Agriculture is considered a critical sector in attaining economic growth for most economies in Africa. However, for the sector to play its role, it needs to be commercialised to enable smallholder farmers to participate in markets and, hence, improve their incomes and livelihoods. In most developing economies, smallholder farmers find it difficult to participate in markets because of the numerous constraints and barriers mostly reflected in the transaction costs that make access to input and output markets difficult. When analysing the effects of transaction costs on market participation, much attention has been accorded to farmers while ignoring middlemen/traders who are also part of the marketing system. Furthermore, studies on the effect of transaction costs on market participation tend to focus on grains and cereals while ignoring agrocommodities that are more perishable. The purpose of this study was to holistically examine the effects of transaction costs on participation of smallholder farmers and middlemen in banana markets of the Great Lakes region in central Africa. The study adopted a non-separable household model which incorporated fixed and proportional transaction costs in the function of maximising utility subject to resource constraints. The Heckman procedure was used to determine the factors affecting the discrete choice of smallholder farmers on whether to sell and quantities to sell while catering for selection biases. Probit analysis was used to determine the farmers’ choice of selling point while the ordinary least squares method was used to analyse the extent of participation of traders. Variables capturing transaction costs in regards to information gathering, negotiating, contracting, monitoring and enforcing of contracts were used in the analyses. The empirical analyses were based on secondary data availed for 2666 farming households and 494 traders located in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. The results of the study indicate that fixed and proportional transaction costs distinctly affect the participation of smallholder farmers in markets. Belonging to farmer groups facilitates information exchange which reduces fixed transaction costs and, hence, increases the likelihood of farmers to participate in markets. The size of a household, distance to markets and ownership of transport means, which is linked to proportional transaction costs, influence the extent of farmer participation in markets. The choice of selling point was significantly influenced by household size, the gender of the household head, off farm revenue, access to price information and the extent of remoteness of household. The effects of transaction costs on market participation of smallholder farmers were more evident in the analyses for bananas than in the one for beans. The participation of traders was significantly influenced by gender, trading experience and supply distance which relate to the bargaining prowess, business networks and per unit transport cost, respectively. Interventions geared towards supporting associations for farmers may facilitate information exchange and enhance bargaining and contracting skills which subsequently reduce transaction costs. Policies aimed at supporting investment in rural infrastructure, in terms of feeder road networks and market places, can lead to reduction in transaction costs and thereby enhance participation of farmers and traders in markets. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development / unrestricted

The present research identified transaction costs in the mining sector in South Africa and provided means for mitigation. A review, discussion and evaluation of theories related to transaction costs such as vertical integration, outsourcing, price, long and short terms contracts was undertaken under literature review. A qualitative study, with two research questions, on eight companies of which four precious metals and minerals, two metallic minerals and two non-metallic minerals, was performed and provided among other results: • Cost of doing business in South Africa is high. • Site specificity and physical-asset specificity are the most influential specialised investments in the mining sector. • Long term contracts are the most appropriate to mitigate transaction costs. • Costly bargaining is the most important implication for all specialised investments. • Exchange rates, Mining Charter, BEE, legislation, taxes, royalties, fuel and electricity increases are cited as reasons for high transaction costs. • The small sample is a big concern as it does not allow generalising the results to over all mining companies. The South Africa’s government, as a regulator and a major stakeholder should revisit the mining charter and therefore the B-BBEE act as this clearly appeared to be a barrier to the development of mining companies. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

There had been a number of researches that investigated on the security market without transaction costs. The focus of this research is in the area that when the security market with transaction costs is fair and in such fair market how one chooses a suitable portfolio to optimize the financial goal. The research approach adopted in this thesis includes linear algebra and elementary probability. The thesis provides evidence that we can maximize expected utility function to achieve our goal (maximize expected return under certain risk tolerance). The main conclusions drawn from this study are under certain conditions the security market is arbitrage-free, and we can always find an optimal portfolio maximizing certain expected utility function.

We examine how information risk and transaction costs influence the initial and subsequent market reaction to earnings news. We find that the initial market reaction is higher per unit of earnings surprise for higher information risk firms (information content effect). Furthermore, it is information risk that induces transaction costs that limit the initial market reaction and lead to higher subsequent drift (transaction costs effect). Information risk does not have an effect on drift beyond that achieved through transaction costs. Our findings highlight the importance of understanding the linkage between information risk and transaction costs in price discovery around public disclosure.

No / The OECD led BEPS project attempts key changes to the international tax standards to limit harmful tax avoidance. First, it is found that calls for the BEPS project are based on arguments (illicit financial flows and tax competition) that are supported by limited evidence and hence may not offer much fiscal gain to the developing countries. Second, it is found that the BEPS project would, through information sharing, further limit the fiscal jurisdiction of capital importing states. Further it is found that tax competition, even if existing in a limited form, is a result of the international tax architecture and the externalities caused by it. In fact, it is seen that the MNCs actually reduce the inefficiencies created by this tax architecture and thereby reduce transaction costs. By agreeing to the BEPS agenda of information sharing the developing countries would be paying the cost of internalising the externality.

Current marketing channel literature overwhelmingly suggests that entering exchange relationships leads to positive outcomes for the exchange parties. Yet, not all exchanges employ relational exchange. Thus, research appears to lack an understanding of the boundary conditions of successful relational exchange. This dissertation contributes to filling this gap by clarifying what is understood as relational exchange and differentiating it from vertical integration. Here, a two-dimensional perspective on exchange structure is offered that integrates our view of relational exchange and extends the conceptualization of vertical integration beyond sole ownership. To derive boundary conditions of relational exchange the literature on interorganizational relationships is integrated into six determinants and two key outcomes of relational exchange. These boundary conditions thus represent the facilitating circumstances that make relational exchange viable and the outcomes of relational exchange that exchange partners seek to achieve. / Ph. D.

Researchers have theorized that Transaction Cost Analysis paradigm draws a connection between transaction specific investment and opportunism with guile. This dissertation investigated this relationship during and after the negotiation process with a focus on contractual safeguarding. It was hypothesized that the pattern of the level of anticipated investment in transaction specific investment was related to choice of governance clause (i.e., contractual safeguarding) in the final negotiated contract. Additionally, it was hypothesized that anticipated investment in transaction specific assets would be related to the amount of opportunism (operationalized as falsity) prevalent in the negotiation process. Also, it was hypothesized that after the contract was formed, the resultant investment in transaction specific assets was inversely related to opportunism (operationalized as a reduction in contract performance quality). Anticipated and resultant investment differ in that anticipated investment is proposed and not committed while resultant is not only committed investment but also includes the investment that would result with the enforcement of the negotiated contract clauses. These relationships were tested using a negotiation simulation utilizing working MBA students as subjects. It was found that the pattern of the level of anticipated investment was related to final negotiated contract clause choice. The anticipated investment level patterns and final negotiated contract clauses were related as follows: 1) anticipated symmetric low investment was related to a market forces form of contractual safeguarding, 2) anticipated symmetric high investment was related to a bilateral form of contractual safeguarding, and 3) anticipated asymmetric investment patterns were related to unilateral clauses favoring the high investor. It was concluded that even in a climate of win-win negotiations and emphasis on trust building, that parties to a contract still desire contractually based safeguards appropriate to their anticipated investment in transaction specific investment. No relationship between anticipated investment level and opportunism in the form of falsity in communications was found. Despite the rejection of this hypothesized relationship, it was concluded that one cannot depend on the anticipation of investment to serve as a disincentive to opportunism in the form of falsity in the negotiation process. No relationship between resultant investment level and opportunism in the form of reduction of quality performance was found. Despite the rejection of this hypothesized relationship, it was concluded that one cannot depend on the presence of resultant investment to serve as a disincentive to opportunism in the form of reduction of quality of contract performance. Contributions derived from this research included a disclosure/falsity scale survey items and a content analysis system for rating false communications ranging from bluffing to lying. / Ph. D.

This study investigates the use of the transaction cost paradigm, as a framework, for evaluating defense contracts and exploring problems related to defense contracting. The study shows that defense contracting is beleaguered with bounded rationality and uncertainty problems, and furthermore, that bounded rationality and uncertainty can lead to opportunistic behavior within defense contracting. The study shows, in particular that adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold-up problems exist within defense contracting. Based on the results of this study the transaction cost paradigm can be used as a framework for evaluating defense contracts and related problems. The results also indicate that hold-up problems and moral hazard problems may be minimized by using proper contracts or acquisition strategies. Based on the case study in Chapter III there does not appear to be a contractual solution to adverse selection problems. / Master of Arts

published_or_final_version / Real Estate and Construction / Master / Master of Philosophy

Bakgrund: Riksbanken har haft sedelmonopol sedan 1897, vilket har inneburit att de sedan dess har haft ensamrätt att ge ut pengar. Den teknologiska utvecklingen och den ökade användningen av internet har lett till att virtuella samfund har utvecklats och i vissa fall har dessa samhällen skapat sin egen valuta. Bitcoin är världens första helt decentraliserade valuta och baserades i början av sin existens på teknisk nyfikenhet för en handfull hobbyister. Under de senaste åren har efterfrågan på bitcoins ökat vilket i sin tur har lett till att kursen stigit explosivartat.Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att kartlägga och analysera de transaktionskostnader som kan uppstå när Bitcoin används som betalningsmedel, samt jämföra dessa kostnader med de transaktionskostnader som är förenade med användandet av traditionella betalningsmedel. Genomförande: Studien har genomförts genom en blandning av ett kvalitativt och ett kvantitativt tillvägagångssätt samt genom en bearbetning av transaktionskostnadsteorin inom ramen för ny institutionell teori. Empirin består av tre delar där studien inleds med en litteraturstudie för att läsaren ska få en inblick i vad Bitcoin är och hur valutan fungerar. Därefter presenteras det kvalitativa angreppssättet i form av semistrukturerade intervjuer och avslutningsvis presenteras studiens kvantitativa angreppsätt i form av en enkätstudie för att kartlägga användandet av bitcoin.Slutsats: Studien visar att transaktionskostnaderna för Bitcoin är högre än för traditionella betalningsmedel i och med att valutan i dagsläget är beroende av den traditionella infrastrukturen för betalningar samt att dess användare därutöver frånsäger sig det skyddsnät som traditionella betalningsmedel omfattas av. För att Bitcoin ska bli ett etablerat betalningsmedel krävs det att de grundläggande funktionerna för pengar uppfylls. Något som studien visar är bristfälligt i nuläge / Background: The Swedish central bank has had a currency monopoly since 1897, which has meant that they since then have had exclusive right to issue money. Technological advances and the increasing use of the Internet has led to an evolvement of virtual communities and in some cases these communities created their own currency. Bitcoin is the worlds first fully decentralized currency. In the beginning the currency was based on technological curiosity to a handful of hobbyists. In recent years demand for bitcoins has increased, which has led to a dramatic price increase.Aim: The purpose of this thesis is to identify and analyze the transaction costs that may arise when Bitcoin is used as means of payment, and to compare these costs with the transaction costs associated with the use of traditional means of payment. Completion: The study was conducted through a mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches as well as a processing of the transaction cost theory in the context of new institutional theory. The empirical material consists of three parts in which the study begins with a literature review for the reader to get a glimpse of what Bitcoin is and how the currency works. The qualitative approach is in the form of semi-structured interviews and finally the study's quantitative approach is presented in the form of a questionnaire to survey the use of bitcoin.Conclusion: The study shows that Bitcoins transaction costs are higher than conventional means of payments when account is taken to the fact that the currency is dependent on the current financial structure. The user furthermore disclaims the safety net that traditional means of payments offer. For Bitcoin to become an established means of payment it requires that the basic functions of money are fulfilled which the study shows is inadequate.