abstract: The first official history of the Great Patriotic War appeared in the Soviet Union in 1960-1965. It evolved into a six-volume set that elicited both praise and criticism from the reading public. This dissertation examines the creation of the historiographical narrative of the Great Patriotic War in the decade following de-Stalinization in 1956. The debates historians, Party and state representatives engaged in, including the responses they received from reviewers and readers, shed new light on the relationship between the government, those who wrote state-sponsored narratives, and the reading public. The narrative examined here shows the importance and value placed on the war effort, and explores how aspects of the Stalinist period were retained during the Thaw. By focusing on previously unexplored archival material, which documents debates and editorial decisions, an examination of how officials sought to control the state’s explanation of events, motivations and consequences of the war can be examined in-depth. To date, the periodization, terminology and areas of concentration that define the course of the Great Patriotic War are fixated on topics that Stalin’s war narrative favored, assigning significance to events according to Stalinist preferences rather than objective analysis. My study of the war’s historiography shows how contentious its memory became at every level, making it difficult to clearly discern who represented and opposed the party line throughout Soviet society. The author argues that the collective memory of the war, as propagated by the state, became so all-encompassing that it was often the preferred version, infiltrating individual memories and displacing or blending with personal recollections and factual documentation. Because the war touched the entire population of the Soviet Union, its story became the foundational myth of the USSR, replacing the October Revolution, and was used as a legitimizing tool by Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. Most recently, it has experienced a revival in the post-Soviet period by Vladimir Putin as a way to unify Russia and build popular support for his administration. Viewing how the public interacted with representatives of the state over the creation of the official history of the war suggests that like no other event, war compels any state, even a totalitarian state, to reexamine its foundations, historical memory, foreign and domestic policies and views on censorship. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation History 2016

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Perestroika, unlike previous attempts at economic reform, represents the beginning of a new era in post-war Soviet politics. If one were to categorize the major Soviet leaders since Stalin it would be more accurate to term Khrushchev a liberal Stalinist, Brezhnev a conservative Stalinist, and Gorbachev, may be properly classified as an anti-Stalinist. Gorbachev's accession to power represents the beginning of what might be termed post-post-Stalin reform. To illustrate the uniqueness of perestroika, this thesis is structured around a comparison of Gorbachev's economic, political, and social reforms with those of Nikita Khrushchev. A contrast with Khrushchev is necessary because it is impossible to determine the uniqueness of perestroika and to draw informed conclusions about Gorbachev unless the record of the first-post Stalin reformer is examined. Because Gorbachev and Khrushchev are both reformers, it is to be expected that they should share certain common objectives. But the similarities are far less significant than the differences. The differences between Gorbachev's and Khrushchev's approaches to reform are a function both of substantive policy differences and historical circumstance. Historical Context Khrushchev came to power at a time when the Soviet Union was weak relative to the United States. Externally, the most pressing need was for the Soviet Union to achieve military parity with the United States. Internally, Khrushchev's first years were ones of struggle for absolute leadership with other Politburo figures who had differing notions of reform. The world that Brezhnev and his successors bequeathed to Gorbachev bore little resemblance to the one which Stalin left to Khrushchev. By the time of Gorbachev's accession to power, the Soviet Union had become the military equal of the United States. Political Reform Khrushchev's main objective was to weaken the power of the bureaucracy largely in order to enhance his own personal power. Gorbachev's focus is less Stalin than it is the Stalinist system. The lack of subordination of political and economic reform to the pursuit of personal one-man rule marks perestzoika as a distinct improvement over de-Stalinization. Economic Reform In economic policy, Khrushchev followed Stalin's practice of meeting economic problems with administrative measures. Although Khrushchev made his reputation by denouncing Stalin's leadership, he did nothing to address the root of the Soviet Union's troubles—the Stalinist economic system. Perestroika is theoretically superior to de-Stalinization because Gorbachev eschews administrative tinkering in favour of economic change. Gorbachev has rediscovered the co-operative socialism and limited tolerance for free-enterprise of the 1920s. The implication of this return to 'Leninism' is an admission that the Stalinist system is a failure. CONCLUSION The essence of Khrushchev's reforms, and their subsequent failure, can be traced to his fixation with appearance over substance. For all of his 'liberal' reforms, Khrushchev is essentially a 'Stalinist' politician. Perestzoika is superior to de-Stalinization both because of historical circumstance and substantive philosophical differences. Gorbachev's return to Leninist principles effectively ends the period of reformed Stalinism. But the objective need for reform does imply its necessary success. There are many obstacles to effecting deep change in the Soviet Union, obstacles which cannot be surmounted soon. It cannot be expected that a people will cast off the habits of a lifetime. Nonetheless, Gorbachev's reforms are rigorous and potentially longlasting, as opposed to Khrushchev's 'administrative' changes which did not really address the flaws of the Soviet system. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The purposes of this study were (1) to identify the reasons for and the processes of underground communication in Russia since the seventeenth century and (2) to utilize the information to interpret the clandestine media's significance. The study concluded: (1) underground media have evolved because Russian governments have oppressed free speech; (2) dissidents have shared similarities in the methods of illicit communications; (3) whereas the earlier clandestine press tended to be either literary or political, today's samizdat is a synthesis of many varieties of dissent; (4) underground media have reflected the unique characteristics of Russian journalism; and (5) the Chronicle of Current Events is unparalleled as a news journal in the history of Russian dissent.

This Thesis attempts to be an overview of the so far achievements accomplished in the fight against the Afghani rebels and in the reconstruction and state-building in Afghanistan. The author seeks to analyse strategies applied by the Soviets during the Cold War invasion (1979- 1989) and the Western allies under the U.S. leadership in cooperation with NATO (2001- present). The paper describes tactics of the invaders in the two wars and identifies "tipping points" when the conventionally stronger invading powers had to resort to counterinsurgency tactics. The author applies counterinsurgency warfare theory presented by David Galula and others in those phases of conflicts in order to evaluate the success or failure of given strategies. The theoretical framework consists of the theory of asymmetrical conflicts, insurgency warfare and counterinsurgency theory with special focus on its implications when applied in Afghanistan. The main goal of the work is to analyse the weaknesses of the Soviet strategy and to inquire whether the Western allies are not repeating the same mistakes their Cold War counterparts committed.

During the shift from the rule of Joseph Stalin to that of Nikita Khrushchev, people in the Soviet Union witnessed dramatic political, economic, and social changes, evident even in such private aspects of life as residential home interiors. The major architectural style of Stalin's era, known as Stalin's Empire Style, was characterized by grandeur and rich embellishments. The buildings' interiors were similarly grandiose and ornate. By endorsing this kind of design, Stalin attempted to position himself as an heir of classical traditions, to encourage respect for his regime, and to signal his power. When Nikita Khrushchev became the country's leader shortly after Stalin's death in 1953, he proclaimed that "excessive decorations" were not only unnecessary, but harmful. As a result, the standardized panel buildings produced at his initiative were defined by straight, plain lines, and were devoid of literally any architectural details that were not considered functional. These changes in Soviet architecture were reflected in interior design and furnishings: the minimalist aesthetic became their defining characteristic. The purpose of this study is to gain, through examination of existing literature, new insight into why a transition to a minimalist aesthetic was happening in the 1950s and 1960s in Soviet urban interior design. To achieve this goal, the present thesis analyzes works by contemporary scholars on the subject and examines statements the Soviet government as well as Soviet architects and interior decoration specialists made regarding the state's views on architecture and interiors during the period of 1950-1960. While research has been published that explores some aspects of this stylistic transition, the present work is unique in that it identifies and focuses on three distinct reasons for the change to minimalism in Soviet urban residential interiors under Khrushchev: the deficit of apartment space, reduction of construction costs, and ideological motives.

The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze in detail the many aspects of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship as it developed from 1953 to 1970. The relationship between the two is extremely important because it provides insight into the roles of both Egypt and the Soviet Union in both the history of the Middle East and in world politics. The period from 1953 to 1970 is key in understanding the relationship between the two states because it is the period of the genesis of the relationship and a period in which both nations went through marked changes in both internal policy and their external relations.