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Promotion to partner has always been a future goal for auditors, still becoming a partner is not an easy task, and it has many requirements, and since the audit profession is a sensitive profession and it concern everyone in the society, and since partners are the most important capital that audit firms have, so that is why we thought it is very important to investigate how this position can be reached?This research has a qualitative methodology and has interviews and internal documents as research strategy. The research consist of 7 interviews varied between authorized auditors who are still working in auditing firms or left it before becoming partners, partners and HR, the interviews were performed personally via phone or face to face.The findings are based on semi structured interviews and internal documents. There is significant effect between profitability and promotion to partner beside many more aspects such as Reputation, personal characteristics, promotion systems, personal branding, overtime, industry specialized, education and gender, but being profitable was the most important one.

A presente dissertação parte de uma análise dos principais corpos regulatórios nacionais e internacionais da governança corporativa para buscar os traços essenciais que caracterizam tal sistema. Uma vez identificados os traços essenciais a partir dos elementos regulatórios, passa o texto a analisar os elementos caracterizadores da governança corporativa por meio das principais disposições doutrinárias sobre o tema. Após estabelecido um conceito funcional de governança corporativa, busca-se compreender as bases econômicas que originaram e auxiliaram no desenvolvimento do sistema da governança corporativa. A partir deste ponto são levantadas as principais Indagações acerca do funcionamento do mercado em um ambiente de informações assimétricas, ressaltando-se o impacto advindo dos agency costs. Finalmente, após levantados os problemas relacionados à assimetria de informação, essencialmente focados no agency problem, se propõe a dissertação a vincular o desenvolvimento do sistema da governança corporativa à mitigação dos problemas de assimetria de informação. / The present work starts from an analysis of the main national and international regulatory provisions in connection to corporate governance searching for the essential traces that characterize such system. Once the essential traces are identified by means of the regulatory elements, the dissertation moves on to analyze the characterizing elements of corporate governance through the main academic considerations on the subject. After a concept of corporate governance is reached, the intent of the works shifts to comprehending the economic basis that have originated and further developed the corporate governance system. From this point forward, the dissertation addresses the main questions on the working of markets under asymmetric information, mainly taking into consideration the impacts arising from the agency costs. Finally, after the problems related to asymmetric information are addressed, basically related to agency problems, the work deals with the objective of bonding the development of the corporate governance system with the reduction of the problems arising from asymmetric information.

Deux types de motivations ont été identifié liées au comportement de surinvestissement : le conflit d’agence (Jensen, 1986) et la surconfiance (Heaton, 2002). Si la littérature sur le lien entre surconfiance et surinvestissement examine une de ces motivations, au sujet de surinvestissement liées au problème d’agence, la littérature existante se concentre sur les caractéristiques financières des entreprises et mécanismes de contrôle pour expliquer le phénomène. Cependant, ces facteurs n’influencent l’acte de surinvestir qu’indirectement, via l’opportunité de surinvestir. En nous appuyant sur la littérature, nous pouvons établir que la culture influence l’opportunité de surinvestir selon l’environnement institutionnel dans lequel s’inscrit l’entreprise et certaines techniques utilisées pour atténuer le surinvestissement au niveau de l’entreprise. Nous avançons que la culture exerce une influence plus directe sur le surinvestissement, en affectant les décisions des gestionnaires de passer de l’opportunité à l’acte de surinvestir. Pour empiriquement vérifier notre proposition nous avons construit un échantillon de 1 550 sociétés surinvestisseur potentielles, qui sont cotées et ne sont pas engagé dans le secteur financier, de 36 pays pour la période comprise entre 2001 et 2011. Nous trouvons qu’un haut niveau de Masculinité et l’Évitement-Incertitude conduisent à un surinvestissement exacerbé. Nous considérons que nos résultats accroissent notre compréhension des facteurs comportementales de surinvestissement, et soutiennent dans une certaine mesure la vue que la théorie de l’agence n’est pas entièrement transférable entre les cultures. / Two behavioral motivations have been identified for overinvestment: agency conflict (Jensen, 1986) and overconfidence (Heaton, 2002). While the literature on overconfidence and overinvestment studies one of these motivations, with regards to agency related overinvestment, extant literature tends to focus on financial characteristics and control mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. However, such factors influence the act of overinvestment only indirectly through affecting the opportunity to overinvest. Based on literature we can establish that culture influences the opportunity to overinvest through the institutional environment in which the company operates, and the cultural influence on some of the techniques used to mitigate overinvestment at the company level. We posit that culture exerts a more direct influence on overinvestment in affecting management’s decisions to move from the opportunity to the act of overinvestment in capital expenditures. To empirically verify our assertion we construct a sample of 1,550 quoted, non-financial, potential overinvestor firms from 36 countries for the period between 2001 and 2011. We find that higher masculinity and uncertainty avoidance in a culture leads to more overinvestment. We believe that our findings, besides advancing understanding of the behavioral drivers of overinvestment, lend support to those who question the cross-cultural transferability of agency theory.

Magister Commercii - MCom / This literature study aims to identify international best practice concerning the role of the board and more particularly that of the independent director in ensuring good corporate governance. The study is based on sources which include a large contingent of up to date sources on the subject ranging from newspaper articles, journal articles, various corporate governance codes, company reports and reports on governance such as Cadbury and Higgs. / South Africa