaluable utterances of a natural language. The class of truth-evaluable utterances includes assertions, con. ectures and other kinds of speech act susceptible of truth evaluation. The class of non-truth-evaluable utterances includes commands, exhortations, wishes i.e. utterances not evaluated as being true or false. The problem is placed in the context of radical interpretation theory and it shown that it is a substantial problem of Davidson‘s early theory of radical interpret at ion. I consider the possibility of distinguishing between locutionary and illocutionary act in uttering a sentence and its significance in the present project. I discuss the suggestion that the mood of the verb of the sentence signifies the required distinction between truth-evaluable utterances and non-truth-evaluable ones. I argue that no criterion for the distinction based on the mood of the verb is adequate. The solution that I propose to the problem of classifylng truth-evaluable utterances appeals to mental states. The view that grounds this line of inquiry is that the truth-evaluability of an utterance is a characteristic of it exclusively relevant to the doxastic dimension of the speaker’s mind. I discuss the constraints that the nature of radical interpretation puts upon the way we construe the notion of belief. I propose that a possible classification of mental states into doxastic and non-doxastic that would result in a classification of utterances into truth-evaluable and non-truthevaluable ones can be given by an elaborated version of a decision theoretic scheme. I suggest that a decision theoretic scheme based on a decision theory that, like Savage’s theory, grants independence axioms is a better candidate to offer a solution to the central problem of the dissertation than a scheme based on a non- standard decision theory such as Richard Jeffrey’s. I conclude by showing that the proposal I make satisfies the constraints I have considered and that it can be accommodated by a radical interpretation theory.

The purpose of this study is to discuss the appropriateness of a cognitive approach to Donald Davidson&#039 / s meaning theory. Davidson makes the bold proposal that a truth theory, modified for a natural language, may be treated as a meaning theory for that language. According to Davidson, a meaning theory is an empirical theory. Radical Interpretation is at the center of such an empirical inquiry which places restrictions on the truth theory to make it suitable as a meaning theory without appeal to semantic notions. Davidson&lsquo / s aim in presenting this bold proposal and radical interpretation is to shed light on the concept of meaning, not to define the actual semantic competence of language users. But what Davidson&lsquo / s project does not aim to define is the main thing that a cognitive approach must account for. Whether a truth theory can represent the semantic competence of language users is discussed in this work. It is concluded that, although there is no a priori reason for such a representation claim, the cognitive approach&mdash / with the right assumptions to make the claim testable&mdash / can lead to an empirical research programme.

El artículo expone el argumento antiescéptico de Davidson; pero, en el análisis del argumento y de las respuestas a sus críticos, va quedando claro que los argumentos e instrumentos utilizados en este y otros puntos de la obra de Davidson implican la remoción de algunos de los supuestos básicos del paradigma filosófico dominante de matriz cartesiana. Así, el abandono del mito de lo subjetivo y su sustitución por la idea del carácter esencialmente intersubjetivo del pensamiento y de sus contenidos; la asunción del carácter esencialmente social del lenguaje y, con él, de la normatividad y, ya en un plano metafilosófico,el abandono del fundacionismo y la simultánea refutación, por inconsistencia, de su contracara, el escepticismo filosófico.---Davidson’s Antiskeptic Argument as a Convergence of Radical Innovations”. This article exposes Davidson’s antiskeptical strategy. After that analysis it aims to turn clear that the arguments and tools used in this and other aspects of Davidson’s works imply the removal of some of the basic assumptions of the dominant philosophical paradigm of Cartesian basis. Thus: the abandonment of the myth of the subjective and its substitution by the idea of the essentially intersubjective character of thought and its contents; the assumption of the essentially social character of language and, with it, of the normativity, and, in a metaphilosophical level, the abandonment of the foundacionism and the simultaneous rebuttal, by inconsistency, of philosophical skepticism.

This diploma thesis is concerned with possible connection between literary theory of Wolfgang Iser and analytic philosophy of language. First of all I introduce analytic linguistic turn in general but the main part of thesis is dedicated to two opposite conceptions of language and interpretaton within the latter period of analytical movement. I want to explore Michael Dummett's and Donald Davidson's dispute over the role of conventions and questions about their indispensability in linguistic communication.Whereas their own opinions converge in view of the fact that influence of society on human thought is radically irreducible, there is great difference between their beliefs in the necessity of conception of rules inherent in social linguistic practice. My aim is to vindicate Davidson's theory of interpretation against Dummett's objections and then continue to discussing Iser's own theory of reading. Particularly I try to demonstrate that Iser's concept of literariness is based on Dummett's philosophical assumptions. In closing the main interest will be to reconsider if Iser's explanation of difference between literature and ordinary speech or document stands up to Davidson's challenge of Iser's entire treatment of linguistic practice. And, namely, if Davidson' philosophy of language can provide an...

This paper aims implementation of selected knowledge, e.g. the principle of charity, which were developed in the framework of analytical philosophy of language (Davidson, Quine) making methodology cultural anthropology, based on interpretative approaches examining social actors / players examination. The first part will be devoted to explanation of thought experiments, e.g. Radical translation, radical interpretation) within the discussion of analytic philosophy of language (Quine, Davidson). The second part will focus on the transfer of this knowledge to make the methodology of cultural anthropology. In the next section we will highlight a breach of the principle of charity. We will focus on critical reflection theories that have been developed in the field of linguistic anthropology, specifically linguistic relativism (Sapir, Whorf). The last part is devoted to the problem rationality which is discussed in the context of Evans Pritchard research of African Azande. These examples point out the methodological errors with anthropologists field research committed to the negative consequences to which it wrong methodological approach led. Keywords: principle of charity, ethnographic research, radical interpretation, translation, Understanding, relativism, rationality

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