Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed November 17, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 431-440).

John Rawls's political liberalism has shaped contemporary political philosophy. Three other theories, feminism, republicanism, and communitarianism, devote a good deal of space to refuting Rawls's theory, and claim to be superior alternatives to it. My main thesis is that they are not alternatives to Rawls's political liberalism but variations of it. That is, although these theories present themselves as external critiques of liberalism, they are ultimately internal critiques, because their own theories are built upon the basic principles of liberalism. This is not to deny that many of their criticisms are well-taken and thus need to be addressed by liberal theorists. I also argue that Rawls's theory of political liberalism is in general terms correct. It needs however to be revised in other to solve what I take to be its main problem: Its lack of a foundation. In my dissertation I propose a revised version of political liberalism, which includes an argument in support of the political liberal conception of justice.

The issue of Kurdish self-determination within the highly centralized Republic of Turkey has been a controversial issue with its local, national and international dimensions over the years. Without solving this issue, Turkey might not reach the aims of joining the European Union (EU), economic sustainability, literal democracy, pluralism, and peace. After 40 years armed struggle between Kurdish and Turkish sides, two significant suggestions are currently being discussed: a provincial system similar to what the Ottoman Empire accepted with its own multicultural system; second, the current unitary system with more powerful local authorities. This paper analyzes the problem in an inductive method and takes the second approach to evaluate Turkish centralization, modernization, and transformation to French Republicanism. This evaluation concludes with the critique of the French universal citizenship understanding and requirement of more pluralistic, democratic citizenship and administrative model as a solution of minority rights and self-determination problem in Turkey.

The issue of Kurdish self-determination within the highly centralized Republic of Turkey has been a controversial issue with its local, national and international dimensions over the years. Without solving this issue, Turkey might not reach the aims of joining the European Union (EU), economic sustainability, literal democracy, pluralism, and peace. After 40 years armed struggle between Kurdish and Turkish sides, two significant suggestions are currently being discussed: a provincial system similar to what the Ottoman Empire accepted with its own multicultural system; second, the current unitary system with more powerful local authorities. This paper analyzes the problem in an inductive method and takes the second approach to evaluate Turkish centralization, modernization, and transformation to French Republicanism. This evaluation concludes with the critique of the French universal citizenship understanding and requirement of more pluralistic, democratic citizenship and administrative model as a solution of minority rights and self-determination problem in Turkey.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008. / Title from file title page. Melissa M. Merritt, committee chair; Andrew J. Cohen, Sandra Dwyer, committee members. Electronic text (85 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 9, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 82-85).

Thesis--Frankfurt am Main. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 305-319).

Thesis--Frankfurt am Main. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 305-319).

No Renascimento, o surgimento de um senso histórico que pensava os antigos em seus termos próprios, e a ideia de que seria preciso imitar os antigos, não resultaram em apenas uma posição humanista, qual seja, aquela tendência que foi predominante e que enfatizava o poder da liberdade humana sobre os caprichos da Fortuna. Também surgiu um ponto de vista trágico, no qual se insere Maquiavel e que possuirá importantes aspectos comuns com a recuperação do trágico entre os alemães do século XIX. O ponto de vista trágico levou Maquiavel a pensar a república como arena institucional-legal que permite um equilíbrio tenso e criativo entre forças sociais opostas, capaz de canalizar as ambições para o bem comum, fazendo com que a vitalidade expansiva dos cidadãos colabore para a vitalidade expansiva da república. / In the Renaissance, the emergence both of a historical sense that made it possible to regard the Ancients according to their own standards, and of the notion that it would be necessary to emulate them resulted not only in a humanist attitude, i.e. the predominant disposition at that time, which emphasized the power of human freedom over the whims of Fortune. It also brought to light a tragic point of view, in which Machiavelli partakes, which will have important common traits with the retrieval of the tragic among the XIX century Germans. The tragic point of view lead Machiavelli to think the Republic as a legal-institutional arena which allows a taut and creative equilibrium between opposite social forces, capable of directing the aspirations for the common good, making the expansive vitality of the citizens collaborate with the expansive vitality of the Republic.

Esta tese se insere no campo da teoria política normativa e tem como tema o estudo do debate sobre o conceito de liberdade. Nossa proposta consiste em analisar o conceito de liberdade como não interferência, de Isaiah Berlin; o conceito de liberdade como não dominação, de Philip Pettit; e a ideia de liberdade construtivista, de Nancy Hirschmann, para assim colocar esses conceitos em relação entre si. Objetivamos indicar a possibilidade de diálogo entre as diferentes correntes teóricas apontadas, como também propor uma leitura sobre o conceito de liberdade, para assim ampliarmos o nosso entendimento sobre o que é ser livre. Acreditamos que articular elementos das diferentes teorias pode enriquecer essa reflexão que pretende ser teórico-normativa, mas que, ao mesmo tempo, ambiciona refletir sobre as condições de liberdade para os diferentes sujeitos, tendo em vista as suas vidas nas sociedades contemporâneas e plurais. Nosso argumento é de que o exercício de compreender diferentes visões de liberdade de forma articulada é um caminho profícuo para abordarmos a indagação sobre quem é o sujeito livre. Desse modo, procuramos não apenas retomar criticamente os conceitos dos autores citados, mas também oferecer um possível diálogo entre as distintas concepções de liberdade tratadas nesta tese. Além disso, propomos usar o tema da opressão para articular elementos do pensamento dos três principais autores retomados aqui: Isaiah Berlin, Philip Pettit e Nancy Hirschmann. Defendemos que a ideia de não opressão pode ser uma abordagem teórica e política para discutirmos a liberdade. Tal chave de leitura nos permite pensar não só os espaços de liberdade, mas as diferentes experiências das pessoas. Assim, a liberdade considerada como não opressão relaciona a liberdade com a liberdade de escolha e, ao mesmo tempo, indica a necessidade da não dominação e atenção à construção do sujeito que escolhe. As escolhas se inserem em relações complexas, e a leitura da liberdade pela ideia da opressão é uma ferramenta normativa atenta a importantes aspectos políticos dessas escolhas / This thesis belongs to normative political theory field and has as its theme the study of the debate on the concept of freedom. Our proposal is to analyze Isaiahs Berlins concept of freedom as non-interference, Philip Pettits concept of freedom as nondomination, and Nancy Hirschmanns idea of constructivist freedom, and thereby to put these concepts in relation to each other. We intend not only to indicate the possibility of a dialogue between these different theoretical views, but also to propose a new way of developing the concept of freedom in order to expand our understanding of what is to be free. We believe that the articulation of elements taken from different theories can enrich this reflection that intends to be theoreticalnormative, but at the same time aspires to reflect about the conditions of freedom of the different subjects regarding their lives in plural and contemporary societies. Our argument is that the exercise of understanding different views of freedom in an articulated manner is a fruitful way to approach the question of who is the free subject. Thus, we not only approach critically the concepts of these authors, but we also offer a possible dialogue between the different conceptions of freedom treated in this thesis. In addition, we propose to use the theme of oppression to articulate elements of the thoughts of the three main authors discussed on this thesis: Isaiah Berlin, Philip Pettit and Nancy Hirschmann. We defend that the idea of non oppression, can be a theoretical and political approach to discuss freedom. This key of reading allow us to think not only spaces of freedom, but the different experiences of people. Thus, freedom considered as non oppression relates freedom to freedom of choice and, at the same time, indicates the necessity of non domination and attention to the construction of the choosing subject. The choices are embedded in complex relationships, and reading freedom by the idea of non oppression is a normative tool aware of important political aspects of these choices

O que se pretende nesta pesquisa é buscar os procedimentos e pressupostos que conferem legitimidade à lei jurídica dentro da perspectiva da política kantiana. A pesquisa seguirá por três caminhos de investigação: primeiramente, a partir do artigo À paz perpétua e da Metafísica dos Costumes se busca lançar as bases do problema retomando a argumentação acerca da origem do Estado. Pela análise dos mecanismos e razões que conduziram à formação do Estado, perpassa-se por questões centrais da política kantiana como o estado de natureza, o contrato originário, a organização jurídica do estado civil e o republicanismo. Em um segundo momento, um passo inicial é incitar o debate sobre a fundamentação do direito ser externa ou interna, isto é, se a própria norma jurídica é suficiente para fundamentar a si mesma ou se necessita de um embasamento externo. Recorre-se à Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes a fim de resgatar dali os conceitos de autonomia da vontade, o procedimento de universalização da máxima e o imperativo categórico a fim de estabelecer como se legitima a lei moral. Enfim, a última etapa argumentativa pretende efetivamente explorar se há um conflito e como resolvê-lo no que tange à conciliação entre o direito e a ética: como harmonizar a lei legítima fruto do republicanismo (advinda de uma representatividade) à lei que concorda com a autonomia da vontade. / This study aims to seek the mechanisms and conditions that legitimise the legal law on the scope of kantian politics. This research will be divided in three argumentative moments. The first one is related to groundworking the problem by proceeding the arguments of Toward Perpetual Peace and Metaphysics of Morals about the origins of the State. Through the analysis of the mechanisms and reasons that guide to the State formation we aim to point some central questions on the kantian politics as the state of nature, the original contract, the juridical civil organisation of the state and the republicanism. The second argumentative moment, our first step is to promote the debate about the foundation of Law being internal or external. So we use the \"Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals\" to rescue the concepts of autonomy of will, categorical imperative and the universalisation of maxim in order to expose how the moral law finds its legitimacy as well as if this procedure serves as example to be followed to legitimise the legal law. Finally, the last moment of this study is dedicated to think if there is a conflict between Law and ethics and how to solve it - how to articulate the legitimacy of the republicanism law (that comes from a political representation) to the law that comes from the autonomy of will.