Throughout the 1960s, Guatemala’s radical left became consumed in an internal debate concerning the revolutionary strategy they believed should be followed to generate radical socio-political and economic changes in Guatemala. Confronting the societal anxieties that accompanied advances in modernity, such as growing wealth inequality, new forms of social poverty, and the marginalization of the fragments in Guatemalan society (primarily, peasants and workers), Guatemala’s radical left encountered a fundamental quandary in the development of its revolutionary methodology. Should they work within the confines of electoral democracy to realize radical reforms or, as a militant faction of the radical left increasingly proposed, would radical changes require an armed struggle aimed at toppling the nation’s entire system of governance?

In Latin America, a social revolution is statistically far more likely to fail than to succeed. Yet there is little understanding as to the contributory factors of revolutionary failure or success. Many researchers look for commonalities by examining multiple revolutions across the region or even around the globe and throughout large periods of time, but their analysis frequently lacks commonality in the underlying conditions of the insurgencies. The case of Peru, however, provides a unique opportunity to examine multiple revolutions in the fairly homogenous environment of one state during a short and constrained timeframe of thirty years. In the history of the Republic of Peru, there have been only four social revolutions. These insurgencies were contained within two discreet periods of time: the MIR and ELN in the 1960’s, and Shining Path and MRTA in the 1980’s to 1990’s. While each of these revolutions experienced varying levels of success, each ultimately failed due, in no small part, to a particular set of structural and socioeconomic variables. / text

Guerilla Warfare is a weapon of the weak; it is decisive only where the actor in power fails to commit adequate resources to the conflict. The Chinese and Cuban revolutions are examples of guerilla warfare success, albeit under different conditions and employment techniques; while Mao Tse-tung utilized decentralized guerilla warfare to indoctrinate and mobilize the masses of peasants for revolutionary struggle against a stronger enemy; Fidel Castro employed a more centralized approach to create the conditions necessary for popular support of the revolution. However, in both cases guerilla warfare was simply part of a pragmatic grand strategy to build nationalism across all classes of society. It is well known that revolutionary movements do not succeed where only one class of society is mobilized. As a result, both Mao and Castro designed dual strategies: an internal component focused on the peasant base; and an external component focused on a nationalistic appeal to all classes of society. In a revolutionary setting, the strong force of nationalism can cut across all segments of the population and strongly enable popular support for the insurgents. Both revolutionary leaders skillfully managed the contradictions associated with their respective dual strategies - a difficult task indeed since the dual strategy is one of deception. This thesis will prove that through such a plan of action, Mao and Castro integrated efforts such as leadership and ideology, with the key ingredient of guerilla warfare, to create the conditions for the control of resources necessary to achieve ultimate victory. Following revolutionary success, the experience of guerilla warfare and the dual strategy - particularly in Cuba - shaped the respective foreign policies within the context of a worldwide struggle against imperialism. Cuba has continued to refine the dual strategy in order to obtain international support and maintain the Castro regime in power. China eventually adopted a dual strategy of a different variety: the separation of economics from communist ideology. Although implementation of the dual strategy continues to the present day, it was the revolutionary process that not only validated the concept, but provided the credibility required to continue its execution.

This thesis is not a life history of Archie Mafeje. Instead, it is an attempt to grapple with his ideas. This thesis is said to be a ‘biography’ insofar as it is dedicated to a study of one individual and his contribution to knowledge. In trying to understand Mafeje’s ideas and the intellectual and political environment that shaped them, the thesis relies on Lewis R. Gordon’s concept of ‘epistemic possibility’. The thesis comprises four main parts. Part I locates Mafeje and his work within the broader African intellectual and political environment. Part II evaluates his critique of the social sciences. Part III focuses on his work on land and agrarian issues in sub-Saharan Africa. Part IV deals with his work on revolutionary theory and politics. Broadly speaking, this thesis is the first comprehensive engagement with the entire body of Mafeje’s scholarship. Specifically, the unique perspective of this thesis, and therefore its primary contribution to the existing body of knowledge, is that it seeks to overturn the idea that Mafeje was a critic of the discipline of anthropology only. The view that Mafeje was a mere critic of anthropology is in this thesis referred to as the standard view or the conventional view. The thesis argues that Mafeje is best understood as criticising all of the bourgeois social sciences for being Eurocentric and imperialist. This is offered as the alternative view. The thesis argues that the standard view makes a reformist of Mafeje, while the alternative view seeks to present him as the revolutionary scholar that he was. This interpretation lays the foundation for a profounder analysis of Mafeje’s work. In arguing that all the social sciences are Eurocentric and imperialist, he sought to liquidate them and therefore called for ‘non-disciplinarity’. It should be noted that in this regard, the primary focus of this thesis consists in following the unit of his thought and not whether he succeeded or failed in this difficult task. / Sociology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Sociology)