No one seems to be against freedom of speech. We have profound disagreements, nonetheless, about what people should be allowed to say. Superficially, these disagreements seem to be independent of our own personal views on larger moral issues such as the desirability of state neutrality and the possibility of promoting certain views of the good life. This perception, however, misrepresents the deeper connections that one's views on free speech have with one's interpretation of political morality; connections which shape the very way in which one reasons about free speech. In order to understand these connections, it is important to be conscious of the rich and complex history of the very notion of freedom of speech. While sometimes represented as a modern ideal, the very fabric of the modern view on free speech is the result of earlier social practices and of competing moral claims. To understand how we think about free speech today it is not enough to look into our own world. Some aspects can only be made vivid by revisiting the history of this notion. But not only that. Aside from reconstructing the history of the modern notion of freedom of speech, we also have to grasp the place of liberalism in shaping our views on these matters. Questions of paternalism, neutrality, and the good life, and of liberalism's relationship to these ideas, are all important in defining what it means to have free speech. Any articulation of free speech which disregards these points would be missing an important aspect of the discussions surrounding what we should be allowed to say. To reason about free speech, we need to go beyond the normal justifications for the freedom of speech. Truth, democracy, and autonomy are the familiar reasons for defending freedom of speech, but they are not the defining aspects of one's free speech reasoning. For that, we need to look elsewhere. This is what the argument in the thesis is set to do: to explore and explain how our free speech reasoning is shaped by historical experiences and by the gradual evolution of a certain view of the moral world. By engaging in a reconstruction of the different forms of reasoning on these issues, the argument sets out a systematic account of the competing ways of reasoning about free speech. The argument has four parts. In Part One, I set out the history of the social practices and moral claims which gave birth to the modern idea of freedom of speech and claim that they are still an integral part of what it means to have free speech. Part One shows how some of the normative positions (liberties, claim-rights, and immunities) which are thought to be part of the freedom of speech were the result of certain historical experiences. Then, in Part Two, I introduce some key theoretical distinctions with regard to liberalism, which provide the argumentative platform for the rest of the thesis. In developing the distinction among different strands of the liberal tradition, the variable role and meanings of principles of neutrality is of particular significance. Part Three then goes on to connect the different strands of the liberal tradition with the justifications for valuing freedom of speech, showing how opposing versions of the arguments for a defense of free speech reflect underlying assumptions about political morality. Finally, Part Four explores the three core aspects of the modern view on free speech: the formalization of moral reasoning, the role of a set of individual rights in the identification of neutral reasons, and the place of one's view on political morality in the delimitation of the meaning of the freedom of speech. It is not the purpose of the argument to defend one particular form of reasoning over the others, but to examine the different argumentative resources that are available within competing strands of the contemporary debate. Put simply, this thesis seeks to show that - and the ways in which - our free speech reasoning is fundamentally shaped by our deeper views about political morality.

An exploratory study on instructional design for classroom activities that encourage algebraic reasoning at the elementary school level. Assistance with the activities was provided as students needed further scaffolding, and multiple solutions were encouraged. An analysis of student responses to the activities is discussed.

This dissertation conducts an investigation into nonmonotonic reasoning---forms of reasoning which allow defeasible inferences arrived at in the absence of complete information, and which, when additional information is acquired, may need to be revoked. In contrast to the mathematical notion of consequence which is based on proof---mathematical proofs, once established, are beyond reproach, no matter what additional information is acquired---nonmonotonic forms of reasoning are often employed in Artificial Intelligence, where generally only incomplete information is available, and often 'working' inferences need to be made; e.g. default inferences. The platform on which this analysis of nonmonotonic reasoning is carried out is conditional logic; a relative of modal logic. This thesis explores notions of consequence formulated in conditional logic, and explores its possible-worlds semantics, and its connection to nonmonotonic consequence relations. In particular, the notion of default consequence is explored, receiving the interpretation that something is inferred to be true by default if it holds in a `majority' of possible worlds. A number of accounts of majority-based reasoning appear in the literature. However, it is argued that some of the more well known accounts have counter-intuitive properties. An alternative definition of `majorities' is furnished, and both modal and conditional formulations of this form of inference are given and compared---favourably---with similar approaches in the literature. A second, traditional problem of reasoning in Artificial Intelligence is tackled in this thesis: reasoning about action. The treatment presented is again based on conditional logic, but also incorporates an account of dynamic logic. The semantics proposed approaches the frame problem from a different perspective; the familiar `minimal change' approach is generalised to an account based on the principle known as Occam's Razor. The conditional introduced proves to be a valuable contribution to the account given---which again is compared, and contrasted with other approaches in the literature---accommodating a causal approach to the problem of correctly determining the indirect effects of an action.

Clinical decision-making (CDM) research has focused on diagnostic reasoning, CDM models, factors influencing CDM and the development of expertise. The research approaches used, including phenomenology, have not addressed the question of how CDM is perceived and approached by nurses. This study describes perceptions of CDM in relation to patients in pain using a phenomenographic methodology. At semi-structured interviews, participants were asked to recall their responses to a situation involving a patient in pain. The responses fell into four categories: (1) the effect of the clinical environment; (2) the role of other health professionals; (3) the place of the patient; and (4) the role of experience. Examples of differences in perceptions that were likely to impact on the nurses� approach to CDM include: the ongoing effects of time and workload demands on CDM; nurses are initially dependent but were eventually able to make decisions autonomously; the patient who may be peripheral or central to CDM; and the nurses� move from the use of theoretical principles to experiential knowledge as reflection-on-practice is employed. Perceptions in all categories are strongly implicated in the nurses� sense of confidence and independence. Implications for nursing practice and nursing education suggested by the findings relate to the number of areas in which graduates work in the first year of practice, the size of new graduate workloads, graduate transition programs, the place of reflection-on-practice and undergraduate (UG) program clinical experience patterns. Among issues for further research arising from the study are: replication of the study; detailed examination of the development of CDM in the first year of nursing practice and during UG nursing education programs; the role of other health professionals in the development of CDM behaviour; the links between CDM and clinical knowledge development; and the type of clinical environments that foster confidence and independence. A conclusion of the study is that the way CDM is approached is influenced by the amount, quality, relevancy and recency of clinical experience. In this study, phenomenography was shown to be an appropriate approach to the description of nurses� perceptions of CDM in relation to patients in pain. In addition, nurses� changing perceptions over two years and the subsequent effect on CDM behaviour were described.

The ‘belief bias’ effect is one of the most pervasive findings in the study of syllogistic reasoning. Here, participants respond “valid” to more believable than unbelievable conclusions, regardless of the actual validity of the conclusion. There is also an interaction characteristic of the belief bias effect, in that conclusion believability plays a greater role when conclusions are invalid than when they are valid. The experiments reported in this thesis had two goals: first, to determine how individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity influence belief bias in reasoning; and second, to indentify which WM systems are involved in syllogistic deductive reasoning. To this end, both experiments employed a dual task paradigm. In Experiment 1, participants remembered spatial arrays whilst reasoning through syllogisms in order to load the visuospatial sketchpad. Results demonstrated that performance on the secondary spatial memory task suffered when participants reasoned through syllogisms of which the validity and believability of conclusions were incongruent (i.e., “conflict” problems), indicating that reasoning through conflict problems utilized limited visuospatial WM resources. Also, only participants with high WM capacities showed the typical belief-bias effect, with greater effects of conclusion believability on invalid than on valid conclusions. This interaction was not present for low WM span participants, because they made greater errors on problems with invalid, unbelievable conclusions. In Experiment 2, participants remembered digit sequences whilst reasoning in order to load the phonological loop. Both of the major results from Experiment 1 were replicated. Accuracy on the secondary digit recall task was impaired when participants reasoned through conflict problems, demonstrating that limited verbal WM resources were directed toward reasoning. Again, only high WM span participant showed the interaction between conclusion validity and believability characteristic of the belief bias effect. Effects were additive for low WM span participants because they made more errors on invalid, unbelievable syllogisms. Results from both experiments demonstrate first, that both visuospatial and verbal WM resources are involved in syllogistic reasoning, and second, that individuals with different amounts of available WM resources demonstrate differential belief bias. These results are discussed in terms of the mental models and mental logic theories of reasoning and in terms of dual process accounts of reasoning.

The ‘belief bias’ effect is one of the most pervasive findings in the study of syllogistic reasoning. Here, participants respond “valid” to more believable than unbelievable conclusions, regardless of the actual validity of the conclusion. There is also an interaction characteristic of the belief bias effect, in that conclusion believability plays a greater role when conclusions are invalid than when they are valid. The experiments reported in this thesis had two goals: first, to determine how individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity influence belief bias in reasoning; and second, to indentify which WM systems are involved in syllogistic deductive reasoning. To this end, both experiments employed a dual task paradigm. In Experiment 1, participants remembered spatial arrays whilst reasoning through syllogisms in order to load the visuospatial sketchpad. Results demonstrated that performance on the secondary spatial memory task suffered when participants reasoned through syllogisms of which the validity and believability of conclusions were incongruent (i.e., “conflict” problems), indicating that reasoning through conflict problems utilized limited visuospatial WM resources. Also, only participants with high WM capacities showed the typical belief-bias effect, with greater effects of conclusion believability on invalid than on valid conclusions. This interaction was not present for low WM span participants, because they made greater errors on problems with invalid, unbelievable conclusions. In Experiment 2, participants remembered digit sequences whilst reasoning in order to load the phonological loop. Both of the major results from Experiment 1 were replicated. Accuracy on the secondary digit recall task was impaired when participants reasoned through conflict problems, demonstrating that limited verbal WM resources were directed toward reasoning. Again, only high WM span participant showed the interaction between conclusion validity and believability characteristic of the belief bias effect. Effects were additive for low WM span participants because they made more errors on invalid, unbelievable syllogisms. Results from both experiments demonstrate first, that both visuospatial and verbal WM resources are involved in syllogistic reasoning, and second, that individuals with different amounts of available WM resources demonstrate differential belief bias. These results are discussed in terms of the mental models and mental logic theories of reasoning and in terms of dual process accounts of reasoning.

Automated reasoning, and in particular automated theorem proving, has become a very important research field within the world of mathematics. Besides being used to verify proofs of theorems, it has also been used to discover proofs of theorems which were previously open problems. In this thesis, an automated reasoning assistant based on Godel's class theory is used to deduce several theorems.

Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on March 10, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Thesis advisor: Dr. Mark Fine. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis presents work on analytical reasoning with external representations (ERs) using problems similar to those used in the US GRE college-entrance examination. The work investigates the factors associated with effective ER use in situations where subjects select, construct and reason with their own ERs. Practically all previous work has tended to focus solely upon performance rather than process. In this thesis the emphasis is upon cognitive processes during the entire time-course of reasoning with ERs, from problem comprehension through to answer selection. A background to the work is provided by 2 comprehensive reviews of: 1.) previous research on ERs and reasoning and 2.) the cognitive and semantic properties of ERs. Results from three empirical studies are reported. The first study examined a large corpus of 'workscratchings' produced by subjects as they solved paper and pencil-based analytical reasoning problems under test conditions. The workscratching ERs showed great diversity between and within subjects and across a range of problems. They included lists, various kinds of table, set diagrams, node and arc diagrams, first-order and propositioned logic, plans and natural language. It is shown that problem-solving performance is related to the type of ER used in the solution. The second study utilised a computer-based system (switchERI). The system administered analytical reasoning problems and provided a. range of ER construction environments for the subject to choose and switch between. User-system interactions were recorded dynamically during problem solving. This methodology permitted microanalyses of the cognitive events at each stage during the time-course of problem solving. A process account of analytical reasoning with ERs is developed in which five major stages are identified - problem comprehension, ER selection, ER construction, read-off from the ER and answer selection/responding. A range of common slips and misconceptions are identified at each stage. The results show, inter alia, that subjects whose responses are consistent with their ERs perform better than subjects whose responses are inconsistent with their ERs even if the ER is partially incorrect. The data from the workscratching analysis and switchERI study informed the design of' switchERII, a second system. SwitchERII incorporates a. representation of the semantics of Euler's Circles, dynamically parses the user's representation and provides feedback and advice. A third study was conducted with the switchERII system. Few, if any, studies to date have attempted to relate subjects' prior knowledge of ER formalisms to their reasoning performance. Subjects' prior knowledge of ER formalisms was assessed in both switchER studies. It was observed that subjects' performance on representation interpretation tasks does not necessarily predict their performance in conditions where they select and construct their own representations. The reasons for the decoupling are discussed. Data from all three studies show that subjects often utilise multiple representations in their solutions, either concurrently or serially via. ER switching. Two distinctly different types of switching were observed. One kind ('thrashing') is associated with poorer performance and reflects less comprehensive prior knowledge, inability to select au appropriate ER and hazy problem comprehension. Judicious switching, on the other hand, is associated with high levels of problem comprehension and skilled matching of the ERs' properties to changing task demands. It is claimed that effective reasoning with ERs involves complex interactions between at least three factors: (a.) within-subject variables such as the subject's representational repertoire (prior knowledge) and representational modality preferences (cognitive style); (b.) skill at overcoming a variety of barriers to comprehension and an ability to discern the salient attributes and characteristics of different problem types and (c.) an understanding of the semantic and cognitive properties of graphical and non-graphical ERs coupled with an ability to match those properties to the problem's task demands. It is suggested that the role of externalisation in reasoning with ERs may be to facilitate the swapping of information between cognitive subsystems. A mechanism by which the use of diagrammatic ERs may facilitate self-explanation is also proposed. The thesis concludes with an argument in favour of a domain-independent 'ER curriculum'. It is suggested that direct instruction in the use of a range of ERs might equip students with wider representational repertoires and hence allow them more scope to indulge their representational preferences. Finally, several directions for future work are proposed. These include extending the representational semantics of switchERII, evaluating various types of system feedback and implementing a mechanism for checking for slips during read-off from ERs.

Complex systems are naturally understood as combinations of their distinguishing characteristics or \definit{features}. Distinct features differentiate between variations of configurable systems and also identify the novelties of extensions. The implementation of a conceptual feature is often scattered throughout an artifact, forcing designers to understand the entire artifact in order to reason about the behavior of a single feature. It is particularly challenging to independently develop novel extensions to complex systems as a result. This dissertation shows how to modularly reason about the implementation of conceptual features in both the formalizations of programming languages and object-oriented software product lines. In both domains, modular verification of features can be leveraged to reason about the behavior of artifacts in which they are included: fully mechanized metatheory proofs for programming languages can be synthesized from independently developed proofs, and programs built from well-formed feature modules are guaranteed to be well-formed without needing to be typechecked. Modular reasoning about individual features can furthermore be used to efficiently reason about families of languages and programs which share a common set of features. / text