Inaug.--Diss.--Würzburg. / Lebenslauf. "Literatur": p. [86]-88.

Thesis--Zürich.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

Socrates' daimonion [δαιμόνιον] is a very complicated issue. What the daimonion is and what roles it played in Socratic way of life are the two central and probably most difficult questions about this issue, since Plato and Xenophon provided different images of Socrates' daimonion. Still, this paper tries to list and analyze all Plato's and Xenophon's accounts concerning the daimonion in order to examine both similarities and differences between them and offer a comprehensive image of Socrates' daimonion that can answer the two central questions. In fact, these two questions are so important for Socrates' daimonion, because intrinsically they are in relation to the two charges Socrates faced: his impiety to the city-gods and his corruption of Athenian youths. No matter how distinct Plato’s description of daimonion is from Xenophon, they both attempted to defend their common teacher against the two charges. It is said that Socrates' daimonion caused the charge of his impiety, as Socrates only acknowledged his daimonion but not the city-gods that his contemporary Athenians believed in. Therefore, both Plato and Xenophon put much effort in arguing Socrates' daimonion proves his piety. Plato endeavored to demonstrate Socrates' daimonion belongs to the divine system of city-gods, while Xenophon in order to undermine the particularity of the daimonion, claimed it, other than name, has no difference from the divination that Athenians resort to. Furthermore, the accounts of Socrates' daimonion in the widely-accepted pseudo-Platonic dialogues Theages and Alcibiades I may offer a new reading of Socrates' daimonion. The daimonion seems to select those who have potential to philosophize as Socrates' interlocutors, but it cannot predict whether who will obtain benefit and when they will leave Socrates. Therefore, from a close reading of Theages and Alcibiades I, it can be shown that Alcibiades, the most notorious one of the youth whom Socrates was alleged to "corrupt", went on to his own destructive path rather than under the guidance of Socrates.

This goal of this thesis is to examine the connection between piety and the city-state according to the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues. This thesis first sets out to understand Socrates’ piety. Then, through consideration of Socrates’ discussion of piety in the city-state in the Euthyphro, the Apology, the Symposium, and the Republic, this thesis sets out to outline Socrates’ understanding of the role piety ought to play in the just city-state. Based on my reading of these dialogues, I argue that piety is, for Plato’s Socrates, a necessary component of the just city-state.

This study focuses on Plato's "problem" with Sophistry. In recent years, that "problem" has come to be understood either as Plato's disagreement with the "philosophical" doctrines of the ancient Sophists or as his unreflective condemnation of their way of life. Hegel is responsible for the first way of thinking, Nietzsche for the second. For both, the "problem" posed by the ancient Sophists was of considerable importance. It confronted Plato with the challenge that philosophy justify itself--a challenge which Plato could not fully understand and which he failed to meet. According to Hegel, the challenge posed by the Sophists cannot be met by advancing a doctrine. It can only be met dialectically. According to Nietzsche, it cannot be met at all for the Sophist is justified in his rejection of the "rules" of all philosophical discourse, including dialectical argument. After offering some historical background on the ancient Sophists, I examine Hegel's and Nietzsche's understanding of Plato's "problem" with them. My argument is that both are correct to identify the "problem" posed by the Sophists as a challenge that philosophy provide for itself a justification. I argue that Hegel is right to conclude that such a justification can only be given dialectically but that Nietzsche teaches us that it must be conducted in an ad hominem manner. Contrary to both, I argue that Plato understood this very well and that the dialogues are written in accordance with this understanding. I then focus on the drama of the Sophist in order to show that Plato fully understood the challenge posed by the ancient Sophists and that his response to it is adequate. Plato does not think that the challenge of the Sophist can be met for once and for good. For that reason, the philosophical life is justified. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

No description available.

Thesis (M.A. (Applied Ethics for Professionals))--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities, School of Social Sciences, 2015. / Plato in his dialogue the Republic designs an ideal polis, the Kallipolis, seeking ‗justice, our good and the knowledge of the good required for understanding and bringing justice, happiness and good government into our lives and society‘ (Santas 2010, p.7). The first step in the Kallipolis‘ development is a polis without formal government whose citizens live a modest, stable, sustainable lifestyle. Disparaged by Glaucon as a polis for pigs, Socrates‘ incongruous rejoinder is ‗the true polis… is the one we‘ve described, the healthy one, as it were‘ (Rep. 372e). Contemporary commentators are critical of this polis, questioning its role in the Republic. In trying to understand the polis for pigs, and Socrates‘ praise thereof, I posit it is a village, and consider it has virtue, is good and its citizens are happy. However, despite being true and healthy, it is not the best or an ideal polis, but it is crucial to the development of the Kallipolis.

archives@tulane.edu / The Platonic Socrates is renowned both for his disavowals of knowledge and for his irony, and it is often the case that both interlocutors and readers believe his disavowals to be ironic. Such a belief frequently underlies interpretations of Plato’s Meno, which take Socrates’ claim not to know at all what virtue is to be either partially or entirely untrue; either Socrates knows what virtue is or he at least knows in some respect even if he does not know its essential being, its ousia. This dissertation argues that Socrates is being honest in his claim in the Meno not to know at all what virtue is, and this means he is not able to recognize some one thing called “virtue.” This serves as a starting point for a new interpretation that examines the arguments and the drama of the dialogue as an illumination of Socrates’ perplexing disavowal of knowledge. Socrates’ claim not to know at all what virtue is shown to indicate an aporia he confronts with respect to his understanding of virtue. And this aporia, it is argued, concerns, not what virtue is but that it is. The dissertation argues further that Socrates’ aporia with respect to virtue is fundamentally woven into his uncertainty about whether knowledge is possible at all. The fundamental character of Socratic philosophy, which is practiced by investigating with others into the virtues, is thus shown to involve an investigation into the very foundation of philosophy itself. / 1 / Alexander James Shaeffer

Thesis (M.A.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Russell Dancy, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of Philosophy. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 16, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.