Russian warfare is one of the most currently debated topics between military experts. Some define it as something wholly new and name it hybrid warfare. Others say that hybrid warfare is nothing but an old method brought back to life. Some experts also argue that any nation at war will use any method to win, regardless of being a defender or aggressor. One thing, however, binds these experts together—the will to understand Russian warfare.  Hybrid warfare uses both state and non-state actors together to achieve a common goal. Because of mixing these actors, it becomes hard to define further. Because of that, experts still struggle to understand Russian warfare and the use of hybrid warfare. Thus allowing Russia to continue to act within the grey area between a state of neither peace nor war.  By analysing Russia’s intervention in the ongoing conflict in Syria with Lewickis military and non-military dimensions. This study shows that Russian warfare and its actions in Syria are based more on international reputation. When there is a risk for tarnished reputation, they act through non-state actors. When there is a chance for improved reputation, they act through state actors. This study also shows that there are fundamental differences in what Russia does officially and unofficially, which is also based on international reputation.

On the 24 of February 2022 Russia launched an operation to seize control of Hostomel Airport, a few miles from Kyiv. Although Russia is the military superior state in the war with Ukraine, they failed to achieve the strategic purpose of the operation. The operation is an example of the classic, empirical puzzle of how relatively superior military actors can still lose armed conflictsagainst a weaker opponent. The aim of this study is to make a contribution to the research on asymmetric warfare, focusing on why a military stronger, state actor sometimes fails to achieve strategic victory in a conflict with another state actor. The more specific aim is to increase the understanding of why Russia, the military stronger state, did not achieve the strategic objective of the operation at Hostomel Airport in February 2022. The study was carried out as a single case study, using the method “structured, focused comparison”. Two theories were used to increase the understanding of the outcome, Warden´s theory of Air Superiority and Leonhard´s theory of Combined Arms. The results of the study shows that both Warden´s and Leonhard´s theories contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of the outcome of the operation. Russian forces lack of air superiority resulted in several consequences and frictions to the Russian assault. Russian forcescould not operate freely in the air and both the Ukrainian air defence and air force were able toaffect the Russian forces throughout the operation. One of the most important conclusions of the study was that the Russian forces lack of air superiority enabled the Ukrainian air force to bomb and destroy the runways, making them impossible to land heavy aircraft on. Russia did notimplement the principles of combined arms during most of the operation, and never at the critical moments. One consequence of this could be that the initial attack was prolonged, making it impossible for Russian reinforcements to land on the runways.