Thesis (M.A.)--University of Queensland, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 248-271).

One of the most important issues that arise under the statutory oppression remedy is the manner in which a court will use its wide powers to order relief once oppression has been found. Guidelines according to which courts will exercise their discretion become even more desirable where a remedy may impact on the governance structures of the corporation. There is an extensive body of case law under the oppression remedy, most of which tends to relegate the exercise of the remedy to the facts of a case. / However, from a study of the case law, two principles appear with varying frequency depending on the size of the corporation. These are principles which may be asserted under the oppression remedy. The first principle states that the majority may not exercise its electoral rights to the prejudice of the minority. It flows from the relationship between members of a corporation and arises most frequently at closely held corporations. The second principle is against abuse of fiduciary position, which entails a duty on directors and senior management to protect the interests of all shareholders. Abuse of fiduciary position may also involve instances where there is a breach of fiduciary duties to the corporation. This second principle is more prevalent at widely held corporations. The remedy will be tailored according to the principle under which liability was found.

The fundamental question of private law’s remedies is how do subsequent remedial actions rationally address prior failures. This question can be approached either intrinsically or extrinsically. While the former justifies and explains the remedial action from within the original plaintiff-defendant relationship, the latter welcomes external principles and goals. The arguments of this thesis fit within an intrinsic approach to private law’s remedies. To this end, several arguments are levied against the extrinsic perspective, and, in particular, its confidence in the separation of rights and remedies. For positive inspiration, it looks to two leading intrinsic theoretical accounts—those of Ernest Weinrib and John Gardner, respectively—with an eye to revealing what, if any, meaningful differences there are between the two. Using the language and logic of practical reasons and reasoning, this dissertation suggests that remedies can be understood in one of two ways. First, the remedy is just the same as the original reason. If I fail to pay my debt on the date it is due, my subsequent remedial action in paying it later is carried out because of the original reason, namely, that I owe a debt to someone. Second, the remedy is a reflection of certain second-order reasons that are part of the original (operative) reason. These are reasons not to act for certain other reasons that counsel against the performance of the first-order reason to do the obligatory action. These reasons stick around and tell you to do something; that doing nothing is not optional. If I break your toe, I can no longer satisfy the original reason not to break your toe; however, I can and must do something to address my initial failure. The content of this reparative action is constrained by the original reason not to break your toe. While its first-order strength is no longer available—one can no longer act for the reason it recommends—it can nonetheless provide guidance with respect to what the next-best thing might be.

The fundamental question of private law’s remedies is how do subsequent remedial actions rationally address prior failures. This question can be approached either intrinsically or extrinsically. While the former justifies and explains the remedial action from within the original plaintiff-defendant relationship, the latter welcomes external principles and goals. The arguments of this thesis fit within an intrinsic approach to private law’s remedies. To this end, several arguments are levied against the extrinsic perspective, and, in particular, its confidence in the separation of rights and remedies. For positive inspiration, it looks to two leading intrinsic theoretical accounts—those of Ernest Weinrib and John Gardner, respectively—with an eye to revealing what, if any, meaningful differences there are between the two. Using the language and logic of practical reasons and reasoning, this dissertation suggests that remedies can be understood in one of two ways. First, the remedy is just the same as the original reason. If I fail to pay my debt on the date it is due, my subsequent remedial action in paying it later is carried out because of the original reason, namely, that I owe a debt to someone. Second, the remedy is a reflection of certain second-order reasons that are part of the original (operative) reason. These are reasons not to act for certain other reasons that counsel against the performance of the first-order reason to do the obligatory action. These reasons stick around and tell you to do something; that doing nothing is not optional. If I break your toe, I can no longer satisfy the original reason not to break your toe; however, I can and must do something to address my initial failure. The content of this reparative action is constrained by the original reason not to break your toe. While its first-order strength is no longer available—one can no longer act for the reason it recommends—it can nonetheless provide guidance with respect to what the next-best thing might be.

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, 1956. / "May, 1956." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 74). Also issued in microfiche.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Marburg.

No description available.

No description available.

Dermatological remedies make up at least one-third of the traditional pharmacopoeia in southern Italy. The identification of folk remedies for the skin is important both for the preservation of traditional medical knowledge and in the search for novel antimicrobial agents in the treatment of skin and soft tissue infection (SSTI). Our goal is to document traditional remedies from botanical, animal, mineral and industrial sources for the topical treatment of skin ailments. In addition to SSTI remedies for humans, we also discuss certain ethnoveterinary applications. Field research was conducted in ten communities in the Vulture-Alto Bradano area of the Basilicata province, southern Italy. We randomly sampled 112 interviewees, stratified by age and gender. After obtaining prior informed consent, we collected data through semi-structured interviews, participant-observation, and small focus groups techniques. Voucher specimens of all cited botanic species were deposited at FTG and HLUC herbaria located in the US and Italy. We report the preparation and topical application of 116 remedies derived from 38 plant species. Remedies are used to treat laceration, burn wound, wart, inflammation, rash, dental abscess, furuncle, dermatitis, and other conditions. The pharmacopoeia also includes 49 animal remedies derived from sources such as pigs, slugs, and humans. Ethnoveterinary medicine, which incorporates both animal and plant derived remedies, is addressed. We also examine the recent decline in knowledge regarding the dermatological pharmacopoeia. The traditional dermatological pharmacopoeia of Vulture-Alto Bradano is based on a dynamic folk medical construct of natural and spiritual illness and healing. Remedies are used to treat more than 45 skin and soft tissue conditions of both humans and animals. Of the total 165 remedies reported, 110 have never before been published in the mainland southern Italian ethnomedical literature.