This study aims to develop the logic of relativism, then to apply that logic to the question of self-refutation in relativism. / After first defining generic relativism as radical indexed pluralism, the study identifies three substantive theses following as a consequence of this definition that any instance of relativism must meet: (1) the formal requirements for relativity, (2) objective equity, and (3) incommensurability. Each of the three theses is developed in detail to determine precisely what must be demonstrated by a claim of relativism. / Next, the study develops five separate logical systems to represent the logic of relativism, each adding progressively more complex relativistic features. The first system is modelled on basic modal logic. The second models multiple kinds of relativity. The third models relativised accessibility relations. The fourth combines features of the second and third systems. And the fifth is modelled on a non-normal modal logic. Finally, the charge of self-refutation is evaluated with regard to each system in turn. / I argue that while all five systems initially seem to support models that support fully relativistic perspectives, when an operator is added to the language to express whether a sentence is true for a perspective, four of the systems can no longer support fully relativistic perspectives, since some sentences including that operator must be evaluated to be absolute within all perspectives. The fifth system, however, formulated analogously to a non-normal modal logic, does support fully relativistic perspectives even with the additional operator. I argue further that the nature of relativism provides some motivation for considering this last system to be the logic of global relativism. / While these formal, structural arguments do not fully address all the varieties of self-refutation arguments levelled against relativism, in particular, those based upon pragmatics, incoherence, and the nature of language, I argue that there are reasons to think that these latter kinds of argument may not be completely successful, and I suggest various ways that these arguments might be strengthened against relativism.

Seth, a savvy but shy innocent from the American mid-West, discovers the hedonism of Guangzhou when he jumps ship with the Preacher. He becomes entangled with the patriotic Snow Flake and together, they visit her remote ancestral village. But they are followed there by the shadowy figure of Lin Jun who tests Seth’s commitment to the values of his forefathers and his feelings for Snow Flake. The novel examines what it is to be a Westerner in contemporary China through the character of Seth who, with no appropriate language skills, embarks on an adventure without morals – discarding his religious beliefs, recreating himself as his imagination sees fit and running wild with the Preacher and Snow Flake. At the same time, the novel also asks how the West should best engage China on sensitive internal issues such as the suppression of religious, spiritual, democratic and artistic movements when China grows ever stronger and more influential. This question is presented to Seth when he is totally removed from his own culture and faced with an extreme event that, even in his state of mind, is totally contrary to his own moral framework. The exegesis discusses Seth’s dilemma from the perspective of cultural relativism - that is when can an individual from one culture declare an event which takes place in another culture to be ‘wrong’? The exegesis also discusses my own dilemma of writing about a culture that is not my own and concludes that Guangzhou both asks how the West can engage China on sensitive issues and is also my response to this very question.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2002. / Title from paper copy. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Supervisor: Thomas K. Seung. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2004. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 187-199). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ99222

This thesis examines how the displaced Sudanese in Egypt, Kenya, and the United Kingdom discuss the topic of "Human Rights". Whereas many studies on "Human Rights" are primarily concerned with the opinions of outsiders, an attempt is made here to provide an alternative perspective in that the focus of this dissertation is on how the displaced Sudanese, themselves, discuss "Human Rights" in view of their situation as exiles. The thesis begins by tracing the historical evolution of the 'Western' concept of "Human Rights" and investigating the historical relationship between Anthropology and "Human Rights". Attention is paid to the role of the doctrine of "cultural relativism" in the discipline of Anthropology. After briefly looking at Sudan's geographical and social makeup, I explain the difficulties I encountered as an independent scholar conducting research on "Human Rights" and Sudan. This is followed by descriptions of the fieldwork locations. What comes next is the heart and soul of the thesis. After giving brief descriptions of the interviewees, 1 analyse how the interviews were conducted and explain how the issue of "Politics" dominated practically every discussion with the interviewees. Next, excerpts from nineteen interviews are presented for the reader to get acquainted with the conversations between the Interviewees and myself. Finally, an examination is made of how "Human Rights" is employed as a manipulative device (or tool) by the interviewees. This is essentially the crux of the study. The chief aim of the thesis is to present various ways the notion of "Human Rights" can be (and is) interpreted and utilised by the displaced Sudanese in the context of their own circumstances as exiles.

This thesis will critique Gilbert Harman's moral relativism. Harman argues for a form of moral relativism he calls a "conventionalist" account of morality. He supports this by defending a view of explanations, a view of simplicity, and a view of the moral "ought." However, the anthropological literature contains strong evidence against his drawing of this relativist conclusion — and in support of a contrary one. According to anthropologists, there is a universal belief in the moral wrongness of incest, the "incest taboo": its existence suggests that Harman may have better supported a form of moral realism than the relativism he endorses. Thus, at the very least, Harman's argument does not prove that relativism is true; more strongly, it may prove that relativism is false, and realism true. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

The purpose of the studies was to test 1) the effectiveness of experimenter-directed principle testing discussions in moving subjects from an ethical relativist position to a more universalist position on all cultural practices which are unethical 2) whether subjects at higher levels of moral development rejected ethical relativism to a significantly greater degree than subjects at lower levels of moral development 3) whether subjects at higher levels of moral development were more willing to accept non-ethical cultural practices than were subjects at lower levels of moral development-. These questions were generated from Bernard Gert's rationale for the existence and validity of universal moral principles and from Lawrence Kohlberg's claim that persons at higher levels of moral development are more likely to be universalists. The subjects for the first study were 44 grade eleven students drawn from two classes in a Vancouver-high school. The subjects for the second study were 32 fifth year university students in the Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia. In both cases, the main reason for selection was the cooperation of the teachers, The level of moral development for each subject was measured by using Rest's Defining Issues Test. Movement from an ethical relativist position to an ethical universalist position was measured by using Kehoe's Cultural-Ethical Relativism Scale. In study one, all subjects were pre-tested with the Defining Issues Test and then randomly divided into a treatment group and a control group. All subjects were post-tested with the Cultural-Ethical Relativism Scale. In study two, all subjects were pretested with the Defining Issues Test and Form A of the Cultural-Ethical Relativism Scale. All subjects were administered the treatment and then post-tested with Form B of the Cultural-Ethical Relativism Scale. The treatment in both studies attempted to determine if subjects would demonstrate a greater willingness to 1) accept non-ethical cultural practices 2) reject the ethical relativist position 3) accept the ethical universalist position. Analyses of the data in study one suggested that the treatment had no significant effect. Analyses of the data in study two suggested that the treatment did have a significant effect on the subjects' willingness to accept non-ethical cultural practices. The treatment, however, also had a significant effect on the subjects' willingness to accept unethical cultural practices. These results suggest that the treatment caused disequilibrium within the subjects' values system whereby they could not distinguish cultural practices with ethical implications from those without. In future studies, this distinct-ion must be clarified. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate

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