Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Background: People with schizophrenia experience significant deficits in empathic skills, which are important for effective interpersonal relationships. Researchers have speculated about the roles of personal distress, emotion regulation, and metacognition in empathic interaction, but the impact of these constructs on empathy has yet to be empirically investigated. This study examines the relationships among these constructs in a sample of people with schizophrenia receiving community-based treatment (N = 58). It was hypothesized that better emotion regulation and metacognition, as well as reduced personal distress, would predict empathy. Further, emotion regulation was expected to mediate the relationship between personal distress and empathy, and metacognition was expected to moderate the relationship between personal distress and empathy. Method: Participants with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder completed self-report questionnaires of emotion regulation and personal distress, a performance-based measure of empathy, and an observer-rated interview to assess metacognition. Results: Metacognition, but not emotion regulation or personal distress, significantly predicted cognitive empathy performance, with a trend-level association for affective empathy performance. Mediation analyses revealed that emotion regulation mediates the relationship between personal distress and affective empathy performance, and moderation analyses revealed that metacognition moderates the same relationship. Moderation results suggest the relationship between personal distress and affective empathy performance is significant for those with low metacognition, but that the relationship is the opposite of hypotheses – increased personal distress is associated with better performance. Conclusions: This study is the first of its kind to examine performance-based empathy with personal distress, emotion regulation, and metacognition. Results suggest interventions targeted to improve metacognition may be useful in enhancing empathic skills. Future work is needed to improve existing measures of empathy and personal distress, and to parse apart the intricacies of the relationships among personal distress, emotion regulation, and empathy.

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Essentialist thinking refers to the intuition that category membership and category-specific features are caused by an internal, invisible, essence. Across three studies, we investigated essentialism from a developmental, a cognitive, and a social perspective. In the first study, using a structured interview, we investigated whether Canadian children aged 5-to-8 hold an essentialist view of national identity, and whether their view differs from that of American children. Compared to older children, younger Canadian children were more likely to believe that Canadian identity was biologically based, and that traits associated with Canadian identity were heritable. However, we found no differences between Canadian and American children in terms of essentialist thinking. In the next study, we tested whether adults obscure their essentialist thinking and whether it may be unveiled by cognitive demand. We presented participants with a switched-at-birth paradigm where some participants were under time pressure and others were not. We found that adults under time pressure were more essentialist about national identity and gender than adults not under time pressure, though we saw no effect on race. This suggests that adults obscure their essentialist thinking, but it can be unveiled during cognitive demand. Finally, we assessed whether essentialist thinking is associated with addiction stigma. We presented participants with fictional news articles about scientific studies to prime either essentialist or anti-essentialist views about addiction. Both participants’ biological and non-biological essentialism were associated with addiction stigma, with the latter being a stronger correlate. This suggests that the extent to which individuals view addiction as a fundamentally distinct category has more impact on stigma than whether adults view addiction as genetically based. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Essentialism is the human intuition that category membership is caused by an internal, invisible, source. Humans treat category members as if there is something deep inside them that makes them who they are. Across three chapters, we investigated whether people are essentialist about social categories, and the subsequent consequences. In the first study, we showed that younger children, more than older children, believed in an internal, Canadian, essence. There was no difference between Canadian and American children in how they viewed national identity. Next, we demonstrated that adults are more essentialist about social categories like national identity and gender when they are under time pressure. Finally, we showed that thinking about addiction as a biologically based and distinct category is associated with addiction stigma.

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This study examines the accuracy of a context-sensitive (i.e., goal dimensions) measure of personality compared to a traditional measure of personality (NEO-PI-R) and generalized self-efficacy (GSE) to predict variance in task performance. The goal dimensions measure takes a unique perspective in the conceptualization of personality. While traditional measures differentiate within person and collapse across context (e.g., Big Five), the goal dimensions measure employs a hierarchical structure where the item level (i.e., first-order) is based on behaviors in a given context, and at the dimension level (i.e., second-order) each behavior is organized by organizational goals. As such, at the item level, the person is differentiated within context, but at the dimension-level, person is undifferentiated and the situation is differentiated by goals. To develop this measure, the behavior-in-situation items were identified, a goal taxonomy that captures the work context was developed, and the items were linked to the goal dimensions. The predictive accuracy of the goal dimensions measure was compared to that of the NEO-PI-R and GSE for performance on four tasks (creative, mundane, conflict management, and persuasive) and an overall performance composite. The results were modest in that the goal dimensions models did not perform substantially better than the traditional measure of personality. Specifically, the bivariate correlations between the goal dimensions and each criterion ranged from 0.00 to 0.30 and 19 out of 80 correlations (23.75%) were significant; compared to the absolute values of the correlations between the NEO-PI-R facets and each criterion that ranged from 0.00 to 0.24 with 26/240 significant correlations (10.83%). However, the results indicate that the goal dimensions model accounted for significant variance in task performance beyond that accounted for by the best traditional model for one or more of the criteria in the conflict management task and the persuasive task. These results suggest that future research on the goal dimensions measure is warranted. / Ph. D.

In synaesthetic personification, personality traits and other human characteristics are attributed to linguistic sequences and objects. Such non-perceptual concurrents are different from those found in most frequently studied types of synaesthesia, in which the eliciting stimuli induce sensory experiences. Here, subjective reports from synaesthetes were analysed and the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying personification were investigated. Specifically, the neural bases of personification were examined using functional MRI in order to establish whether brain regions implicated in social cognition are involved in implementing personification. Additional behavioural tests were used to determine whether personification of inanimate objects is automatic in synaesthesia. Subjective reports describing general characteristics of synaesthetic personification were collected using a semi-structured questionnaire. A Stroop-like paradigm was developed in order to examine the automaticity of object personification, similarly to the previous investigations. Synaesthetes were significantly slower in responding to incongruent than to congruent stimuli. This difference was not found in the control group. The functional neuroimaging investigations demonstrated that brain regions involved in synaesthetic personification of graphemes and objects partially overlap with brain areas activated in normal social cognition, including the temporo-parietal junction, precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex. Activations were observed in areas known to be correlated with mentalising, reflecting the social and affective character of concurrents described in subjective reports. Psychological factors linked with personification in previous studies were also assessed in personifiers, using empathy, mentalising and loneliness scales. Neither heightened empathy nor mentalising were found to be necessary for personification, but personifying synaesthetes in the study felt lonelier than the general population, and this was more pronounced in those who personified more. These results demonstrate that personification shares many defining characteristics with classical forms of synaesthesia. Ascribing humanlike characteristics to graphemes and objects is a spontaneous and automatic process, inducer-concurrent pairings are consistent over time and the phenomenological character of concurrents is reflected in functional neuroanatomy. Furthermore, the neuroimaging findings are consistent with the suggestions that synaesthetes have a lower threshold for activation brain regions implicated in self-projection and mentalising, which may facilitate the personification processes in synaesthesia.

Theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, has traditionally been investigated in humans and nonhuman primates. However, non-primate species, such as domestic dogs, may also be potential candidates for such a faculty. Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) evolved from a social-living, wolf-like ancestor, and were the first species to be domesticated, with likely selection for sensitivity to human cues and human-like cognitive abilities. Dogs typically spend their lives in the rich social environment of human families, and thus dogs are naturally enculturated. The combination of these factors make dogs an excellent candidate for having a functional theory of mind. Yet perhaps surprisingly, prior research on theory of mind in dogs is limited, with inconclusive and contradictory results. The research described in this thesis is a systematic investigation of dogs' potential to demonstrate a functional theory of mind in their interactions with humans. Four experiments are presented, based on the Knower-Guesser paradigm (Povinelli et al., 1990), in which a knowledgeable and an ignorant human informant indicated the location of hidden food to the dog. In Experiment 1, one informant was absent (Guesser) and one present (Knower) during the food-hiding, and the dogs chose the Knower. However, when both informants were present, the dogs chose the informant that did the baiting, but this preference was less than when the Guesser was absent. In Experiments 2 and 3, a third experimenter hid the food while the informants covered their cheeks (Knower) or eyes (Guesser) with their hands, or were attentive (Knower) or inattentive (Guesser) to the food-hiding. In both cases, the dogs showed a significant preference for the Knower. In Experiment 4, the dogs showed no preference between the informants when they had equal perceptual access to the baiting, and were unsuccessful at selecting any container when the informants did not provide communicative cues. Overall, the present research provides the most definitive evidence yet that domestic dogs may be able to attribute differential states of knowledge to human observers, and thus may possess a functional theory of mind.

Within the text of The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt circumscribes the concept of natality in ways that tend to conflate its biological, historical, institutional and phenomenological dimensions. This dissertation seeks to clarify this concept and the conceptual territory that surrounds it. Specifically, it is argued that Arendt’s construction of the concept of natality is inherently dual. Each person is delivered into a worldly environment through her primary, biological birth. As soon as she is born, she begins to be conditioned to the accepted normative standards of her community. A gap necessarily exists, however, between the person she is socio-culturally conditioned to be, and who she is explicitly, uniquely and authentically. When deeds and words are employed in service of revealing someone’s individual identity or essence, and thereby showing her to be more than simply a mirror of her cultural conditioning, it heralds a second birth, one which is existential instead of biological. According to Arendt, this existential natality must take place in the presence of other existential agents, and also may be witnessed by a spectator who then seeks to express the significance of what has occurred to those removed from the original event either by space and/or time. This expression takes the form of artifactual objects, including works of art, architectural monuments and various forms of narratives. Arendt’s theory concerning the creation of these objects contains two major problems that are critically addressed within this project. The first problem concerns the spectator’s capacity for making judgments. Works written after The Human Condition are shown to demonstrate Arendt’s attempts to address this issue. The second problem concerns the way in which Arendt portrays the issue of embodiment. This issue must be reconciled both by appealing to work from within her canon, as well as through the introduction of recent scholarship from the field of social cognition. The project concludes with the presentation of a concrete, historical example intended to be illustrative of the preceding theoretical material.

Thesis advisor: Ellen Winner / Despite the widespread involvement of individuals in drama either as performers or audience members, psychologists know very little about the cognitive and affective underpinnings of acting. Acting may provide a powerful lens through which to understand how we understand our own and others' minds. In this dissertation, I review research on theory of mind, empathy, and emotion regulation, show how these three skills are related to acting theory and acting training, and discuss studies I have previously completed demonstrating correlations between skill in acting and skill in theory of mind, empathy, and positive emotion regulation. I then completed four studies. Study 1 was a longitudinal study comparing children (ages 8-10) receiving acting vs. visual arts training over the course of one academic year testing the hypothesis that acting training in childhood is causally related to development of advanced theory of mind, positive emotion regulation, and empathy. Study 1 found that children in acting classes gain in empathy and expression of emotion over a year above children involved in other art forms. Study 2 was a qualitative study designed to determine the kinds of habits of mind taught, explicitly and implicitly, in acting classes for children (ages 8-10). The purpose of Study 2 was to determine the extent to which acting teachers strive to teach theory of mind, empathy, and adaptive emotion regulation in their acting classes. Study 2 found that children in acting classes at this age are taught about physicality and motivation, with no emphasis on empathy or emotion regulation and only a slight emphasis on theory of mind. Study 3 was parallel to Study 1, but with young adolescents, aged 13-15. Study 3 found that adolescents involved in acting classes gain in their empathy, theory of mind acuity, and expressive emotion regulation over the course of a year over and above adolescents involved in other art forms. Study 4 was parallel to Study 2, with acting classes for adolescents. Study 4 found that adolescent acting classes focus on theory of mind and motivation, without any emphasis on empathy or emotion regulation. I conclude by considering the potential impact of this research on our understanding of typical development in theory of mind, empathy, emotion regulation, and on our understanding of individuals deficient in these skills. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

A versão infantil do Teste de Ler a Mente nos Olhos (Reading the Mind in Eyes Test - Child Version ) de Simon Baron-Cohen, é composto por 28 fotografias da região dos olhos de indivíduos com diferentes expressões e tem como objetivo uma quantificação da habilidade do indivíduo em inferir estados mentais a partir de expressões faciais, sendo usualmente utilizado como um instrumento para avaliação de Teoria da Mente. Neste trabalho foi feito um estudo de validade de uma versão em português do teste, visando maiores esclarecimentos acerca de suas propriedades psicométricas. O teste foi aplicado em uma amostra controle de 434 crianças de dois estados brasileiros, São Paulo e Santa Catarina, cursando o ensino fundamental e em uma amostra clínica de 20 crianças diagnosticadas com Transtornos do Espectro do Autismo. Foram encontrados um índice de consistência interna (alfa de Cronbach) de 0,718 e variância estatisticamente significativa de acordo com o ano escolar. Não foram encontradas diferenças significativas com relação ao sexo e Estado. Não houve diferença estatisticamente significativa nos escores dos grupos controle e clínico. Os resultados foram, portanto, parcialmente favoráveis para validade de construto, mas não foram encontradas evidências de validade critério / The \"Reading the Mind in Eyes Test - Child Version\" by Simon Baron-Cohen, consists of 28 photographs of the eye region of people with different expressions and aim a quantification of the individual\'s ability to infer mental states from facial expressions, and is usually used as an instrument for assessing Theory of Mind. This paper is a study of validity of a Portuguese version of the test, seeking further clarification about its psychometric properties. The test was applied to a control group of 434 children from two Brazilian states, Sao Paulo and Santa Catarina, in elementary school and a clinical group of 20 children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders. We found an index of internal consistency (Cronbach\'s alpha) of 0.718 and statistically significant variance in accordance with the school year. There were no significant differences with regard to gender and state. There was no statistically significant difference in the scores of clinical and control groups. The results were therefore partially favorable to construct validity, but there was no evidence of criterion validity