I examine how Plato, in his early dialogues, tries to make good on Socrates' claims, in the Apology, about the value of his philosophical life and the benefits it provides his fellow citizens. Beginning with the Apology, I analyze how Socrates tries to exhort people to take care for or tend to virtue and the state of their souls. I argue that Socrates is challenging his fellow-citizens, and Plato his readers, not only to recognize their ignorance, but also to engage in active philosophical inquiry into ethical questions. This aspect of Socrates' mission--his quest to get people to live examined, philosophical lives--is sometimes called philosophical protreptic. In subsequent chapters, I analyze the arguments that Socrates employs in engaging interlocutors in philosophy in three dialogues, the Euthydemus, Lysis, and Alcibiades I. In the Euthydemus, Socrates argues that wisdom is necessary for happiness, but he and his interlocutor discover that they neither have nor understand the wisdom they need. In the Lysis, Socrates discusses friendship and love with two youths, and though their inquiry fails, their cooperative philosophical investigation exemplifies philosophical love and friendship. Finally, in the Alcibiades I, Socrates tries to convince an ambitious young Alcibiades that true power and happiness arise from self-knowledge, and he challenges the young man to seek self-knowledge by taking up a philosophical life under Socrates' guidance. What emerges in these dialogues is a radical and compelling picture of the good life. Socrates does not believe that he or any human fully understands virtue or happiness. His investigations end inconclusively, and indeed he has little hope that he or anyone else will discover final and complete answers about virtue or happiness. Nevertheless, each dialogue demonstrates both the nature and value of philosophical enquiry. We humans are limited and ignorant, and we need to examine ethical questions together in order to live well. By drawing others into the philosophical discussion--full though it is with problems, inconclusive results, and difficulties--Socrates believes that he is both himself living the best available human life and offering the greatest benefit any human can provide to those with whom he talks.

No description available.

Inaug.-diss.--Breslau. / Vita.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / This dissertation investigates how Socrates understands his trial. It is a well-known fact that Socrates is accused of impiety and corruption of the young and is subsequently executed. Unlike an ordinary defendant who is supposed to make every effort to be acquitted, Socrates, behaving provocatively, seems even to induce the death penalty. By reading Plato's and Xenophon's works, this dissertation clarifies his thoughts on the trial that must be the basis of his conduct and explains how he achieves his aim. To deal with Socrates' view of the trial as a whole, this study examines three questions. First, does he believe in his own innocence? I argue that before and even at the trial, Socrates does not intend to prove his innocence effectively. He does not reveal his belief clearly, but at least it is clear that to be acquitted is not his primary purpose. Second, what does Socrates want to achieve at the trial? Socrates' primary purpose is to demonstrate his virtue in public. His speech that provocatively emphasizes his excellence as a benefactor of the city enables him to be convicted as a wise and noble man rather than as an impious corrupter of the young. Third, why does he refuse to escape from jail? I argue that by introducing the speech that defends the laws of the city, Socrates makes himself appear to be a supremely law-abiding citizen who is executed even when escape is possible. This study maintains that Socrates vindicates his philosophy before the ordinary people of Athens by making a strong impression of his moral excellence and utility to others. His presentation of philosophy makes it possible that being convicted and executed are compatible with appearing virtuous and being respected. Socrates promotes his posthumous reputation as a great philosopher, and thus secures the life of philosophy after his death by mitigating the popular hostility against him and philosophy as such. Socrates' understanding of his trial leads us to his idea of the nature of philosophy and the city, and of their ideal relationship. This dissertation is therefore an introduction to Socratic political philosophy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: Christopher Bruell / This study of Xenophon’s Memorabilia investigates the famous Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. Specifically, it is an attempt to understand the claim that anyone who knows what the right thing is to do, automatically chooses to do it. I concentrate on Socrates’ view of one particular virtue, namely moderation. This is both because moderation is the virtue that Xenophon’s Socrates most often identifies with knowledge, and because it is the virtue that Xenophon associates most closely with Socrates himself. The first part of the dissertation considers whether the thesis that virtue is knowledge is an accurate description of ordinary moral life. The first task is to articulate the ordinary moral outlook. I examine the presentation of this outlook in seven conversations about political ambition in Book Three of the Memorabilia. I conclude that according to Xenophon’s Socrates, the moral outlook is based on two beliefs. One belief concerns the content of the moral law. It is the belief that we are obligated to do good for others, and in the first place to be good citizens and serve our country. The second belief is that morality is good, and the greatest good, for the individual who obeys the moral law, regardless of the apparent sacrifices that it requires. This second belief seems to be the basis for the view that virtue is knowledge: obedience to the moral law is so good that anyone who knew this would automatically obey the law, and anyone who resists obeying it must be ignorant of how good it is. The moral outlook combines these two beliefs. It holds that that what is best for the political community is also best for the individual, or that the law that directs us to do good for others and the law that discloses to us what way of life is best for ourselves are the same law. This belief is so fundamental to the moral life that the question, whether what is good for the individual really coincides with what is good for the community, is not a legitimate question to raise, and it cannot be raised without departing somewhat from the ordinary moral attitude. On the other hand, once the fundamental assumption of moral life comes to light as a mere assumption, it is impossible to avoid investigating it, and to continue to assume that we know what virtue is. Accordingly, the second half of the dissertation attempts to clarify this question, by examining Xenophon’s presentation of the Socratic education in Book Four of the Memorabilia. I argue that this part of the Memorabilia does not assume that virtue is political virtue, and rather shows how Socrates investigated what virtue is without this prior assumption. The last part of the dissertation is a preliminary effort to follow Socrates’ investigation of this question. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2008. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / A translation and close study of the “myths” of the afterlife that conclude Plato’s Republic and Gorgias. This thesis attempts to understand the essential political teachings of the dialogues in question—about the definition of justice, its rightness, and its consequences—through the lens of their final stories. Glaucon and Callicles represent two responses to the apparent problem that the unjust fare better than the just. To Callicles, Socrates offers his “political art in truth” in the place of Gorgias’ “art” of rhetoric. To Glaucon, Socrates presents an orderly universe and an orderly city that seem to mirror justice in the soul. Both men require different, salutary accounts of justice from Socrates. These are not false or unphilosophic fables, but true images of τὰ ἔσχατα, of the ultimate and most extreme things—not as guides to any underworld but to the best way of life possible among living human beings. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Political Science Honors Program. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: Christopher Bruell / It is only in "erotic matters" that Plato's Socrates is wise, or so he claims at least on several occasions, and since his Socrates makes this claim, it is necessary for Plato's readers to investigate the content of Socrates' wisdom about eros. This dissertation undertakes such an investigation. Plato does not, however, make Socrates' view of eros easy to grasp. So diverse are Socrates' treatments of eros in different dialogues and even within the same dialogue that doubt may arise as to whether he has a consistent view of eros; Socrates subjects eros to relentless criticism throughout the Republic and his first speech in the Phaedrus, and then offers eros his highest praise in his second speech in the Phaedrus and a somewhat lesser praise in the Symposium. This dissertation takes the question of why Socrates treats eros in such divergent ways as its guiding thread and offers an account of the ambiguity in eros' character that renders it both blameworthy and praiseworthy in Socrates' estimation. The investigation is primarily of eros in its ordinary sense of romantic love for another human being, for Socrates' most extensive discussions of eros, those of the Phaedrus and Symposium, are primarily about romantic love. Furthermore, as this investigation makes clear, despite his references to other kinds of eros, Socrates distinguishes a precise meaning of eros, according to which eros is always love of another human being. Socrates' view of romantic love is then assessed through studies of the Republic, Phaedrus, and Symposium. These studies present a unified Socratic understanding of eros; despite their apparent differences, Socrates' treatment of eros in each dialogue confirms and supplements that of the others, each providing further insight into Socrates' complete view. In the Republic, Socrates' opposition to eros, as displayed in both his discussion of the communism of the family in book five and his account of the tyrannic soul in book nine, is traced to irrational religious beliefs to which he suggests eros is connected. Socrates then explains this connection by presenting romantic love as a source of such beliefs in the Phaedrus and Symposium. Because eros is such a source, this dissertation argues that philosophy is incompatible with eros in its precise sense, as Socrates subtly indicates even within his laudatory treatments of eros in the Phaedrus and Symposium. Thus, as a source of irrational beliefs, eros is blameworthy. Yet eros is also praiseworthy. Despite his indication that the philosopher would be free of eros in the precise sense, Socrates also argues that the experience of eros can be of great benefit in the education of a potential philosopher. Precisely as a source of irrational religious belief, the erotic experience includes a greater awareness of the longing for immortality and hence the concern with mortality that Socrates believes is characteristic of human beings, and by bringing lovers to a greater awareness of this concern, eros provides a first step towards the self-knowledge characteristic of the philosophic life. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / Unlike the vast majority of the Platonic dialogues, which feature Socrates as the primary interlocutor, the conversation depicted in Plato's Sophist is led by a Stranger from Elea. While some scholars claim that Socrates' silence throughout the majority of the dialogue and Plato's replacement of Socrates with another philosophic protagonist imply an abandonment of Plato's "earlier," Socratic concerns, careful attention to the Sophist suggests otherwise. In fact, the Sophist appears to be one of the few places in the Platonic corpus where Plato chooses to have two mature philosophers (Socrates and the Eleatic Stranger) confront each other. Plato's dramatic chronology suggests that the conversation depicted in the Sophist takes place the day after Socrates has heard the indictment against him. Thus, the Sophist is part of the series of Platonic dialogues that portray the last days of Socrates--the days leading up to his trial and execution at the hands of the Athenian multitude. At the beginning of the Sophist, Socrates playfully describes the Eleatic Stranger as a cross-examining philosopher-deity who has come to evaluate and judge his philosophical logoi. Additionally, Socrates encourages the Eleatic Stranger to explain the relationship between the philosopher and the sophistic appearance that the philosopher takes on before the ignorant multitude. Socrates remarks imply that while the Athenian demos may not have genuinely understood him, a more accurate inquest can be made by a fellow philosopher. In fact, in the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger indirectly interrogates the philosophical claims made by Socrates in a variety of other Platonic dialogues. However, the Eleatic Stranger does not simply valorize Socrates' approach to philosophy. While the Eleatic Stranger and Socrates often share similar interests, concerns and conclusions, the Eleatic Stranger is also highly critical of and offers alternatives to some of Socrates' characteristic logoi. In this way, Plato appears to stage a philosophical trial of Socrates in the Sophist--one that encourages his readers to think deeply about the true character of the philosophical life. This dissertation examines the similarities and the differences between Plato's Socrates and the Eleatic Stranger in order to shed light on Plato's own conception of the nature and limits of the philosophical life. It takes the form of a commentary on Plato's Sophist and highlights the conflicts between Socrates and the Eleatic Stranger. Special attention is paid to the Eleatic Stranger and Socrates' disagreements about philosophical methodology and philosophical ontology, both of which are highlighted by the Stranger's critical remarks about Socratic logoi. It is argued that Plato does not side either with the Eleatic Stranger or with Socrates. Instead of simply dismissing one of his philosophical protagonists, Plato encourages his readers to confront both and, thus, begin the investigation of the true nature of philosophy for themselves. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This dissertation begins with a brief literature review of contemporary scholarship about sacrifice and the <italic>Phaedo.</italic> Chapter 1 provides a description of a Greek sacrificial ritual. Drawing on recent scholarship concerning Greek sacrificial practice, I conclude that the most significant feature of animal sacrifice was that it maintained a proportion between gods and men. In a sacrifice, a proportion between gods and men was enacted and set forth that would have been deeply interwoven with the day-to-day life of the <italic>polis,</italic> Chapter 2 argues that there are many similarities between the death scene and a Greek sacrificial ritual such that the entire <italic>mise-en-scène</italic> of the death scene has "the look" of a Greek sacrificial ritual. Since a Greek sacrificial ritual enacts a proportion between gods and men that is crucial for the maintenance of the city, we should expect that the death of Socrates in the <italic>Phaedo</italic> would enact a similar proportion by providing a logos of life and death. Nevertheless, there are elements in the death scene that also suggest a rupture of sacrificial economy. Chapter 3 offers a close reading of the "second sailing" passage in the Phaedo and argues that through it Socrates provides a way of doing philosophy that both acknowl-edges the limitations of mortals while seeking to set forth an account of life and death, of generation and destruction as a whole, that is proportionate. Although the death of Socrates in the <italic>Phaedo</italic> unfolds according to sacrificial themes it is not a tragedy, for its goal is to restore a version of the archaic ratio that is now appropriate for mortals who, after Socrates' self-sacrifice, are aware of their limitations. In witnessing the <italic>Phaedo</italic> one is offered a vision of an enactment of a proportion between gods and men such as one might have witnessed at a Greek sacrificial ritual. Chapter 4 explores the discussion of the soul and its relationship to the body in the Phaedo. An examination of the section in which Socrates calls death "nothing but a separation of the soul from the body" reveals that such a logos is really disproportionate and comic. In contrast to this view of the soul, I argue that Socrates presents a <italic>logos</italic> of the soul that can act "as if" it is other than itself. In this way, the soul is able to reconsti-tute itself as proportional. Finally, the epilogue points out the differences between my interpretation of the <italic>Phaedo</italic> and Nietzsche's. While Nietzsche sees the death of Socrates as enacting a pes-simistic view of embodiment, I contend that Socrates' death--seen as a sacrifice--may be linked to a Derridean notion of triage to reveal how the ethical situation of the Phaedo is really one of vigilance without reserve rather than salvation or escape. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Plato describes a way of reasoning that comprises two complementary operations, collection and division. Collection unifies many into one while division divides one into many. In other words, while collection brings together many parts into a whole, division divides a whole into many parts. While Plato goes into some detail in his observations on collection and division, several questions remain unanswered. More specifically, the means by which collection and division operate, their product, and their relation to deductive and non-deductive reasoning are uncertain. The purpose of this study is to shed light on collection and division by defending the following thesis: collection and division define logical frameworks that underlie both deductive and non-deductive reasoning. Chapter 1 will introduce collection and division by reviewing recent literature, defining key terms, and discussing illustrations of collection and division in the dialogues. Chapter 2 will explain how collection and division define logical frameworks through three operations: seeing, naming, and placing. These operations will be discussed in terms of their relations to reasoning about wholes and parts. Chapter 3 will present four models for interpreting the logical structures that are produced by collection and division. It will present the argument that collection and division define non-hierarchical structures of overlapping parts. Chapter 4 will present the argument that collection and division define whole-part relations that underlie deductive reasoning on the one hand, and the formulation of definitions in dialogues such as the Sophist and the Statesman on the other. Chapter 5 will explore the relation between collection and division and non-deductive reasoning. It will present the argument that Meno’s definition of virtue and Euthyphro’s definition of piety are formulated using collection and division. Chapter 6 will provide a summary of key points from the preceding chapters and discuss unanswered questions and avenues for future research.