This study examines the Islamic concept of Al-Wala’ wal Bara’ (Loyalty and Disavowal) in modern Salafism referred to here as WB. The research is divided into two parts. Part One introduces the phenomenon of modern Salafism and the concept of WB (Chapter One). It also demonstrates how the Quran, particularly its sixtieth chapter (Surah Al-Mumtahanah) and the concept of Millat Ibrahim (Religion of Abraham) play an important role in formulating the modern Salafi concept of WB (Chapter Two). Part Two discusses the realities and complexities of the concept. First, the concept in Wahhabism, whose adherents form the majority of modern Salafis, and whose tradition is believed to have influenced and shaped modern Salafism, is discussed (Chapter Three). The complexities of WB are described as the research recognizes the diversity or “spectrum” of the concept in modern Salafism, which ranges from what might be termed “very mild” to “very extreme” (Chapter Four). The research shows that one of the main reasons for this diversity is the different Salafi orientations or the backgrounds from which modern Salafis emerge. This is proven through analyzing the writings on WB by Salafis of purist, politico and Jihadi backgrounds – a specific categorization of modern Salafis used for the purpose of this research (Chapter Five). The analysis is conducted by mainly observing the role of WB within their intellectual systems. Through this analysis, it is concluded that a particular Salafi orientation has an effect on the style of writing and presentation of the concept by modern Salafis. This reflects the position of WB in modern Salafism as being fluid and multi-dimensional. The research then, aims to explore the centrality, breadth and complexity of the WB concept in modern Salafism, and proves that WB in modern Salafism is not static but flexible and dynamic. The significance of the research lies in the fact that understanding modern Salafi conceptions of WB is an urgent priority in the lives of Muslims today. This understanding is critical, as Muslims increasingly live as minority communities across the globe and WB has specific implications for whether (and how) Muslims can live with non-Muslims. The research concludes that the consequences of applying the modern Salafi concept of WB are serious – WB generally promotes a way of life that is insular and hostile towards non-Muslims and this, it might be argued, is at variance with more tolerant, inclusive nature of Islam.

This research studies the theology of those Wahhabis who have now named themselves Salafis. For the purpose of the study, they are referred to as the ‘Wahhabis-self-named-Salafis’ (WSNS). The thesis starts with the observation that the WSNS are usually studied from a political perspective, much less frequently a theological one. Recent research has identified that the theological background of all the different factions of the WSNS is one and the same. This is true for the WSNS who advocate a peaceful way to achieve their goals, as well as those who do not. This thesis aims to explore some of the theological issues that unify these factions. This research demonstrates that, because the WSNS are opposed to the very concept of interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith, especially when these texts deal with important theological issues such as the Attributes of God, they have developed a vision of Islamic history which is entirely different from the one which had traditionally been accepted by most Muslim scholars and Western academics. They have redefined the notion of Sunnism as it has been known, mostly basing themselves on this single issue. This thesis shows that the WSNS deny the existence of any interpretation ever made by a recognised member of the Salaf (i.e. the Muslims of the first three generations). In contrast, the Sunnis who do not claim to be Salafis, but who nonetheless consider themselves as treading the path of the Salaf (called in the thesis: ‘Sunnis-not-claiming-to-be-Salafis’) are of the view that they did allow interpretation. The WSNS therefore consider that the Ash‘ari scholars (from the main Sunni theological school) had a corrupted creed concerning God. This leads the followers of the WSNS, from across the spectrum of the different factions, to consider that most of the Islamic scholars from the past had actually failed to understand the proper Tawhid, or Oneness of God, which is tantamount to considering them all as misguided, with the notable exception of Ibn Taymiyya and his students, and Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his students. The research argues that, by favouring the non-violent factions of the WSNS simply because they are officially opposed to terrorism and suicide bombings, current counter-terrorism strategies are allowing the gradual replacement of the core of the notion of Sunnism to go ahead, thereby fuelling future chaos and confusion in the Muslim community. This thesis highlights the longer term implications of these strategies for the Muslim community and the world at large.

The thesis examines two of the arguably most contentious strands within contemporary Islam – Salafism and Islamism – in the British context from 1965 to the contemporary period. Its central argument is that by using their (multi-directional) connections, modern Muslim sects in Britain fashioned a distinct ‘Western Muslim’ consciousness, which has gradually altered their relationship with the ‘Muslim world’ at large. Rather than generating remittances to send ‘back home’, to Muslim-majority countries – Britain, and the West more broadly, came to be seen as another important Muslim space in need of resources, institutions, and unique paradigms for understanding and practicing Islam. Put differently, scholars, activists and intellectuals began carving out a self-conscious Western form of Islam, and in this process have begun to subvert their peripheral status vis-à-vis the heartlands of the Muslim world. The thesis charts the emergence of this ‘Western Muslim’ consciousness beginning from the late 1960s to the present. It demonstrates that this was neither a linear process of severing ties with Muslim-majority countries, nor one of wholly adopting Western cultural codes or modes of faith. Rather Salafis and Islamists rooted Islam in Britain, but on their own terms. It opens with a re-examination of the religious lives of the first generation pioneer migrants that arrived in the post-War period from South Asia, who were involved with either the Ahl-e-Hadith or the Jamaat-e-Islami. It examines how each faction established their mosques and organisations in the British context, making complex and sophisticated adaptions in their thoughts and practice while negotiating their changed setting. It suggests that the sharp generational divide – where the first were primarily seen in ethnic terms and the second adopted a global religious identity – has hitherto dominated accounts of Muslims in Britain, and needs to be critiqued and revised. From their inception, the struggle to recreate an ‘authentic’ Islam was pivotal in both movements. Purging Islam from adulterations and perceiving themselves as part of the global ummah were sentiments that were present, to a certain degree, in the first-generation. This is not to say that there were no generational differences, but that these differences were more fluid than has been suggested. The thesis also explores the reasons underpinning the resurgence of ‘traditional’ religious figures at the expense of ‘intellectuals’. However, in the context of individualisation, new media and the democratisation of religion, this raises important questions as to how ‘traditional’ religious authority is being transformed and adapted. It analyses the seemingly contradictory elements of the desire to wholeheartedly follow ‘authentic’ religious figures on the one hand, and still actively rationalise and determine which interpretation of Islam they ultimately follow on the other. With the advent of cyberspace, it also examines the changing contours of the ‘community’ and the relationship between offline and online networks. It argues that the internet has accelerated the development of like-minded or ideological transnational networks that span online and offline spaces. These networks increasingly take precedence over geographically close ‘communities’ decentralising, but not devaluing, the masjid.

This study deals with the relationship between religious fundamentalism and the internet. It aims to be a critique of the conception that religion and modernization are inherently incompatible; that modernization leads to the death of religion, as advocated the secularization theorists. It argues that the notion is an inaccurate characterization and understanding of the interplay between the forces of religion and modernization; rather, both co-exist and mutually reinforce one another. It also argues that it is inappropriate to label religious fundamentalism as an anti-modern movement; it might be true that it is ideologically ultra-orthodox, but it is technologically a modern movement. The value of this study lies in its findings that the most conservative religious groups like the Salafi community not only persist in the face of modernization, but also transform realities of modernity like the internet into a new form of modern product that serves well their religious needs and interests. To support this, I analysed Salafism, a transnational Islamic fundamentalist movement, and its use of the internet within the Indonesian context to uncover how they employ the technology. I examined the ways the Salafis use the internet in accordance with their ideological purposes in the frameworks of ‘cultured technology’, localization process of global force of information technology, appropriation of global media, and spiritualizing technology. Textual analysis was mainly employed as a method to understand the Salafi web contents and uncover the ways the Salafi use the internet.

The recent policies of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, combined with the collapse of the Syrian state in 2011, created conditions that led to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or “ISIS.” As of November 2014, ISIS controls large areas of western and northern Iraq and northern and eastern Syria, an area roughly the size of Belgium. The rise of ISIS in the past three years has caught the attention of every major nation, especially the United States, and world leaders are justified in fearing a strong ISIS in the Middle East. The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the US strategy in combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The effectiveness of the United States strategy is closely linked with numerous factors, including the history of sectarian violence in Iraq. These factors will be explored throughout the paper. This analysis sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of the US strategy and provides various ways the US can further its goals in the region.

Résumé : Cette thèse s’intéresse à la question de la radicalisation violente chez les salafistes algériens. Elle tente de comprendre comment s’effectue le glissement d’un militantisme (ou d’une sympathie) en faveur d’un islam politique légal, vers un activisme clandestin versé dans l’action violente sous le seau du djihad armé. Saisir le cheminement de cette entrée en radicalité, nous amène d’abord à réfléchir sur la radicalisation de la pensée religieuse comme première étape du processus étudié. L’engagement au profit du djihad est ensuite tributaire d’une construction (ou reconstruction) identitaire fondée sur un renversement moral de l’ordre socioreligieux établi. Les représentationsqui en émanent sont le produit d’une socialisation de l’individu à une pensée radicalisée qui, lorsqu’elle est combinée à d’autres variables facilitatrices ou incitatrices, le prédispose à passer à l’acte. Ainsi, au niveau macro, les opportunités/menaces agissent comme des facteurs facilitateurs ou précipitateurs dans l’engagement armé ; la répression et la fermeture du champ politique sont à ce titre, les variables les plus redondantes dans l’explication de l’entrée en radicalité chez les salafistes algériens. Au niveau méso et micro, l’influence des réseaux préconstitués (organisations armées, réseaux de soutiens logistiques…) et des liens sociaux (amis, voisins, famille…) pèse lourdement sur le choix de l’engagement collectif et individuel. Enfin, les chocs moraux et les récits mémoriels sur la répression subie peuvent aussi nous éclairer à saisir un certain nombre de trajectoires de radicalisation violente chez les djihadistes algériens / Abstract : This thesis focuses on the issue of violent radicalization among Algerian Salafists. It tries to understand how is the shift of activism (or sympathy) for a legal political Islam to a clandestine activism poured into violent action in the bucket of armed jihad. Enter the path of the entry into radicalism, leads us first to reflect on the radicalization of religious thought as a first step in the process studied. The commitment in favor of jihad is then dependent on a construction (or reconstruction) of identity based on moral overthrow of the established socio-religious order. The representations that come in are the product of socialization of the individual to a radicalized thought which, when combined with other variables or incentive-facilitators, predisposes to pass the act. Thus, at the macro level, opportunities / threats act as facilitators factors or precipitators in the armed engagement; repression and the closure of the political field as such are the most redundant variables in explaining the entry into radicalism among Algerian Salafists. At the meso and micro level, the influence of pre-made networks (armed organizations, logistic support networks ...) and social connections (friends, neighbors, family ...) weighs heavily on the choice of the individual and collective commitment. Finally, moral shocks and stories on the memorial suffered repression may also enlighten us to enter a number of violent radicalization trajectories among Algerian jihadists.

This dissertation examines the production and reproduction of knowledge among Salafi groups in post-Soeharto Indonesia. It specifically discusses the issues of how Salafi groups produce the knowledge they claim to be based on the authentic form of Islam in the context of social, political, and economic change. Salafis advocate the need for a return to the authoritative religious sources: the Holy Qur’an, the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, and the Salafi manhaj (methods and paths of Salafi teachings). Without the last element, Salafis claim, the proper understanding and practice of Islamic teachings are impossible. The research was carried out in three major sites: Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Makassar, where significant numbers of Salafis are found. Ethnographic fieldwork, conducted from January to June 2011, and from July 2012 to February 2013, focused on the individual roles, organizational networks, and historical and sociological processes which shaped the reproduction of Salafi knowledge. To create an ideal community based on the Salafist understanding of Islamic ethics, many Salafis create separate enclaves where they erect madrasa and mosques, two strategic institutions fundamental for their development. Claiming to be based on the authority of the Prophet, Salafis develop a medicine and market it to other Muslim groups. Most Salafis engage in endogamous marriage to maintain the groups’ solidity. The roles of women within Salafi groups are highly circumscribed. While having careers is possible, women are expected to stay at home and take care of their families. Salafis represent only a tiny minority of Indonesian Muslims, and they compete with a diverse admixture of Muslim groups, which challenge Salafi interpretations of Islamic knowledge. The political aspects of Salafism are visible in a number of matters of religious knowledge and practice. Salafis use the issues of religious purification as a political tool to maintain their identities and to attack other Muslim groups. Heated debates between Salafis and traditionalist, and to a lesser degree, reformist Muslims, which sometimes lead to violent conflicts, are inevitable. While creating sharp social and religious divisions, debates also result in an exchange of ideas among Muslim groups, heightening the diversity of Salafist forms of knowledge and practice.

Orientador: Omar Ribeiro Thomaz / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-16T02:17:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cherem_YoussefAlvarenga_D.pdf: 1035958 bytes, checksum: 4a762265cb3536a4d795c76a9b2437a9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / Resumo: Quais são os papéis e os signicados do conceito de jihad para os movimentos islamistas contemporâneos? Este trabalho pretende analisar o conceito de jihad na ideologia do jordaniano-palestino 'Isâm Muhammad Tâhir al-Barqâwî (Abû Muhammad al-Maqdisî). Com isso, procuraremos demonstrar que o jihad moderno, em sua manifestação salafista militante, está ligado a uma recomposição da identidade islâmica em três eixos: a crença ('aqîda), a lei (sharî'a) e a guerra/luta/combate (qitâl, jihâd, h. arb). O jihad, portanto, não pode ser dissociado da visão de mundo específica em que se insere. E, segundo o pensamento salalista-jihadista, é parte imprescindível do modo de vida do verdadeiro muçulmano. E, diversamente de outras leituras históricas e contemporâneas do jihad, esse jihad se torna, ele próprio, um modo de vida: uma missão, uma ideologia, e uma doutrina religiosa / Abstract: What are the roles and meanings taken by the concept of jihad for contemporary islamist movements?The aim of this work is to analize the concept of jihad in the ideology of the Palestinian-Jordanian 'Is.âm Muhammad T. âhir al-Barqâwî (Abû Muhammad al-Maqdisî). I contend that modern jihad, in its militant, salafi conception, is connected to a recomposing of Islamic identity on three axis: belief ('aqîda), law (sharî'a), and war/combat/fight (qitâl, jihâd, h.arb). Jihad, therefore, cannot be set apart from the specific worldview wherein it thrives. According to salafi-jihadi thought - and contrary to other historical and contemporary understandings among Muslims - jihad becomes a way of life in itself: a mission, an ideology, and a religious doctrine / Doutorado / Antropologia / Doutor em Antropologia Social

Les premiers signes de la radicalisation salafo-djihadiste contemporaine remontent au début des années 80, dans le sillage de l'intervention Soviétique en Afghanistan et de l'instauration de la république islamique d'Iran. Courant minoritaire, totalitaire et ultraconservateur de l’islam, il se considère comme le fédérateur de l'Oumma (communauté des croyants) et l'incarnation de l'islam authentique des origines. Ce mouvement plus proche d’une idéologie révolutionnaire que d’un message religieux, a pris une ampleur internationale, dans le sillage des révoltes du Printemps Arabe fin 2010. Une organisation particulièrement habile dans l'utilisation des moyens modernes de communications et dans la diffusion de la propagande a su créer une dynamique efficace suscitant l'adhésion de jeunes gens et des moins jeunes, depuis tous les continents. Cette organisation terroriste dénommée Daesh ou Etat islamique a réussi à s'imposer là où ses prédécesseurs ont échoué. Comment y est-elle parvenue ? Qui sont les volontaires prêts à mourir pour cette cause ? Quelles sont leurs motivations ? Comment répondre à cette nouvelle forme de menace d’une extraordinaire complexité ? Quelles sont les solutions et les évolutions de ce phénomène d’ampleur ? C’est à toutes ces questions que la présente recherche tente de répondre, sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, avant de conclure sur quelques perspectives et voies d’exploration, de nature à contrecarrer davantage l’influence et les effets d’une idéologie meurtrière qui marquera durablement le 21ème siècle. / The first signs of the contemporary salafo-Jihadism radicalization date back to the early 1980s, following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a minority, totalitarian and ultraconservative Muslim, he considers himself to be the federation of the Ummah (community of believers) and the embodiment of authentic Islam from its origins.This movement closer to the revolutionary ideology than the religious message has taken on an international dimension in the wake of the Arab Spring revolts at the end of 2010. An organization particularly skilled in the use of modern means of communication and in disseminating Propaganda has created an effective dynamic, attracting young people and young people from all continents. This terrorist organization called Daesh or Islamic state managed to impose itself where its predecessors failed. How did she get there? Who are the volunteers ready to die for this cause? What are their motivations? How to respond to this strong new threat? What are the solutions and evolutions of this phenomenon of magnitude? This is to those questions that this research attempts to answer, without claiming to be exhaustive, before concluding on a few prospects and ways of exploration, such as to thwart more influence and the effects of ideology a murderer who will permanently mark the 21st century.

The thesis focuses on the phenomenon of Boko Haram in Nigeria, attempting to give an understanding of the group based on the academical analysis that has been elaborated through time. A contextualisation of the movement’s evolution introduces two cases of study, currently under scholars’ scrutiny: the birth of the splinter-cell Ansaru and the Chibok kidnapping. The work is integrated by on-going debates among scholars and the most recently published contributions to the research.