The aim of the thesis is to approach the issues of transfer pricing, both in terms of legislation, and especially from the perspective of maker of Transfer pricing Documentation and from a practical point of view to analyze the most often transaction between related parties. The thesis is divided into four parts. The first part deals with transfer pricing legislation and provides a general overview of publicity available documents and legal regulation related to transfer pricing issues in the Czech Republic. The second part deals with general and practical look at the Documentation that is used as evidence of transfer prices for tax control. The third part describes transfer pricing methods in detail, which are recommended by OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration. The last part analyzes the most often transactions between related parties and provides particular examples from practice experience.

In 2017 an amended version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines was published which included new provisions to prevent BEPS through the shifting of risks. Through the amendment of the Guidelines, it was clarified that for an entity in an MNE to contractually assume a risk, for transfer pricing purposes, it needs to control the risk and have the financial capacity to assume it. Since the proposal of an updated framework regarding risk it has been discussed whether the framework on risk was the right way to go to come to terms with the problem with the shifting of risks and whether the concept of control over risk is in line with the arm’s length principle which constitutes the foundation for the Guidelines. The objectives of the thesis include providing an overview of the OECD framework related to risk, analysing, and evaluating the definition of control over risk, and assessing its application and interpretation in Swedish courts. On the basis of this the objectives are to examine the consequences of the concept and its application in relation to the arm’s length principle and Swedish law and with this discussing the future of the Guidelines in Swedish law. To assess whether an entity in a MNE has control over risk multiple sub-concepts needs to be assessed out of which few have a clear meaning. Of main importance when assessing the concept is to determine the performance of decision-making functions. The interpretation of control over risk has in some cases, in Swedish courts, led to results which are not in line with the principle of legality and the principle of the actual substance of the transaction. Similarly, to the Guidelines, the Swedish courts put emphasis on the performance of decision-making functions in order to have control over risk. Parts of the control over risk concept can be seen as not being in line with the arm’s length principle by imposing higher control and financial capacity requirements on entities in MNEs than what independent enterprises actually have. Because of the inherent problems in defining control over risk, the effects of the interpretation of the concept in Swedish courts, and the non-arm’s length character of the risk assessment it can be questioned which role the Guidelines should have in Swedish law.

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On 8 June 2012, National Treasury amended Regulation 10(1) (c) of the Exchange Control Regulations to specifically include intellectual property. In so doing, all companies wishing to dispace intellectual property to an offshore destination had to obtain prior approval from National Treasury. However, National Treasury is reticent to grant permission to reassign these assets, as revenue from intellectual property is perceived to contribute vastly to the South African tax revenue. This amendment came into being shortly after the dismissal in the Oilwell case. This case, in essence, held that intellectual property is not capital for the purposes intended by National Treasury, and therefore no prior approval to assign it offshore is required from National Treasury. This dismissal led to a large outflow of intellectual property to tax favourable foreign locations. At the same time, it exposed transfer pricing risks that had previously gone unnoticed. Although these risks have once again been mitigated by the amendment to Regulation 10(1) (c), it does not mean that it is now a thing of the past, best left forgotten. The South African government intends to relax or abolish all exchange control regulations in the future. At present the exact date when this is to take place is not known. Once the exchange control regulations are abolished, the transfer pricing risks associated with intellectual property will once again come to the forefront and will lead to significant loss to South African tax revenue. The three main risks that became apparent during the period before the amendment to Regulation 10(1) (c) are the following: * Transfer pricing risk consisting of mainly: - A lack of a comparables database to enable tax administrators to determine an appropriate arm’s length price for intellectual property. - A lack of the relevant skills, experience and knowledge required to accurately assess transfer prices of intellectual property. * Challenges in obtaining relevant, comprehensive and timely information to accurately determine arm’s length prices for intellectual property transactions. * A lack of understanding the principle of economic substance and legislation in South Africa to define economic substance parameters. * In this mini-dissertation, these weaknesses are discussed in more detail to highlight to SARS the trials it faces when the exchange controls regulations are expelled. Various ways in which these flaws can be challenged head-on are also presented. / MCom (South African and International Tax), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

On 8 June 2012, National Treasury amended Regulation 10(1) (c) of the Exchange Control Regulations to specifically include intellectual property. In so doing, all companies wishing to dispace intellectual property to an offshore destination had to obtain prior approval from National Treasury. However, National Treasury is reticent to grant permission to reassign these assets, as revenue from intellectual property is perceived to contribute vastly to the South African tax revenue. This amendment came into being shortly after the dismissal in the Oilwell case. This case, in essence, held that intellectual property is not capital for the purposes intended by National Treasury, and therefore no prior approval to assign it offshore is required from National Treasury. This dismissal led to a large outflow of intellectual property to tax favourable foreign locations. At the same time, it exposed transfer pricing risks that had previously gone unnoticed. Although these risks have once again been mitigated by the amendment to Regulation 10(1) (c), it does not mean that it is now a thing of the past, best left forgotten. The South African government intends to relax or abolish all exchange control regulations in the future. At present the exact date when this is to take place is not known. Once the exchange control regulations are abolished, the transfer pricing risks associated with intellectual property will once again come to the forefront and will lead to significant loss to South African tax revenue. The three main risks that became apparent during the period before the amendment to Regulation 10(1) (c) are the following: * Transfer pricing risk consisting of mainly: - A lack of a comparables database to enable tax administrators to determine an appropriate arm’s length price for intellectual property. - A lack of the relevant skills, experience and knowledge required to accurately assess transfer prices of intellectual property. * Challenges in obtaining relevant, comprehensive and timely information to accurately determine arm’s length prices for intellectual property transactions. * A lack of understanding the principle of economic substance and legislation in South Africa to define economic substance parameters. * In this mini-dissertation, these weaknesses are discussed in more detail to highlight to SARS the trials it faces when the exchange controls regulations are expelled. Various ways in which these flaws can be challenged head-on are also presented. / MCom (South African and International Tax), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Den fortsatt snabba tillväxten av internationell handel och den ökade globaliseringen harresulterat i en ökning av användandet av internprissättning inom koncerner. Detta har i sin turuppmärksammat multinationella företag, som till följd av detta hamnat i mitten av en storm avstridigheter. I takt med att transaktioner ökat, har det uppstått problem med internprissättning.Internprissättningen används som ett viktigt verktyg av globala företag för att uppnå optimalavinster, där det kan uppstå manipulation av internpriser. Internprissättning förklaras därförofta som fenomenet att vinstmaximera genom att utnyttja andra länders skattesystem ochkringgå statliga regleringar. Mobiliseringen av internprissättning i syfte av skatteflykt är nästintill osynligt för allmänheten och ytterst svårt för tillsynsmyndigheter att upptäcka. För attkomma till underfund med detta problem och samtidigt hjälpa skattemyndigheter ochmultinationella företag har organisationen Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) tagit fram ett antal riktlinjer.Syftet med vår studie är att genomföra en komparativ undersökning för att pröva om det finnsen skillnad mellan tillämpningen av OECD:s riktlinjer, mellan länder med anglosaxiskrespektive kontinental redovisningstradition. Därför sker den komparativa studien mellan detkontinentala Tyskland och det anglosaxiska Storbritannien. För att undersöka potentiellaskillnader används kapitel I, II och IV i OECD:s riktlinjer för internprissättning (OECDTransfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2010).Dessa kapitel innehåller armlängdsprincipen, internprissättningsmetoder och dokumentation.För att kunna bedöma om det finns några skillnader i tillämpningen av OECD:s riktlinjermellan Tyskland och Storbritannien har vi kvalitativt granskat lagtexter och riktlinjer frånländernas skattemyndigheter. Vidare har vi använt oss av kvalificerad juridisk och ekonomisklitteratur.Vi har kommit fram till att det finns en skillnad mellan tillämpningen av OECD:s riktlinjermellan Storbritannien och Tyskland. Trots likheter som identifierats finns även storaskillnader mellan de två länderna. Dessa olikheter har varit av sådan omfattning att slutsatsenom att det råder skillnader i tillämpningen av OECD:s riktlinjer mellan ett anglosaxiskt ochkontinentalt land, kunnat dras. Studien bidrar till ökad kunskap om hur skattelagstiftningen ärutformad i Storbritannien och Tyskland. Den bidrar även med kunskap om hur OECD:sriktlinjer är utformade och hur dess utformning påverkar andra länders internprissättning. Vårstudie bidrar vidare med litteratur om Tysklands och Storbritanniens implementering avOECD:s riktlinjer samt OECD:s påverkan på utformning av länders skatteregler inominternprissättning. / The continued rapid growth of international trade and the increased globalization has resultedin an increase of use of transfer pricing within corporate groups. This has, further attractedattention to multinational companies that, as a consequence, have ended in the midst of astorm of debates. As transactions increased the problem of transfer pricing arose. Transferpricing is used as an important tool of global companies to achieve optimal profits, whereinternal prices may be manipulated. Transfer pricing is therefore often explained as thephenomenon of maximizing profit by utilizing other countries' tax systems and bypassinggovernment regulations. The mobilization of internal pricing for tax evasion is almostinvisible to the public and extremely difficult for regulatory authorities to detect. In order toaddress this problem while helping tax authorities and multinational companies, theOrganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed a numberof guidelines.The purpose of our study is to carry out a comparative study to determine if there is adifference between the application of the OECD guidelines, between countries with Anglo-Saxon and Continental Accounting tradition. Hence, the comparative study takes placebetween the Anglo-Saxon United Kingdom and the Continental Germany. To investigatepotential differences, chapters I, II and IV are used in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration 2010. These chapters include the arm'slength principle, transfer pricing methods and documentation. In order to assess whether thereis any difference in the application of the OECD guidelines between United Kingdom andGermany, we have qualitatively reviewed legal texts and guidelines from the tax authorities ofthe countries. Furthermore, we have used qualified legal and economic literature.We have found that there is a difference between the application of the OECD guidelinesbetween United Kingdom and Germany. Despite similarities identified, there are also majordifferences between the two countries. These differences have been of such, that theconclusion that there are differences in the application of the OECD guidelines between anAnglo-Saxon and Continental country, could be drawn. The study contributes with increasedknowledge of how tax law is designed in the United Kingdom and Germany. It alsocontributes with knowledge of how the OECD guidelines are designed and how its designaffects other countries' transfer pricing. Our study further contributes literature on UnitedKingdom’s and Germany's implementation of the OECD Guidelines, as well as the OECD'simpact on the design of countries' tax rules in transfer pricing.This paper is hereinafter written in Swedish.