Bakgrund: Svenska företag har visat sig vara bland de bästa i världen på hållbarhetsredovisning. Tidigare studier har försökt hitta förklaringsfaktorer för att definiera vilka faktorer som ökar den mängd hållbarhetsupplysningar företag rapporterar frivilligt. Ägarstrukturens påverkan på hållbarhetsredovisning är ett relativt outforskat område och ska därför förklaras i den här studien.   Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att genom en kvantitativ metod förklara hur ägarstrukturer påverkar hållbarhetsredovisning hos Large-Cap- och Mid-Cap företag noterade på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm.     Metod: Ämnet har testats utifrån skapandet av hypoteser och empiriska observationer. En innehållsanalys har gjorts genom granskning av 173 företags års- och hållbarhetsredovisningar, noterade på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Hållbarhetsredovisningen har studerat dels utifrån det ekonomiska perspektivet och dels utifrån det miljö och samhällsmässiga perspektivet.   Resultat/slutsats: Utifrån vår analys av de olika ägarstrukturerna och deras påverkan på hållbarhetsredovisning har slutsatsen blivit att det inte finns något större samband mellan de två.   Bidrag/framtida forskning: Ägarstrukturens förklaringsgrad visade sig vara låg då få signifikanta samband fanns mellan ägarstrukturer och hur de redovisar hållbarhet. Framtida forskningsförslag är att genom en kvalitativ och kvantitativ metod jämföra skillnader gällande hållbarhet som företag redovisar och deras faktiska hållbarhetsaktivitet.

Corporate governance is a highly discussed topic in financial circles. Recent corporate failures have triggered regulatory reforms where the internal audit was given a stronger position. However, this regulatory evolution also brought challenges to internal audit activity. The growing demands and pressure from stakeholders have placed internal auditors in a difficult position of having to serve several stakeholders and sometimes inconsistent ones with different agendas. That is why the aim of this thesis was to examine how regulations have impacted the internal audit within financial institutions with a special focus on internal auditors’ relations with their stakeholders. In order to achieve the aims of this study, qualitative interviews were conducted as they were considered most suitable in order to uncover a deeper meaning and significance regarding the topic. The findings in this study indicate that internal auditing activity within financial institutions faces a multitude of challenges. Beyond having to deal with traditional duties, these institutions now have to incorporate mandatory audits from regulators within their scope of practise as well. This steers them in a direction where they have to satisfy the needs of yet another stakeholder.

This research is the result of the author’s quest to answer the question whether Corporate Governance is effective in Emerging Markets. Literature on Corporate Governance in the emerging markets of Latin America is limited mostly due to the relatively slower development of capital markets and the late adoption of corporate governance principles. Corporate Governance laws, which largely follow Sarbanes Oxley guidelines, were published and implemented in the mid 00´s and no research has checked their impact on corporate value in Latin America. This research reports compromises two empirical projects. The first project focused on the relationship between boards of directors attributes such size and composition, Corporate Governance law and firm value for Colombia. The second project focused on another Corporate Governance variable, CEO Duality and tested whether it has had any impact in Mexico. This second project also studied whether board attributes such as size and composition and Corporate Governance law were related to firm value. Based on the listed companies from Colombia and Mexico for the years 2001 to 2012 the author found no relationship between board size or composition and firm value. Results from Mexico, where CEO duality is allowed showed that it has no relationship with firm value. These results do not support or contradict either Agency theory or stewardship theory. Results on the impact of the adoption of a Corporate Governance law in firm value are mixed. Results for Colombia contradict previous literature by reporting a positive relationship between Corporate Governance laws and firm results while results from Mexico support previous research by reporting no relationship between these variables. This research is valuable for regulators and policy makers in their quest to assess the impact of the adoption of Corporate Governance laws in emerging markets. . Since effective Corporate Governance is important in easier access to financing it is important for shareholders to know which Corporate Governance mechanisms are positively related to firm value. Similarly, it is also important for investors (both foreign and local) in assessing the risk for equity investments in Colombia and Mexico.

Les scandales financiers des années 2000 ont mis en exergue les dysfonctionnements du gouvernement de l'entreprise. Il a été opéré une remise en cause de la capacité de processus de la gouvernance de l'entreprise actuelle à agir de manière cohérente et à gérer au mieux les conflits et les intérêts de toutes les parties prenantes. L'audit légal est apparu comme un des moyens de régulation du comportement des acteurs dans un cadre théorique de l'agence. L'audit légal joue un rôle central dans la gouvernance de l'entreprise en raison de l'asymétrie d'information existant entre actionnaires et dirigeants. L'objet de cette étude est de comprendre quelles sont les pratiques des commissaires aux comptes qui auditent les sociétés cotées en France. A cette fin une étude descriptive des pratiques a été adoptée. La mise en œuvre d'un nouveau cadre réglementaire et législatif semble avoir un impact sur ces pratiques. L'introduction d'un contrôle de la profession par le Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes (H3C) apparaissait pouvoir modifier les pratiques de travail des commissaires aux comptes. Ce travail met en lumière que les commissaires aux comptes peuvent être regroupés en trois groupes : les adaptatifs, les coopétitifs et les généralistes. Par ailleurs, il révèle que les commissaires aux comptes tiennent compte dans leurs pratiques de travail du réseau professionnel, de la constitution des équipes, du knowledge management et de la formation technique. / The financial scandals of the 2000s have brought out many of the corporate governance's malfunctions. The capacity of the present-day corporate governance's process to a better management of all stakeholders' conflicts and interests was called into question. Audit has appeared as one of the means to regulate the operators' performance within the theoretical framework of the agency. Audit plays a causal role in corporate governance due to the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. The aim of this study is to understand what the practices of the auditors auditing listed companies in France are. A descriptive study of the practices was implemented to this end. The implementation of a new regulatory and legislative framework appears to have an impact on these practices. The introduction of a control of the profession by the Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes (H3C) appeared to be able to change the auditors' working practices. This work highlights the auditors' possible division into three clusters: the adaptives, the coopetitors and the generalizing. Moreover, it reveals that the auditors take into account the professional network, the setting up of teams, the knowledge management and the technical training within their work practices.

This dissertation addresses the question of effective delegation, exploring it through the concept of managerial discretion (i.e., a latitude of managerial actions, which lie in the zone of shareholders’ acceptance). While the corporate governance perspective on managerial discretion focuses mainly on the costs associated with delegation, the strategic management perspective emphasizes its benefits in creating value for the firm. Building on research in corporate governance and strategic management, this dissertation develops and empirically tests a theoretical framework that explains how the two distinct dimensions of managerial discretion jointly influence organizational outcomes. The proposed framework illuminates the importance of balance between the restraining and enabling decisions undertaken by professional managers. This dissertation makes a two-fold contribution to the field of corporate governance. First, it identifies and explains organizational and environmental forces that jointly shape strategic and governance dimensions of managerial discretion, redefining the concept. Second, it conceptually and empirically explores an integrative model of managerial discretion within the broader corporate governance framework, providing evidence of the joint effects of governance and strategic dimensions of discretion on organizational outcomes. The results suggest that the effect of governance dimension of managerial discretion on a firm’s performance is contingent on the strategic dimension of discretion. This draws attention to potential strategic implications of board monitoring over managerial decision making. While the majority of studies emphasize the benefits of increased control over managerial decision making, particularly stressing board monitoring, this dissertation also considers the benefits of delegation for firms’ strategic development. By reversing the polarity of the current emphasis on disciplining managers, this dissertation provides a more balanced view of the notion of corporate governance. The value of this approach derives from the integrated model, which highlights the benefits and the costs of delegation.

Cette thèse étudie l’impact de la composition du conseil d’administration sur la performance financière d’une entreprise. Elle est composée de trois chapitres. Dans le premier chapitre, nous effectuons une revue de la littérature sur les conseils d’administration. Nous pointons l’évolution de la gouvernance des entreprises au cours des dernières décennies, et montrons en quoi l’efficacité des conseils d’administration est devenue un sujet majeur de ce champ de recherche et une préoccupation importante des actionnaires et des régulateurs. En particulier, après avoir présenté le cadre théorique de la gouvernance, nous présentons les résultats des articles académiques étudiant l’impact de la composition du conseil d’administration sur la performance de l’entreprise. Dans les deuxième et troisième chapitres, nous étudions l’impact de la présence de différents types d’administrateurs au sein du conseil. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous proposons un modèle théorique pour tenter de comprendre et de déterminer l’impact de la représentation salariale au conseil d’administration sur la valeur actionnariale de l’entreprise et sur l’horizon de ses investissements. Nos résultats suggèrent que la représentation salariale peut s’envisager comme un choix, pour les actionnaires, entre liquidité et information. Nous montrons que lorsque des représentants des salariés siègent au conseil d’administration d’une entreprise, celle-ci a une plus grande probabilité d’investir dans des projets à long-terme qu’une entreprise sans représentation salariale. Nous montrons également que les salariés ayant accès à une information interne précieuse, leur présence au conseil d’administration peut permettre d’augmenter la valeur actionnariale de l’entreprise. Ainsi, nous proposons un modèle de la représentation salariale cohérent avec certaines études empiriques. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous étudions empiriquement l’impact des connexions politiques sur le taux d’intérêt d’emprunts bancaires en utilisant un échantillon de prêts concernant des entreprises de plusieurs pays. Si ce sujet a déjà été largement traité, nous proposons une nouvelle définition de la connexion politique que nous subdivisons en deux catégories, selon l’exposition médiatique, forte ou faible, des politiciens. Les politiciens les plus en vue sont aussi ceux pour lesquels le risque d’être soupçonné de conflit d’intérêt ou de manquement à l’éthique est le plus important, et pour qui le coût d’un scandale est le plus élevé. Aussi discriminons-nous les connexions politiques selon qu’elles impliquent des politiciens très en vue ou des politiciens à un niveau inférieur. Cette division se fonde sur l’hypothèse que les politiciens les plus exposés sont, ayant le plus à perdre d’un scandale, disposent de la marge de manœuvre la plus réduite en tant que dirigeants d’entreprise et sont donc les moins à même d’impacter la performance de l’entreprise. Nos résultats confortent la pertinence d’une telle redéfinition de la connexion politique en fonction de la visibilité des politiciens concernés. Nous montrons en particulier que les entreprises politiquement connectées qui empruntent auprès de banques politiquement connectées le font à des taux significativement inférieurs à celles non connectées, et que cet effet est plus important lorsque la connexion de l’emprunteur passe par un politicien moins exposé. Nos résultats suggèrent que l’effet est encore plus fort si la banque est elle aussi connectée par l’intermédiaire d’un politicien moins exposé. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que les entreprises connectées politiquement empruntent significativement moins auprès de banques connectées par l’intermédiaire d’un politicien très exposé médiatiquement. Nos résultats suggèrent enfin que cet effet est plus fort à l’approche d’élections, un moment il est particulièrement coûteux pour un politicien d’être soupçonné de manquement à la déontologie. / This thesis studies the impact of the composition of the board of directors on the firm financial performance. It consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, we review the literature on boards of directors. We show the evolution of corporate governance over the past decades, and how the efficiency of boards of directors has became a key issue for shareholders and regulators. After describing the theoretical and historical framework, we present and discuss the academic papers studying the impact of board composition on the firm performance. In the second and third chapters, we examine the impact of the presence of different directors on the board. In the second chapter, we provide a theoretical model that aims at understanding and determining the impact of employee representation on the board of directors on the shareholder value of the firm and on its investment horizon. Our results suggest that with employee representation, shareholders face a tradeoff between liquidity and information. We show that a firm with employee representation is more likely to invest in long-term rather than in short-term projects and that, because employees have access to valuable inside information, their presence on the board may increase the shareholder value. Consistent with some empirical studies, we offer some theoretical support for employee representation on the board. In the third chapter, we study the impact of political connections on the rate of interest of bank loans. We conduct a cross-country study of the impact of political connections on bank loans interest rates. While this topic has already been widely investigated, we offer a new definition of political connection. We subcategorize political connections into two categories: politicians with a high media exposure, and lower level politicians. Politicians with business ties bear the risk of being suspected of ethics breaching or of having conflicting interests, which can be costly for their reputation. We discriminate the political connections of firms based on the idea that with greater exposure comes greater risk of suspicion, and thus smaller ability to impact the firm performance. We study the impact of political connection of the borrower as well as of the lender on interest rates. Our results give support to our definition, as we find significant differences depending on the level of visibility of the political connections of the borrower and of the lender. Our results show that politically connected firms which borrow from politically connected banks enjoy a significantly lower rate if they are connected with lower level politicians. Our results suggest that the rate is even lower if the bank also is connected with lower level politicians. Furthermore, our results suggest that politically connected firms tend to avoid borrowing money from banks that are connected with top politicians. Our results also suggest that this effect is stronger in pre-election periods, when the potential cost for politicians of being suspected of collusion is higher.

This thesis examines short- and long-term decision making, CEO-remuneration and its effects on company performance measured as return on assets during a time-period containing market up- and downturns with regards to company resilience. We examined this in a Swedish context by looking at listed companies on the Stockholm stock exchange during the period 2004 to 2014. The research was conducted using a multiple regression analysis to capture relationships between the dependent variable, the independent- and control variables over the observed time-period. We measure short-term action as decreases in R&D-spending, CapEx and number of employees, that can create short-term profits, whilst long-term actions is the opposite which are expected to generate a high level of company performance in the long run. In our observed population we find that companies who balance short- and long-term actions have a higher company performance, thus deviating from previous research. We also find that an increase in CEO-remuneration will not yield higher company performance when regarding firm size. The results of the study indicate that the companies in our sample have a goal alignment between the CEO and owners, although it shows tendencies of risk adversity in decision making. We find there is a more complex relationship between decision making, the CEO, and company performance than first expected.

The issues surrounding sustainability continues to be at the forefront of the human agenda and firms are increasingly being held accountable by their stakeholders to assist in bringing about sustainability. Despite this, there is a tension surrounding the role of firms and the benefits implementing sustainability practices and policies has for these actors. On the one hand, being sustainable underpinned by a strong CSR-oriented governance board with the right compositional factors results in superior firm performance. On the other hand, sustainability is suggested to increase costs and reduced competitiveness thereby reducing firm performance. These contrasting results supported by mixed scholarly findings concerning different mediating factors influencing the overarching relationship creates a confusion gap that warrants this current study. As such, the study’s purpose is to investigate the relationship between two distinct yet interrelated relationships, the impact of board of directors’ composition on CSR performance measured by ESG scores and the impact of CSR performance on firm performance so as to contribute to the debate on these notion that continues to plague academia and the pragmatic world. This study is realized through a quantitative archival-longitudinal study design underpinned by metaphysical assumptions. Regression analyses using panel data on a sample of 123 listed companies headquartered in the Nordic Countries for the period 2010-2018 is undertaken to analyze the potential relation between CSR performance and five board composition factors, specially the gender diversity, independence, size, frequency of meetings and the presence of CSR committee. The association between CSR performance and firm performance is investigated in a similar way. Under rigorous statistical testing and analysis, the results indicate that there potentially is a relation between board composition and firms’ ESG performance. The results derived from the relationship between CSR and firm performance is inconsistent and cannot be fully accepted. This study contributes theoretically to CSR, corporate governance and finance literature by expanding upon how these three notions are linked in light of the sustainability trend that is gripping modern society. Socially, this research is useful for providing empirical evidence on the value of strong governance structures so as to foster sustainability and encourage debate on its value. Pragmatically, our study suggests what board composition factors are most conducive for supporting CSR that may assist firms’ corporate governance structuring and focus.

This study investigates the relationship between corporate sustainability and dividend policy in the Nordic countries. In the field of finance, the importance of corporate sustainability is growing, particularly in the Nordic countries, which excel in global sustainability rankings. In response to this occurrence many firms are increasingly incorporating sustainability into their operations, which in turn might affect the strategic decisions of these firms. One of these is the dividend policy decision. Dividend policy in the form of cash dividends is a central concept in finance and is affected by conservation of capital and time value of money. The purpose of this study is to clarify the relationship between sustainability and dividend policy, which the authors have done by including different theoretical arguments. These are grounded in the agency theory, the signaling theory and the stakeholder theory. Previous research such as Benlemlih (2019) has examined the relationship between sustainability and dividends, but not in the same regional setting. ESG is used as a proxy for sustainability, while two proxies are used for dividend policy; dividend payout ratio and dividend yield. Through a quantitative approach information is collected on the ESG score and dividend data using the Thomson Reuters Eikon database and then analyzed using regression analysis. The data spans over 10 years (2008-2018) and covers 117 firms with available ESG and dividend payout data.  The findings indicate that there is a significant relationship between the ESG score and the dividend payout ratio of Nordic firms, while the dividend yield has no relationship with the ESG score. As both measurements had positive coefficients, the authors determined that there is a positive relationship between sustainability and dividend policy. Based on the findings, the excess liquidity hypothesis was dismissed, while the authors concluded that there was support for and against the overinvesting hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. The authors believe one possible explanation for these mixed results could be due to the regional setting, as it differs from the settings of previous studies. By illustrating the relationship between corporate sustainability and dividend policy, this study could be of interest to large and medium sized firms in the Nordic countries that use business strategies involving ESG practices or consider implementing such strategies. Similarly, it could be used by investors that use ESG-screening as a decision criterion when investing.

Neste estudo, os conceitos e mecanismos da governança empresarial foram revisados para identificar os instrumentos e elementos que possibilitam seu efetivo exercício aos responsáveis pela determinação dos rumos das empresas. Apoiados na constatação de que não existe governança sem controle e que a mesma depende da estruturação de um quadro completo de avaliação do desempenho que permita monitorar não apenas a gestão dos recursos como também os riscos associados, como os de agenciamento. Assim, emerge a necessidade de garantir a independência e isenção dessa avaliação, o que demanda a existência de um órgão especializado e unificado para realizar tal controle, independente das demais unidades com tarefas de caráter executivo. A atribuição desse órgão seria avaliar e controlar as diversas divisões da empresa e servir como instrumento de apoio e conexão, tanto à atividade de gerir, como de controlar e reportar o desempenho vinculado ao risco desses gestores. Demonstra-se que tais atribuições possuem identificação com as funções primordiais da Área de Controladoria, cujo sistema contábil-financeiro de informações é instrumento poderoso e insubstituível no rastreamento e identificação do processo de criação e erosão do valor da empresa por meio das diversas unidades das organizações. Conclui-se que a Controladoria deve ser reformulada para incorporar novas métricas e procedimentos de monitoração do desempenho vinculado ao risco. Desse modo, é proposta uma nova posição da Área na estrutura empresarial, que garanta independência a seu titular por meio do reporte simultâneo ao principal executivo e ao Conselho de Administração e, por extensão, aos acionistas/proprietários. / This dissertation revise concepts and mechanisms of corporate governance, to identify which are the elements and instruments that make it possible to the responsible ones, to determine the corporation?s lines of direction, its effective action. From the evidence that there is no governance without control, and that it depends, therefore, on the structuring of a complete performance evaluation chart allowing to monitor not only the management of resources, but also the linked risks, among them the agency risk, it emerges the need of guaranteeing the independence and the exemption of such evaluation, which requires the existence of a unified and specialized organ to manage this control independently of the remaining units, that carry executive tasks out. This organ should evaluate and control the several divisions of the corporation and work as an instrument of support and connection, not only to the management activity, but also to the activity of controlling and reporting the performance bounded, to these manager?s risk. Evidence is given that such attributions are identified with the primordial functions of the Controlling Area, whose accounting-financial system is a powerful and non-replaceable instrument to track and identify the creation and erosion process of the corporation value through the several units of the organizations. It is, therefore, concluded that the Control Area should be reformulated in a way to incorporate new measures and procedures for monitoring performance linked to risks and it is proposed a new position of the said Area in the entrepreneurial structure, thus guaranteeing independence to its head through a simultaneous reporting to the main executive of the Board, and by extension, to the shareholders/owners.