Inaug.-Diss.--Halle. / Lebenslauf. "Teildruck ... Die vollständige Arbeit erscheint ... als Heft 27 der ... Romanistischen Arbeiten." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2008. / Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 190-203).

Würzburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2003.

L’accès à la justice est considéré comme un des principaux problèmes du milieu juridique canadien depuis plus de trente ans et a acquis une place d’importance dans le discours juridique, notamment en matière de droits de la personne. En effet, à la suite de l’arrêt Ménard c. Rivet qui est venu restreindre de façon considérable l’accès des citoyens au Tribunal des droits de la personne, plusieurs auteurs se sont prononcés sur la question de l’accès à la justice en matière de droits de la personne. L’étude des discours juridiques permet de constater que la plupart d’entre eux traitent des aspects de l’accès à la justice relatifs à l’accès aux tribunaux ou aux institutions. Cependant, il semble que la société pluraliste dans laquelle nous vivons commande d’élargir la notion d’accès à la justice. Roderick A. Macdonald partage une telle conceptualisation de l’accès à la justice. Prenant appui sur le modèle de pensée du professeur Macdonald, il sera possible d’éclairer les fondements des discours juridiques portant sur l’accès à la justice afin de saisir les différents sens que peut prendre l’accès à la justice et d’envisager une transformation du discours sur l’accès à la justice en matière de droits de la personne. De façon plus concrète, cette étude sur l’accès à la justice s’intéresse à un problème fondamental du système judiciaire et à la recherche de solutions qui permettront de redonner confiance aux citoyens en l’administration de la justice.

In dieser Arbeit geht es darum, dass drei wichtige Intentionalitätstheorien, nämlich die von Dennett, Searle und Chisholm miteinander verglichen werden. Im Vordergrund dieses Vergleichs steht die Frage ob Intentionalität unter Berücksichtigung des semantic ascent als Erklärung für Wahrnehmung und Handlung taugt und wie sich die drei Intentionalitätskonzeptionen dazu verhalten. Dennett ist zwar Eliminativist, d.h. faktisch gibt es für ihn keine Intentionalität. Dennoch möchte er nicht auf das mentale Vokabular von Geist bis Intentionalität verzichten. Er bedient sich des ganzen Begriffsinventars der, wie er abschätzig meint folk psychology, um Handlungen zu beschreiben, betont aber dabei immer, dass der Gebrauch rein metaphorisch bleibt. Die Frage ist, was Dennett nun mit Intentionalität bezeichnet. Nach Dennett interpretieren wir alle möglichen Vorgänge und Systeme als intentional. Mit intentionalen Systemen meint Dennett nicht nur Menschen sondern z.B. auch Bienen, Schachcomputer oder sogar Barometer; Systeme die seiner Meinung nach vorhersagbares Verhalten kennzeichnet. Im Grunde hat Dennett einen sehr technischen Begriff von Intentionalität, der nichts spezifisch Geistiges beschreibt, und der sich wunderbar durch behavioristische Sprechweisen ersetzen lässt. Dies resultiert vor allem daraus, dass Intentionalität für ihn letztlich nur eine Funktion innerhalb eines Biologismus darstellt. Intentionalität dient dazu seine biologischen Bedürfnisse sinnvoll in seinen biographischen Kontext einzubinden und sie dadurch salonfähig zu machen. Bei Wahrnehmungs und Handlungserklärung kann Dennett also nicht auf Intentionalität verzichten, aber um seinem eliminativen Ansatz treu bleiben zu können, instrumentarisiert er Intentionalität auf unzulässige Weise. Searle hingegen möchte Intentionalität und Geist in der Philosophie als eigene Kategorie rehabilitieren, obgleich er andererseits bestrebt ist, Intentionalität und Geist zu naturalisieren. Diese Ambivalenz durchwurzelt Searles ganzes Werk. Das Ergebnis ist eine internalistische Intentionalitätstheorie, die im philosophischen Agnostizismus verbleibt, weil sie nicht über einen Phänomenalismus hinausgelangen kann. Der Grund hierfür liegt in dem Part den Searle innerhalb seiner Intentionalitätskonzeption der Welt zugedacht hat. Das intentionale Erlebnis hat für Searle eine intensionale wie auch extensionale Ausrichtung. Zunächst schreibt er in Bezug auf intentionale Erlebnisse der Welt eine scheinbar kausal verursachende Rolle zu. "Kausal" definiert Searle in letzter Instanz jedoch als intensional verursacht. Infolgedessen fallen intensionaler Inhalt und extensionales Objekt im intentionalen Erlebnis zusammen. Gemeint werden kann also immer nur eine Proposition, aber niemals die Welt. Searles Intentionalitätstheorie widerspricht damit der basalen Erwartung die Intentionalität zu erfüllen hat, sprich, die Fähigkeit zu besitzen, wirkliche Dinge in der wirklichen Welt meinen zu können. Chisholms Intentionalitätstheorie hat Dennetts wie auch Searles gegenüber einen Vorzug. Sie muss nicht jeweils der Dritte-Person-Perspektive oder der Erste-Person-Perspektive entbehren. Einerseits erkennt Chisholm Intentionalität an und andererseits bleibt er gleichzeitig analytisch. Dies glückt Chisholm, indem er von einem intentional verfassten Selbstbewusstsein ausgeht. Mit diesem Selbst als – mit Kims Worten – Nullpunkt des intentionalen Systems ist es Chisholm möglich, auf sich selbst wie auch auf Dinge außerhalb seiner selbst Bezug zu nehmen. In Chisholms Attributionstheorie bin immer ich der Zuschreibende. Was attribuiert wird ist in jedem Fall eine Eigenschaft von mir. Intentionales Objekt ist demzufolge immer der Zuschreibende selbst. Jeder Fall von Referenz ist in diese direkte Atrribution eingebettet. Die Referenz gelingt deswegen, weil die Eigenschaft, die zugeschrieben wird, dann darin besteht, in identifizierender Relation zu einem bestimmten Ding zu stehen. Chisholm hat damit einen tauglichen Intentionalitätsbegriff entwickelt, der Bezugnahme auf wirkliche Dinge in der wirklichen Welt sinnvoll beschreibt. / In this survey three important conceptions of Intentionality from Dennett Searle and Chisholm get compared. The main question of this comparison is, if, on respect to the semantic ascent, Intentionality is a suitable explication for perception and acting, and how the three conceptions conduct on that. Indeed, Dennett is an eliminativist, this means there is no Intentionality for him. But he does not like do without the mental vocabulary from Mind to Intentionality. To explicate actions he is using the whole equipment of the - disparaging called – Folk psychology, yet he always emphasizes the use is only metaphorical. The question is, what does Intentionality mean for Dennett? In Dennetts way we read many different processes and systems as intentional. For Dennett, intentional systems are not only human beings but also bees, chesscomputer or even thermostates; Systems, whose are in his opinion signed by predictable behavior. Strictly spoken Dennett has a very technical idea of Intentionality, which does not describe any specific mental and which is wonderful replaceable by a behavioristic manner of speaking. In the main, this results from an Intentionality just seen as a biological function. Intentionality in this way serves making biological needs sensible according to the biographical context, to get them fit for good society. In the end, according to explication of perception and acting, Dennett is not able to relinquisch Intentionality, but to remain true to his eliminative attitude, he is instrumentarizing Intentionality in a forbidden way. Not so Searle, he wants to rehabilitate Intentionality and Mind as own kategory. On the other hand he endeavours to naturalize Intentionality and Mind. This ambivalence persists in Searles complete work. The result is an internalistic Intentionality conception, which remains in philosophical agnosticism, because she cannot get out off a phaenomenalism. The cause therefore lies in the part which Searle intended for the world inside his Intentonality conception. The intentional perception for Searle has an intensional and extensional alignment. First Searle grants an apparantly causal role to the world. "Causal" is by Searle at last defined as intensional caused. Consequently, in an intentional act, intensional content and extensional object coincide. Thus you are only able to mean a proposition but never the world. At this point Searles Concept of Intentionality contradicts the basal expectation, which Intentionality has to fullfill, namly the ability to catch real things in the real world. Chisholms theory of Intentionality has, in according to Dennett's and Searle's, a preference. She has not to disclaim the third-person-perspective or the first-person-perspective. On the one hand Chisholm accepts Intentionality and on the other he remains at the same time analytical. Chisholm is managing this by taking selfawarenes as intentional draftet. From this self as – in Kims words – the zero point of the intentional system, Chisholms gets the possibility to refer on himself and to refer on things beside himself. In Chisholms theory of attribution, it' s always me, who attributes. The attribution's object is always a property of myself. Therefore the intentional object is always the speaker himself. Every kind of reference is embed in this socalled direct Attribution. The reference succeeds, because, the attributed property subsits in having an identifying relation to a special thing. So Chisholm has developed a usefull concept of Intentionality, which describes taking reference on real things in the real world.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-30T14:05:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000467347-Texto+Completo-0.pdf: 1416129 bytes, checksum: 5e5fcb1ff6fbad8133efdf313926309d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / This work intends to contribute to the discussion that occurs in analytic philosophy on the epistemology of Hegel, investigating the Dilemma of the criterion based on the interpretation of Hegelian response to it made by Westphal and suggesting possibilities of dialogue from the approach with the Chisholm. The Dilemma of the criterion relates to the arguments of Sextus Empiricus on the impossibility of deciding whether there is or not a Criterion of truth. The argument support that there is a circularity between demonstration and criterion, which branches to the contradictory requirement that the criterion is conditioned and unconditioned, and is based on the application of skeptical Trilemma of Agrippa. We agree with Westphal that Hegel faces the Dilemma of criterion to propose to verify the legitimacy of different conceptions of knowledge without presupposing a concept of knowledge as a criterion. However we consider his approach ambiguous to identify criteria that have been borne by Hegel. These criteria defined the coherence in pragmatic, internal and reflexive dimensions. In addition, Westphal points to several assumptions not shown in Hegel: a realism that assumes that coherence is only possible if there is correspondence, a trust in the capabilities and cognitive dispositions of consciousness, the idea of a common culture to unite the figures of consciousness, the readers of Phenomenology and Hegel himself and a teleological view of history. These theses are not integrated with fallibilism that Westphal attributes to Hegel and at the same time, they did not solve the Dilemma of criterion. These theses are interesting, also for its critical potential, but we believe that the essence of Hegel's response to the Dilemma of the criterion is in its immanent approach of justification that it is expressed in the Phenomenology in two methodological perspectives: phenomenological exposure and the dialectical phenomenology. This contains three steps: auto exposure of ontological and epistemological assumptions, reductio ad absurdum and determinate negation. All Phenomenology’s assumptions are submitted to an attempted reductio ad absurdum, and what all they assume is shown as absolute knowledge. This notion contains the elimination of the scission between knowledge and object and, with it, the scission between truth and justification, which underlies to transcendent approach to justification, presupposed by the Dilemma of the criterion and the epistemological approaches. Hegel's answer to the Dilemma of the criterion thus assumes an exhaustive reduction to absurd of all transcendent approaches and the legitimacy of the demonstration by refutation. From this, we propose some points of contact between the approach of Hegel and the Chisholm. Firstly, this author has a very restricted view of the nature of the criteria, which could be extended from Hegel's vision. Second, both Chisholm as his critics use forms of immanent approach that could be better respected, including their relationship with skepticism by a dialogue with Hegel. Third, the potential implicit in the Hegelian approach to knowledge could be further exploited through contact with the theoretical and language resources available in contemporary analytic epistemology. / Este trabalho pretende contribuir com a discussão que ocorre na filosofia analítica sobre a epistemologia de Hegel, investigando o Dilema do critério a partir da interpretação que Westphal faz da resposta hegeliana a ele e sugerindo possibilidades de diálogo a partir da aproximação com a abordagem de Chisholm. O Dilema do critério diz respeito aos argumentos de Sexto Empírico sobre a impossibilidade de decidir se há ou não um critério de verdade. O argumento sustenta que há uma circularidade entre demonstração e critério, decorrente da exigência contraditória de que o critério seja condicionado e incondicionado, e baseia-se na aplicação do Trilema cético de Agripa. Concordamos com Westphal que Hegel enfrenta o Dilema do critério ao propor-se verificar a legitimidade de diferentes concepções de conhecimento sem pressupor um conceito de conhecimento como critério. Mas consideramos sua abordagem ambígua, ao identificar critérios que teriam sido assumidos por Hegel. Esses critérios definiriam a coerência nas dimensões pragmática, interna e reflexiva. Além disso, Westphal aponta diversos pressupostos não demonstrados em Hegel: um realismo que supõe que a coerência só é possível se há correspondência, uma confiança nas capacidades e disposições cognitivas da consciência, a tese de uma cultura comum a unir as figuras da consciência, os leitores da Fenomenologia e o próprio Hegel e uma visão teleológica de história. Essas teses não se integram com o falibilismo que Westphal atribui a Hegel e, ao mesmo tempo, tornam não resolvido o Dilema do critério. Consideramos essas teses interessantes, inclusive pelo seu potencial crítico, mas acreditamos que o essencial da resposta hegeliana ao Dilema do critério está em sua abordagem imanente da justificação, que na Fenomenologia expressa-se em duas perspectivas metodológicas: a exposição fenomenológica e a fenomenologia dialética. Esta contém três passos: autoexposição dos pressupostos ontológicos e epistemológicos, redução ao absurdo e negação determinada. Todos os pressupostos da Fenomenologia são submetidos a uma tentativa de redução ao absurdo, e o que todos eles pressupõem evidencia-se como saber absoluto. A noção de saber absoluto contém a eliminação da cisão entre saber e objeto e, com ela, da cisão entre verdade e justificação, que subjaz à abordagem transcendente da justificação, pressuposta pelo Dilema do critério e pelas abordagens epistemológicas. A resposta hegeliana ao Dilema do critério, assim, pressupõe uma redução ao absurdo exaustiva de todas as abordagens transcendentes e a legitimidade da demonstração por refutação.A partir disso, propomos alguns pontos de contato entre a abordagem de Hegel e a de Chisholm. Em primeiro lugar, esse autor tem um ponto de vista bastante restrito sobre a natureza dos critérios, que poderia ser alargado a partir da visão de Hegel. Em segundo lugar, tanto Chisholm como seus críticos utilizam formas da abordagem imanente que poderiam ser mais bem conceituadas, inclusive em sua relação com o ceticismo, mediante um diálogo com Hegel. Em terceiro lugar, a potencialidade implícita na abordagem hegeliana do conhecimento poderia ser mais bem explorada através do contato com os recursos teóricos e linguísticos disponíveis na epistemologia analítica contemporânea.

Submitted by Setor de Tratamento da Informa??o - BC/PUCRS (tede2@pucrs.br) on 2015-04-17T19:06:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 467347 - Texto Completo.pdf: 1416129 bytes, checksum: 5e5fcb1ff6fbad8133efdf313926309d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-17T19:06:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 467347 - Texto Completo.pdf: 1416129 bytes, checksum: 5e5fcb1ff6fbad8133efdf313926309d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-17 / This work intends to contribute to the discussion that occurs in analytic philosophy on the epistemology of Hegel, investigating the Dilemma of the criterion based on the interpretation of Hegelian response to it made by Westphal and suggesting possibilities of dialogue from the approach with the Chisholm. The Dilemma of the criterion relates to the arguments of Sextus Empiricus on the impossibility of deciding whether there is or not a Criterion of truth. The argument support that there is a circularity between demonstration and criterion, which branches to the contradictory requirement that the criterion is conditioned and unconditioned, and is based on the application of skeptical Trilemma of Agrippa. We agree with Westphal that Hegel faces the Dilemma of criterion to propose to verify the legitimacy of different conceptions of knowledge without presupposing a concept of knowledge as a criterion. However we consider his approach ambiguous to identify criteria that have been borne by Hegel. These criteria defined the coherence in pragmatic, internal and reflexive dimensions. In addition, Westphal points to several assumptions not shown in Hegel: a realism that assumes that coherence is only possible if there is correspondence, a trust in the capabilities and cognitive dispositions of consciousness, the idea of a common culture to unite the figures of consciousness, the readers of Phenomenology and Hegel himself and a teleological view of history. These theses are not integrated with fallibilism that Westphal attributes to Hegel and at the same time, they did not solve the Dilemma of criterion. These theses are interesting, also for its critical potential, but we believe that the essence of Hegel's response to the Dilemma of the criterion is in its immanent approach of justification that it is expressed in the Phenomenology in two methodological perspectives: phenomenological exposure and the dialectical phenomenology. This contains three steps: auto exposure of ontological and epistemological assumptions, reductio ad absurdum and determinate negation. All Phenomenology?s assumptions are submitted to an attempted reductio ad absurdum, and what all they assume is shown as absolute knowledge. This notion contains the elimination of the scission between knowledge and object and, with it, the scission between truth and justification, which underlies to transcendent approach to justification, presupposed by the Dilemma of the criterion and the epistemological approaches. Hegel's answer to the Dilemma of the criterion thus assumes an exhaustive reduction to absurd of all transcendent approaches and the legitimacy of the demonstration by refutation. From this, we propose some points of contact between the approach of Hegel and the Chisholm. Firstly, this author has a very restricted view of the nature of the criteria, which could be extended from Hegel's vision. Second, both Chisholm as his critics use forms of immanent approach that could be better respected, including their relationship with skepticism by a dialogue with Hegel. Third, the potential implicit in the Hegelian approach to knowledge could be further exploited through contact with the theoretical and language resources available in contemporary analytic epistemology. / Este trabalho pretende contribuir com a discuss?o que ocorre na filosofia anal?tica sobre a epistemologia de Hegel, investigando o Dilema do crit?rio a partir da interpreta??o que Westphal faz da resposta hegeliana a ele e sugerindo possibilidades de di?logo a partir da aproxima??o com a abordagem de Chisholm. O Dilema do crit?rio diz respeito aos argumentos de Sexto Emp?rico sobre a impossibilidade de decidir se h? ou n?o um crit?rio de verdade. O argumento sustenta que h? uma circularidade entre demonstra??o e crit?rio, decorrente da exig?ncia contradit?ria de que o crit?rio seja condicionado e incondicionado, e baseia-se na aplica??o do Trilema c?tico de Agripa. Concordamos com Westphal que Hegel enfrenta o Dilema do crit?rio ao propor-se verificar a legitimidade de diferentes concep??es de conhecimento sem pressupor um conceito de conhecimento como crit?rio. Mas consideramos sua abordagem amb?gua, ao identificar crit?rios que teriam sido assumidos por Hegel. Esses crit?rios definiriam a coer?ncia nas dimens?es pragm?tica, interna e reflexiva. Al?m disso, Westphal aponta diversos pressupostos n?o demonstrados em Hegel: um realismo que sup?e que a coer?ncia s? ? poss?vel se h? correspond?ncia, uma confian?a nas capacidades e disposi??es cognitivas da consci?ncia, a tese de uma cultura comum a unir as figuras da consci?ncia, os leitores da Fenomenologia e o pr?prio Hegel e uma vis?o teleol?gica de hist?ria. Essas teses n?o se integram com o falibilismo que Westphal atribui a Hegel e, ao mesmo tempo, tornam n?o resolvido o Dilema do crit?rio. Consideramos essas teses interessantes, inclusive pelo seu potencial cr?tico, mas acreditamos que o essencial da resposta hegeliana ao Dilema do crit?rio est? em sua abordagem imanente da justifica??o, que na Fenomenologia expressa-se em duas perspectivas metodol?gicas: a exposi??o fenomenol?gica e a fenomenologia dial?tica. Esta cont?m tr?s passos: autoexposi??o dos pressupostos ontol?gicos e epistemol?gicos, redu??o ao absurdo e nega??o determinada. Todos os pressupostos da Fenomenologia s?o submetidos a uma tentativa de redu??o ao absurdo, e o que todos eles pressup?em evidencia-se como saber absoluto. A no??o de saber absoluto cont?m a elimina??o da cis?o entre saber e objeto e, com ela, da cis?o entre verdade e justifica??o, que subjaz ? abordagem transcendente da justifica??o, pressuposta pelo Dilema do crit?rio e pelas abordagens epistemol?gicas. A resposta hegeliana ao Dilema do crit?rio, assim, pressup?e uma redu??o ao absurdo exaustiva de todas as abordagens transcendentes e a legitimidade da demonstra??o por refuta??o. A partir disso, propomos alguns pontos de contato entre a abordagem de Hegel e a de Chisholm. Em primeiro lugar, esse autor tem um ponto de vista bastante restrito sobre a natureza dos crit?rios, que poderia ser alargado a partir da vis?o de Hegel. Em segundo lugar, tanto Chisholm como seus cr?ticos utilizam formas da abordagem imanente que poderiam ser mais bem conceituadas, inclusive em sua rela??o com o ceticismo, mediante um di?logo com Hegel. Em terceiro lugar, a potencialidade impl?cita na abordagem hegeliana do conhecimento poderia ser mais bem explorada atrav?s do contato com os recursos te?ricos e lingu?sticos dispon?veis na epistemologia anal?tica contempor?nea.

Early antebellum defenders of slavery acknowledged that slavery created problems for southern society. They contended, however, that slave society was better and more natural than other forms of social organization. Thomas R. Dew, William Harper, and James Henry Hammond each expressed a social philosophy in which slavery had a crucial role in preserving social order. They argued from the basis of social organicism, the idea that society should have an elite that controlled the masses. For all three men, slavery represented a system of order that helped balance the dangers of democracy. Significantly, however, all three men recognized that the slave system was not perfect, and despite their defense of slavery, argued that it was a human institution and therefore corruptible.