In today's fast-paced, hyper-mediated society, the ability to balance accuracy and efficiency is essential. Media literacy educational programs have arisen to meet this need and proliferated in recent years. Although the practice of media literacy is thriving, its underlying mechanisms are poorly understood and evidence of effectiveness is mixed (e.g., Bergsma & Carney, 2008). A social psychological perspective has the potential to illuminate previously overlooked variables and inform research and practice in this growing field. In particular, whereas media literacy efforts typically emphasize thorough processing of media messages, dual-process theories of persuasion (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) suggest this is not always realistic. When motivation or ability is compromised, individuals default to a low-effort processing mode, relying on peripheral cues or heuristics rather than carefully evaluating message arguments. In this mode, media messages can persuade unconsciously. Using a dual-process approach, the present research investigated how specific barriers to motivation (perceptions of personal invulnerability) and processing ability (emotion-based advertising, environmental distractions) influence the processes of media literacy. Participants (N = 882) were randomly assigned to 16 conditions in a 2 [vulnerability: demonstrated, control] x 2 [distractions: present, absent] x 2(2) [ad type: informational, emotional; two replicates of each type] between-subjects nested design. The vulnerability manipulation increased distrust in the target ads and reduced their persuasiveness, not through the hypothesized mechanism of heightened perceptions of vulnerability, but mediated by increased counterarguing. Relative to informational ads, emotional ads were judged more persuasive, attractive, similar to personal experience, and elicited greater identification. However, they were also rated less trustworthy than informational ads, suggesting emotional advertising largely bypasses logical decision-making processes. Distraction reduced counterarguing only among those who found the ad relatively unpersuasive. The results of this research highlight the central role of trust in media literacy processes. Although individuals recognize and distrust emotional forms of advertising, they are nonetheless persuaded by such appeals. Given the sophistication of contemporary advertising techniques and the ubiquity of distractions, the present research suggests new approaches to media literacy are needed, specifically tailored to decision-making under these more realistic media-use conditions.

The present study is the first in literature to empirically test how both two dimensions of self-esteem—self-respect and self-efficacy—moderate the third-person perception of thin-ideal images in the mass media. Respondents who were high in self-respect and who were high in self-efficacy in the study exhibited greater third-person perception of thin-ideal images. In addition, as self-respect/self-efficacy decreased, “perceived effects of thin-ideal images in the mass media on self” increased. In addition, the study has expanded the scope of behavioral component of third-person effects. Past studies usually assume one behavior outcome for undesirable or negative media messages. The present study has proposed two behavioral outcomes, including image-related outcome and support for restrictions of ideal thinness, in regard to thin-ideal images in the mass media. Results of analyses showed that “perceived effects of thin-ideal images on self” was a more reliable predictor of image-related outcome and that “perceived effects of thin-ideal images on others” could better predict support for restrictions of ideal thinness in the mass media. The findings of both predictors of behavioral outcomes also indicate that in relation to a media message, individuals might evaluate the media effects at different levels and hence engage in more than one cognitive process. Therefore, using third-person perception to predict behavior may not merely commit a methodological error, but also simplify the possible cognitive processes and fail to solicit accurate results.

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