En 1969, le gouvernement de Pierre Elliott-Trudeau réalisa la plus grande expropriation de l’histoire du pays au nom du développement, pour construire le plus grand aéroport au monde : Mirabel. Le projet fut un cuisant échec pour plusieurs raisons sociales, politiques et économiques. Ce mémoire se concentre surtout sur les impacts post-expropriation sur la population de Mirabel et le positionnement politique de ces-derniers. / In 1969, the government of Pierre Elliott-Trudeau made the biggest expropriation of all time in the history of the country. The project was a total failure for social, political and economic reasons. This study focuses on the post-expropriation impact on the population of Mirabel and their political positioning.

En 1969, le gouvernement de Pierre Elliott-Trudeau réalisa la plus grande expropriation de l’histoire du pays au nom du développement, pour construire le plus grand aéroport au monde : Mirabel. Le projet fut un cuisant échec pour plusieurs raisons sociales, politiques et économiques. Ce mémoire se concentre surtout sur les impacts post-expropriation sur la population de Mirabel et le positionnement politique de ces-derniers. / In 1969, the government of Pierre Elliott-Trudeau made the biggest expropriation of all time in the history of the country. The project was a total failure for social, political and economic reasons. This study focuses on the post-expropriation impact on the population of Mirabel and their political positioning.

Canada's relations with Nicaragua changed greatly during the 1980s after the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power in a revolution which overthrew the Somoza dynasty. For the first few years of the new regime in Nicaragua, Canada provided little support, declaring that Canadians had no significant interests in the country and there was no reason for them to get involved in Central America's ongoing conflicts. When Brian Mulroney first came to power with Joe Clark as his Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Progressive Conservatives generally held to the course set by the previous Liberal government. However, as the 1980s went on the Conservatives began providing Nicaragua with more bilateral aid, and became increasingly involved in the regional peace process known as Esquipulas; this culminated in Canadian peacekeepers entering the region in 1990 as part of a UN peacekeeping force. The major impetus for the government's change in attitude was the strong and consistent pressure placed on the government by the Canadian public. Aid raised privately by Canadians for Nicaragua overshadowed government aid for much of the decade, making the government response look weak. The support of the Canadian public for action in Central America was the major factor which pressured the federal government into becoming more involved in Nicaragua, even though the government was not as supportive of the new regime in Nicaragua as a large portion of the Canadian public often was.

Canada's relations with Nicaragua changed greatly during the 1980s after the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power in a revolution which overthrew the Somoza dynasty. For the first few years of the new regime in Nicaragua, Canada provided little support, declaring that Canadians had no significant interests in the country and there was no reason for them to get involved in Central America's ongoing conflicts. When Brian Mulroney first came to power with Joe Clark as his Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Progressive Conservatives generally held to the course set by the previous Liberal government. However, as the 1980s went on the Conservatives began providing Nicaragua with more bilateral aid, and became increasingly involved in the regional peace process known as Esquipulas; this culminated in Canadian peacekeepers entering the region in 1990 as part of a UN peacekeeping force. The major impetus for the government's change in attitude was the strong and consistent pressure placed on the government by the Canadian public. Aid raised privately by Canadians for Nicaragua overshadowed government aid for much of the decade, making the government response look weak. The support of the Canadian public for action in Central America was the major factor which pressured the federal government into becoming more involved in Nicaragua, even though the government was not as supportive of the new regime in Nicaragua as a large portion of the Canadian public often was.

The timeframe of 1978-1984, a period of critical importance in the development of the nuclear world, sets the boundaries for this analysis of Canadian nuclear arms control policy. The situation brought about by increasing hostility between the superpowers, and changes in doctrine and advances in technology that facilitated nuclear war-fighting scenarios, was extremely grave. Therefore it would seem appropriate for Canada, in its traditional role as mediator and middlepower devoted to easing the danger of world conflagration, to have taken an active stand in its nuclear arms control diplomacy. Such was not the case, as bureaucratic politics, cybernetic decision-making, and cognitive dissonance made adherence to the status quo, or minimal rhetorical changes, the order of the day. While that changed towards the end of the period under examination, there remained little substantive modification of policy, despite the growing threat of nuclear disaster. Four examples of Canadian nuclear arms control policy are examined with the aid of official government documents and appropriate commentary from a variety of analysts. Canadian arms control policy at the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, the controversy over the question of testing the American Air-Launched Cruise Missile in Canada, and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's personal peace initiative provide a wealth of information that is used to illustrate the struggle of bureaucratic politics versus rational decision-making. Some of the more influential theoretical and structural difficulties within the foreign policy-making process in Canada that posed real impediments to comprehensive analytical decision-making are presented. These problems are outlined in order to provide a framework for the analysis of the four policy situations. In the first three cases, the decision-making indicates the predominance of the bureaucracy's cybernetic conduct. In the last instance, the attempts of the Prime Minister to impose rational/analytical decision-making on the policy process caused him to actively circumvent the bureaucracy within Canada, but he was bested by external forces. The thesis of this monograph is that Canadian nuclear arms control policy for much of this period was reactive, limited to well-crafted rhetoric, and oblivious to the changing nature of the strategic environment. The reasons for this policy behavior may be traced to external constraints imposed by the dynamics of the international system, the nonrationality of the nuclear world, and the weakness of Canada's influence vis-a-vis the superpowers. As well, the importance of not alienating the United States by too forceful a criticism was an essential consideration in the policy process due to the many issues of contention that already existed between Canada and the United States, and the vulnerability of Canada in economic terms to the negative reactions of its North American neighbour. When the Prime Minister did try to set policy and actively change the nuclear world via his personal peace initiative, the same factors and forces proved to be his undoing. In addition, the reactions on the international scene by some of the more powerful Western players indicate that Canada did not have the credibility to attempt such an influential role in the nuclear world. This response may have been prompted by Canada's minimal defence spending in recent years, or it may well have been the fate of a middlepower trying to exert influence in areas where the other nations were loathe to accept it. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

Diploma thesis "Language policies of Canada: An Evaluation of Trudeau's Policy of Official Bilingualism" deals with Canadian English-French language duality. The thesis describes evolution of Canadian language policies on federal as well as on provincial level. On federal level, long-time prime minister of Canada Pierre Elliott Trudeau has achieved a goal to create fully bilingual federal government; on provincial level, the thesis deals mainly with the province of Québec as it has the most far reaching language legislation in Canada. The thesis evaluates Trudeau's aim to deal with Québec separatism and nationalism by stressing out new pan-Canadian identity of bilingual state reaching "from coast to coast".

Entre 2013 et 2017, le projet d’oléoduc Énergie Est a été l’un des plus importants enjeux économique, politique et environnemental des années 2010. Initié pendant le gouvernement conservateur de Stephen Harper et annulé sous le gouvernement libéral de Justin Trudeau, c’est le plus ambitieux projet d’oléoduc de l’histoire du Canada. S’il n’a jamais traversé les provinces d’ouest en est, il est passé au travers de deux gouvernements fédéraux différents ayant leur discours environnemental propre. Or, avec la croissance soutenue de l’exploitation des sables bitumineux et l’édification de nouveaux oléoducs au pays, c’est à se demander si leurs discours sont réellement distincts. Pour réaliser cette étude du discours environnemental fédéral, il a fallu combiner l’analyse du discours avec un cadre théorique permettant de rendre compte de l’impact de l’exploitation des sables bitumineux sur le gouvernement à Ottawa. C’est ainsi que nous en sommes venus à une élaboration conceptuelle combinant une analyse de l’espace, de l’État et de l’histoire canadienne jointes à l’approche de l’analyse du discours. Le résultat de cette thèse est qu’il existe à la fois des similitudes et des dissemblances entre les discours des deux gouvernements. Malgré qu’ils s’amenaient au Parlement en se présentant comme une alternative environnementale sérieuse, les libéraux ont été contraints par des facteurs économiques et politiques hérités du précédent gouvernement conservateur lui-même influencé par une histoire économique canadienne particulière. Énergie Est est un cas éclairant sur la problématique du développement économique au temps des changements climatiques.

Abstract During the 1960s both the federal and provincial governments continued to take on new and larger responsibilities. During this same time period citizens began to mobilize and challenge the state on a number of social issues including race, gender, labour, urban sprawl and the environment. Citizens believed that not only did they have the right to challenge the authority of government in planning public policy, but they also had a right to participate in the decision-making process as much as any bureaucrat, expert, or elected official. In planning airports in Pickering, Ste. Scholastique and Sea Island, the federal government was opposed by citizen groups in each of these three cases. Citizens believed their voices were not being heard and that government officials did not respect them. As a result, they disrupted the meticulously laid out plans of elected officials and policy planners by drawing on evidence and expert advice. The conflict over federal airport development is an example of the evolution of the consultation process with citizens, as citizens challenged the way public policy was planned. Governments now had to justify policies like expropriation for the public good since citizen groups would form over any intrusion into their private lives. The debates over airport planning highlights the role of citizens, bureaucrats, provincial and federal politicians as they all tried to navigate the complex shifting landscape of the Canadian state. By 1976 the Pickering Airport had been canceled, Mirabel was opened, and the Sea Island runway expansion would be delayed for 15 years. Although the citizen groups never had complete victories, citizen participation became more paramount to state planning after these events. Public policy planning in Canada had become far more inclusive than ever before. Whether the politicians, bureaucrats or citizens were aware of the consequences remain to be seen. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / Abstract During the 1960s both the federal and provincial governments continued to take on new and larger responsibilities. During this same time period citizens began to mobilize and challenge the state on a number of social issues including race, gender, labour, urban sprawl and the environment. Citizens believed that not only did they have the right to challenge the authority of government in planning public policy, but they also had a right to participate in the decision-making process as much as any bureaucrat, expert, or elected official. In planning airports in Pickering, Ste. Scholastique and Sea Island, the federal government was opposed by citizen groups in each of these three cases. Citizens believed their voices were not being heard and that government officials did not respect them. As a result, they disrupted the meticulously laid out plans of elected officials and policy planners by drawing on evidence and expert advice. The conflict over federal airport development is an example of the evolution of the consultation process with citizens, as citizens challenged the way public policy was planned. Governments now had to justify policies like expropriation for the public good since citizen groups would form over any intrusion into their private lives. The debates over airport planning highlights the role of citizens, bureaucrats, provincial and federal politicians as they all tried to navigate the complex shifting landscape of the Canadian state. By 1976 the Pickering Airport had been canceled, Mirabel was opened, and the Sea Island runway expansion would be delayed for 15 years. Although the citizen groups never had complete victories, citizen participation became more paramount to state planning after these events. Public policy planning in Canada had become far more inclusive than ever before. Whether the politicians, bureaucrats or citizens were aware of the consequences remain to be seen.

In the 1970s the Canadian government took a strong stand against apartheid sport policies. Despite Canada’s limited sporting links with South Africa, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau and his Liberal government took on a leading Commonwealth position in promoting the isolation of South African sport. The catalyst for this leadership was Canada as host of two ‘mega’ sporting events during the 1970s - the 1976 Montréal Olympics and the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games. This thesis focuses on the progression and adoption of new policies and initiatives which looked to strengthen Canada’s foreign policies dealing with apartheid sport while promoting these initiatives within the Commonwealth. Canada, a senior member of the association, had proved itself to be a key ally of newly independent Commonwealth nations throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. These nations looked to Canada for guidance. Along with taking on a stronger Commonwealth position during the Trudeau era, Canada also looked to increase its international presence by focusing less on its traditional ties with the United States and more on forging relationships with a variety of newer nations. As Canada looked outside its borders to assert itself, within the country regionalism was on the rise with the advent of Québec separatism. All these factors played a major role in the development of Canadian foreign policy during the 1970s. This thesis focuses on the balance between internal and external pressures for change and how changes unfolded in light of Canada holding two mega sporting events in quick progression. From 1968 to 1980, Trudeau dominated Canadian politics. An engaging figure, he came to power promoting his notion of a ‘Just Society’ and looking to expand Canada’s international prestige. Newly opened archives of the External Affairs Department at the Library and Archives Canada show that Trudeau played a key role in the development of Canada’s new policies, especially during the period of 1975 to 1978. The wide range of primary sources consulted, many recently opened through Access to Information and Privacy requests, alongside a variety of sources from voluntary associations, analysed in this thesis provide a fulsome, chronological narrative of how Canada moved to the forefront of the Commonwealth and the association’s movement to isolate South African apartheid sport.

This dissertation evaluates the recent academic consensus on liberal multiculturalism. I argue that this apparent consensus, by subsuming religious experience under the general category of culture, has rested upon undefended and contestable conceptions of modern religious life. In the liberal multicultural literature, cultures are primarily identified as sharing certain ethnic, linguistic, or geographic attributes, which is to say morally arbitrary particulars that can be defended without raising the possibility of conflict over metaphysical beliefs. In such theories, the possibility of conflict due to diverse religious principles or claims to the transcendent is either steadfastly ignored or, more typically, explained away as the expression of perverted religious faith. I argue that this conception of the relation between culture and religion fails to provide an account of liberal multiculturalism that is persuasive to religious believers on their own terms. To illustrate this failing, I begin with an examination of the Canadian policy of official multiculturalism and the constitutional design of Pierre Trudeau. I argue that the resistance of Québécois nationalists to liberal multiculturalism, as well as the conflict between the Québécois and minority religious groups within Quebec, has been animated by religious and quasi-religious claims to the transcendent. I maintain that to truly confront this basic problem of religious difference, one must articulate and defend the substantive visions of religious life that are implicit in liberal multicultural theory. To this end, I contrast the portrait of religious life and secularization that is implicit in Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory of minority rights with the recent account of modern religious life presented by Charles Taylor. I conclude by suggesting that Kymlicka’s and Taylor’s contrasting conceptions of religious difference—which are fundamentally at odds regarding the relation of the right to the good, and the diversity and nature of genuine religious belief—underline the extent to which liberal multicultural theory has reached an academic consensus only by ignoring the reality of religious diversity. / text