A series of polypeptides with well-defined sequences, (Asp3Phe1)n, (Asp2Phe1)n, (Asp1Phe1)n, (Asp1Phe2)n, and (Asp1Phe3)n, containing the hydrophilic amino acid, aspartic acid (Asp) and the hydrophobic amino acid, phenylalanine (Phe), were synthesized. Their behaviour in aqueous solution was investigated by performing fluorescence quenching and non-radiative energy transfer (NRET) experiments which were complemented by dynamic (DLS) and static (SLS) light scattering. The photophysical properties of the polypeptides were dependent on their Phe content. An increase in the Phe content led to an increase in the extinction coefficient, fluorescence quantum yield, and fluorescence average lifetime of the polypeptides. Circular dichroism experiments revealed that except for the (Asp1Phe3)n polypeptide, which adopts an alpha-helical conformation in aqueous solution, the other polypeptides did not adopt any known conformation in solution. The fluorescence quenching studies performed using molecular pyrene physically bound to the polypeptide via hydrophobic interactions resulted in protective quenching for the (Asp1Phe1)n, (Asp1Phe2)n, and (Asp1Phe3)n polypeptides, with some pyrenes having a lifetime of ~300 ns. Evidence for protective quenching was also observed in the polypeptides richer in Phe, when pyrene was covalently attached onto the polypeptides. However pyrene was found to be fully exposed to the quencher solution for the more hydrophilic polypeptides. The presence of NRET between a naphthalene labeled polypeptide and a pyrene labeled polypeptide for the (Asp1Phe2)n and (Asp1Phe3)n polypeptides and its absence for the (Asp3Phe1)n, (Asp2Phe1)n, and (Asp1Phe1)n polypeptides led to the conclusion that those polypeptides richer in Phe generate interpolymeric aggregates which provide protection to a hydrophobic cargo like molecular pyrene whereas the hydrophilic polypeptides exist predominantly as unimolecular micelles. These results were confirmed by DLS and SLS experiments.

People with low self-esteem (LSEs) often have doubts about how much their romantic partners love and value them. These doubts, which undermine their relationships, are difficult to overcome because LSEs tend to downplay the meaning of positive behaviour and resist positive feedback from their partners. In Study 1, I provided evidence for the notion that LSEs’ “insensitivity” to acceptance is a form of motivated self-protection, rather than a pervasive negative bias. In Studies 2-4, I investigated whether LSEs could be induced to take their partners’ kind words to heart by manipulating how abstractly they described a recent compliment. LSEs felt more positively about the compliments, themselves, and their relationships – as positively as HSEs felt – when they were encouraged to describe the meaning and significance of the compliments. The positive effects of this abstract reframing intervention were still evident two weeks later, in both participants’ self-reported thoughts and feelings about their relationships and in partners’ reports of participants’ behaviour towards them. Study 5 demonstrated that the abstract reframing intervention prevented LSEs from taking a relationship threat to heart and lashing out at their partners. Taken together, the present studies show that when prompted to reframe affirmations from their partners, LSEs feel just as secure and satisfied with their romantic relationships and behave as positively towards their partners as HSEs do.

Pregnancy, a human phenomenon experienced throughout the world and throughout history, has been largely ignored by the philosophical community. A preference for the abnormal and the extraordinary has left this common yet challenging process on the sidelines of philosophical discussion. Pregnancy stands as a significant challenge to many of our intuitions about the self, particularly those concerning the boundaries, plurality and diachronic identity of the self. Because of this, pregnancy necessitates a theory of the self which does not merely uphold our usual assumptions about the self. Daniel Dennett presents a theory of the self which meets this criterion. He argues that the self is a centre of narrative gravity: an abstract, theoretical entity which is useful for the explanation and prediction of an individual’s behaviour. Dennett’s theory, though provocative, lacks a basis in typical human experience. He relies primarily on thought experiments and extraordinary conditions to support his theory. To demonstrate the applicability and generality of this theory, it must be tested against a common, natural human occurrence like pregnancy. In this paper we explore the application of Daniel Dennett’s theory of the narrative self to the experience of pregnancy. This application yields a double result. Dennett’s theory is bolstered by a demonstration of its generality and applicability, and the experience of pregnancy is placed into a context in which it can be validated and understood.

In this thesis I investigate the social and cultural dimensions of the self through an examination of the psychiatric disorder of depersonalization. Specifically, I apply Thagard's Multilevel Interacting Mechanisms framework to depersonalization, which reveals the complex interaction between the phenomenal nature of the illness, and the (culturally construed) conception of the self. I argue that in addition to being a factor for this particular mental illness, the Western independent conception of the self is descriptively incomplete. These conclusions have both bioethical implications for the optimal treatment of depersonalization, and conceptual implications as to our understanding of the self. In the former case, I advocate for greater recognition of the social and cultural contributions to depersonalization, and a more pro-active response to potentially unhealthy self-concepts. With respect to the self, I argue that despite the lack of a 'single monolithic self-concept', the self can be understood as unified both phenomenally, and more broadly by taking a multilevel approach. Depersonalization has been chosen for this project as it is challenging (and ultimately revealing) on two fronts; first it is an incredibly subtle yet disturbing phenomenal experience that affects approximately 2.5 percent of the Canadian population, making it an ideal subject for fostering an understanding of the phenomenal subtleties of selfhood. Secondly, the rates of depersonalization vary dramatically across cultures, and I shall argue that this is largely a result of divergent conceptions of the self. An integrative multilevel account of depersonalization will help explain how these phenomenal and social components operate within the larger phenomena of selfhood.

Moral responsibility is an issue at the heart of the free-will debate. The question of how we can have moral responsibility in a deterministic world is an interesting and puzzling one. Compatibilists arguments have left open the possibility that the ability to do otherwise is not required for moral responsibility. The challenge, then, is to come up with what our attributions of moral responsibility are tracking. To do this, criteria which can adequately differentiate cases in which the agent is responsible from cases in which the agent is not responsible are required. I argue that an agent is responsible for the consequences of an action if they stem, in an appropriate way, from the agent's deep values and desires. These deep values and desires make up the Deep Self. Parts of the Deep Self, first, tend to be enduring; second, desires within it tend to be general (as opposed to directed towards specific things); third, they tend to be reflectively endorsed by the agent; fourth, these traits are often central to the agent's self-conception; and fifth, they are not generally in extreme conflict with other deep traits. Empirical work is drawn upon to help develop a suitable account of what deserves to be called a part of the Deep Self. I also strengthen and extend this view by considering issues of poor judgement and weakness of will, and when and how we can be considered responsible for them.

The partners of people with low self-esteem (LSEs) are just as loving and generous as the partners of people with high self-esteem (HSEs; Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, & Kashy, 2005; Murray et al., 2000). Nonetheless, LSEs persist in underestimating their partners’ regard (e.g., Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 2000). In this research, I propose a model of attribution inversion, which predicts that LSEs will invert the positive attributions for a partner’s sacrifice that would be predicted by classic theory (Kelley, 1967), because of the risk associated with interpreting a partner’s sacrifice too positively. In Study 1, LSEs worried more than HSEs about their partners’ sacrifices. In Studies 2 and 3, LSEs experienced more anxiety over a large (but not small) sacrifice relative to HSEs, and attributed less caring motives to their partners. Studies 4 and 5 demonstrated my proposed mechanisms: Offering one’s partner an exchange of favors (Study 5)—thereby reducing exchange concerns—or experimentally increasing LSEs’ caring attributions (Study 4) eliminated LSEs’ tendency to be more cautious than HSEs about their partners’ sacrifices, suggesting that exchange concerns and doubts about caring drive LSEs’ typical caution. Finally, Study 6 demonstrated that caution is not unique to LSEs. Under a cognitive load manipulation, HSEs were just as cautious, but were apparently able to override that automatic inclination when given sufficient time and resources. Overall, my research suggests that the discounting of a partner’s sacrifices is one route by which low self-esteem is self-perpetuating even with a loving partner.

Most people seem to have the intuition that self-deception is always and obviously wrong. In this thesis, I make the case that under certain circumstances, self-deception can actually do a great deal of good and ought to be morally permissible – especially in cases where it would be life-threatening, dehumanizing, or cruel to insist on complete authenticity. I argue that self-deception can be rational and that it can also sometimes be morally permissible to allow the self-deception of others to go unchallenged, especially in cases where the opportunity to exercise compassion, empathy, and kindness towards each other takes precedence over a concern for truth. I then confront self-deception’s staunchest opponents, the Existentialists, who maintain that self-deception is never morally permissible because it conflicts with their supreme value, authenticity. I focus specifically on the work of Nietzsche and Sartre and identify the various problems that arise from their objections to self-deception. I conclude this thesis with some suggestions as to why so many people might have come to believe that authenticity is the supreme value, when a closer investigation suggests that it probably is not.

Of the numerous psychological constructs self-esteem is the most known. It is well documented that having high levels of self-esteem is associated with positive health implications. Self-esteem is theorized as a global and stable construct impacted by both academic and non-academic domains. The physical domain compartmentalized within the non-academic domain, is used to look at self-esteem related to physical self-perceptions. In the physical domain, the Exercise and Self-Esteem Model (EXSEM) (Sonstroem & Morgan, 1989) was developed to measure changes in self-esteem, physical competence, physical acceptance, and self-efficacy across an exercise intervention. Fox (2000b) suggested that middle-age marks a time where positive changes to self-esteem are possible. For women, middle-age can be accompanied by several challenges including a physical body that moves further from societys ideal (i.e., young, beautiful, and thin). Hatha yoga is an exercise practice that has become popular in North America in recent years, especially with middle-aged adults, and may represent an ideal activity to be used within the EXSEM as it emphasizes both physical competence and acceptance. <p>The purpose of the study was to utilize the EXSEM as a framework to examine self-esteem, physical competence, physical acceptance, and yoga self-efficacy constructs for middle-aged women participating in a 12-week Hatha yoga intervention. An additional exploratory objective of the study was to examine potential changes in mindfulness consisting of observing, describing, acting with awareness, and accepting without judgement for middle-aged women participating in a 12-week Hatha yoga intervention. <p>Participants in the study were 51 women (M age 49.3  6.1; yoga group, n = 21; control group, n = 30) of predominantly White ethnicity (92%). Descriptive information about the sample via a demographics form and an Eastern philosophy familiarity open-ended question, and the following measures, Godin Leisure-Time Exercise Questionnaire (GLTEQ; Godin, & Shephard, 1985), Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965), Physical Self-Perception Profile (PSPP; Fox & Corbin, 1989), Body Esteem Scale (BES; Franzoi, & Shields, 1984), Body Image Visual Analog Scale (BIVAS), Yoga Self-Efficacy Scale (YSES), and the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004) were collected at pre-test and post-test (YSES was administered an additional time for the yoga group only). Doubly multivariate analyses using SPSS (version 14.0) examined four statistical models to answer research questions and help negotiate several dependent variables in the research design. Model 1 looked at higher order constructs in the EXSEM (i.e., RSES, physical self-worth subscale of the PSPP, BES, BIVAS, and YSES). Model 2 was identical to model 1 with the exception of including lower order domain items for physical competence (i.e., PSPP subscales of sport competence, physical strength, physical condition, attractive body). Model 3 looked at subscales of YSES (i.e., standing poses, forward bends, back bends, twists, and seated/supine poses), whereas model 4 examined subscales of KIMS only (i.e., observe, describe, act with awareness, accept without judgement). <p>Following the doubly multivariate analysis, PSPP subscales showed significant group by time interactions; follow-up univariate tests, p < .05, showed significance on PSW F(1, 49) = 12.22, conditioning subscale of PSPP F(1, 49) = 10.65, strength subscale on PSPP F(1, 49) = 13.11, BIVAS F(1, 49) = 6.45, YSE total score F(1, 49) = 9.84, and YSE subscales of forward bends F(1, 49) = 17.84, twists F(1, 49) = 8.18, and seated/supine poses F(1, 49) = 6.21, and observation subscale of KIMS F(1, 49) = 12.16, p < .05. In all cases, the yoga group improved more over time than the control group.<p>General support for the use of the EXSEM for middle-aged women participating in Hatha yoga over 12-weeks was noted with changes in yoga self-efficacy for total score, twists, forward bends, and seated/supine poses; physical competence of physical self-worth, body conditioning, and physical strength; and physical acceptance (BIVAS). A major finding was that no overall change in self-esteem was found with a sample whose means for self-esteem were similar to previous research with middle-aged women. Similarly, partial support for mindfulness with changes in observing following the 12-week Hatha yoga intervention was found. Future research should focus on further developing appropriate measurement of physical acceptance; the appropriateness of EXSEM for examining Hatha yoga should be considered; qualitative methods should be used to gain additional insight into the process of Hatha yoga participation for middle-aged women.

Självledarskap innefattar strategier som syftar till att medvetandegöra och förändra individens tankar och i förlängningen beteende. Genom att förändra tankemönster kan individen förhoppningsvis öka chansen att hantera stress. Forskning visar att ökat självledarskap medför ökad self-efficacy, vilket i sin tur förbättrar förmågan att hantera stress. Studien syftar till att undersöka om det även finns samband mellan självledarskap och stress, hypotesen var att det föreligger ett negativt samband mellan de båda variablerna. Deltagarna (89 studenter, varav 56 kvinnor) besvarade en enkät bestående av självledarskap, självskattad stress och arbetsmiljö. Analyser visade att det inte fanns ett linjärt samband mellan variablerna, men att självledarskap ändå ökar när arbetskraven ökar. Även självskattad stress ökar vid högre arbetskrav. Det krävs dock ytterligare forskning för att vidare undersöka sambanden, gärna med experimentell design rörande huruvida förändringar i självledarskap leder till förändrade stressnivåer.

Människor tenderar att attribuera framgångar till sig själva och misslyckanden till externa källor, fenomenet kallas för Self-serving bias. Hur individer attribuerar kan enligt forskning påverkas av bland annat graden av självkontroll samt självkänsla. Enligt forskning kan intentioner eller beteendemål aktiveras automatiskt och omedvetet av en utlösande signal, så kallad priming, och därmed aktivt guida en persons självreglering. Denna studie har genom ett experiment, med 56 högskolestudenter, undersökt om priming av självkontroll och självförtroende kan påverka hur en individ attribuerar vid framgång och misslyckande. Resultatet visade ingen signifikant skillnad mellan priminggrupperna. Humör visade sig ha betydelse för hur deltagarna attribuerade. En ojämn gruppfördelning och en för bred variationsvidd på beroendemåttet diskuteras om det hade någon påverkan på resultatet.