No description available.

Le travail présente une analyse systématique des témoignages et des fragments concernant les philosophes atomistes, «élèves» de Leucippe et Démocrite de Abdère. L'objectif poursuivi dans cette thèse est de fournir une définition adaptée et dans la mesure du possible cohérente de ce qu'on entend par «Democritéens» ou «atomiste antique» après Démocrite, mais également de montrer que une définition pareille ne peut pas être séparée de l'analyse de la diffusion de l'atomisme dans la Grèce orientale et les territoires de la Syrie, de l'Égypte et probablement de la Phénicie. Séparée du milieu thrace originaire que, à part Leucippe et Démocrite, inclut vraisemblablement également Métrodore de Chio, la « phase » historique de l'atomisme du IV-Ill siècle av. J.-C. présente des caractères inédits pour la spéculation de Leucippe et Democrite. Il n'est pas seulement nécessaire d'examiner la vie et la pensée de ces atomistes à la lumière de la position aux cours d'Alexandre et de ses épigones dans le IV siècle av. J.-C., mais aussi par rapport à la culture égyptienne de matrice alchimique qui «reçoit» l'atomisme de Democrite. Par rapport aux « plusieurs voix » qui la théorie de l'ancien atomisme prendra dans un cadre bien transformé, il est nécessaire de garder la définition de «atomisme» et «Democritéens» en contrepartie d'une exigence méthodologique et historico-philosophique. L'analyse de la pensée de ces philosophes présente, en effet, des caractères compréhensibles à la lumière du lien existant chez Démocrite entre éthique et physique. Encore : la théorie de la connaissance de type «obscure» (σκοτίη) est un concept qui se révèle essentiel pour le chercheur qui veuille comprendre certains passages de la spéculation de ces atomistes postérieurs. / The work is a systematic analysis of the testimonies and the fragments about the ancient atomists, “pupils” of Leucippus and Democritus. The aim of the thesis is to propose an appropriate meaning of the “democriteans” or “ancient atomist” after Democritus, also considering that these terms cannot be separated by the diffusion of this philosophy in the areas of Eastern Greece, Syria, Egypt and, probably, Fenicia. In the 4th-3rd c. BC the historical phase of the atomism is different from the original Thracian context, that includes Leucippus, Democritus and also Metrodorus of Chios, and it shows unprecedented aspects for the leucippean and democritean speculation. The study of these atomists’ life and theory has to consider their role within the court of Alexander and his Epigeons in the 4th c. BC, and the alchemic Egyptian culture “receiving” the atomism. In this new and mutated context the leucippean-democritean theory will have "many voices", otherwise the terms 'atomism' and “democritean” still need to be used according to methodological, hystorical and philosophical demands. The theory of these philosophers, in fact, can be understood only in the light of the democritean connection between physics and ethics. Furthermore the epistemological theory of Democritus concerning the obscure knowledge (σκοτίη) represents a fundamental concept for the scholars to understand many aspects of the speculation of these later ancient atomists.

Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation argues that if we are to respect the common sense perspective then Pyrrhonian scepticism can be neither avoided nor defeated. While Pyrrhonian scepticism can be diagnosed it cannot be cured, at least, so long as we take a non-revisionary attitude towards common sense. The fundamental reason for this is that Pyrrhonian scepticism derives from the application of norms of inquiry that constitute part of the content of common sense in unusual but not fanciful or impossible situations. Implicit in this dissertation is a distinction between Cartesian and Pyrrhonian scepticisms, and for present purposes these two scepticisms can be distinguished on two criteria. First, unlike Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism is not global in its doubts. It is not global because it does not attempt to question our entitlement to entire domains of commitment, for instance commitments to anything beyond the content of our perceptions, all at once. Nor does Pyrrhonism attempt to deny the possibility of knowledge. Rather, Pyrrhonian scepticism questions our entitlement to one commitment at a time and is hence iterative rather than global. This leads to the second far more interesting criterion in that unlike its Cartesian cousin Pyrrhonian scepticism claims not to be revisionary of the common sense perspective. In fact Pyrrhonian scepticism represents itself as the common sense perspective under special conditions. On this reading Pyrrhonian scepticism is a form of common sense scepticism. The claim that Pyrrhonian scepticism is commonsensical calls for a clarification of in what exactly the common sense perspective consists, and its relationship to scepticism. Of particular interest in this regard is a position that has been called Common Sense Naturalism (CSN). CSN consists, in part, in three important claims. First, that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to common sense. Second, that because we are thus constrained, we have an entitlement to those commitments that constitute the content of common sense. Third, that the content of common sense is inherently anti-sceptical. These three claims jointly warrant Page 5 Page 6 the conclusion that appeals to commitments to which we are commonsensically entitled can feature prominently in refutations of scepticism. I argue that CSN is incorrect in that even if we have an entitlement to our common sense commitments we have an equally valid entitlement to Pyrrhonian scepticism, as Pyrrhonian scepticism can be derived from the common sense perspective itself. I also argue that CSN is correct but misleading in suggesting that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to the content of common sense. CSN is correct in that we are always forced to take ourselves to be entitled to some commonsensical commitments but overlooks the fact that the content of these commitments varies, becoming at times amenable to Pyrrhonian scepticism. In fact what we take to be commonsensical is sensitive to our mood at the time. This can be used to explain that feature of the phenomenology of scepticism according to which Pyrrhonian scepticism is a recurrent but not a constant problem. Presenting these arguments requires both that the nature of CSN be clarified (chapter 1), that the relationship between common sense and Pyrrhonian scepticism be established (Chapter 2). Finally, we must also provide an account of the content of common sense be given (Chapter 3) which provides warrant for continued inquisitive activities even after the emergence of Pyrrhonian scepticism from within common sense.

Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation argues that if we are to respect the common sense perspective then Pyrrhonian scepticism can be neither avoided nor defeated. While Pyrrhonian scepticism can be diagnosed it cannot be cured, at least, so long as we take a non-revisionary attitude towards common sense. The fundamental reason for this is that Pyrrhonian scepticism derives from the application of norms of inquiry that constitute part of the content of common sense in unusual but not fanciful or impossible situations. Implicit in this dissertation is a distinction between Cartesian and Pyrrhonian scepticisms, and for present purposes these two scepticisms can be distinguished on two criteria. First, unlike Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism is not global in its doubts. It is not global because it does not attempt to question our entitlement to entire domains of commitment, for instance commitments to anything beyond the content of our perceptions, all at once. Nor does Pyrrhonism attempt to deny the possibility of knowledge. Rather, Pyrrhonian scepticism questions our entitlement to one commitment at a time and is hence iterative rather than global. This leads to the second far more interesting criterion in that unlike its Cartesian cousin Pyrrhonian scepticism claims not to be revisionary of the common sense perspective. In fact Pyrrhonian scepticism represents itself as the common sense perspective under special conditions. On this reading Pyrrhonian scepticism is a form of common sense scepticism. The claim that Pyrrhonian scepticism is commonsensical calls for a clarification of in what exactly the common sense perspective consists, and its relationship to scepticism. Of particular interest in this regard is a position that has been called Common Sense Naturalism (CSN). CSN consists, in part, in three important claims. First, that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to common sense. Second, that because we are thus constrained, we have an entitlement to those commitments that constitute the content of common sense. Third, that the content of common sense is inherently anti-sceptical. These three claims jointly warrant Page 5 Page 6 the conclusion that appeals to commitments to which we are commonsensically entitled can feature prominently in refutations of scepticism. I argue that CSN is incorrect in that even if we have an entitlement to our common sense commitments we have an equally valid entitlement to Pyrrhonian scepticism, as Pyrrhonian scepticism can be derived from the common sense perspective itself. I also argue that CSN is correct but misleading in suggesting that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to the content of common sense. CSN is correct in that we are always forced to take ourselves to be entitled to some commonsensical commitments but overlooks the fact that the content of these commitments varies, becoming at times amenable to Pyrrhonian scepticism. In fact what we take to be commonsensical is sensitive to our mood at the time. This can be used to explain that feature of the phenomenology of scepticism according to which Pyrrhonian scepticism is a recurrent but not a constant problem. Presenting these arguments requires both that the nature of CSN be clarified (chapter 1), that the relationship between common sense and Pyrrhonian scepticism be established (Chapter 2). Finally, we must also provide an account of the content of common sense be given (Chapter 3) which provides warrant for continued inquisitive activities even after the emergence of Pyrrhonian scepticism from within common sense.

This thesis discusses Descartes' conception and negotiation, in the period from 1637 to 1648, of the responsibilities arising from teaching. His concerns spring particularly from the teaching of sceptical arguments, and from his efforts to maintain his project's integrity as his followers take it up. My argument is twofold: that such responsibilities were a persistent and prominent concern through this crucial period in his career, and that they offered terms of criticism within which major early responses to his work, friendly and hostile, were formulated. In Chapter 1, I show how these concerns shape the Principia. Chapter 2 argues that Descartes' conception of his responsibilities are rooted in a widespread early modern conception of the risks of scepticism, and that they are visible, within the Discours, in his remarks about exemplarity and publication, as well as in the actual business of publishing the text. In Chapter 3, these concerns are linked to a positive conception of the gains Descartes hoped to secure for his students against pressures within Aristotelianism. Finally, in Chapter 4, I show that Descartes' critics mobilise this understanding to frame early attacks on the interactions between Cartesianism and existing scholastic institutions. In closing, I suggest three directions in which to develop historiographical issues raised in the thesis.

This thesis presents an empirical study of dendroclimatology, with the purpose of contributing to a wider understanding of the way scientists generate knowledge about climate change. Dendroclimatology is a science that produces knowledge about past climates from the analysis of tree growth. For two years, I have studied the work of a group of dendroclimatologists, joining them on fieldwork and sampling expeditions in the Scottish Highlands, observing how they generate data from tree samples to reconstruct past temperatures in Scotland and examining how they have mobilised a Scottish temperature reconstruction in a scientific debate over historical changes in climate. This thesis develops two parallel narratives about the practice of making dendroclimatological knowledge and the roles of trust and scepticism in this process. In describing how dendroclimatologists work to extract information about past climates from trees, I identify the importance of trust relationships and scepticism at each stage of their work. I conduct a symmetrical analysis of both trust and scepticism in science. In the past, scholars studying science have emphasised the critical role of either trust or scepticism in the construction of scientific knowledge, and have paid relatively little attention to examining the relationship between the two. In my study, I demonstrate that scepticism is part of the ordinary practice of dendroclimatology, and that scepticism in normal science (which I call “civil scepticism”) is fundamentally dependent (or “parasitic”) on existing trust relationships established through a variety of means. Dendroclimatologists engage in intimate interactions and mutual scrutiny of each other’s competence throughout the work they do in the field and in the laboratory, and they build upon and expand these trust relationships to create and defend climate reconstructions. I show that dendroclimatologists sustain trust relationships in part by demonstrating that they are competent sceptics (which I call “sceptical display”) and, in part by provisionally suspending their scepticism to permit agreement on what constitutes valid dendroclimatological knowledge. I also analyse how these internal practices of scepticism and agreement are influenced by sceptical challenges from actors external to the dendroclimatology community, including challenges grounded in similar trust relationships (a further instance of civil scepticism) and challenges that are not (which I call “uncivil scepticism”). I conclude that dendroclimatological knowledge is only possible as a result of contingent social negotiations over the distribution of trust and the boundaries of a trusting community.

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1980.

Montaigne has widely been regarded as one of the most significant sceptics of the XVI Century. Yet, if we consider his Essais as a whole, he turns out to be more a sceptical thinker like Socrates or Saint Augustine rather than a pyrrhonist like Sextus Empiricus. He is closer to the Academic scepticism rather than to the absolute scepticism of Pyrrhonism. This thesis contends that despite most of modern research, Montaigne’s biggest debt to ancient sources is with Socrates, Plato, Cicero, Saint Paul, Saint Augustine and Plutarch rather than with Sextus Empiricus. I argue that Montaigne was familiar with the distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism and his quest for truth meant that he had more affinity with Socrates and St. Augustine than with Sextus Empiricus or Pyrrho. He did not suspend his judgment more pirronico: on the contrary, he exerted it in every occasion. The Christian tradition left a more important mark than it was initially thought in Montaigne’s Essais. This reconsideration of Montaigne’s scepticism leads to a re-evaluation of different aspects of the sceptical tradition since the ancient times. In this thesis I show that Montaigne’s scepticism was partly shaped by the presence of scepticism in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Old Testament and in St. Paul, Lactantius and St. Augustine. Powerful currents of scepticism permeated different traditions during the Middle Ages and although their existence has been acknowledged, their potential debt to Greco-Roman antiquity and their influence in the recovery and transmission of scepticism in the early modern period still need further investigation. I argue that in the sceptical crisis of the early modern period Sextus’ writings may have fuelled this crisis, but they did not initiate it. I claim that Sextus Empiricus revival was more a result rather than a cause of the sceptical crisis. Considering that scepticism is a fundamental part of the Essais as a whole we can say that Montaigne was an important part of the sceptical crisis but his scepticism was not shaped by Sextus. I present in this thesis Montaigne’s originality and the complexity of his thought, and even though sometimes it is difficult to follow, his vision is utterly harmonious and consistent. Montaigne considered the ideas of many who had gone before him, sometimes following them, sometimes taking his own path. Montaigne believed in the possibility of real knowledge, even if, in the tradition of Socrates and Augustine, he despaired of achieving it in one person’s life. Montaigne was a sceptic who believed in the existence of truth and he sought that truth through the medium of the essay.

This thesis explores the intersection between the study of Shakespearean drama and the theory and practice of early modern dramatic genres. It reassesses the significance of tragedy and the idea of the tragic within three separate yet related generic frames: tragedy, history, and tragicomedy. Behind this research lies the fundamental question of how newly emerging dramatic genres allow Shakespeare to explore tragedy within different aesthetic and dramatic contexts, and of how they allow his writing to move beyond tragedy. The thesis begins by looking at Shakespeare’s deployment of the complex trope of “nothing”. “Nothing” as a rhetorical trope and metaphysical idea appears across many of the tragedies, often becoming a focal point for the dramatic representation of scepticism, loss and nihilism. The trope is often associated with the space of the theatre, and sometimes with the dramaturgy of tragedy itself. However, it is also deployed within the histories and tragicomedies at certain moments which might equally be called tragic. “Nothing” therefore provides a starting-point for thinking about how the genres of history and tragicomedy engage with tragedy. Part I focuses on tragedy, including extended readings of Timon of Athens and King Lear. It explores Shakespearean drama as a response to the pressures of the early modern cultural preoccupation with, and anxiety about, scepticism. Stanley Cavell and other critics of early modern dramatic scepticism have tended to locate this engagement with scepticism within tragedy. However, this section shows that the same sceptical problematic is addressed across Shakespearean dramatic genres, with very different results. It then explores why scepticism should display a particular affinity for tragedy as a dramatic genre. Part II focuses on history, with particular reference to Richard II and Henry V. The trope of “nothing” is used as a starting-point to explore the intersection between Shakespearean history and tragedy. Engaging with Walter Benjamin’s theory of baroque tragedy as Trauerspiel (mourning-plays) rooted in history, it argues that Trauerspiel provides a useful generic framework against which to consider the mournful aesthetic of Shakespeare’s histories. Part III focuses on early modern tragicomedy and The Winter’s Tale, asking how Shakespeare achieves the transition from tragedy to tragicomedy in his later writing. It explores tragicomedy’s background on the early modern stage in theory and practice, paying particular attention to Guarini’s theory that pastoral tragicomedy frees its hearers from melancholy, and to the legacy of medieval religious drama and its engagement with faith and belief. Returning to the trope of “nothing”, this section shows that The Winter’s Tale addresses the same sceptical problematic as the earlier tragedies. Arguing that scepticism opens up a space for tragedy and nihilism in the first half of The Winter’s Tale, it demonstrates that Shakespeare finds in the genre of tragicomedy an aesthetic and dramatic form which allows him to move through, and beyond, the claims of tragedy.

In this thesis, I investigate different Contextualist strategies for responding to the sceptical Argument from Ignorance (AI). Such responses are notable for not challenging the Principle of Epistemic Closure (widely held to be primarily responsible for the argument's conclusion). I am concerned to explore Contextualism's ability to respond to AI in a way which does not result in an uncomfortable concession to scepticism. In Part 1, I discuss Semantic Contextualism; in Part 2, I investigate how AI fares with regards to transmission of warrant when AI utilises either invariantist or Contextualist presuppositions; and in Part 3, I discuss whether Epistemic Contextualism succeeds where Semantic Contextualism fails, arguing that it does. I conclude with an endorsement of Epistemic Contextualism. Part 1: I demonstrate that Semantic Contextualism, of which I will consider three different varieties (externalist, internalist, presuppositionalist), is overly concessive to scepticism because it results in the following four difficulties: (1) knowledge attributions of the form 'I know/S knows that ~B' (where B stands for the sceptical brain-in-a-vat hypothesis) are invariably false; (2) the sceptical context is extremely easy to install; (3) scepticism is said to result from entirely ordinary epistemic practices and; (4) the sceptical context is taken to be an entirely legitimate context of ascription. I conclude Part 1 with the claim that Semantic Contextualism is overly concessive to scepticism. Part 2: Previously, Moore's Proof of an External World has been diagnosed with failing to transmit the warrant on offer for its premises to its conclusion. I argue that it is possible likewise to charge AI with transmission failure but that this cannot be done when some of the conceptual resources of Contextualism are brought to bear on AI. I show that AI can be charged with transmission failure when it is interpreted in support of invariantist (context-unrestricted) scepticism and that only when it is viewed as an argument for a context-restricted form of scepticism does it succeed in transmitting warrant. In this way, the sceptical consequences of AI are considerably reduced. Part 3: The conceptual resources newly deployed in Part 2, which show that a context-restricted, as opposed to invariantist, interpretation of AI can succeed in transmitting warrant, are borrowed from Michael Williams' Epistemic form of Contextualism. But is this form of Contextualism as concessive to scepticism as I showed Semantic Contextualism to be? I argue that it does not represent an overly concessive position vis-a-vis scepticism and therefore represents a superior Contextualist position and response to scepticism. To establish this conclusion, I interrogate the strategy and main elements of Williams' theoretical diagnosis of scepticism and his resultant version of Contextualism so as to determine the extent to which scepticism can be allayed by it. Particular attention is paid to specifying issues that Williams does not discuss, most prominently how the sceptical context has to be understood in order for it to resist his theoretical diagnosis of scepticism and what makes toleration of such resistance by context-bound scepticism reasonable. I conclude my thesis with an endorsement of Williams' Epistemic Contextualism.