<p>Purpose: The purpose of this research is to explore the reasons behind the abolish-ment of statutory audit in small limited firms in Sweden and to discuss whether it would be beneficial for these firms to still maintain an audit of their business after the abolishment.</p><p>Method: As a major part of this research study, qualitative interviews with auditors have been conducted to obtain professional opinion in the subject of inter-est. Previous research are presented to provide a broader perspective of the debate.</p><p>Frame of Reference: The authors present an extensive background to auditing and accounting. Stakeholder model and agency theory have been applied to aid an under-standing of the relationship between a firm and its stakeholders. Experi-ences from other European Union countries are presented to provide a ba-sis of comparison and discussion. Moreover, advantages and disadvantages of auditing are presented to facilitate a discussion of whether it is beneficial to maintain an audit of small limited firms.</p><p>Conclusion: After extensive research the authors have identified and determined the most probable reasons behind the abolishment of statutory audit. The au-thors can after a broad research conclude that the central reasons behind the abolishment are the costs of auditing. Populism and politics, as well as harmonisation motives of the European Union, are also prominent reasons for the abolishment of statutory audit in small limited firms in Sweden.</p><p>Highlighting the benefits of auditing illustrates that accomplishing an assur-ance of quality is one of the most essential motives of an audit review. Au-diting may facilitate granting of loans, longer credit periods and loyalty, a credible image of the firm, as a result of business owners providing trust-worthy information to their stakeholders. It can be concluded that it is beneficial for small limited firms to maintain an audit of their business, de-spite the abolishment of statutory audit.</p> / <p>Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att utforska de bakomliggande orsakerna till revisionspliktens avskaffande i små aktiebolag i Sverige och att diskutera hu-ruvida det är fördelaktigt att behålla revision i bolagen efter slopandet.</p><p>Metod: För att erhålla en professionell åsikt kring ämnet i fråga, har denna studie till största del bestått av kvalitativa intervjuer med respondenter från revisions-byråer. Tidigare studier är även presenterade för att tillföra debatten ett bre-dare perspektiv.</p><p>Referensram: Författarna ger en omfattande beskrivning av redovisning och revision. Intressentmodellen och agentteorin har tillämpats i syfte att underlätta för-ståelsen av relationen mellan företag och dess intressenter. Erfarenheter från andra EU-länder är presenterade för att möjliggöra jämförelse och dis-kussion, dessutom beskrivs för- och nackdelar av revision för att underlätta diskussionen om huruvida det är fördelaktigt att behålla revision i små ak-tiebolag.</p><p>Slutsats: Författarna har efter omfattande forskning fastställt de troligaste orsakerna till slopandet av revisionsplikten i små aktiebolag. Sammanfattningsvis kan författarna hävda att huvudorsakerna till avskaffandet är kostnaden av att upprätthålla revision. Populism, politik och EU:s harmoniserande strävan är ytterligare framträdande anledningar till slopandet av revisionsplikt i små ak-tiebolag i Sverige.</p><p>Att erhålla en kvalitetsstämpel är den främsta fördelen med revision. Dessutom kan revisionen underlätta beviljande av lån, längre kredittider, bi-dra till ökad pålitlighet och trovärdighet av bolaget. Dessa fördelar resulterar från ägarnas pålitliga information som de förser sina intressenter med. Av-slutningsvis kan man påstå att det är gynnsamt för små aktiebolag att behål-la revision även efter slopandet.</p>

<p>Introduction: Over half of the Swedish IT-projects get delayed and more expensive than budgeted. Large corporations and governmental institutions stand before the process of investigating in new IT-systems in intervals of three to five years. In order to decrease the cost, an external consultant with large experience in IT-purchases could be used by the customers. These consultants does today work solely for the customers, helping them to find the best solution. We want to see if an external consultant instead could act as an inde-pendent moderator between the supplier and customer in the IT-systems lifecycle.</p><p>Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze problems and possible solutions related to the involvement of third party consultants in larger IT-projects. In particular, we will investigate when and where in the project cycle it could be beneficial to use an independent moderator.</p><p>Method: We have conducted semi-structured interviews with six organizations to get an understanding about consultants in IT-projects. Four of the interviewed were IT-managers at organizations were large IT-systems are bought and implemented. Then, two of the in-terviewed represented the supplier companies that sell large IT-systems.</p><p>Frame of reference: Transaction cost theory and agency theory has been used. Transac-tion cost theory is a theory on whether you should conduct the service internally or purchase it from external firms. Agency theory describes problems in the relationship between a principal and an agent. The agent has a diversified interest towards the principal. In our case, the agent is a consultant.</p><p>Conclusion: The implementation phase benefits from using an external moderator who monitors what the customer needs, and then in a continuous interval measures if the project is aligning towards the stated goal. This can lower the failure of information and identify problem areas early and thereby prevent costly adjustments later in the project. An in-dependent moderator with a high degree of routine and specific knowledge could enhance communication, create a better fit of the implemented system and foresee opportunistic advices from suppliers. In the pre-study phase there are benefits for the customer with evaluating the need, stating specific demands and define a clear goal.</p>

<p>The Enron collapse in 2001 has resulted in an increasing attention to corporate governance. Even in Sweden, some scandals have occurred, for example Skandia, ABB, Trustor; a parallel could be drawn, implying that these scandals have resulted in increased attention to corporate governance. Corporate governance concerns the relationship between a corporation’s management, board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The problems with the relationship between managers and share-holders are referred to as the principle-agent problem. The increase in corporate governance disclosure can be seen as a way by the corporations to regain the trust from the shareholders. Can agency theory be used to explain why some corporation disclose more corporate governance information than others?</p><p>The purpose with this master thesis is, with starting point in agency theory, to contribute to the understanding of which factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information in the annual reports.</p><p>For this thesis, a quantitative research has been performed. Annual reports from corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange have been examined, to be able to develop a corporate governance disclosure index and to measure 15 characteristics, derived from the agency theory and two control variables. The data was analysed in SPSS , using both linear and multiple regressions.</p><p>The analysis showed that role duality actually measured if a corporation had a foreign parent company and corporations listed on the O-list other on Stockholm Stock Exchange served as proxies for smaller corporations. Therefore, it was possible to con-clude that corporations were influenced by the origin of the parent company and the size of the corporation to disclose corporate governance information. Another conclusion was that corporate governance characteristics derived from agency theory is not appropriate when trying to find factors that influence corporations to disclose corporate governance information. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is inappropriate to take the starting point in the agency theory.</p>

Univ., Diss.--Wageningen, 2006. / Zsfassung in niederländ. Sprache.

Wirtschaftswiss. Fakultät der Humboldt-Univ., Diss.--Berlin, 2006. / Zsfassung in dt. Sprache.

Wiss. Hochschule für Unternehmensführung, Diss--Koblenz, 2006.

This study examines the existence of pay-performance sensitivity in total compensation and bonus during the financial crisis, using data between 2007-2010 from Swedish 196 listed firms. We perform panel data regression analysis of CEO compensation on financial performance measured as stock returns. Our results indicate that there is, although not significant, a weak positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance during 2007-2010. However during 2009-2010 in a market state defined as post-crisis we find weak negative pay-performance sensitivity at a significance level of 10 %. Nevertheless, as regards to the bonus paid to executives there was a significantly positive relationship relative bonus % and firm performance. These results contribute to our understanding of the pay-performance sensitivity in times of financial disturbance, highly relevant to the existing debate considering CEO compensation.

Organizations are increasingly focusing on their value chain activities in an effort to improve their performance, especially in the recent economic times. Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of their channel activities has become a focal point for many organizations. Interorganizational systems (IOS’s) have played an important part in this effort. While in theory, IOS’s have the ability to enhance the degree of cooperation and coordination between two channel partners, often the results obtained are not what is expected. Hence, it becomes very important to understand the barriers to the assimilation of these technologies. Drawing upon theoretical perspectives of governance, including transaction cost analysis (TCA), control theory and agency theory, we develop an integrative model that examines the factors that influence an organizations assimilation process. The model identifies and examines three stages of assimilation: technological, exploitive and explorative assimilation that add value to an organization. The model features asset specificity, technological uncertainty, performance documentation, agent orientation and bilateral governance mechanisms as antecedents to assimilation. It also examines the moderating effects of bilateral mechanisms. Our results suggest that theories of governance provide an additional lens to examine assimilation phenomena. In specific, our empirical analysis leads to several key findings: (1) channel partners who are locked in to the relationship with high levels of asset specificity are more likely to assimilate the technology; (2) bilateral governance mechanisms are a key force in the assimilation process, with both direct and moderated effects; (3) organizations that view the channel partner as an agent of the firm are less likely to adopt the technology, especially when the relationship exhibits low levels of bilateral governance mechanisms. Together these findings provide new insights into barriers to the assimilation of IOS’s in channel relationships.

<p>This literature study aims to identify international best practice concerning the role of the board and more particularly that of the independent director in ensuring good corporate governance. The study is based on sources which include a large contingent of up to date sources on the subject ranging from newspaper articles, journal articles, various corporate governance codes, company reports and reports on governance such as Cadbury and Higgs.</p>

Agency theory is one of the principal frameworks utilized in explaining the family business phenomena. The objectives of this dissertation are to (1) identify the unique agent-principal dynamics that differentiate family firms from non-family firms, (2) determine the effects of these unique agency dynamics on family firm performance, and (3) evaluate these unique agency dynamics within family businesses, as moderated by differing forms of governance and management practices.This dissertation proposes that family firms are defined by two unique and opposing agency dynamics. On one hand, it is posited that family firms are defined by their ability to deploy concomitant forms of relational governance that reduce information asymmetry and associated agency costs. On the other hand, it is posited that family firms are distinctly encumbered with agency costs from non-economic family oriented goals. These distinct agency cost-savings, termed as family gains, and agency costs, termed as family costs, contribute to the study on how and why family firms perform differently than non-family firms.In addition, the study proposes that the ensuing trade-off between family gains and family costs may lead to competitive advantages for family firms in highly competitive environments. This agency trade-off provides a link between agency theory and the resource-based perspective of the family firm.Finally, this dissertation seeks to investigate these agency dynamics among family firms that employ differing governance and management practices. In particular, this study looks at how the agency dynamics of family firms that employ the most concentrated forms of management and governance, manifested as owner-manager led family firms, compare against other forms of family firms. This study posits that manager led family firms, on one hand, have greater family gains and, on the other hand, have greater family costs when compared against other forms of family firms. Moreover, it is proposed that under highly competitive environments, the trade-off between family gains and family costs lead to greater competitive advantages for owner-manager led family firms over other family firms.This dissertation employs cross-sectional linear regression as the primary tool for empirical analysis on Australian business data. In addition, non-parametric testing is utilized to support the above analysis. These analyses are complemented by proper robustness checks to support the study’s validity.The results from empirical analysis corroborate this study’s propositions. First, the research suggests that family firms have family gains driven by lower information asymmetries, but have family costs driven by greater divergence in firm objectives. Second, the results indicate that family firms outperform non-family firms, which is consistent with extant family business literature. Likewise, the results suggest that family firms under managerial ownership have greater family gains and greater family costs than other