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Any military body which is essentially an irregularly raised volunteer force presents certain peculiar problems of recruitment, discipline and organisation. The resources available to a regular army to secure enlistment, discipline and supplies, were, because of its very nature, denied to the Jacobite army of 1745/6. The methods, however, by which the problems of recruitment, discipline and finance were solved by the rebel army were often to play a decisive part in the fate of the rebellion as a whole. Problems of local recruitment, and the availability of small parties of men to enforce recruiting or levy money, were often to affect the fortunes of the rebel army operating at a distance of several counties. In one sense such local activities remained isolated from the main strategy, for local recruitment was apparently much less affected by the varying fortunes of the main force than might have been expected. It is difficult to trace a discernible pattern between important military successes or reverses and local recruitment. Local recruitment, for instance, was affected primarily by the presence locally of the main force rather than by the news of military actions elsewhere. The major actions of the campaign do not appear to have had a decisive effect on recruitment, even in their own immediate neighbourhood. From, for instance, the St. Andrews district, out of a total of forty-four rebel recruits in the official "List of Persons concerned in the Rebellion," only five joined after the Jacobite victory of Prestonpans. Again, from Haddington, an area which one would also expect to reflect the action at Prestonpans, out of fifty-nine recruits, only ten joined after that battle. These statistics alone, of course, are not conclusive. The lists of named adherents are not exhaustive and precise details of time of adherence are not given in all cases. The figures do, however, serve to suggest that the factors which explain local recruitment. are complex rather than simple. Such factors are examined separately in relation to each geographical area.

Initially, this research programme investigated training methods to improve strengthrelated material handling performance in the British Army. A widely used training programme was evaluated for its effectiveness in improving material handling, and found to provide some significant but small improvements. Modifications to the training programme, including the use of a large strength-training element, were devised based on prior research evidence. The modified training programme was evaluated and compared with the original programme, and shown to be significantly more effective at improving material handling. Any means to improve the effectiveness of strength training per se would further improve the effectiveness of the modified training programme. Consequently, a potential means to improve the effectiveness of strength training via postexercise nutritional supplementation was investigated. The encouraging but not statistically significant results suggested further research to evaluate the potential of the supplementation regimen and also to better illuminate the possible mechanisms. An evaluation of the hormonal and metabolic responses to varying combinations of resistance exercise and supplementation provided little additional evidence to support the effectiveness of the supplementation regimen. However, the likely mechanism of the effect that may exist was better identified as a direct effect of insulin or amino acid availability on muscle cell growth, rather than a reduction in circulating cortisol concentration.

To maintain high levels of proficiency and readiness the U.S. Army trains its soldiers on military bases across the country. However, the Army currently possesses an insufficient amount of land with which to train on, necessitating an expansion of current bases. This paper explores the Army's land acquisition policies, using as case studies the ongoing expansions at Fort Carson in Colorado and Fort Polk in Louisiana. Fort Carson, which announced expansion plans in 2006, faced strong opposition and the project has ground to a halt. In early 2009 Fort Polk announced a 100,000-acre expansion. They have utilized a broad public outreach program and promised on numerous occasions not to use eminent domain to acquire privately-held land. As a result, the Polk expansion has proceeded much more smoothly. Using lessons learned from the pair of case studies, this paper then presents a list of best practices the Army can use for future land acquisition projects. / text

Since vegetables are of such importance in the nutrition of human beings, it is natural that they should play a large part in Army feeding. They are high in food value. The different kinds vary widely in their energy values; some-- like potatoes--are high in carbohydrates, others--like lettuce and cucumbers-- are low. Fresh or canned they are high in minerals and vitamins, low in protein and fat, and are valuable for bulk and palatability. When purchasing fresh produce it was necessary to know something of quality, appearance, and texture. Quality is made up of many characteristics-- some external, internal, chemical, and physical. Appearance is concerned with shape, color, freedom from blemishes and dirt. Texture contrasts hard or soft, smooth or granular, stringy and fibrous or free from fiber, crisp or flabby, wilted or tough. The flavor of vegetables is due to several constituents: sugar, organic acids, mineral salts, and aromatic compounds. A combination of these gives flavors that make vegetables palatable and attractive. The nutritive value of a given vegetable depends on the part of the plant to be used, as well, as the variety, climate, soil in which it is grown, conditions of storage, and preparation. The leaf, stem, flower, seed, and fruit are all edible parts. When purchasing vegetables for the Army it was well to know that the initial price was by no means the ultimate cost as there was a wide margin between the cost as purchased and edible-portion cost. Waste in preparation, storage, and losses in the cooking of highly perishable produce would cost six cents per pound as purchased and thirty cents per pound edible portion. The condition of the vegetables when delivered has a great influence on the probable yield. When purchasing canned vegetables, grades were used as purchasing guides. Samples of each grade of produce were requested for testing to find out if the product was satisfactory. The highest grade was not purchased for general use; Grade B or Standard was acceptable for the Army mess. Fresh and frozen vegetables were used largely in Army camps and fields in the United States. Canned and dehydrated products were to be used in combat areas overseas because they were easy to prepare, there was little or no waste, and the nutritive value was fairly well retained. The problem of storage was not difficult, and shipping space was saved when dehydrated food was shipped because of its lightness and lack of bulk. The Army food purchasing officer needed to be familiar with the local vegetable supply and market center facilities. A knowledge of standardizing, grading, packaging, sorting, and transporting produce was necessary in order to purchase food economically and intelligently. Because of uncertainty of crops due to curtailed planting and harvesting occasioned by labor shortages, it was difficult for producers and distributors to cooperate at all times. The Quartermaster's office arranged with local marketing centers for information on prices, substitutions, and quantities of local produce available, several days in advance, so that suitable substitutions could be made on menus if sufficient fresh vegetables were not obtainable. Inspection of all food on delivery was required, and if low grade or unsatisfactory produce was discovered it was returned to the dealers or an adjustment requested. This was done to determine whether or not supplies met the contract requirements for quality and conditions specified by the Army. / Graduation date: 1947

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Army wives throughout the United States participated in a study to evaluate the application of the triadic hypothesis of social support (Sarason, I.G., Sarason, & Pierce, 1992). The concept of social support consisted of the interaction among personality, interpersonal and situational factors with situation conceptualized as the event of relocation. The three factors were hypothesized to contribute independently to the prediction of well-being. Regression analyses revealed significant contribution from personality and interpersonal factors.

Maps -- Chapter I. The regiments and the posts -- Chapter II. Recruitment -- Chapter III. Routine at the Western posts -- Chapter IV. Rations, clothing, promotions, pay, and care of the disabled -- Chapter V. Discipline and related problems -- Chapter VI. Entertainment, moral guidance, and burial of the frontier -- Chapter VII. Conclusion -- Bibliography.