No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Computer-aided architectural design (CAAD) programs represent architectural design at a low level of spatial abstraction. While this representation model allows CAAD programs to capture the precise spatial characteristics of a design, it means that CAAD programs lack the underlying computational apparatus necessary to reason about design at a conceptual level. This thesis is a first step towards building a framework that bridges the gap between the conceptual aspects of a design and its low level CAAD-based spatial representation. Specifically, this thesis presents a new framework, referred to as the Conceptual Requirements Reasoner (CRR), which provides an architect with a framework to validate conceptual design requirements. The CRR will demonstrate how qualitative spatial representation and reasoning techniques can be used as the link between a design's conceptual requirements and its underlying quantitative spatial representation. A museum case study is presented to demonstrate the application of the CRR in a real world design context. It introduces a set of museum design requirements identified in research and shows how these requirements can be validated using the CRR. The results of the case study shows that the CRR is an effective tool for conceptual requirements reasoning.

To be numerate is to have the ability to understand numbers and be confident with numeric information presented in day-to-day situations. The way numeracy is defined varies between researchers; however, most agree that having skills in numeracy is essential to function in the world. In order to provide students with the opportunity for exposure to basic numeracy skills, McMaster University’s course Math 2UU3 – “Numbers for Life” is offered to non-mathematics major students in second year or above. To measure the effectiveness of this course, and to determine whether students retain the numeracy skills and knowledge acquired in the course, we developed a series of assessments with questions based on content learned throughout the semester. Students were tested three times – once before completing the course, once after completing the course, and once again a year later. This study focuses in on the logical reasoning aspect of numeracy which includes understanding logical structures and being able to work through problems rationally and systematically. The results from the study reveal that students who took the course and participated in completing the given assessments showed improvement with their logical reasoning skills significantly. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc)

This thesis develops a novel account of judicial common-law reasoning by precedent. If a new case is relevantly similar to a precedent case, judges are generally bound to follow the decision made in the precedent case. Important differences between cases can justify deciding the new case differently. The literature offers two main approaches to reasoning by precedent. According to rule-based-approaches, every case is decided by either following an existing rule or establishing a new one. I show that rule-based approaches are untenable. Analogy-based approaches claim that similarities and differences between two cases are determined through reasoning by analogy. These approaches are problematic because some similarity or difference can always be found between two cases. Accounts suggested so far cannot explain how precedents can provide significant guidance to judges. My dissertation salvages analogy-based approaches by supplementing them with insights from argumentation theory. Analogies contain a figurative part that is used to make someone see the analogy‘s literal part in a new way. An arguer can manipulate her interlocutor‘s perception of the literal part through the way she describes the figurative part by rhetorically drawing attention to those similarities that she considers relevant. Arguments by analogy use this to convince interlocutors of conclusions about the literal part. I propose to see judges in the role of interlocutors, evaluating arguments by precedent. The opinion that documents the precedent case from the point of view of the former judge is the figurative part of an analogy. The literal part is the new case. They form an analogical argument for repeating the precedent decision. The judge evaluates the argument by considering a number of critical questions. If all the critical questions can be answered, the precedent is applicable and must be followed. Otherwise, the precedent is either not applicable or has to be distinguished. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis describes reasoning by precedent in the common law. I discuss two important approaches to how reasoning by precedent works, rule-based theories and analogy-based theories. I reject rule-based theories as untenable. I describe the main problem analogy-based theories face: To show that precedents can constrain judicial reasoning so that judges cannot decide cases according to their own normative commitments. I use insights from psychological research into analogical reasoning and from argumentation theory to develop a new analogy-based account. I suggest that judges should be seen as interlocutors evaluating an argument by precedent. This argument contains an analogy between precedent case and present case, and a rule stating that the precedent decision needs to be followed if precedent case and present case are legally the same. The judge needs to first understand the analogy under the application of the principle of charity, and then evaluate it using critical questions.

In a Bayesian perspective, the probabilistic dependencies between hypotheses under consideration and diagnostic pieces of evidence are the only relevant information for probabilistic updating. We investigated whether human probability judgments conform to this assumption, by manipulating the sensory systems involved in the acquisition and processing of information concerning evidence and hypotheses. Hence, we ran five (computer-based) experiments using a variant of the classic book bag and poker chip task (e.g., Phillips & Edwards, 1966). Participants were first presented with pairs of urns A and B filled with a different proportion of balls that turned either red or green in the visual condition, balls that emitted either a low- or high-pitched sound in the auditory condition, and balls that both turned a color and emitted a sound in various cross-modal (i.e., audio-visual) conditions. One urn was then selected at random, some balls were randomly drawn from it, and their color and/or sound were disclosed. Participants’ task was to estimate the probability that each of the two urns has been selected, given the information provided. In Experiments 1 and 2, we compared the probability judgments referring to probabilistically identical visual and auditory scenarios that only differed with regards to the sensory system involved, without finding any difference between the answers provided in the two conditions. In Experiment 3, 4, and 5, the addition of cross-modal scenarios allowed us to investigate the effects on probabilistic updating of synergic (i.e., both visual and auditory evidence individually supported the hypothesis they jointly supported) or contrasting (i.e., either visual and/or auditory evidence individually supported the hypothesis opposite the one they jointly supported) audio-visual evidence. Our results provide evidence in favor of a synergy-contrasting effect, as probability judgments were more accurate in synergic conditions than in contrasting conditions. This suggests that, when perceptual information is acquired through a singular sensory system, probability judgments conform to the Bayesian assumption that the sensory system involved does not play a role in the updating process, whereas the simultaneous presentation of cross-modal information can influence participants’ performance.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.